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Abstract 
Author: Ayman Abdel Aziz Shaheen 
Title : Land and Land Conflict in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process: 
1990-1999. 
Degree: Ph. D., School of Politics and International Studies (Polis) 
Submission: May 2000 
This thesis examines the importance of the debates and struggle over land in the 
Oslo Accord and immediately post-Oslo. It does this by first situating the conflict 
over land in the historical context of the spread of Zionism from the 1880s, 
culminating in the establishment of the State of Israel in Palestine in 1948. It then 
reviews and contrasts the policies on land and settlement of the Israeli Labour and 
Likud parties. The focus of the thesis is an assessment of Israeli settlement policy 
on the West Bank and Gaza-Strip after the Oslo Agreement of 1993. It examines 
the sequences of Israeli-Palestinian agreements that have divided Palestinian land 
into different categories and argues that these categories and the problems they have 
created have ignored the historical importance of land in the conflict between Israel 
and Palestine. 
The thesis argues that the classification of land is intended to further subjugate 
Palestine to the political and economic dominance of Israel, and that the 
formulation for discussing land issues undermines the possibility for the 
establishment of a strong and economically independent Palestinian state. The 
thesis submits that the persistence of Israeli settlement policy and the manner of 
Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank has not encouraged the Palestinian National 
Authority (PNA) to conduct a comprehensive land survey and registration 
procedure. Moreover. Israeli strategy in the post-Oslo period has been to promote 
the cantonisation of Palestine to ensure that any future Palestinian state will remain 
economically weak and politically disjointed. 
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Introduction 
Palestinians and Zionists have been in conflict in Palestine for more than a century 
and the conflict has passed through many different stages in the struggle to control 
land. This thesis examines the conflict and struggle over land between Israel and 
Palestine particularly in the period following the Oslo Agreement of 1993. Land 
questions are central to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In order to better understand 
the process of land ownership and transfer during different periods of Palestine's 
modern history we have to briefly review land issues during the Ottoman rule, the 
period of the British Mandate, after the imposition of the Israeli state, and in the 
period after the 1967 War. We then begin to assess what the impact of these 
different periods may have had on Palestinian communities. The historical revision 
of the struggle over land during the last four decades of Ottoman rule until the 
signing of the Oslo Agreement clarifies and reinforces the significance of the 
struggle which took place in the last decade of the twentieth century. 
By exploring these stages the study examines why the Palestinian-Israeli 
agreements are difficult to function in the presence of the Israeli policy of 
confiscating Palestinian land, building new settlements, expanding the present 
settlements, controlling the majority of the Palestinian territories, and regulating 
Palestine's international border crossings. 
Resolving land problems and disputes between Israel and Palestine are the key to 
any hope of establishing a real and just peace in the long conflict between the two 
sides. Many studies have been written about the Palestinian-Israeli quarrel and 
covered many sides of this conflict but the debates about land in the post-Oslo 
Agreement has not been examined in detail. The majority of studies that examine 
this period are concerned with the possibilities of finding political solutions that 
advance the peace process. and give it a chance to work and succeed. The 
contribution of this study is to investigate to what extent the control over land 
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affected Palestinian-Israeli relations and the effect of this control on both parties 
politically, socially, and economically. 
The issue of land encompasses many different issues such as the future of 
Jerusalem, the solution to the refugees question, the final border between 
Palestinians and Israelis, and the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. This 
thesis examines specifically the struggle over land between Palestinians and Israelis 
particularly those conflicts relating to Israeli settlement in Palestinian territories 
after the Oslo Agreement period. 
Background 
Palestine is a small Middle Eastern country about the size of Wales, which is linked 
to Asia and Africa. It borders on Lebanon in the north, Egypt and the Gulf of Aqaba 
in the south, Jordan and Syria on the eastern border, and the Mediterranean to the 
west (see map 1.1). It covers about 27,000 square kilometres (Simpson, 1930,12) 
excluding the Dead Sea and the Lake of Tebrias, which together cover 690 square 
kilometres, but including Lake Huleh (Peel, 1937,235). Palestinians number more 
than seven million; three million live in Palestine, the remaining include those who 
were expelled during the wars of 1948 and 1967, plus their descendants. Jews in 
Palestine number around five million (al-Ayyam May 20,1998). 
Palestine could be divided into four areas; a) The hill areas which estimated 
8,862,000 dunums, there is 2,450,000 dunums are cultivable. b) The Five Plains 
which consists of the Maritime Plain, Acre Plain, the Vale of Esdraelon (excluded 
the Vale of Jezreel -Marj Ibn Amir-), the Hule Plain and the Plain of Jordan 
(included the Vale of Jezreel). The total area of these plains are approximately 
5,424,000 dunums and the cultivable area are 4,094,000 dunums. c) The Beersheba 
region which its area estimated at 3.200,000 dunums and there is 1,500,000 dunums 
are cultivable. d) the desert area which estimated about 9.189,000 dunums. In 1930 
the total cultivable area were estimated about 8,034.000 dunums (Simpson, 1930, 
1 2). 
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As a result of the issue of the Ottoman Land Code, in 1858 Palestinian Arabs 
became for the first time acquainted with land registration and title deeds (kushan). 
The Land Code brought fundamental change to land ownership, however, many 
Palestinian Arab peasants did not register their land because first, they were unable 
to pay the registration tax because they were too poor, and second, they feared that 
if they registered the land, their names would appear in the Ottoman official 
records, and they would be subject to conscription. Peasants continued to cultivate 
the land according to their customs and ignored the new law of land ownership, but 
Arab absentee merchants and Palestinian Arab notables registered some millions of 
dunums (one dunum equal 1000 square metre or 1 /4 acre) in their own names 
(Ruedy, 1971; Stein, 1984; Said and Hitchen, 1988; Smith 1992; Divine, 1994). 
The Zionist political movement developed as a result of Eastern European 
persecutions and pogroms conducted against the Jews in the late nineteenth century. 
Zionists wanted a national home which they stated could be Argentina, Uganda, 
Cyprus, or Palestine (Stevens, 1971; Heikal, 1996a; Jiryis, 1996; ). Eventually in 
1905 the Zionist congress adopted Palestine as their Jewish Homeland to which 
Jews could return and settle, they successfully established the Israeli state in 1948, 
fifty years after the first Zionist Congress in 1897 (Smith, 1992; Tessler, 1994; 
Heikal, 1996b). 
The Zionist settlement enterprise began in 1882. Its aim was to mobilize a large 
number of Jews to go to Palestine and purchase the largest area of land they 
possibly could in the most fertile areas, so that they could establish many 
settlements to form the nucleus of their planned state in Palestine (Simpson, 1930; 
Peel, 1937; Ruedy, 1971). The Jewish settlements depended on two factors, the 
land and immigrants. The land to be purchased or confiscated and people to be 
brought from outside. The term '`settlement" in the Palestinian mind means 
replacement by new-comers (immigrants). 
As a result of subsequent waves of Jewish migration, and the Zionist policy of 
purchasing land. Palestinians and Zionists entered into one of the most difficult 
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conflicts in the twentieth century, which is still unresolved. It has caused five 
devastating wars (1948,1956,1967,1973, and 1982) between Israel and its Arab 
neighbours and Palestinians that killed and injured hundreds of thousands of 
people, mostly Arabs (al-Nahal, 1981; Heikal, 1996b). 
In the early 1990s both Palestinians and Israelis reached an interim agreement 
known as the Oslo Agreement or the Declaration of Principles (DOP) which was 
signed in Washington on September 13,1993. The agreement solved many issues 
such as the mutual recognition between the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
(PLO) and the government of Israel, Palestinian self-government, the establishment 
of Palestinian police forces and so on. 
The agreement however left the main and most important issues unresolved. It 
confirmed that these issues would be resolved in the permanent status negotiations 
which were to commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the 
third year of the interim period. The critical issues are: firstly, the Israeli 
settlements, which have spread everywhere in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip after 
the 1967 War (see maps 1.5 & 3.1). Secondly, the status of Jerusalem, valued by all 
religions which was annexed by the Israelis challenging the will of the international 
community in 1967. Thirdly, Palestinian refugees who were expelled by force by 
the Israelis in the 1948 war. These constitute more than sixty percent of all 
Palestinians. Fourthly, the borders between the State of Israel and the emergent 
Palestinian entity. This is in addition to the solution of the water crisis (Said, 1995a, 
Karmi, 1999). 
The solution of these four issues formed the real challenge to the Palestinian-Israeli 
peace process which started in Madrid in October 1991. The agreement did not 
determine if the new Palestinian entity would become an independent state or 
continue as a form of Palestinian self-rule. 
5 
Statement of the Problem 
This study explores the conflict over land and land rights between Palestinian Arabs 
and Zionists and it does so by situating the struggles over land in a historical 
context. The Ottomans published the Land Code in 1858, which resulted in a big 
change in the ownership of land in Palestine. They classified land into six 
categories Mulk (Private land), Miri (State land), Waqf (Land guaranteed to pious 
foundation or revenue from land guaranteed to pious foundations), Mahlul land 
(state land), Matruka (Communal profits or land subject to public easement in 
common), and Mewat (Dead or undeveloped land) which made the question of land 
ownership very complex for both the Palestinians and the Zionists during the 
British rule (Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1945; Hyamson, 1955; Smith, 
1992). 
The conflict over land began from the second wave of Zionist immigration in the 
first decade of the twentieth century (Simpson, 1930; Said and Hitchen, 1988) 
where the new-comers needed land to settle, so with the Zionist settlement project, 
the conflict arose, due to the settlers' purchasing land from the Arabs. Zionists tried 
to buy as much land as they could, they concentrated their efforts in the northern 
and the coastal areas of Palestine which are the most fertile areas in Palestine and 
where there are large tracts owned by Arab absentees which could be purchased 
easily. This does not mean that they did not acquire land in the hilly and the 
southern areas of Palestine; they did so but in small numbers (Simpson, 1930; Peel, 
1937). 
The process of purchasing land (transfer of land to the Zionists) started in 1882 
during the reign of the Ottomans and accelerated during the British Mandate who 
by and large supported the Zionist movement to establish a Jewish national home 
(State). According to the Balfour Declaration in 1917, it promised the Jews that 
they could establish their homeland in Palestine (Said and Hitchen, 1988; ). But this 
process created a new and a bitter clash with Palestinian Arabs, particularly when 
the landless peasant class wildly appeared as a result of the land-purchasing. 
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After the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, new laws relating to land 
were issued. First of all, a law concerned with private land belonging to Palestinian 
absentees who had been expelled from their villages and cities, put it under Israeli 
custodianship and then leased it to Israelis. Second, the so called `state land' was 
distributed under the previous rulers to enable the Israeli settlers to acquire more 
land (Ruedy, 1971; Jiryis, 1996). 
Israel was able to occupy the remaining part of Palestine that is, the West Bank 
(including Eastern Jerusalem) and Gaza-Strip in the war of June 1967. After the 
occupation of these new territories the Israeli Government started organising 
settlements. There is no doubt that the Israelis concentrated their settlement policy 
in some areas of the West Bank more than others. The main aim of this 
expansionist policy was concerned with security, where they could establish a series 
of security belts of settlements linked together and having access to the protection 
of Israeli security. But this policy was carried out at the expense of Palestinian 
sovereignty and is totally at odds with Palestinian aspirations and interests. The 
settlements and their by-pass roads fragmented Palestinian society which now lived 
in cantons and separate enclaves (Alone, 1970; Arab League, 1985; Lukacs, 1990; 
Palestinian Information Service, 1997a). 
The Israeli Government confiscated Palestinian land for the establishment of 
settlements. It resorted to every method in order to do so; all categories of land were 
subject to expropriation. It was only natural those people whose land was taken by 
force should react with every means against occupation. What has happened in 
Palestine is the outcome of Israeli seizure of Palestinian land. According to the 
resolutions of the U. N. Security Council and General Assembly, the West Bank and 
Gaza-Strip are considered occupied territories (see foot-note to chapter one No. 4). 
Despite this, Israel continues its settlement policy turning a deaf ear to the pledge of 
the international community (Alone, 1970, Kale, 1978: Arab League, 1985; Lukacs, 
1991). 
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From 1967 on, the political thought of both sides started to change and developed 
because of the new situation which the Israeli settlements created. Both sides 
started searching to find a durable solution to Palestinian political aspirations and 
the Israeli security needs (Peers, 1994). The DOP or the Oslo Agreement that came 
about as a result of the secret negotiations between the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) and the government of Israel were as much a product of the 
need to assuage increased tensions within Israeli society, as a circumspect attempt 
to deal with the national aspirations of the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza- 
Strip (Jones, 2000). The agreement aims at solving the problem through a series of 
stages. The agreement did not offer any solution to the question of the Israeli 
settlements. It did not even state clearly the halting of Israeli settlement activities in 
building new ones or expanding those already in existence (Said, 1995b). 
Palestinians believed that building and expanding of the settlements was contrary to 
the spirit of the DOP for establishing peace and mutual understanding, because they 
were convinced there could be no peace with the settlement policy. On the other 
hand, Israel consider that the issues were delayed till the final status negotiations, so 
when this stage will come, they will negotiate the issue. 
The settlement issue is a sensitive and crucial one for any long-term peace 
settlement. It is no surprise that the irony of the Oslo Agreement is that the Israelis 
confiscated ten per cent of the areas of West Bank after the signing of this 
Agreement (al-Ayyam, January 27,1997). 
The thesis focuses on the post-Oslo Agreement period or what is known as the 
interim period of the conflict over land. The Oslo Agreement generated general 
concepts about the interim period and the permanent status negotiations. Soon after 
the signing of this Agreement, negotiations commenced on the implementation of 
the interim agreements (www. Israel-mfa. gov. il/mfa/go. asp? MFAHOOqOO). 
The first interim agreement was that of Gaza-Jericho, which was signed in Cairo on 
May 1994. It dealt with the Israeli withdrawal from the greater part of the Gaza- 
Strip and Jericho area. transferring authority to the Palestinians, power and 
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responsibility to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), and others (Agreement 
on the Gaza-Strip and the Jericho area, 1994). Israeli military forces withdrew from 
more than 60 per cent of the Gaza-Strip and Jericho area, which is estimated at 65 
square kilometres (al-Fatah Movement, 1994). The land of the Gaza-Strip was 
divided (see map 4.1) into the following categories: 
a) Area A that under the full control of PNA. b) The Yellow area, from which the 
Israeli authorities had overriding responsibility and security powers, while the PNA 
had responsibility and powers for civil affairs. The Mawasi Area in Rafah and Khan 
Younis in the south of the Strip is a part of the Yellow area (This area will be one 
of the two case studies of the thesis). c) The areas and the settlers of the Israeli 
settlements are under the full control of Israelis (www. merip. org/rabbani. htm). 
The Third agreement signed between Palestinians and Israelis was the Palestinian- 
Israeli Interim Agreement on the West Bank which was known as Oslo II, where 
Israel redeployed its military forces from the main Palestinian towns (see map 1.4). 
The land of West Bank was divided into three categories; 
a) Area A, where the PNA had full control. This area occupies approximately 3 per 
cent of the total land surface of the West Bank. It consists of the Palestinian cities, 
and contains 26 per cent (excluded the Palestinians of Jerusalem) of the Palestinian 
population of the West Bank (Abu Hameed interview, February 8,1999). b) Area 
B, where the majority of towns and villages are located. In this area the internal 
security control is under the Israelis, while the civil and police affairs over the 
residents is under that of the PNA. This area forms about 27 per cent of West Bank 
and contains 70 per cent (except for the Palestinians of Jerusalem) of the 
Palestinian population. c) Area C which forms about 70 per cent of the land 
(including the Israeli settlement areas) is under Israeli control and is governed by 
both the Palestinians and the settlers (www. merip. org/rabbani. htm). Both 
Palestinians and Israelis agreed that Israel will make further redeployment in 
another two phases. the first would start direct by after the election of the 
Palestinian Council. The two phases should be completed within 18 months where 
areas A and C would be transferred to PNA jurisdiction except for the issues to be 
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negotiated in the permanent status negotiations (www. Israel-mfa. gox,. il/mfa/ 
go. asp? MFAHOOqaO) 
Under the Likud Government (1996-1999), Israel signed two agreements with the 
PLO. The first dealt with the Israeli redeployment of its military forces from the 
great part of Hebron City, while the second was the Wye River Memorandum 
(November 1998) which gave details of the Israeli redeployment of 13 per cent of 
the West Bank. 
The Israeli redeployment from Palestinian cities and the formation of categories 
according to the interim agreement of September 1995, led to the fragmentation of 
the West Bank into Zones of Palestinians and promoted the atomisation of 
Palestinian society. Because area A is not contiguous, and Israel remained in 
command of the road network connecting the different towns of area A, all 
movement of goods and persons in and out of, and between these enclaves can be 
interdicted at will (www. merip. org/rabbani. htm). 
In area B in the West Bank and in the Yellow area of the Gaza-Strip, the Israelis 
have security control, so on the pretext of security needs, Israelis continue their 
previous policy of confiscating land, arresting Palestinians, demolishing houses, 
prolonging curfews, and other measures. 
The situation of area C which form the largest area of the West Bank, remains 
under full Israeli control. In 1994 according to the Gaza-Jericho First Agreement, 
30 per cent of the Gaza-Strip remained under full Israeli control, then no further 
Israeli withdrawal took place in the Gaza-Strip. In 1995, according to the Oslo II 
Agreement, this area consisted of 71 per cent of the total West Bank. Then, in 1998, 
according to the Wye River Memorandum (which was implemented in late 1999, 
early 2000) area C consisted of 58 per cent of the West Bank (Asfour Convocation 
November 11.1998). There is no fundamental difference between area C and the 
Yellow area in the Gaza-Strip according to the Israeli practice in this area, so Israel 
is controlling the largest number of areas in the Palestinian territories. 
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After the signing of the agreements instead of transferring land to the Palestinians, 
thousands of dunums of Palestinian land were confiscated, new settlements were 
built and some that already existed, expanded. Thousands of dunums were also 
confiscated for the by-pass roads in order to demolish the boundaries between Israel 
and the settlements in the West Bank. The number of settlers (excluding those in 
Jerusalem) increased, for example, according to the Israeli Bureau Census, by 
11,600 in 1996 to reach 148,000; an increase of 8.5 per cent, where as the Israeli 
Peace Now Movement estimates that the number of settlers increased by 7,000- 
8,000 in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip in 1997 (Cited in al-Ayyam January 27, 
1998). 
Palestinians rejected the Israeli activities in regard to land and settlements, arguing 
that Israel created facts that might kill any hope of transferring land to them as well 
as the foreclose of the Palestinian hope in the final status settlement, where they are 
looking to establish their independent state in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip 
(Habbash interview, December 12,1998). 
The thesis examines the following main issues when discussing the post-Oslo 
period: 
1) The early stage of Zionist settlement in the reign of the Ottoman, the British 
Mandate. And the Israeli settlement strategy and activity in the West Bank and 
Gaza-Strip in post-June 1967 War and its impact on Palestinians and Israelis. This 
is to provide a context within which the struggle over land in the 1990's. 
2) The struggle over land in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations from Madrid 
Conference (October 1991) till the end of the interim period (May 1999). This 
struggle took place in the negotiations halls, rather in the battles and wars as usual. 
3) The explanations behind Israeli activities in the post-Oslo Agreement since 1993, 
confiscating new land, building new settlements, expanding the existing settlements 
and increased the number of settlers and constructing by-pass roads to link the 
settlements with Israel. The analysis of the Israeli official statements and parties 
programmes will clarify this point. 
4) Oslo Agreement and the other agreements which were signed in Cairo and 
Washington 1994,1995,1997, and 1998, which classified the land of West Bank 
and Gaza-Strip into different interim categories of different degree of controlling 
the land and people among the two sides. I would study these interim categories and 
their impact on the Palestinians and the stages of its change. 
5) The PNA efforts resolve questions of land ownership, inherited for more than a 
century that left much ownership of land without a just solution to the original 
owners (Palestinians). The different levels of control of land between PNA and 
Israelis in the post-Oslo Agreement affected the land registration and ownership in 
the West Bank and Gaza-Strip 
Research Objectives 
One of the aims of the study is to show how the Zionist strategy regarding the 
control of land succeeded through different contemporary historical stages. The 
thesis focuses on this Zionist strategy during the post-Oslo Agreement period. The 
study will also show that Palestinian political thought regarding the control over 
land has entirely changed since the late 1980's. This strategy of controlling land 
was crowned by the Palestinian acceptance of the phased solution to the Palestinian 
question. There is no doubt that Palestinians have learned from Zionists to accept 
what is proposed and then struggle to obtain more. 
The second aim of the study is to investigate the importance of land in achieving a 
lasting, just and comprehensive peace to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. For land is 
central to the conflict. It is also important to understand the process of land 
ownership and transfer during different periods of modern Palestinian history: 
Ottoman rule, British Mandate. Post Israeli state, post-1967 War and post Oslo 
Agreement. How and why the agreement was done in different stages and its impact 
to the local community. By exploring these stages I will show why Palestinian- 
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Israeli agreements are difficult to achieve in the presence of the Israeli policy of 
confiscating Palestinian land, building new settlements and expanding the present 
settlements according to their security plans. The Palestinians have rejected Israeli 
activities and demands. Therefore, the study will investigate these problematic 
aspects of the peace process within the interim period (1994-1999), indicating how 
land and settlement issues largely explain that this process did not work. 
The Oslo Agreement tried to solve the problem of Palestinians regaining control of 
land through several stages. As each phase has its complexities of implementation, 
the study will attempt to investigate if these phased solutions were appropriate. It 
will also examine if these solutions make sense in establishing mutual confidence 
between Palestinians and Israelis, and thereby contribute to attaining a successful 
final solution through the negotiation of the permanent status issue. 
The thesis suggests that: 
Settlement policy was adopted after the war of 1967, to achieve political, strategic, 
and security for the occupier's. The aim of this policy remained the same in the 
interim period with some adjustments made by the Labour government, which 
concentrate and intensify the settlement activities over specific areas as an 
introduction to the annexation of these parts to Israel in the final status settlement. 
Israeli victory in the war of 1967, prompted settlement policy in the occupied 
territories to secure security in what were perceived to be strategic areas. At the 
same time these settlements would change the situation of land ownership. Some 
settlements have no strategic importance yet they were built. The selective Labour 
policy of intensifying the settlement policy in strategic places shows the Labour 
settlement theory of exchanging some land of the West Bank in return for peace. 
The settlement theory of Likud Party appears to be the same of that in 1970's. 
In examining the settlement policy of the two Israeli political parties I raise the 
following questions: 
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First, why were settlements needed for Israeli security? This leads to a number of 
sub-questions like why was the Allon plan of 1967 largely accepted among the 
Labour Party in 1960's till late 1990's? What is the difference between Israel two 
major parties with regard to the settlement policy? What types of settlement were 
built? Did these settlement has access to Israel? What is the method adopted by the 
different Israeli governments to acquire land for the settlement? What is the Impact 
of these settlements over the Palestinian people? How did Palestinians respond to 
the settlement policy? How did these settlement complicate the situation in the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict? 
Second, what was the link between Israel's settlement policy and conflict with 
Palestinians? The Israeli government continued the expansion of settlements 
throughout the 30 years up to the Oslo Accords. Settlements enabled the Israeli 
military to shape the nature of the land and its characterisation during the peace 
negotiations establishing three categories of land A, B, and C. 
The thesis examines the reasons behind Israel's expansion of settlements and why 
the promotion of a peace agreement has been difficult in the context of continued 
Israeli settlement. 
Third, the thesis examines why the Oslo Agreement took place when it did. This is 
important because there is no doubt that it opened a new era of peaceful coexistence 
between the Palestinians and the Israelis. For the first time both tried to solve their 
differences by sitting together and negotiating. 
Methodology 
The thesis uses a combination of research tools including the use of primary and 
secondary data collected from different Palestinian ministries and institutions. Also 
documents from the Committee of Land and Resisting Settlement that belong to the 
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC Parliament) which is one of the most 
important committees in the PLC. I have also used documents from the Palestinian 
Information Service which belongs to the Presidential office. 
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Primary data was collected through two case studies in addition to personal 
interviews with Palestinian officials at different levels like ministers, under- 
secretary, directors of some departments in the Palestinian ministries, officials from 
the security level, members of the PLC Committee of Land and Resisting 
Settlement, the Palestinian Public Committees for Defending the Land (National- 
Islamic Committees) which is struggling against Israeli settlement policy. 
Case studies material focussed on the living conditions of Palestinians living close 
to Israeli settlements. I choose two areas one in the Gaza-Strip, Mawasi Area, and 
the second in the West Bank, Salfeet Province. The following set of questions were 
examined, how their land was confiscated by the Israeli government, which 
category of land did they hold, what have relations been like with their new 
neighbours and what kinds of difficulties did they face? And what changes occurred 
with the Israeli occupation forces according to the interim agreements? 
As a Palestinian citizen, I could not go to Israel and meet with Israelis due to the 
political and security situation. I needed permission from the Israeli Interior 
Security Agency (Shabak) to enter Israel which I could not get. I tried to meet 
members of the Israeli Peace Movement, but I failed to do so. The thesis thus 
centres around Palestinian perspectives although I do also present detailed Israeli 
official perspectives and views present in Israeli Publications and media. 
The Thesis is organised in the following way: 
Chapter one examines issues of land ownership in Palestine until 1967, chapter two 
looks at Israeli settlement in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 1967-1993. It 
studies settlement policy in the Palestinian Occupied Territories and its impact on 
the political thought of both Palestinians and Israelis. Chapters three to seven detail 
the conflict over land during the interim period. These chapters study the 
Palestinian-Israeli peace process that led to the signing of the agreements (1993- 
1998) and the implementation of these agreements regarding the control of land. 
The study investigates the Palestinian socio-economic effect of the control over 
land and the Israeli settlement activities during the post-Oslo period. Chapter three 
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looks at the Land question in Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Chapters four and five 
at Israeli settlement in the post-Oslo Agreement and chapter six at the socio- 
economic impact in the post-Oslo Agreement regarding the controlling of land. 
while chapter seven deals with the changes took place regarding land ownership 
during interim period. 
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Chapter One: Contemporary History of the Struggle on 
Land 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter therefore builds on the context provided the history of the land conflict 
in Palestine. In order to understand the root cause of the conflict between 
Palestinians and Israelis, it is necessary to explore the land tenure system during 
different colonial periods. These indicate the social transformation that the area 
underwent and the importance of the possession of land that is linked with the 
structure of Palestinian society. Colonial occupation invariably centred around land 
(its acquisition or redistribution). Land rights were jealousy defended and often 
backed by physical force. The Palestinians were incessantly struggling for the 
control of their own land. The violence with which the Palestinians of the 21 St 
century fight to regain their land bears witness to the efficacy of this issue. 
From the beginning land played a crucial role in shaping the conflict between the 
Palestinians and Israelis. The land tenure system in Palestine needs to be located 
with reference to the social and political history of the country. This chapter 
elaborates the role of different actors in dispossessing Palestinians from their land. 
The understanding of the land tenure in Palestine in the reign of the Ottoman rule 
and the British Mandate leads to an understanding of Israeli policy of confiscating 
the land of the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the war of 1967. At the same time I 
will show that the notion of a Jewish National Home was a political project and 
was a response to economic needs, it was not simply a religious project. Also it will 
lead us to investigate if the Israeli policy towards the Palestinian Occupied 
Territories after the 1967 War was based on political, national security and 
economic considerations or religious requirements. 
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Israeli settlement strategy required the requisition of lands, In the post-1967 War 
period Israel adopted different methods to achieve the target of establishing 
settlements. The effect of this policy was devastating for Palestinians in the 
occupied territories. 
Between the June 1967 War and the signing of the Oslo Agreement, the political 
thought of both Palestinians and Israelis regarding control of land developed 
through different stages. The Palestinian uprising (Intifada) pushed both sides to 
adopt a more realistic policy towards the concept of a peace settlement. 
1.2 Palestine under Ottoman Rule 
The British occupation of Palestine in 1917 put an end to almost four centuries of 
Ottoman rule. Palestinian Arabs with other Arabs in neighbouring countries in the 
fertile crescent and the Arabian Peninsula aligned with Great Britain under the 
leadership of al-Sharif Hussein to push the Ottomans out of the region. There is no 
doubt that the four centuries of Ottoman rule in Palestine created conditions for the 
future of the conflict over Palestine that took place in the twentieth century. 
1.2.1 Ottoman Reforms and the Land Code 
Due to the Ottoman reforms after to the defeat of Mohammed Ali in the Greater 
Palestine, the Turkish government encouraged the enlargement in the agricultural 
sector and the expansion in the cultivable areas to increase the production where 
they could succeed. For example between 1856 and 1880 citrus cultivation of Jaffa 
quadrupled and in the south of the country the cultivation of grains increased from 
150,000 to 200,000 acre. Anew sorts of fruits, vegetables and techniques of 
cultivation were introduced, but cultivation remained primitive in general. The 
increase in the agricultural cultivation formed new villages which increased the 
population (Gozansky, 1987,23: 36: Divine, 1994,79). 
After the restoration of Ottoman rule in Palestine in year the 1841 great changes 
occurred in Palestinian Arab society especially in the agricultural sector, Charles 
Smith wrote: 
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What then of the land's productivity? Estimates again are not totally 
reliable, but it seems that a major expansion of productivity occurred 
following the Crimean war and the restoration of the Ottoman authority 
and greater security in the region. We see more land cultivated, by 
peasants and tribes as well as large holders, mainly in response to 
demand from market in the Middle East and Europe (Smith, 1992,23). 
Donna Divine also asserted this fact by noting: 
By all accounts, Palestine began to develop in a serious way during 
these years, its pattern of development etched by the imperial reforms 
known as the Tanzimat and by the extension of the European economic 
market (Divine, 1994,79). 
The Turks enhanced the security position in the countryside so that the 
transportation within Palestine itself and with its neighbouring Velayat (state) 
became easier. It made the movement of goods and crops within the region easier, 
giving new opportunities for trade and market. Ports like Jaffa, Gaza and Haifa 
became more important and prosperous. The Ottoman Bank was established in 
Jerusalem and opened several branches in other Palestinian cities. Other foreign 
banks also opened branches in Palestine and started to give loans to Palestinians. 
However, the majority of Palestinian peasants were not qualified for the loans. 
Peasants asked for credit through the traditional mechanism from the merchants and 
notables, where the interest rate was very high. This undermined the peasant's 
economy (Divine, 1994,118: 122). 
Palestine was a populated area with a strong and vibrant emerging economy and 
this evidence opposes Herzel's belief that Palestine was a land without people for a 
people without land (Heikal, 1996a, 75). Ahad Ha'am, however, the father of the 
cultural Zionism, asserted in 1891 that Palestine is inhabited and its cultivable land 
is cultivated by Palestinian Arabs (Cited in Khalidi, 1988,216). 
For the Ottomans. Palestine was considered a conquered land, and therefore it was 
owned by the Empire. The Sultan granted land ownership to his subjects who gave 
great service to the Empire. The Islamic law of land ownership was replaced by the 
Land Code of 1858. which aimed at asserting direct control over the actual 
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cultivator and increase land revenues (Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 
1945,225; Divine, 1994,91; Bederi. 1998,19). The new law classified land into 
six categories, little differences were introduced to the previous categories of the 
land tenure (Bederi, 1998,20: 29). The land was classified according to the new- 
land tenure as follow: 
Mulk Land (private or freehold land): 
This land was held complete by free hold. The owner of mulk land could dispose of 
it as he liked for sale, mortgage and as bequest. Mulk land was divided into two 
types; the first were given to the Moslem conquerors or to Palestinian Arabs who 
embraced Islam, therefore, they paid a tithe of total production, the second type 
which was left in the hands of non-Moslem Palestinian Arabs who paid the tribute 
by sharing or by paying specific amounts. There were other mulk lands which the 
houses in the cities and villages were built on regardless of its area, and all the 
terrain in the cities and the villages, which was less than half a dunum. If the owner 
of the mulk land had no heirs he did not leave a will, the land would transfer to the 
state and become vacant state land. Mulk land could be found in the old cities and it 
was present rarely in the countryside (Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1945, 
4; al-Nahal, 1981,44: 227, Stein, 1984,11). 
Mini Land (state, leasehold or feudal land): 
The possessor of this land held it by usufruct tenure of conditional perpetuity, 
where he could profit from it (Simpson, 1930,30; Hyamson, 1950,79). This land 
was leased to the Palestinian Arab cultivators and it formed the majority of the 
agricultural land in Palestine. Miri land could be sold, mortgaged or leased after 
receiving permission from the land office, but it could not be bequeathed (Stein. 
1984,11: Bederi. 1998,30). On the occupiers death it would be transferred to his 
heirs according to the occupier's religious law, and if not, the land would be 
returned to the state. Also it returned to the state if the occupier did not cultivate it 
for three consecutive years (Simpson, 1930,30; Anglo-American Committee of 
Inquiry. 1945.229, Divine. 1994,13 1). _11iri 
land could be converted into muulk land 
if special leave was obtained from the head of the state and when the state divests 
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itself of all its rights the land became mulk (Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. 
1945,230). 
The person could hold mini land if he paid the consideration to the state that 
consisted of two payments. The first one mu'ajala (an immediate payment) which 
was known as the price of land and it was considered as the entrance fee paid for 
one-time. It was assessed by the local experts according to the fertility and situation 
of the land. The second was the deferred payment mu-ajjala, known as the annual 
tithe (u'shr) (Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1945,229). 
The u'shr system dates from Islam and was a tax which the peasant was required to 
pay to the tax collector and as its name suggests was equal to one-tenth of the 
peasants produce. In 1880's the Ottomans added 2.6 per cent as taxes. U'shr was not 
collected directly by the Ottoman authority. Traditionally it was portioned by public 
auction to influential person like a local official, Shaykh, money lender or mukhtar 
(the head of the village or the family). They exploited this system to their benefit. 
U'shr reached in some occasions to 30 per cent, thereafter, in 1927 the British 
Mandate abolished u'shr and replaced it with the land tax and other taxes, which 
reached to 19 per cent, in 1935 the system of taxation was replaced by the Rural 
Property Tax (Simpson, 1930,70: 72; Peel, 1937,150; Anglo-American Committee 
of Inquiry, 1945,246; Hyamson, 1950,90; Stein, 1984,5: 16). 
Two or more individuals could share in holding mini land and there were two types 
of share holding; firstly, ordinary partnership (ishtirak) and secondly, village or clan 
partnership (musha'). Therefore due to this provision in mini land law, the musha' 
system appeared in the villages where a group of villagers could share in holding a 
large area of agricultural land, where the land was distributed among them 
periodically, usually once every one to five years which meant that the peasant 
cultivated some times in one locality, and after a year or more he would leave to 
another. So musha ' at its core had a collective village ownership (Simpson. 1930. 
31, Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. 1945,230; Hvamson, 1950.85). 
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This system was established to prevent the transfer of village land to strangers and 
to enforce cooperation among the peasants. However, with time the musha' system 
worked against the improvement and development of the cultivated land of the 
village. In 1933 the British High Commissioner estimated that the area of musha' 
land was four to five million dunums (Stein, 1984,14; al-Hizmawi, 1993,44-49). 
Non-pious foundations had the right to the usufruct of mini land as did ordinary 
trading companies as well as the individuals mentioned above who could acquire it 
for their own purposes (Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1945,230). 
Min land had to be registered in the land registry, but due to poor Ottoman 
administration a great deal of mini land was held without registration. Until 1945 a 
large part of this category was not registered or was under imperfect and obsolete 
registration. Nonetheless under the British Mandate a considerable part of land of 
Palestine was surveyed and registered (Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 
1945,231). 
WaqfLand (Mortmain): 
Waqf land was owned by pious foundations for charitable or religious purposes. It 
was divided into two types. The first was waqf sahib (true waq/) which came from 
mulk property, ownership of which was ultimately transferred to a religious or 
charitable institution. The transference of ownership occurred either by deed or by 
the individual's will and was irrevocable (Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 
1945,228; Simpson, 1930,30). The second was waqf gher sahih (imperfect waqf) 
which came from mini land which was ultimately owned by the state. In that case 
the Sultan (the head of the state) devoted some of the state land to waqf land 
(Simpson, 1930,30, al-Hizmawi, 1993,39). 
During the Ottoman rule the area of true waqf was not more than 100,000 dunums 
(Simpson, 1930,30), while the area of the imperfect ll'agf constituted 600,000 to 
1,000,000 dunums (Simpson, 19-330-30, Stein, 1984,12, al-Hizmaxvi, 1993.41). 
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Metruka Land (common profit): 
Metruka land was left for the general public's use, such as village roads, the 
highways, and those lands assigned to the use of a community for a particular use. 
These might have been communal pastures, woodlands, markets and places of 
worship. This type of land was owned by the state alon. The cultivation, transfer 
and ownership of metruka land was prohibited for individuals or groups (Simpson, 
1930,31; al-Nahal, 1981,46; Cano, 1993,21). 
Mewat Land (Dead, waste or undeveloped land) 
Mewat land was that which had not been left or given to the inhabitants and it was 
not held the title deed (kushan) such as unoccupied hilly, scrub wood land and 
grazing land. It was vested in the government had certain importance in its area, 
and formed more than half of Palestine. It was the land that was located far from 
villages usually about one and a half miles. The Ottoman's encouraged its subjects 
to cultivate this land by ensuring the title deed to the individual who cultivated it. 
The individual cultivating it with permission from the state received the title deed 
free of charge and if he did so without permission the individual would have to pay 
the value of the land. The British Mandate prohibited any of mewat lands without 
permission and any cultivation activities in this category was considered an offence. 
The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry about the greater part of mewat land 
was not completed until 1945. So it is difficult to say that all the lands, for example, 
south of the Beer al-Saba' District is mewat land (Simpson, 1930,30; Anglo- 
American Committee of Inquiry, 1945,233: 256; Stein, 1984,12; Hyamson, 1950, 
80, al-Nahal, 1981,58). 
Mahl tel Land (transfer of ownership from mini to state land): 
Alahlul was miii land that was without cultivation for three years or when the 
occupant of the land died and he had no heirs according to his religious laws. The 
ownership of this land was then to be transferred to the state. In actual practice 
inahlrd land rarely occurred in Palestine. _1fahlul land was estimated during the 
British Mandate in 1921 of 87.2-3-33 Turkish dunums where one Turkish dunum 
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equals 919.3 square metres (Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1945. 
230: 232: 255; Hyamson, 1950,79; Stein, 1984,13). 
There is another classification of land tenure the mudawara or jiftlik lands. This 
land belonged to the Sultan Abdul Hamid after he had paid a small amount to the 
Ottoman State Treasury. These lands however were originally held in traditional 
private possession, with the indigenous peasants refusing to acknowledge the 
legality of the Sultan's ownership (Simpson, 1930,57; Peel, 1937,260). After the 
Turkish revolution in 1908 and the dethroned of the Sultan, these lands transferred 
to possession of the state (Peel, 1937,259: 60; Hyamson, 1950,82; Stein, 1984,14). 
We should however bear in mind that mini land was similar to mulk land except for 
the fact of paying the tenth. The Ottoman government did not enquire about the 
ownership of this category, and they believed that this land was the individual's 
property. 
1.2.2 Land Code and the Change in the Land Ownership 
According to the Ottoman Land Code the peasants were required to register their 
lands in the official registries (Khalidi, 1988,211). Some of the peasants refused to 
register their land, because they did not want to pay the high registration fees and 
they were afraid that if they did so, their names would appear in the Ottoman 
official files, in which case they would be subject to Ottoman conscription which 
they did not want. Most of the peasants were uneducated, so they were unfamiliar 
with Ottoman land laws (Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1945,238; 
Ruedy, 1971,138; Bederi, 1998,27). 
The aims of the land codes were not realised in Palestine due to ineffective, and 
inefficient registration procedures. Registries offered a patchwork previous and 
were inaccurate in giving the true picture of land ownership (Divine. 1994,92; 
Hvamson. 1950.79; Bederi. 1998.27). Nevertheless, land purchases occurred 
between Palestinian Arabs according to their own particular tradition. which did not 
involve any legal documentation. 
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Cultivated land was considered of major importance in the post-Ottoman reform 
era, especially in terms of trade and export. Palestinian society was mainly 
dependent on the agricultural sector, so land became more important than before 
and the cultivable area increased. As a result of the reforms, the interests of the 
Palestinian notables and merchants focused on the purchase and cultivation of land 
(Divine, 1994,91). They supported peasants in the expansion of the cultivable land 
by supplying them credit, and hence the merchants and notables became money 
lenders and on some occasions supplied labour power to increase the cultivable 
lands (Khalidi, 1988,214). Under these conditions the land, seed and animals 
appeared as vital resources where they became the symbol of the influence and 
power in Palestinian society. 
The impact of the Ottoman reforms and their new Land Code drew merchants from 
Lebanon and Syria to use their relations with the Ottoman officials to purchase 
large tracts in the most fertile areas in Palestine, for example Sursuq a banker from 
Beirut owned 400,000 dunums in the north of Palestine (1869 and 1872) of which 
372,000 dunums were fertile and cultivable land. He owned twenty villages and 
these tracts were inhabited and cultivated by the peasants who had practised 
traditional ownership from generations. The total lands purchased by them was 
875,000 dunums (al-Nahal, 1981,41; Abu Yaseer, 1988,480). Stein estimated the 
holding of land by Arabs residing outside Palestine to be 405,000 Turkish dunums 
(Stein, 1984,26). 
A great majority of Arab landlords sold land tracts to Jews. Rashid Khalidi stated 
that in 1924-1925 Sursuq and this partners (excluding other Arab absentee 
landlords) sold around 240,000 dunums, and before 1914 they sold 313,000 
dunums (Khalidi, 1988,214: 26). 
To avoid conscription some peasants registered the land in the name of people who 
had died a long time earlier, and to avoid the high tax on land registration some 
registered ten or twenty dunums when they probably held hundreds. In some cases 
they even left the registration of land to the notables and merchants to avoid the 
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high registration tax and conscription. Influential people registered a large number 
of properties because they were able to avoid military service (Khalidi, 1988.211: 
Divine, 1994,84: 87; Hyamson, 1950,78). 
1.2.3 Zionism and the National Home 
Jews lived peacefully and were treated well in the Arab world and Spain during the 
reign of the Arab Caliphate, whereas in Western and Eastern Europe they were 
persecuted and expelled. For example, England evicted many Jews from 1290 until 
the end of the seventeenth century when they were allowed to return. Similar 
developments were repeated in France. In Russia special laws were imposed against 
Jews, prohibiting them from living amongst the Christian Russian people (Smith, 
1992,8: 26). 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries many Jews believed that their 
return to the Promised Land was linked with the arrival of the Messiah. False 
Messiahs appeared in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, like the pseudo- 
messiah from Smyrna in 1648, Michael Cardos from Crete, Mordechai Mokiah 
from Hungary and Jacob Querido from Turkey. They also believed that their 
dispersion was God's will. They were merely waiting to return to the Promised 
Land (Tessler, 1994,17; Ibrahim, 1994,454). 
As aresult of the French revolution its ideas of freedom, justice and equality in 
affected the European Jews, and led to the emergence of the Jewish enlightenment 
movement. The new movement led to a demand among Jews for assimilation into 
European society. The enlightenment movement (haskala) became stronger in 
Russia in the reign of Tsar Alexander II in the middle of the nineteenth century 
(Smith, 1992,28, Tessler, 1994,31: 32). 
Within this social and religious revolution among the Jews, a revivalist movement 
developed as a reaction to assimilation, calling for a return to the roots of Jewish 
culture, but it did not call for a return to Palestine. So until the second half of the 
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eighteenth century the number of Jews who lived in Palestine were insignificant, 
about five thousand out of three million throughout the world. 
In this climate among the Jews of Europe, Zionist ideology emerged. Initially it was 
very weak, and was criticised by orthodox and traditional Judaism (Palumbo, 1987. 
5). With the death of Tsar Alexander II, Jews were subjected to Russian persecution 
and injustice. The persecution reached its peak in 1881, when Russian pogroms 
took place against the Jewish Pale. 
In these miserable conditions the Zionist idea arose among the Jewish Pale. Many 
assimilationist leaders became leaders of political Zionism, like Lilienblum and 
Pinsker in Russia. The Jews tried to solve their problem of European persecutions 
by finding a homeland. In this case the Jewish homeland would be created at the 
expense of others (Palestinian Arabs). Zangwill a prominent Zionist said in 1911: 
Why shouldn't the Palestinians welcome an opportunity to make a 
magnanimous gesture by giving up their homeland to be used by the 
Jews who had been so badly treated in Christian Europe (Palumbo, 
1987,11). 
Pinsker wrote that the homeland should be a piece of land, to be owned by Jews, 
from which they could never be exiled. His view towards the `Promised Land' 
(Palestine) at that time was that as it was the land where Jewish political life had 
stopped and been destroyed he recommended that the Jews should not link 
themselves with this land (Heikal, 1996a, 65). The Jewish national homeland for 
the founder of the Zionist ideology was a political need, not a religious need. 
We can conclude that Jews did not adopt ideas because they were Jews, but because 
the conditions which society created around them directed their thoughts. The Jews 
attempted to settle and build settlements in Palestine and also tried the same in 
Argentina. In the USA rich Jews purchased land in the west of the United States as 
the location of Jewish state. They also tried in other places where they could flee 
from the eastern European persecution and pogroms such as those that took place in 
Russia in the early 1880's (Palumbo. 1987.5; al-Miseri, 1996,493). 
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Rich Jews in Western Europe were not comfortable with the Jewish migration from 
Eastern Europe (Heikal, 1996a, 29). These immigrants became associated w ith 
social disruption, cheating and prostitution which Western European Jews believed 
place them in a bad light. As a result of this migration rich western Jews 
encouraged them to migrate and settle outside Europe, supporting them financially 
in both Palestine and Argentina (Palumbo, 1987,5; al-Miseri, 1996,493). Up to 
1900, Moses Montefiore supported the first settlements, and particularly Baron 
Rothschild who paid 40 million francs to Jewish settlers in Palestine (Smith, 1992, 
29: 83). While Hersch financed the settlers in Argentina. 
The Bilu group and the Lovers of Zion (a Zionist groups were founded in Russia 
and their first attempt to settle in Palestine was in late 1970's) who belonged to the 
first migration, were the first Zionist groups to succeed in building settlements in 
Palestine from 1882 onwards. the Lovers of Zion convened three conferences 
before the first International Zionist Congress of 1897 led by Herzel, but failed due 
to a lack of institutional structure and to the fragmentation of their ideas (Tessler, 
1994,59). The pioneer Jewish settlers in 1882 lacked agricultural knowledge and 
skills as the majority of them were town-based. The establishing of new settlements 
was expensive and the settlers spent considerable amounts of money in purchasing 
land. They adopted the Arab peasants' models of agriculture which was not based 
on capital incentive. Within months the settlements were on the verge of collapse, 
some settlements were even abandoned, so in 1883 the settlers asked help from 
Baron Rothschild who supported them immediately and took the settlements under 
his wing (Giladi, 1975,175). 
The Baron's administration made fundamental changes in agricultural methods, 
such as the introducing of new crops, and the planting of vineyards to export wine 
and the Baron himself took the responsibility for marketing abroad. His 
administration purchased more land in the vicinity of the existing settlements to 
expand them, and purchased land in other places to establish new settlements 
(Giladi, 1975.175). In 1889 the Baron transferred the responsibility of the 
settlements to the Palestine Jewish Colonisation Association known as the P. I. C. A. 
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which was founded in 1882 (Cano, 1993,56; Simpson, 1930.39). It bought land 
and installed settlers on it. This association started settlement activities in 1882. 
The transfer was because the Baron was dissatisfied with the economic results, but 
his administration continued to support the settlements and to establish new ones 
(Simpson, 1930,38; Ruedy, 1971,140; Giladi, 1975,178). Until the end of the 
nineteenth century the majority of the Jewish settlements were located in the fertile 
areas of the coastal plain, Eastern Galilee and Marj Ibn Amir 'Jezreel' (Simpson, 
1930,39; Khalidi, 1988,214; Elmusa, 1996,72: 73). 
1.2.4 The International Zionist Movement and its Efforts 
Herzel succeeded where previous Zionists such as the Lovers of Zion had failed. He 
asked for an International Zionist Conference in Basel in 1887, where he 
transformed modern political Zionism during the reign of Pinsker and Lienblum 
from the stage of a confusion of ideas, into an institutional structure (Shofani, 1996, 
411). Herzel believed that the national home for Jewish people should be 
guaranteed by public law. To achieve this aim he needed international recognition. 
The Zionists proposed Palestine as the Jewish homeland while it was still under 
Ottoman authority. Herzel's important efforts were directed to the Sultan of Turkey; 
he offered 20 million lira, 2 million as the price of Palestine, and 18 million as aid 
to the Ottoman government to help with its economic crisis (Zai'ter, 1955,47; 
Heikal, 1996a, 69). Herzel tried later with Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany, who was an 
Ottoman ally (Stevens, 1971,49; Tessler, 1994,47). However, Herzel's diplomatic 
efforts failed to achieve any kind of recognition or approval. Following this failure, 
the British government made a proposal to the Zionists for a settlement to be 
established in Uganda. This proposal was approved in 1903 at the Zionist Congress 
by 295 to 178 with 98 abstentions. It was ironic that the religious group of the 
Zionist Congress accepted the proposal that the socialists opposed. A committee 
was formed to check if Uganda was a reasonable place for settlement (Stevens. 
1971,52, Shofani. 1996,417). 
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There was a great Jewish migration between 1881 and 1914 from Eastern Europe 
and Russia, as a result of pogroms, persecution and discrimination. Less than 2 per 
cent of the 2.65 million emigrants chose Palestine, whereas more than 98 per cent 
went to the USA and other countries. Political Zionism accounted for only 55,000- 
70,000 immigrants. These Jews believed that the USA was their promised land not 
Palestine (Tessler, 1994,61; Mia'ri, 1996,39). 
Palestine was the Zionist target for two waves of migration. The first lasted up to 
1903, and was made up of 20,000-30,000 immigrants, whereas the second wave 
1904-1914 carried 35,000-40,000 immigrants (1). The Jewish migration stopped 
during the days of the First World War, and in 1918 the number of the Jews in 
Palestine had declined to 55,000 due to a counter migration (Stevens, 1971,65; 
Khalidi, 1988,213; Tessler, 1994,145). 
In 1901 the fifth Zionist Congress promoted the establishment of the Jewish 
National Fund JNF (Keren Kaymet), which it considered as the executive arm of 
the Zionist Organisation in the field of purchasing and developing land for the 
immigrants in Palestine. The land which the fund could purchase was to be held in 
a common trust in the name of the Jewish people. According to Trust law, it could 
never be sold. It would be leased to the new settlers at a very low rate for 49 years. 
Up till 1914 the JNF held only 4 per cent of the total Jewish land in Palestine. By 
1948 it owned more the 50 per cent (Simpson, 1930,36; Smith, 1992,83; Shofani, 
1996,435). 
The immigrants of the second migration benefited from the new Zionist institutions 
that were established in the late nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century. 
These institutions supported the immigrants before and after their moving to 
Palestine, so they were more organised than the immigrants of the first migration 
and they led both the Zionist society in Palestine and the International Zionist 
Movement (Khalidi. 1988,213, Mia'ri, 1996,41, Shofani, 1996,436). 
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1.2.5 Palestinian-Jewish Relations and Land Purchasing 
As a result of the purchasing of land, confrontations between Zionists and 
Palestinian Arabs occurred in 1880s in Gedera settlement and Nes Ziyyona 
(Khalidi, 1988,215). In 1930 writing about relations between Palestinians and 
settlers Sir John Simpson noted to the British government "The relation of the old 
PICA colonist with their Arab neighbours and with their Arab workmen were 
excellent -a mutual advantage to both communities" (Simpson, 1930,39: 50). 
The relations between both sides worsened as a result of the second Zionist 
migration which was motivated by greater ideological fervor. They were more 
deeply imbued with political Zionism than the first (Khalidi, 1988,210). Their 
behaviour and relations with the Palestinian Arabs was so bad, Ahad Ha'am a 
prominent cultural Zionist described how those Zionists regarded the Arabs in 
Palestine and how they should deal with them "the only language that the Arabs 
understand is that of force ... 
hit them [Arabs] shamefully without reason and even 
brag about it" (Cited in Palumbo, 1987,8). 
During the British Mandate one of the Zionist revisionist writers, William Ziff, 
referred to the Palestinian Arabs as a "sickly, degenerate race, and low on the scale 
of human development" (Cited in Palumbo, 1987,10). 
The settlers of the second wave influenced and convinced the settlers of the first 
period to adopt their political Zionism and they succeeded (Simpson, 1930,55; ). 
Enmity grew and the Zionist target became clearer in the eyes of the Palestinian 
Arabs. In 1908 the Young Turk Revolution reimposed the 1876 constitution, which 
guaranteed freedom of speech. Arab subjects of the Ottoman Empire were given the 
opportunity to found newspapers, so new free Palestinian newspapers came into 
existence, such as al-Asmai. al-Karmel, al-Najjah and Filastin which began to write 
about the dangers of a Zionist migration and their policy of purchasing land, 
showing that they were aiming at restoring the Jews to Palestine, to enable them to 
establish a national home (Khalidi, 1988.218, Smith, 1992,35; Tessler, 1994, 
129). Arab representatives in the Turkish Parliament asked the Turkish government 
31 
to stop the Jewish migration and prohibited the transfer of land to the Jews. The 
weak and corrupt Turkish administration forbade any move. 
Land was and still is the focus of and the key to the Zionist-Arab conflict. Without 
land there would be no hope for the Zionists to establish a Jewish home. The 
Zionist recognised this fact from the beginning, so they started their policy of 
purchasing land (Stein, 1984, xiv). 
Up to 1892 the Jews established twenty settlements, the areas of these settlements 
ranged from between 800 and 15000 dunums each. Other smaller settlements were 
also set up during this period. The Jews also established the Ben Yehoda settlement 
and others to the east of the Jordan River. The Ben Yehoda area covered 1400 
dunums (Heikal, 1996a, 63). 
Until 1914 the numbers of settlements increased to 44 and the area that the Jews 
were able to purchase was about 418,000 dunums. More than 275,000 dunums 
came as a result of the Baron Rothschild's financial assistance. Thirty-seven were 
established in Galilee and the coastal plain. Only 12,000 Jews lived in these while 
the remainder inhabited the main cities, such as Jerusalem, Hebron, Jaffa and Haifa. 
In 1907 peasants owned 20 per cent of the land in Galilee and 50 per cent in the 
Jerusalem district, and in 1932 they owned 80 per cent in the coastal and the Acre 
plains - approximately 2,560,000 dunums. The Zionist agricultural settlements and 
the urban population were located in these areas (al-Nahal, 1981,37; Stein, 1984, 
26: 226; Khalidi, 1988,213; Smith, 1992,32: 83). 
There is disagreement among researchers about the question of who sold land to the 
Jewish settlers. There are no full details about the number of 418,000 dunums, or 
from whom the Jews had purchased these areas. Dr. Abraham Granot the managing 
director of the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kaymet) recorded 245,581 dunums in 
this table. Out of the above mentioned number the Jews purchased between 1878 
and 1914 from the following 61.329 dunums from Arab absentee landlords, 62,415 
dunums from local landlords. who owned substantial amounts of land. 30.836 
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dunums from Palestinian Arab peasants and 91,001 dunums from various sources [ 
the Ottoman government, the Churches, large foreign companies and ordinary 
wealthy businessmen] (Granot, 1952,277). While the remaining 200,000 dunums is 
not mentioned from whom they were purchased. Jack Cano a Zionist writer stated 
that the main process was carried out by those absentee landlords who owned 
considerable amounts of land (Cano, 1993,46). 
Jews were prohibited from holding land according to Ottoman law, so to overcome 
this difficulty they adopted many strategies to purchase the land through Ottoman 
Jews who transferred the land to the European Jews. For example, Sursuq sold one 
tract of 60,000 dunums to an Ottoman Jew in 1902. By bribing the Ottoman 
officials, foreign consuls, foreign merchants and churches were able to transfer land 
to Jews (Khalidi, 1988,225; Smith, 1992,34). 
Ruhi al-Khalidi, the deputy of Jerusalem in the Ottoman Parliament traced the land 
sale parcel-by-parcel to Jewish institutions from 1878-1907,. His data was collected 
from newspapers and other published sources of the period. He listed the names of 
the vendors who sold a total of 247,466 dunums which amounted to 60 per cent of 
all land purchased. These sources yield the following results: 
143,577 dunums (58 per cent): non-Palestinian absentee landlords. 
88,689 dunums (36 per cent): Palestinian absentee landlords. 
15,200 dunums (6 per cent): local landlords and fellaheen [peasants] (Cited in 
Khalidi, 1988,225). 
al-Nahal noted that "in 1930 a spokesman of the Jewish agency said in front of the 
Shaw Commission that 10 per cent of the land was purchased from the Palestinian 
Arabs" (al-Nahal, 1981,43). 
The beginning of the First World War severe by disrupted the Palestinian economy. 
Many Palestinian Arabs were subject to conscription in the Ottoman army. 
Livestock, fuel and food were requisitioned from Palestinian Arabs. Many were 
forced to mortgage their properties to meet the demands made on them by the 
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Ottomans (Peel, 1937,153; Alsberg, 1975,533; Kimerling & Migdal, 199). 26). 
But the most important and dangerous measure taken by the Ottomans, was that 
during their retreat from Palestine they destroyed or removed the records and the 
principal government officials (Stein, 1984,3). 
1.3 Palestine under the British Mandate 
Great Britain's Balfour declaration can be understood first of all as a more to serve 
its colonial interests in the East. These were the creation of a human barrier 
between Egypt and the Eastern Arab World. This entity would be totally linked to 
Britain and would keep the routes between Britain and its colonies in the Indian 
subcontinent open. Also the Empire would provide a great service to Europe, as 
Jews would be resettled in the Promised Land, according to their wishes, and there 
would be no more Jews there. 
On November 2,1917, Arthur Balfour, the British foreign minister, informed Lord 
Rothschild by letter of Britain's pledge the Jewish people. This became known as 
the Balfour Declaration. He stated: 
His majesty's government view will favour the establishment in 
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their 
best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being 
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the 
civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine 
... 
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to 
the Zionist Federation (Cited in Caftan, 1988,10). 
Before 1917 another undertaking was given to the Arabs that Palestine would be a 
part of the Arab Empire after the defeat of the Turks in World War I. But it is clear 
that Britain had chosen the implementation of Balfour's pledge (Za'iter, 1955,37). 
Great Britain did not ask Palestinian Arabs if they accepted the establishment of 
this national home. the declaration denied Palestinian rights of self-determination. 
The Jewish population in Palestine were a small minority, less than 10 per cent and 
the odd thing is that on November 2.1917 Palestine was not under British rule and 
therefore not available to be promised to others. However the declaration was as 
one nation promising to a second nation the country of a third (Za'iter, 1955,14). 
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Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations [approved by the Paris Peace 
Conference] expressed the political situation of the peoples of Palestine, Iraq, 
Lebanon and Syria in these terms: 
their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised 
subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a 
mandatory until such times as they are able to stand alone (Cited in 
Cattan, 1988,22). 
In 1920 Palestine was put under the British Mandate which was to be responsible 
for putting into effect the declaration originally made by the government of His 
Britannic Majesty, favouring the establishment in Palestine of a national home for 
the Jewish people. For the Zionists the Jewish national home consisted of 
Mandated Palestine, South Lebanon, South West Syria and Western Jordan (Map 
1.1). The Aspirations of the Palestinian people were totally ignored by the great 
powers and its people, the party most affected not consulted. Article 22 was 
contravered, as Balfour himself stated: 
The contradiction between the letters of the Covenant and the policy of 
the allies is even more flagrant in the case of the `independent nation' 
of Palestine than in that of the `independent nation' of Syria (Cited in 
Cattan, 1988,26). 
1.3.1 Land Ordinance of 1920 and its Amendments 
On November 18,1918 the British military government closed all the land registry 
offices in Palestine and stopped all kinds of land transfer (Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry, 1945,238; Stein, 1984,23). According to the British official 
William Ormsby-Gore (Britain's liaison officer with the Zionist Commission) the 
reason for this measure was to protect Palestinian tenants from displacing the 
Zionist from the land which was being sold to them by large estate landlords (Stein, 
1984,39). 
This was not the real reason, because this step would stop Zionist purchases of 
land, essential for establishing the Jewish home. This would Work against the 
British pledge towards the Zionists. The land offices were closed according to 
Zionist needs, because they favoured the British move. 
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Zionists favoured the closing of the land registry for many reasons. First, it would 
stop speculation in the land market and the Zionists would be able to purchase land 
at its lowest price. Second, in 1919 there were rumours that large areas of land were 
going to be designated as waqf and this would allow the previous owner of this land 
to hold the land for long-term lease. This would decrease the land put on the market 
for sale, and therefore, would deprive the Zionists of purchasing this land. Thus the 
Zionists supported the continuation of closing the land registration offices and dealt 
with these rumours as fact but we do not know if this was true or not. Third, the 
Zionist proposals were being acted in the Paris Peace Conference, so they needed to 
suspend the transferring of land (Stein, 1984,41). 
On the other hand the Zionists opposed the loans given to the Palestinian Arab 
peasants by the Anglo-Egyptian Bank. To obtain the loan the borrower needed 
reasonable collateral. The only collateral available for the peasants was their land. 
As I mentioned above many tracts of land were not registered in the land registries, 
in that case what the peasants owned through local (traditional) forms would be 
recognised legally by the government (Stein, 1984,42). 
In 1919 the Zionists were able to see the draft of the Land Transfer Ordinance, 
while the Palestinian Arabs did not. The Zionists together with British officials 
prepared a report on the land regime which affirmed article four of the Mandate (2). 
This tends to reinforce the argument that the British supported the Zionists because 
the British foreign minister, Arthur Balfour was ready to give preferential rights to 
the Zionists during the Mandate period. 
According to British officials the Ordinance was initiated to protect Palestinian 
tenants when the large estate absentee landlords sold large tracts to the Zionists, 
because their principal of purchasing land was that the land should be vacant of any 
tenant (Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. 1945,289). This condition was put 
in the Land Ordinance draft by Norman Bentwich (a British Jew sympathetic to the 
Zionists) the British Senior Judicial Officer who controlled the Land Registry 
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Department during the military administration and later became the first Attorney- 
General in the British civil administration (legal adviser to the British government). 
He stipulated that in the event of transferring land, tenants should maintain 
sufficient land for themselves and there families. This was deleted from the draft 
(Stein, 1984,44), and the only beneficiary of this deletion was the Zionists. 
In September 1920 the Land Transfer Ordinance was signed by the High 
Commissioner and the land registry offices were reopened in October 1920. The 
Ordinance defined the transfer as: 
a sale, mortgage, gift dedication of waqf of every description, and every 
other disposition of immovable property, except a device by will or 
lease for a term not exceeding three years, and includes a transfer of 
mortgage and a lease containing an option by virtue of which the term 
may exceed three years (Simpson, 1930,148; Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry, 1945,239: 242). 
The Palestinian Arabs opposed the Ordinance because it kept down the price of all 
land, and delivered land which was on the market into the hands of the Zionists at a 
low price (Peel, 1937,218). The Ordinance was amended and substituted by the 
Land Transfer Ordinance of 1920-1921 which shows that in the case of agricultural 
land that was leased, the transferor should satisfy himself that any tenant in 
occupation would retain sufficient land in the district or elsewhere for the 
maintenance of himself and his family. In 1929 the Mandated government enacted 
the Protection of the Cultivator Ordinance, which provided less protection from 
tenants. At best the Ordinance would provide monetary compensation. In fact the 
Ordinance did not protect the Palestinian Arab tenants because of the 
circumvention by the landlords and purchasers, due to a loophole in the Ordinance 
itself. In 1930 the Arab landless made up 29.4 per cent of the peasants (Simpson, 
1930,35; Peel, 1937,239). 
The British Mandate tried to solve the problem of the landless peasants by giving 
them land for cultivation. In 1932 the British Mandate discovered that only 664 out 
of 2607 peasant applicants were able to comply with their conditions, even though 
not all of the 664 peasants were actually granted land. Each family was given less 
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than the minimum percent of land of 130 dunums (according to Simpson. 1930) 
which was needed to maintain afellah family in a decent standard of living on the 
non-irrigated tracts (Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1945,296: 299, 
Hyamson, 1950,89). 
The amending Ordinance of 1930 protected those people who had carried on 
continuously for five years grazing, watering animals and, cutting of wood and any 
work of a similar nature. The landlord was to make an equivalent provision towards 
the livelihood of these people. Also the Ordinance tried to strengthen the position 
of the tenant and to get rid of the loopholes of the previous Ordinance. The 
Protection Ordinance of 1933 was enacted to provide more protection for the 
tenant. The Zionists opposed the Ordinance because the loopholes were about to be 
eliminated and therefore their efforts to purchase land were badly effected. In 1941 
the committee which was formed to review the Ordinance of 1933 described it as a 
serious obstacle to the reasoned development of the country (Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry, 1945,290). This paragraph manage to satisfy the Zionist 
opposition. Albert Hayamson described the land system in Palestine as "the system 
of land tenure was still in a very unsatisfactory state when the Mandate terminated" 
(Hyamson, 1950,88). 
1.3.2 Zionist Migration, Land Ownership and the Jewish Community 
There is no doubt that the British Mandate facilitated Jewish immigration to 
Palestine according to; a) the Balfour Declaration which recognised it as part of the 
preamble to the terms of the Mandate, b) Article seven of the Mandate that there 
shall be included a nationality law with provisions framed so as to facilitate the 
acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent 
residence in Palestine. The Immigration Ordinance was initiated in 1920 which 
allowed the Zionists to bring 16,500 immigrants per annum. The Ordinance were 
amended several times. Immigrants into Palestine fell into nine categories. At the 
same time the British Mandate prohibited the Palestinian Arabs who were born in 
Palestine but residing abroad. from obtaining Palestinian citizenship (Simpson. 
1910,119. Peel. 1937.4. Zai'ter. 1955,74). 
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Between 1919 and 1948. Palestine was subjected to three major waves of Zionist 
migration. The first from 1919-1923 amounted to about 35,000 immigrants, 
whereas the second lasted until 1931, comprised about 82,000. The last one was 
from 1932-1948 and it consisted of about 265,000. The great majority of those 
immigrants were from Russia and Eastern Europe (Russia and Poland more than 50 
percent) and 20 percent from Germany in the last wave (al-Nahal, 1981,73; Mea'ri, 
1996,42). 
TABLE 1.1 
THE JEWISH MIGRATION TO PALESTINE 1919-1939 
Year No. Immirants Year No. Immirants 
1919 1,806 1930 4,944 
1920 8,223 1931 4,075 
1921 8,294 1932 12,553 
1922 8,685 1933 37,337 
1923 8,175 1934 45,267 
1924 13,892 1935 66,472 
1925 34,386 1936 29,595 
1926 13,855 1937 10,629 
1927 3,034 1938 14,675 
1928 2,178 1939 31,195 
1929 5,249 Total* 364,519 
Source: Tessler, 1994,170 
* The author's calculation 
Until 1930 the Zionists purchased 944,000 dunums, where they established 100-130 
settlements and there were 35,000-46,000 settlers there. The great majority were in 
the most fertile areas such as Galilee, Coastal Plain and the Valley of Esdraelon. 
The social organisation of the Zionist settlements were different. They included 
orange-plantations of private ownership, individual farmers of small holders, co- 
operative settlements on an individual or common basis and communal settlements. 
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During the Mandate period some old settlements were highly increased in size and 
population such as Peta Tiqva and Rehovot. New Zionist suburbs were found in 
Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv which whole inhabitants are Jews (Simpson, 1930, 
24: 48; Peel, 1937,48). According to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry 
(1945), It noted that between 1920 and 1945 Zionists could purchase and register 
938,365 dunums. 
Zionist society concentrated on agricultural settlements and cities such as Tel Aviv, 
Jerusalem and Haifa. Under the British Mandate Jewish society was organized in a 
socio-economic and political entity called the `Yishuv' (Tzur, 1999,103). This 
socity had all types of state institutions such as, defence forces, workers federations, 
an industrial sector, banks, political parties, education, and health systems (3). 
1.3.3 State Domain Land and the Zionist Concessions 
Public land was defined by the Palestine Orders-in-Council 1922-1940 as all of this 
land which was subject to the control of the government of Palestine by virtue of a 
treaty, convention, agreement and succession, and all land which was acquired for 
the public service or otherwise. In that case the public land was; mahlul land, jiftlik 
or mudawara land, forest land, metruka land, mewat land and the sub-soil of all 
other categories of land. Article 12 of the 1922 Order-in-Council gave the High 
Commissioner the full authority to grant or lease any public land (Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry, 1945,256; al-Nahal, 1981,47). 
Under the terms of the Mandate (Article 6) it was laid down that: 
the administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and 
position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced..... shall 
encourage in cooperation within the Jewish agency...... close 
settlement by Jews on the land, including state land and waste land not 
required for public purposes (Cited in Cattan, 1988,26). 
From the Mandate Zionists insisted on holding the State Domain land, the Zionists 
looked for cultivable state domain land. They surveyed cultivable land to see what 
it had to implement under article 6 (4). The government found that there was a 
small part of this land, excluding the desert and the mountain- tops, which the 
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survey had not covered. Moreover the Zionists did not ask for these lands. In 
January 1930 the Director of Land noted that all government land capable of 
cultivation without additional heavy-capital expenditure was under cultivation. It 
was difficult for the government to uproot those people, and if it did so, it would 
violate the article itself. The government tried to satisfy the Zionist demand. There 
was more than 600,000 dunums unquestionably state domain, 95,000 dunums were 
leased to the Zionists, 25,000 dunums were leased to the Palestinian Arabs, 89,000 
dunums belonging to peasants for centuries, 259,000 were occupied by roads, 
rivers, railways and so on; 165,000 dunums were rocks, marshy and sandy grounds. 
Up till 1945 there were 900,000 dunums which were still being surveyed. Of these 
lands 100,000 dunums were given to the Zionists, 120,000 dunums owned by the 
Peasants for generations and 660,000 dunums were occupied by the Army and/or 
were devoted for afforestation (Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1945,259, 
Hyamson, 1950,80; al-Nahal, 1981,49; Stein, 1984,12). 
The Mandate gave Zionists 195,000 dunums, but only 25,000 to the Palestinian 
Arabs whose number of landless peasants was growing and made up of the great 
majority of the citizens of Palestine. We should bear in mind that the most of the 
state domain lands which were leased to the Palestinian Arabs were for a short time 
whereas those leased to Zionists were long-term with nominal rents. 
The largest and most important of the land concessions granted to Zionists in 
Palestine was that of the Lake Huleh region, which covered an area of some 44 
square miles (Hyamson, 1950,81). During the Ottoman rule the JCA obtained a 
concession to drain the Kabara Swamp, and for the development of the Caesarea 
(sand dunes). The land area was 5,170 dunums (Simpson, 1930,40; Hyamson, 
1950,83). 
A concession of an area of 18.000 dunums near the Dead Sea were granted to the 
Palestine Electric Company. Another were given them on the al-Ojah river for 
electric power (al-Nahal. 1981,60: 86: ). The British Mandate offered an area of 
90,000 dunums in Rafah to the south of Gaza. but the Zionist refused. The area «-as 
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located in uncultivated land. An offer of 11,000 dunums near Jericho was also 
rejected by the Zionists (Simpson, 1930,55: 57; al-Nahal, 1981). 
1.3.4 The Peel Plan: The British Partition Plan 
Before 1930 the Zionists were concentrating their efforts to purchase land in the 
most fertile areas (cultivable plains and vale regions). They tried to establish a 
nucleus for their future state, so until 1930 about 1,000,000 dunums of these lands 
were in Zionist's hands. After that date the Zionist plan became more open, and 
they started to concentrate their priorities on purchasing land in the areas such as 
the far northe of Palestine, Syria and Trans-Jordan. These efforts were taken to 
reinforce their geo-strategic requirements (Stein, 1984,174). 
Palestinian anger increased with the development and improvement of the Zionist 
society. It was at the expense of Palestinian Arab society, which became poorer and 
economically worse off as a result of the Mandate's policy which favoured the 
Zionists. A huge migration was taking place in Palestine, with 178,000 immigrants 
reaching Palestine in 1933-1936 (Zai'ter, 1955,95; al-Nahal, 1981,71). And the 
Zionist policy of purchasing land continued in spite of the British official 
recommendation by Sir John Hop Simpson in 1930 which called for halt in the 
transferring of land to Zionist hands (Simpson, 1930). 
An Arab revolt (5) broke out between 1936-1939 and violence spread everywhere 
especially in the rural areas. The great majority of the rebels were from the 
peasants. They attacked British targets, Zionists and in some cases, Arab notables 
(Tessler, 1994,240). 
The British government formed a commission of inquiry under the direction of 
Willam Robert Wellesley, Lord Peel and the six-member the Palestine Royal 
Commission. This was known as the Peel Commission. The Commission referred 
to the causes of the Arab revolt as being the same as those leading to the events of 
1920.1921,1929 and 1933 "the Arab hatred and fear of the establishment of a 
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Jewish homeland". The recommendation of the Peel Commission was totally 
different from the preceding commissions. Its recommendations were: 
The British Mandate had not only failed to achieve a reconciliation of 
Arab and Jewish aspirations, it had kept alive and even reinforced the 
antagonism between the two people. Therefore in the judgement of the 
commissioners, the Mandate should be terminated and in order that 
each national community might govern itself, the territory of Palestine 
should be partitioned (Peel, 1937,380). 
So the Peel commission brought a new idea for solving the conflict: the partition of 
Palestine into two states; one for Jews and the second for Arabs which was to be 
joint to Trans-Jordan. Jerusalem and Bethlehem would be under the British 
Mandate with access to the Mediterranean Sea, where English would be the official 
language (map 1.2). 
According to the partition proposal the Jewish state occupied 20 per cent of 
Palestine, where as Palestinian Arabs owned about 3 1/4 million dunums, and the 
Zionists 1 1/4 million dunums. The Arab population in the Jewish state was about 
325,000, and the Zionist about 300,000. The Zionist state occupied the most fertile 
area. In the proposed Arab state they numbered only 1,250. The commission 
proposed an exchange of population between the two states, so that the Palestinian 
Arabs would form the majority of the proposed Jewish state, and they would own 
more than 60 per cent of its land. The Jewish inhabitants being less in number than 
the Palestinian Arabs, even in their proposed state, would mean an unequal 
exchange of 300,000 Palestinians for just 1,250 Zionists Palestinians rejected the 
Peel Commission proposal (Zai'ter, 1955,128). 
On the other hand the Zionists looked to Peel's proposals for partition as a positive 
step, because it was the first time the British talked about a Jewish state, not a 
Jewish home. But they asked for more land for their proposed state. They did not 
define the precise area of their state, so since that time we can assume that the 
Zionist expansionist ideology existed. According to a David Ben Gurion (head of 
the Zionist Agency in Palestine) speech in May 1937 to the international Zionist 
congress 
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There could be no question ... of giving up any part of the 
land of Israel 
... it was arguable that the ultimate goal would 
be achieved most 
equally by accepting the Peel proposal (Cited in Smith. 1992.99). 
The Zionist Congress asked their leader to negotiate with the British government an 
increase in the area of the Jewish state under the British Mandate. The Zionist 
concept concerning the area of their state was recondite and unclear (Smith, 1992. 
99). The ambiguity of land size used by Zionists remained uncertain, vague, and 
undetermined. There was no law that defined the border and the area of the state of 
Israel. The area and borders were linked with a holy promise. The promise they 
adopted would be determined according to Zionists capabilities, which meant that 
military power was to determine a suitable arrangement for the area of the state. 
1.3.5 The Land Purchasing Zones 
Colonial support for Great Britain in 1939 on the eve of World War II was 
important, especially in the Middle East, so as to keep communication with India 
open. The key influencing factor in the region were the Arabs. They were angry at 
Great Britain because of its Policy in Palestine, so in order to pacify them Britain 
attempted to change its policy in the area. As a consequence, it issued the White 
Paper of 1939, which differed from the previous White Papers of 1922 and 1930 
(Smith, 1992,101; Verdery, 1971,323). The British government stated: 
His Majesty's government believed that the framers of the Mandate in 
which the Balfour declaration was embodied could not have intended 
that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish state against the will of 
the country. 
The White paper determined the number of the Jewish immigrants to be 15,000 per 
annum which would last for five years. Jewish migration should then continue with 
the approval of the Arab side. It also confirmed that within ten years of 
independence Palestine would exist and the Jews should form a minority in the 
proposed state. 
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In respect of the question of transferring land the White Paper classified Palestine 
into three zones 
The steady sale in recent years of Arab land to Jews, there is now in 
certain areas no room for further transfers of Arab land, whilst in some 
other areas such transfers of land must be restricted if Arab cultivators 
are to maintain their existing standard of life and a considerable 
landless Arab population is not soon to be created ... 
in these 
circumstances, the High Commissioner will be given general powers to 
prohibit and regulate transfers of land. 
The Palestinian Arabs rejected the White Paper, because it did not put an end to 
Jewish migration or even to the transfer of land. All wings of the Zionists rejected 
the White Paper. They resisted it politically and military. The S'teirn and Argon 
groups (rightist) started to conduct military operations against both the British 
forces and the Palestinian Arabs (Moharib, 1981,74). 
1.3.6 The Post World War II and the U. N. Partition Plan 
As a result of World War II, the United States emerged as the leader of the Western 
Bloc. Britain wanted to include it in the Palestinian question so that they formed a 
common committee (the Anglo-American committee). The committee 
recommendations represented as the American well and Britain accepted them 
because it needed American aid. The American part of the committee asked for 
100,000 Jews to be allowed to migrate to Palestine. They also asked to remove the 
restrictions on transferring land (Anglo-Anglo American Committee, 1945). 
In 1947 Britain asked the United Nations, as the successor of the League of Nations 
to help resolve the Palestinian question. The United Nations formed an 
international committee of eleven members. The Zionists welcomed the committee, 
while Palestinian Arabs boycotted it. The committee its proposal that asked for the 
partition of Palestine into two independent states one for the Palestinian Arabs and 
the other for the Jews, where Jerusalem would be under international trusteeship 
(Zai'ter, 1955.188; Heikal, 1996a, 225). 
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In November 2,1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the partition 
plan (map 1.3) for Palestine by more than the 2/3 majority which was required for 
its justification. Some states such as Haiti, Liberia, Philippines, China, Ethiopia and 
Greece were subjected to the American pressure. The American President 
personally took change of the matter, while Congressmen and Senators threatened 
the suspension of American aid to some states (Zai'ter, 1955,202; Smith, 1992, 
138; Heikal, 1996a, 235). 
The plan allotted the Jewish state 54 per cent of the land areaabout 14,200,000 
dunums, yet the Zionists in Palestine formed only 33 per cent of the population. It 
was to be inhabited by 460,000 Palestinians and 530,000 Zionists. About 36 per 
cent of the Palestinian Arabs would be under Zionist rule, where as Zionists would 
amount to only 2 per cent in the proposed Arab state. The Zionist accepted the plan, 
while the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab states rejected it. The result of the 
partition plan was five Arab-Israeli wars (Zai'ter, 1955,191). 
1.4 The Post-Israeli State 
As a result of the Partition plan, Britain decided to withdraw its troops from 
Palestine before May 14,1948. The General Assembly approved the plan without 
putting in place the mechanism for implementing it. With the Palestinian rejection 
of the plan the United Nations did nothing to put into effect the international well 
for partition. The new-born Arab states (Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq) which 
rejected the partition plan decided to intervene in the crisis by sending troops to 
Palestine. The total number of Arab and Palestinian troops (al-Jihad al-Mokadas) 
was less than that of the Zionist gangs and troops. The Zionists were also militarily 
better trained and equipped (Heikal, 1996b, 77; Kelsh, 1998). 
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The Arabs were defeated in the war and the Palestinian people were exposed to 
disastrous consequences. 1948 was a turning point in Palestinian history and its 
future, as well as for the Zionists. A Jewish state (Israel) was established on about 
80 per cent of Mandated Palestine. The remaining 20 per cent of what became the 
West Bank and Gaza-Strip came under the Arab control of Jordan and Egypt 
respectively (see map 1.4). 
During the first Arab-Israeli War, over 700,000 Palestinians fled or were forced to 
leave their villages and cities and became refugees (6). The subsequent loss to the 
Palestinians consisted of a huge amount of land and other property. Israel took over 
this land through a variety of mechanisms (Ruedy, 1971,148-154; Shakour, 1996, 
9: 10; Fischbach, 1997,39). The original population of around 362 Palestinian 
villages and many cities (such as Jaffa, Haifa, and Acre) were expelled. Ninety-six 
Palestinian villages remained with their inhabitants and came under a harsh Israeli 
military government for more than twenty years. More than 30,000 Palestinians 
became absentees inside what became Israel. (Zureik, 1996,327). 
In early March 1948, the Haganah act up a committee for Arab properties in the 
villages to control lthe and left by the Palestinians. The new Israeli state absorbed 
about 15 million dunums that it claimed did not belong to individual Palestinians, 
in addition to over 3 million dunums of individually-owned refugee land. The latter 
was taken over by the office of the Israeli Custodian of Absentees. According to the 
Israeli law of 1950 the Custodian was allowed to transfer the land it held to a new 
agency called the Development Authority (governmental institution). By the end of 
1953, the Custodian disposed of all of its refugee property to the Development 
Authority (Fischbach, 1997,39). 
In June 1953, the Israeli state and the Development Authority agreed to sell over 
2,300,000 dunums of the land under their control to the Jewish National Fund. By 
1960, the land belonging to refugees ended up in the hands of the Israel Land 
Authority (Fischbach. 1997.39). It is important to mention that the only 
international resolution regarding the Palestinian refugee question was the U. N. 
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General Assembly resolution no. 194 for the year 1948. This resolution asked Israel 
to allow an immediate return of the Palestinian refugees and to compensate those 
who did not want to return (7). 
1.5 The Result of the 1967 War and the West Bank and Gaza-Strip 
The war of June 1967 was considered to be the most important change in the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, in regard to territorial acquisition. All the Arab-Israeli efforts 
regarding peace based on the result of this war. 
1.5.1 Results of the 1967 War 
In June 1967 Israel attacked the Arab armies on three fronts; Egypt, Syria and 
Jordan. For Israel the war short and successful; it defeated the Arab states within 
six days and occupied large areas (Map 1.4), estimated at about three times its own 
size (8). It occupied the Sinai Peninsula (more than 60,000 square km), and the 
Gaza-Strip (360 square km representing 3 per cent of all Mandate Palestine) it took 
over land from Egypt on the southern front, the Golan Heights (1150 square km) 
from Syria on the northern front, and the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), 
which formed 20 per cent of Palestine; over 5,850 square km) and from Jordan on 
the eastern front (al-Hoor and Mossa, 1983,67; Shello, 1985 , 
13). 
Another Palestinian exodus occurred as a result of the 1967 War (9). William 
Harris, estimated the departure of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
following the war of June 1967, to be about 320,000: approximately 250,000 and 
70,000 respectively left the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. The Jordanian government 
calculateded the exodus from the West Bank as only 355,000 (Harris, 1980,17). In 
1977 The United Nations for Relief and Working Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), 
reckoned that 500,000 Palestinians had been displaced from the occupied territories 
(Abdul Hadi, 1985,181). Israel hoped that the evacuation would have been far 
greater. This was to be the Zionist strategy for controlling land after clearing of its 
from its original owner. In November 1991 Haim Hertzog, the Israeli army's first 
military commander of the West Bank, and the Israeli President from 1983 to 1993 
revealed publicly and proudly that in the immediate aftermath of the 1967 War, he 
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efficiently organised and carried out in co-operation with commander of Jerusalem 
the operation of transferring 200,000 Palestinians from the West Bank (cited in 
Masalha, 1999,91: 92). 
Directly after the Israeli forces entered the West Bank and Gaza-Strip, a harsh 
military occupation was created and installed. In practice Israel established a 
military government in the occupied territories (Chomsky, 1983,103). 
Article 35 of the Israeli military proclamation no. 3 of 7 June 1967 stated that: 
The military forces and their officers must apply the terms of the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 concerning the protection of 
civilians during times of war and concerning everything that affects 
legal proceedings and that if there should be any contradiction between 
this proclamation and the said convention, the terms of the convention 
must be followed (Cited in Shehadeh, 1985,43). 
Article 35 was cancelled by Israeli military order no. 144 of October 22 (10), 1967. 
Apart from the first five months of Israeli occupation of the Arab territories, Israel 
did not perceive these territories as being occupied, but as being part of Israel itself. 
Therefore, it rejected the application of the Geneva Conventions in these areas, 
although it agreed to apply the humanitarian measures mentioned in those 
conventions (Shehadeh, 1985,43). However, these measures were daily violated by 
successive Israeli governments. 
1.5.2 Geography, Topography, and Demography of the West Bank and Gaza- 
Strip 
More than 65 per cent of the Israeli population is concentrated in the coastal plain 
area which extends from north of Gaza to the Israeli-Lebanese border in the north 
of Mandate Palestine; more than 80 per cent of Israeli industry is located in this 
area. This region is the most vital one for Israel, therefore, safeguarding it is 
regarded as a real security need Israel (Shello, 1985,13). 
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On the eastern front before the June 1967 War, the length of this border was 984 
km, After the war this decreased to 550 km. The distance between the Jordan River 
(as the international border between Mandate Palestine and Jordan) and the coast of 
Tel Aviv is about eighty km (Shello, 1985,13; Harris, 1980,5). The distance 
between the Israeli coastal area and the western border of the West Bank ranges 
between 14 km to 30 km from north to south (see map 1.4). Israel's main problem is 
that its most vital area is situated on this narrow stitch of the coastal Plain (Allon, 
1976 cited in Lukacs, 1992), whereas most of the West Bank is high land inhabited 
by a considerable number of Palestinians. Therefore, the West Bank represents an 
important strategic area for Israeli security, and is the most significant of the areas 
occupied by Israel during the war of June 1967 (Harris, 1985,5). 
The West Bank 
The West Bank (see map 1.4) is divided into three zones: 
i) The Jordan Rift, which lies between the banks of the Jordan River. On the West 
Bank of the river the Jordan Rift stretches from Lake Teberias in the north to the 
Dead Sea in the south, totalling of 105 km length. This valley lies below sea level. 
The width of the Jordan Rift ranges between 2-10 km from north to south. The 
valley has a very small Palestinian population in relation to the other three parts of 
the West Bank (Shello, 1985,15). 
ii) The western and eastern slopes of the mountains along the West Bank, where the 
eastern slopes form a steep precipice of around 1200 -1400 meters into the Jordan 
Rift, and the western slopes lead gradually from around 600 meters down to the 
Mediterranean coastal areas. Israeli control over the eastern slopes enables it to 
prevent any possible attack from the east. In addition the low population level of the 
eastern slopes reduces the threat of Palestinian obstruction to any Israeli military 
advance, whereas the western slopes, with a relatively high population, represent 
potential problems (Shello, 1985,18). 
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iii) Tops of the West Bank mountains 
These high mountainous areas, around 10-25 km wide and 130 km long, are 
divided into two groups; the `Yehuda' Jerusalem mountains in the south, whose 
highest peak is 750 metres, and the Nablus `Samaria' mountains in the north, with a 
highest peak is 940 metres. These mountains form the backbone of the West Bank 
and are densely populated. The majority of West Bank cities, towns, and villages 
are located in this high mountainous area (Shello, 1985,21). 
The Gaza-Strip 
The Gaza-Strip is located to the south of the pre-June 1967 borders (see map 1.4), 
where the largest population in Mandate Palestine is located. It forms part of the 
coastal area and has a flat topography, which could not represent a direct threat to 
Israeli security. The length of the Gaza-Strip is about 40 km from north to the 
south. The width varies between 7-15 km from east to west. Gaza-Strip offers direct 
access to Israel's coastal cities. Israel needs the Gaza-Strip to act as a buffer zone 
against Egypt, which is why it conducted an intensive settlement plan of the Rafah 
approach in North Eastern Sinai (south of the Gaza-Strip). During its first years of 
occupation in the Gaza-Strip, Israel was hesitant to place settlers amongst a dense 
and politicised Palestinian concentration (Toak, 1993,49; Lesch, 1985,112). 
When Israel withdrew from Sinai, according to the Camp David Peace Accord of 
1979, the Israeli settlements there were destroyed. Subsequently, Israel concentrated 
its settlement activities in the southern area of the Gaza-Strip. The Gaza-Strip has a 
large and hostile population (Lesch, 1985,112: 13). That is why Israel proposed the 
Gaza-Strip as the first step for the political solution with Palestinians (chapter two). 
The main Palestinian-Israeli struggle over land in the future will be concentrated on 
the West Bank, because it is crucial to Israeli security needs for the protection of its 
heartland in the coastal plain. As it is the essential area for any Palestinian 
independent entity there could be no such thing without the West Bank. 
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1.6 Israeli Settlement Policy in the Palestinian Occupied Territories 
During the Israeli occupation period the Security Council and the General 
Assembly of the U. N. passed several resolutions designating the West Bank and 
Gaza-Strip as occupied territories (11) (Tschirgi, 1985,236). International treaties 
and conventions were to be applied in the West Bank and Gaza -Strip. The 1907 
Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land expressly 
prohibits annexation "of the whole or part of the occupied territory" by the 
occupation power (Article 47); and Article 49 of the 1949 Geneva Convention 
relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war clearly stipulates that 
"the Occupation Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian 
population into the territory it occupies" (Cited in Agwani, 1985,94). 
Jerusalem will be addressed in this thesis as an occupied territory, not as part of 
Israel. This is in accordance with the U. N. General Assembly resolution No. 2851 
of 1971, which called on Israel to: 
comply fully with its obligations under the Geneva Convention, 
declared all measures taken to settle the occupied areas, including 
Jerusalem completely null and void and demanded that Israel rescind 
and desist from all activity related to the establishment of settlements 
and the transfer of parts of its civilian population into the Occupied 
territories (Cited in Tschirgi, 1985,236). 
Israeli policy in Jerusalem has special importance because of its religious and 
strategic position dividing the West Bank into separate enclaves. Jerusalem attracts 
not only Jews, it is also significant for Muslims and Christians. 
The Israeli settlement policy in the Palestinian Occupied Territories passed through 
two stages (map 1.5). The first was under Labour governments, which continued 
until 1977. The second was part of a pattern which began with the Likud victory in 
the Israeli general election of 1977. The Labour governments adopted a 
continuation of the Zionist pre-1949 settlement policy namely that of establishing 
agricultural settlements considered important for economic and strategic reasons, 
and also for use as a political tool. 
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The Likud governments adopted a new pattern of settlement which had a religious 
dimension, which was that these communities should spread all fronts of the 
occupied territories 'Judea and Samaria', even into high-density Palestinian areas. 
because these were part of the land of Israel 'Eretz Israel'. This pattern, which is 
based on religious ideas, was totally different from the traditional Zionists approach 
described above (Harris, 1985,63). 
1.6.1 The Settlement under the Labour Governments 1967-1977 
As a result of the 1967 War, Israel found itself controlling huge areas compared to 
pre-June 1967 War (map 1.5). Israel Minor (the pre-June 1967 border) is small in 
size in relation to the Zionist dream of a national homeland. The map of the border 
of the Jewish national homeland, as submitted to the Paris Conference in 1919 (see 
map 1.1), was a real translation of Zionist aspirations. The war of 1967 gave Israel 
power over the vast majority of the areas demanded by Zionists for a national 
homeland in the Paris Peace Conference (Chomsky, 1983,161; Harkabi, 1988,40; 
Tessler, 1994,163). 
There is no doubt that all wings of any Labour government believe that Israeli 
settlements should be established in Occupied Arab Territories. The differences 
between them are about where, how, and the amount of land to be used for 
settlement. Various plans for Israeli occupation have been proposed by different 
wings of the Labour Party. These include minimalist (to keep the minimum land 
under the Israeli control) and maximalist proposals (Jaffari, 1981, xxvii). 
In July 1967 the Allon Plan was introduced, mid-way between a minimalist and 
maximalist approach. This was considered as being the most significant plan, and 
was initiated during the first decade of Israeli occupation. Allon proposed the 
annexation of 40 per cent of the West Bank and all of the Gaza-Strip (Harris, 1980, 
36). 
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Allon Plan 
Yegal Allon (the Minister of Labour in the coalition government of 1967) believed 
that Israel should not return to the borders of the pre-June 1967 War (Map 1.4), and 
at the same time Israel should seek peace with the Arab States. Also, that Israel 
should not trust the Arabs, even if a peace treaty were achieved. In other words, 
Israel should directly control strategic areas in the occupied territories; it must go 
beyond setting up military sites and immediately implement a comprehensive 
policy of Israeli settlement, leading to annexation of these strategic areas (Allon, 
1970,98: 100). The strategic area on the West Bank is the Jordan Rift, this would 
maximise Israel's security without adding more Palestinians, which meant that these 
areas should be semi-vacant of Palestinians in order to keep the Jewish state pure 
with only a small Arab minority. Allon tried to avoid the demographic problem of a 
relatively high population increase among Palestinians. In that case Israel would 
absorb about 40 per cent of land on the West Bank (Harris, 1980,36; Efrat, 1982, 
36; Chomsky, 1988,105). 
After this annexation the Allon Plan would leave two Palestinian enclaves; one to 
the north of Jerusalem, and the second to the south. Both would be surrounded by 
Israeli territories and be linked to Jordan by a narrow stitch. The two enclaves 
would be free of Arab forces. Israel would indirectly control the entire West Bank 
by surrounding it with a strategic, military-agricultural settlement belt (Agwani, 
1985,95). 
The plan was considered as a settlement strategy rather than as a formal political 
plan, therefore, it left the door open for negotiations with Arabs for a political 
settlement. The proposed security border would become an Israeli political border. 
The Jordan Rift was the most strategic area and the least populated. Allon's plan 
was to organise the settlement of that area, and he asked for the annexation of a 
twenty km strip that would pass through the Jordan Valley to the Dead Sea via the 
Wilderness of the Hebron mountains (Judia) and the Etzion Bloc. When Qirvat 
Arba near Hebron was established in 1968. Allon considered it part of his security 
belt (Oweiss. 1985,260). 
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The first settlements were based on agriculture and light industry. After four years 
of Israeli occupation on the West Bank ten settlements were set up within Allon's 
security belt in the Jordan Rift. By 1971 two chains of settlements came into 
existence; one on the rift bed and the second on the western slope of the Jordan 
Valley. Fourteen Moshavim, six Kibbutzim, two Nahals and one Moshav were 
created. In 1975 settlers within this security belt numbered 1,800 and remained the 
same until 1981. In 1982 the Palestinian population in the area was 28,000, this 
area was considered by Israelis as having a low Palestinian population (Oweiss, 
1985,260). The plan was to squeeze the Palestinians into the high land, in order to 
create a buffer and security zone between Jordan and the Palestinians on the West 
Bank. 
Allon required the annexation of Jerusalem, because of its valuable religious and 
ideological importance to the Jews. Therefore, he asked for an open settlement in 
the city. As for the annexation of the Gaza-Strip, the Palestinian refugees resulting 
from the 1948 War would be resettled in northern Sinai and the West Bank. This 
meant that about 75 per cent of the Gaza-Strip population would be expelled; this 
annexation would eliminate the possibility of an Egyptian invasion (Allon, 1967 
cited in Harris, 1980,40). 
The Allon proposal was submitted officially to the Labour government in July 
1967. William Harris reported that the government adopted the Plan, but did not 
announce it officially in order to avoid international criticism, and the intervention 
of the US (Harris, 1980,36). Oweiss noted that the Labour government approved 
the plan in June 1968 (1985,259). 
The Dayan Proposal 
The Israeli Minister of Defence, Moshe Dayan, played a central role in the Labour 
government's settlement policy. He believed that the settlement areas would be part 
of Israel for ever (Chomskv, 1983,104). Dayan was considered a maximalist. In 
August 17.1973 his plan was published in the Israeli Ha'aretz newspaper, known as 
the 'Dayan Document' (Harris. 1980.177). 
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Dayan favoured a large group of settlements on the West Bank, even in the 
populated highlands. The existing ones were to be developed through the assurance 
of an additional budget. He asked for the setting up of Jewish urban and industrial 
centres in Jerusalem, and also in other Palestinian cities such as Qalqilia and 
Tulkarm in the north west of the West Bank. In the south of the West Bank, in the 
Qiryat Arba settlement near Hebron, he asked for a continuation and accelerated 
rate of industrial and population expansion. He requested the Israeli Land Authority 
to acquire land in these territories for the provision of more settlements. He also 
asked that Israeli companies and individuals be allowed to purchase land in the 
Palestinian Occupied Territories (Dayan, 1973 cited in Harris, 1980,177). 
Dayan believed that creating of settlements in the occupied territories was not of 
great importance for the security of the state of Israel, but it did however create a 
political reality which could be used in any negotiation process with the Arabs. He 
believed that these settlements would not be abandoned. Dayan asked for 
permanent Israeli control over all of the West Bank (Dayan cited in Chomsky, 
1983,105). 
Political settlement with the Arabs was to be functional rather than territorial. Israel 
would remain in the Palestinian Occupied Territories and have a free hand in 
security issues. The settlements would continue without obstacles, and would have 
access to each other, and to the Israeli pre-June 1967 borders. For Dayan, a solution 
to the Palestinian problem could be self-administration for Palestinians (Harris, 
1980,51). 
The Galili Document 
On 17 August 1973, Ysraeli Galili, head of the Inter-Ministerial Settlement 
Committee, submitted his draft to the cabinet. This was prepared in response to a 
request made by Prime Minister Golda Meir withregard to the determination of 
future government policy. The government approved Galili's draft, which became 
known as the Galili Document (Chomsky, 1983,105). 
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The document asserted that there could be no change in government political 
standing or status of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. This meant that 
Israeli policy would continue as under the previous government. The document 
proposed the establishment of new settlements, and the development of the present 
outposts in the Jordan Rift, in order to increase the Jewish population and industrial 
development. A regional centre for the Israeli settlements in the Jordan Rift would 
be established. The document requested the Israeli Land Authority to acquire land 
for the proposed area by any `effective means' (see 2.5 for Israeli methods of 
confiscating land) for settlement activities; the Authority would then lease land in 
the occupied territories to Israeli companies and individuals. These companies and 
individuals would be permitted to purchase land in the occupied territories in co- 
ordination with the Authority. In Jerusalem, as with all other Israelis, the 
annexation and settlement activities would continue to define the city as the Israeli 
capital (Galili Document, 1973 cited in Lukacs, 1992,184). 
Regarding the relation between the Galili Document and the two main proposals 
(Allon Plan and Dayan Document) William Harris stated: 
Nothing could now be construed as over-throwing the settlement and 
territorial dimensions of the Allon Plan, and to this extent the Galili 
Document was undoubtedly a successful upholding of existing 
government policy as represented by the Allon Plan ... 
Yet, at the same 
time, none of the principles of the Dayan Document had been rejected 
outright (Harris, 1980,57). 
Labour Party security theory could be described as "a security border that is not a 
state border is not a security border ... a state 
border that is not settled along its 
length by Jews is not a state border" (Allon, 1970). Therefore, the Labour party's 
strategy was to build a security belt in the Golan Heights, the Jordan Rift, and 
northern Sinai in the Rafah Approach. The Labour Party did not adopt any official 
policy towards settlement in the Occupied Arab Territories. The decision was "not 
to decide". But the absence of a formal decision did not mean the absence of 
settlement activities (Harris, 1980.40: 147; Jaffari, 1982. xxvii). 
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It is useful to point out that about 30 per cent of the settlements built under Labour 
governments were outside the Jordan Rift (Allon Plan). For example: East 
Jerusalem; the Latrun area, which controls the strategic highway between Jerusalem 
and Tel Aviv/Jaffa, where three Palestinian villages were destroyed and their 
inhabitants expelled immediately after the June war of 1967, and the land 
confiscated and annexed to Jerusalem to ensure Israel's permanent control; Etzion 
Bloc (south west of Bethlehem); and Qiryat Arba near Hebron. The last two were 
built on a religious base. The Labour governments permitted the settlement in 
Jerusalem and Hebron because of their nationalistic and religious importance to 
Jews (Lesch, 1985,109). 
From 1967 until the Labour party defeat in the General election of 1977, the Labour 
governments established 25 official sites in the Jordan Rift, and 7 official sites on 
the rest of the West Bank (excluding the settlements in East Jerusalem). The Gush 
Emunim Movement created three settlements on the West Bank (Harris, 1980, 
128). In the Gaza Strip, the Labour governments built five settlements after 
confiscating thousands of dunums in the area (Jaffari, 1981, xxxviii). The most 
significant changes, resulting from settlement policy during the Labour 
governments, were in Eastern Jerusalem, the Jordan Rift, and the south and north of 
Hebron. The effect on the rest of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip Settlements was 
relatively small. 
1.6.2 The Settlement Policy under the Likud Governments 
After the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, Menachem Begin stated that 
"Eretz Israel [the land of Israel] will be restored to the people of Israel. All of it and 
forever (Cited in Chomsky, 1983,161). 
_Begin 
led the Likud Party to victory in the 
Israeli general election of May 1977. He dealt with the Palestinian Occupied 
Territories as 'liberated land'. The party believed in the idea of settlement in Eretz 
Israel (land of Israel), in other words, Jews had to settle everywhere in this land. 
The biblical Jewish settlement dominated Israeli colonisation policy, and the 
application of the 'Jewish historic right' in the occupied territories became stronger 
under Likud governments. The Likud government began large-scale settlement 
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activities everywhere in the West Bank, even in the highlands. according to 'Jewish 
historic rights'. Bible belts here would be more obvious than the security belts 
(Harris, 1980,3: 138; ). To achieve this important target the government resorted to 
the confiscation of large areas of land from Palestinians. 
The Israeli withdrawal from Sinai According to the Camp David Accord, 
encouraged the Israelis to establish more communities on the West Bank and in the 
Gaza-Strip. These activities in the Gaza-Strip (see map 4.1 & 6.1) became more 
intensive particularly after the Israeli withdrawal and the destroying of their 
settlements in Sinai (Jaffari, 1981, xI). 
In 1979 the settlers in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip (excluding East Jerusalem) 
numbered 64,000; when Labour left government in 1977 they were 10,000. Within 
the first two years of Likud rule from 1977 until 1979, the number of settlers 
increased more than six times, forming 2 per cent of the total Jewish population in 
Mandate Palestine, and 4.5 per cent of the occupied territories were the Arab 
population (Harris, 1980,160). The Foundation of the Middle East Peace 
(Washington base) estimated the number of Israeli settlers in the Palestinian 
Occupied Territories in 1976 as 3,176 and in 1979 as 10,000 (cited in Aronson, 
1996,7). This figure seems to be a gross under-estimation compared with other 
sources, as we shall show. 
Three main plans directed the Likud governments after 1977: the Sharon Plan, the 
Drobelz Plan and the Plan of the Ministry of Defence. 
The Sharon Plan 
Ariel Sharon was the Agricultural Minister in Begin's first government and was 
head of the Ministerial Settlement Committee. His plan was for Israeli settlements 
to spread in two parallel lines; the first was a coastal line (western), where more 
than 70 per cent of the Israeli population live, the second was an eastern line from 
the Golan Heights in the north to Sharm al-Shekh in Sinai in the south. The lines 
were to be linked together by many cross and linear roads. This system would 
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represent a dual backbone including the western and eastern flanks of Israeli 
security (Jaffari, 1981, xi). 
Sharon proposed the establishment of three settlement blocs on the West Bank. The 
first one would be in the middle of the West Bank, where three large defensive 
urban centres would be established at the entrance to Jerusalem, to defend the city. 
The second bloc would be built in the north of the West Bank, linking with the 
coastal area on the one hand, and isolating the dense Arab population in the north of 
the West Bank from that inside Israel itself (living near to the pre-June 1967 
border) on the other. The third bloc would be located in the south of the West Bank 
around Hebron, where a group of settlements would be created to link with Qiryat 
Arba (Yediot Ahranot September 23,1977 cited in Jaffari, 1981, xli). 
Sharon believed that his plan would be reasonable both in war and peace. Israel 
would control 70 per cent of the West Bank and Palestinians would control the 
remaining 30 per cent. Within the first four-year term of government; Sharon could 
boast of 44 new settlements on the West Bank (Agwani, 1985,92). 
The aim of Sharon's plan was to divide the West Bank into many isolated cantons. 
In practice the Likud government activities regarding settlement on the West Bank 
worked alongside the Sharon Plan. The situation created under Likud rule was very 
difficult and dangerous for the Palestinians. The geographical unity of the West 
Bank itself was totally destroyed. The complexities and difficulties in the Oslo 
Agreements with regard to the control of land resulted from the fragmentation 
caused by the settlement policy, especially during the Likud governments. The 
break up of Palestinian society on the West Bank and in the Gaza-Strip will be 
discussed in the following chapters of this work. 
The Drobles Plan 
Matityahu Drobles, the second president in the Settlement Department of the IZO, 
announced his plan in October 1978 on behalf of the IZO/Department for Rural 
Settlements. He asked for the creation of 46 ne« settlements for 16,000 Jewish 
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families. Drobles proposed expanding existing settlements, both old and those 
under construction, to absorb an additional 11,000 families (U. N. Security Council, 
official records, 34th year cited in Agwani, 1985,92). 
The proposed communities would be distributed along the West Bank from north to 
south, divided into 22 settlement areas. The main concepts of the plan were; first, 
that settlement is vital to Israeli security needs, therefore, new colonies should be 
established in strategic areas to control all of the West Bank, and reinforce internal 
and external security. Second, the new settlements should be set up around and 
inside the Palestinian population. Third, they should be linked together and not 
isolated (Keren Kaymet official magazine, August 1980 cited in Jaffari, 1981, xliii- 
xliv). 
In this way Drobles could prevent any expansion of Palestinians in the villages, 
towns and cities, and the land was to be confiscated. This type of occupation would 
prevent Palestinians from thinking about independence, and would remove any 
Israeli doubts about permanent occupation (Keren Kaymet official magazine, 
August 1980 cited in Jaffari, 1981, xliii-xliv). 
Plan of Ministry of Defence 
The settlement plan adopted by the Defence Minister (Ezra Whitzman), emerged as 
a result of the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty. It demanded the amalgamation of all 
small settlements which had spread out in various parts of the West Bank into six 
urban centres. Three to be built around Jerusalem to assert its Jewish status, and the 
other three to be created in the north of the West Bank. The centres were to have 
mutual access and be linked to Israel by new roads which would avoid passing 
through Palestinian populated areas (Jaffari, 1981, xlii). 
1.7 Israeli Methods of Acquiring Land 
Following the first Arab-Israeli v ar in 1948 the West Bank and Gaza-Strip came 
under Jordanian and Egyptian rule respectively. With regard to land laws. Jordan 
applied British laww to the West Bank based on the Ottoman Land Code of 1858. 
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which had been amended and developed during Ottoman rule, and also by the 
British Mandate. Jordan amended the land law to provide for Palestinian land 
access. Therefore, the theoretical base of the Ottoman Land Code continued to be 
applied (Shehadeh, 1985,23). The Gaza-Strip was under Egyptian rule. Egypt dealt 
with it as a Palestinian territory, not as a part of Egypt, and did not claim 
sovereignty over it. With regard to the law of land holding, Egypt applied the same 
laws as the Jordanian regimes (Levi, 1982,105). 
Directly after the June 1967 War, the Israeli military commanders on the West 
Bank (Judia and Samaria) and Gaza Strip issued Proclamation 2. This proclamation 
declared the existing laws prior to June 1967 War as valid, unless they were in 
contradiction to the proclamation itself or with any legislation issued by the military 
commander (Military Orders), whether by him or in his name (Levi, 1982,105). 
With the Israeli take over of the Palestinian Occupied Territories, the powers of 
Jordanian government and Egyptian administration were transferred to Israeli 
military commanders each in his own area. A military commander represents the 
executive authority, and according to the Proclamation 2, he is also considered the 
legislative authority. He can enact new laws, cancel or suspend present laws, cancel 
or suspend existing laws, or make legislative changes (Levi, 1982,109). 
The first Israeli settlement after the 1967 War was set up on the Golan Heights (12). 
Shortly afterwards Israel created Kfar Etzion as a first settlement on the West Bank 
(Chomsky, 1983,104). The area covering the Kfar Etzion bloc (group of 
settlements) is estimated at 30,000 dunums. Zionists purchased this area before the 
war of 1948 during the time of the British Mandate. Under Jordanian rule, between 
1948-1967, this area was under the trusteeship of the Jordanian custodian 
(Custodian of Enemy Property). Consequently, when the Israelis occupied the West 
Bank they built their first settlement in this area (Drori, 1982.44; Shehadeh, 1985, 
39). The same case was repeated in the Gaza Strip in 1970, when Kfar Darom was 
established in the same place as the previous settlement of pre-1948 War. 
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The question that arose as a result of the Etzion bloc was that when the West Bank 
came under Israeli control, why were Israelis who were absent between 1948-1967 
given the right to return to land which had been registered in their names on the 
West Bank. Consequently, why then were the millions of dunums located in the 
Israel's pre-June 1967 borders owned by Palestinians who were absent between 
1948-1967 and living on the West Bank and Gaza-Strip not returned? Israel 
continued to consider these people (Palestinians) as absentees, even though the 
West Bank and the Gaza-Strip came under Israeli rule. 
The Judaization process of the West Bank depended upon the ownership of land 
and Israel resorted to all 'legal' and illegal means to acquire land. The familiar 
methods of acquiring land used by the Israelis were; state land, absentee land, and 
land purchases. 
The Elon Moreh Case 
The case of Elon Moreh pressured the Israeli military government into adopting a 
new method of land acquisition, which was to declare land needed for confiscation 
as 'state land'. 
On 5 June 1979, the Israeli Military Commander of the West Bank issued a new 
Military Order concerning the seizure of seven hundred dunums, located in the 
region under his control. The reason for the seizure, as expressed in the order, was 
for military purposes, but an Israeli settlement was built. The land had been 
classified as private, and the owners of the land applied to the Israeli High Court. 
The court decision considered the Military Order null and void, because the seizure 
process was not primarily for military purposes, but for political considerations. 
The court asked for the evacuation of the settlers and the army from the land 
(Shehadeh, 1985.20). 
In regard to the Elon More case, the High Court imposed two limitations on any 
future recourse to the court in cases of land requisition, or possession by military 
authorities. Raja Shehadeh stated the limitation as: 
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1) Seizure of privately owned land could only be prevented or reversed 
by recourse to the High Court. 2) The High Court was not prepared to 
intervene in any dispute over the ownership status of land (Shehadeh, 
1985,21). 
However, the High Court's decision did not prevent the Israeli government from 
creatinging the Elon Moreh settlement, which was built on 'state land' near to its 
original site. The two limitations paved the way for the military government to 
search for non-private land owned (the other categories of land holding (as 
mentioned in the previous chapter) for the acquisition of land (Shehadeh, 1985,22; 
Lewan, 1985,292). 
Seizing Land for Military Purposes 
Within the first decade of Israeli occupation, the most popular method adopted by 
the military government for acquiring land was 'requisition for military purposes'. 
Any category of land could be confiscated for this purpose by issuing a Military 
Order declaring that the land was needed for vital and immediate military 
requirements (Shehadeh, 1985,37). 
In this type of expropriation, the military government does not become owner of the 
land, the owner of the seized land remains the original owner. The military 
government is suppose to pay an annual payment to the landlord for the use of his 
land, however, most Palestinians refuse. The land returns to its owner when the 
military is removed from the site, and when a military government is terminated 
(Drori, 1982,51). 
Up to 1985, Israel had seized about 35,000 dunums on the West Bank for military 
purposes. Permanent settlements were created on some of these lands, where 
seizing of private property was supposed to be for temporary and not permanent use 
(Drori, 1982.51, Shehadeh, 1985.37). 
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Acquiring State Land 
Hundreds of thousands of dunums were confiscated by the Israeli military 
government by declaring it 'state land'. This 'state land' constituted the greatest 
concentration of Israeli settlements. Israel considers all unregistered land as 'state 
land'. In 1967 non-registered land in the West Bank was estimated at two-thirds of 
the total land. The Israeli military government discontinued the registration of land 
after the June 1967 War, later, registration was facilitated only for Israeli Jews. Miri 
land, metroka land, and mewat land were classified by the military government as 
'state land' (Shehadeh, 1985,6: 27; Agwani, 1985,98; Fischbach, 1997,41). 
Military Orders concerning government properties no, 59 of July 1967, and no. 364 
of December 1969 dealt with acquiring 'state land'. These regulations were largely 
used following the high court decision in the Elon Moreh case. Briefly, the orders 
state that when military authorities declare land as 'state land', this is sufficient 
proof unless the opposite is proven. In other words the onus of proof lies not with 
the military government, but with the Palestinian owner. This in total contradiction 
to normal procedure. In this situation Palestinians can only appeal to a Military 
Objection Committee which is itself enacted by Military Order 172. The decision of 
the committee is no more than a recommendation, and the military government has 
the right to ignore it. Until 1985, only 5 per cent of cases taken to this military 
committee were successful (Shehadeh, 1985,22: 24; Lesch, 1985,110). 
As mentioned in chapter one there was much debate about land ownership, where 
the great majority of land in Palestine was not registered. Palestinians were owners 
of the land by custom and tradition, but according to the land law these were not 
acknowledged as theirs. Therefore, the Israeli military government found this 
confusion over land ownership a real opportunity for acquiring land. The Israel's 
perverted use of the Ottoman Land Code enabled it to achieve its target of land 
expropriation. 
According to the British Mandate the Order-in-Council it did not include miri land 
as 'state land'. and the Jordanian laws continued as under British rule. Also. article 
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153 of the Israeli Land Code of 1969, which applied in Israel did not include miri 
land in 'state land'. Whereas the Israeli military government considered this same 
category as 'state land', which is really difficult to understand. Here we see Israel 
applying two different laws in two different places for the same category 
(Shehadeh, 1985,26; Agwani, 1985,98). 
Jordanian law allowed the expropriation of land only if it was to be used for public 
or military purposes. This process required approval from the Jordanian Cabinet, 
and finally from the King. The owner of the land was to be compensated with an 
amount equal to the market land value. Under Israeli occupation the military 
government only compensated owners of private land (who rejected Israeli 
compensation), owners of other categories were ignored. Most of land was 
expropriated to establish new settlements and for the settlers' public purposes, not 
for Palestinian public ends (Shehadeh, 1985,37). 
The implementation of Jordanian Law concerning the expropriation of land for 
public purposes was violated Shehade noted that "land were taken from the private 
individual (Arabs) who used it for private purposes and were given to other private 
individual (settlers) to use it for private purposes for long periods" (Shehadeh, 
1985,27). 
Acquiring Absentees Land 
The Israeli Absentee Property Law of 1950 defined an absentee as "someone who 
left to go to a country which is in a state of war with Israel". Millions of dunums 
came into Israeli hands in the pre-June 1967 borders (Israel Minor). Israeli Military 
Order no. 58, of July 1967, Concerning Abandoned Property, defined an absentee 
as, "someone who has left the area of the West Bank before, during, or after the 
time of the 1967 War". In this case a Palestinian who was resident in an Israeli 
friendly state before the war, such as the United States, would be considered as an 
absentee (Shehadeh. 1985,35). The differences in definition of the two laws were 
enacted to serve Israel in each region. 
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The absentee land was passed to the Custodian of Absentee Property. which had 
seized 430,000 dunums (Benvenisti, 1984,30) representing 7 per cent of total land 
area on the West Bank. Tafkaji, a Palestinian expert on the Israeli settlement issue 
believed that according to his daily follow-up of the land expropriations in the West 
Bank, Benvenisti's figure concerning the Palestinians' absentee land was 
exaggerated. However, Tafkaji has no accurate figure himself (Tafkaji interview 
October 13,1998). 
The function of the custodian was: 
to preserve and attend to the property until such time as its owners 
should return. He does not acquire ownership, and if he leased the land, 
he must deposit the rents in the name of the owner, pending his return 
(Cited in Drori, 1982,48). 
In practice the custodian dealt with absentee property as the absolute owner, 
transferring most of these properties through 49-year leases to Israeli settlers, in 
order to establish new settlements, but never to Palestinians (Drori, 1982,52; 
Shehadeh, 1985,36). 
As mentioned above, as a result of the June 1967 War hundreds of thousands of 
Palestinians left their home areas, including 88 per cent of the residents of the 
Jordan Rift. Consequently, 89,000 dunums were confiscated in the rift; 91 per cent 
was absentee land and private land, while 9 per cent was of 'state land'. A 
considerable portion of absentee land was leased to Israeli settlers in this area 
(Harris, 1980,15; Jaffari, 1981, xxxii; Drori, 1982,52). 
Acquiring Land by Declaring it a Closed Area 
Military Orders can declare certain areas in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip as closed 
areas, the justification being that the area is needed as army training grounds, firing 
ranges or for, manoeuvres and so on. The closure is permitted for a temporary 
period, and the owner of the land may cultivate it when military activities cease. 
However, in practice many land was acquired through this method, and the closure 
of land constituted the first step toward the creating of a new settlement. Qirvat 
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Arba, one of the largest settlements in the West Bank, was established by this 
method, also the land of Ma'ale Adomim (70,000 dunums) near Jerusalem was the 
first to be closed and a settlement was built in the area (Harris, 1980,119; Drori, 
1982,53; Shehadeh, 1985,37). 
Purchasing Land 
Jordanian Law prohibited citizens from selling land to non-Jordanians. Such a 
process could only be followed after obtaining special permission. According to the 
same law the selling of land to the enemy (Israelis) carried the death penalty; during 
the period of Israeli occupation, Palestinians of the West Bank held Jordanian 
citizenship (Abu Medain interview February 17,1999). 
The military government removed these restrictions which prevented Jewish 
companies from purchasing land. The Heymanuta Company, affiliated to the IZO, 
was working in the Palestinian Occupied Territories for land purchase. As in 1979, 
restrictions on the purchase of land on the West Bank by individual Israelis was 
removed by the Israeli Military Commander of the West Bank (Jaffari, 1981, xlviii; 
Drori, 1982,53). Moshe Drori estimated what Heymanuta purchased 73,000 up to 
1982 (Drori, 1982,52). Kalil Tafkaji confirmed that up until the end of 1998 Israeli 
companies and individuals purchased no more than 100,000 dunums. He asserted 
that the great majority of these purchases were illegal such as; 1) Using fake 
documents with fake signatures/imprints of people who had already died in order to 
sell the land. 2) By purchasing a tract from a person who was not the sole heir but 
was willing to sell the tract without the approval of the remaining heirs (Tafkaj i 
interview October 13,1998). The registration process for the purchase of land by 
Israelis (individuals and companies) was conducted in secret. The military 
government established a secret Land Registration Department at its headquarters, 
therefore, it is difficult to calculate the actual number of dunums purchased by 
Israelis. Raja Shehadeh estimated this area as. "it constitutes a small percentage of 
the land used for settlement. " (Shehadeh, 1985.39). 
I2' 
Many Palestinians have been martyred defending their land against theft from 
Israeli settlers. On March 30,1976 (land day) was witness to Palestinian resistance. 
Seven Palestinians were killed on the West Bank and inside Israel. Public 
demonstrations spread to the whole of Mandate Palestine rejecting the Israeli policy 
of confiscating land. 
1.8 Developments in Palestinian-Israeli Political Thought since the 
1967 war 
There is no doubt that what resulted from the Israeli occupation of the West Bank 
and the Gaza-Strip changed the political stance of both Palestinians and Israelis. 
The development and change of political thought amongst the PLO was greater and 
faster than that of the Israelis. The dual society that was created in the Palestinian 
Occupied Territories as a result of the Israeli settlement policy, encouraged the 
Palestinian leaders to be more realistic in proposing and dealing with political plans 
in order to resolve the Palestinian question. 
The PLO's rejection of different political resolutions in the early years of the Israeli 
occupation was testament to the relation between the land and the political solution. 
However, with time Israeli settlement expansion provoked a real fear on the 
Palestinian side for Palestinian political aspirations of independence. The leaders of 
the PLO were concerned that if the situation continued there would be no land left 
to be negotiated for due to the expansion of the Israeli settlements and a large scale 
increase of settlers. 
1.8.1 On the Israeli Level 
The principles guiding the Israeli government in the aftermath of the June 1967 
War, was base on the idea of no return to the 1967 War borders. The Israeli Prime 
Minister Levi Eshkol supported the Allon Plan in regard to settlement in strategic 
areas of the Occupied Arab Territories (Harris, 1980,51). Israel accepted the U. N. 
Security Council resolution no. 242 (13) of 22 November 1967. 
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On February 9,1971, the Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir, announced a new 
Israeli Plan for the peace accord. New points in this proposal stated that Israel 
would continue to control the Gaza-Strip with the possibility of it becoming a 
Jordanian port. No withdrawal from the Syrian Golan Heights, and Jerusalem 
would remain unified and a part of Israel. The idea of a Palestinian independent 
state was rejected by the Israeli Prime Minister (News Week, February 15.1971 
cited in al-Hoor and Mossa, 1983,106). 
The Israeli interpretation of the U. N. Security Council resolution 242 differed from 
that of the Arab States. This interpretation could be understood from the reiteration 
of the Israeli Foreign Minister, Yigal Allon's Plan. His idea of the resolution was 
that it did not ask Israel to withdraw from all the territories, not even from those 
that came under Israeli control in the 1967 War. He believed that the resolution 
asked Israel to withdraw from territories, but that it had the right to establish 
settlements in the Occupied Arab Territories (Cited in Lukacs, 1992,190). Egypt 
and Jordan accepted U. N. Security Council resolution 242 which had been rejected 
by the Syrian government, although the Arab interpretation of the resolution was 
that Israel should withdraw from all the occupied territories (al-Hoor and Mossa, 
1983,133). 
If we examine the Israeli plans for establishing peace, these plans were directed at 
the Arab States, Egypt, Syria and Jordan in particular. None were directed towards 
the Palestinian people, or their representatives. During the first decade of Israeli 
occupation in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, there was no Israeli official 
statement mentioning the political rights of the Palestinian people. For the Israelis, 
the Palestinian question was no more than a humanitarian issue towards refugees. 
Israel refused to recognise the PLO as representative of the Palestinian people, and 
this stand continued until both sides arrived at the Oslo Agreement. 
At the Camp David Accord (14). Israel agreed to sit down with Jordan, Egypt, and 
representatives of the Palestinian people to negotiate the future of the West Bank 
and Gaza-Strip. The Accord included transitional arrangements for these areas for a 
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period not exceeding five years. Israel would withdraw its military government and 
its civil administration as soon as there was a self-governing authority to replace 
these two institutions. This would be elected by the inhabitants of the West Bank 
and Gaza-Strip. The transitional period would continue for five years, but in the 
third year, and no later, Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the elected representatives of the 
West Bank and Gaza-Strip would enter into negotiations to determine the final 
status of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. The outcomes of the negotiations must 
recognise the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements 
(Camp David Accord cited in Lucaks, 1992,157). 
On August 5,1981, the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) put in place the fundamental 
policy guidelines of the government of Israel. The main points regarding the future 
of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip were that: 
At the end of the transition period set down in the Camp David 
Agreement, Israel will present its claim and act to realise its rights of 
sovereignty over Judea, Samaria (West Bank), and Gaza district ... 
Settlement in the Land of Israel is a part and an integral part of national 
security. The government will act to strengthen, expand, and develop 
the settlement (Cited in Lukacs, 1992,199). 
1.8.2 On the Palestinian Level 
The Palestinian Liberation Organisation was founded in May 1964, according to the 
will of Arab regimes. It followed the Arab regimes' political stand from its 
inauguration up to 1967. When the head of the PLO, Ahmed al-Shokeri resigned in 
1967, a new chairman, Yahia Hamoda led the PLO during the transitional period, 
and lasted until February 1969. The Palestinian Council elected the leader of the 
Palestinian Guerrillas (al-Fatah Movement), Yasser Arafat, as leader of the PLO in 
1969 (Kallaf, 1973,112). 
The PLO and all the other Palestinian organisations rejected U. N. Security Council 
resolution 242. They believed that it ignored the existence of the Palestinian people 
and their right to self-determination. It dealt with the Palestinian question and the 
people as refugees, ignoring their right to return to their homes. The leadership 
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confirmed Palestinian rights to liberate their land through popular armed struggle 
(The Palestinian National Council July 13,1971 cited in Lukacs, 1992.291: 301) 
In 1974 the PLO's stand towards a political settlement started to change, when the 
Democratic Front to Liberate Palestine (DFLP) asked the PLO to enter into a 
political agreement through the Geneva conference, to found a mini state on the 
West Bank and Gaza-Strip. The al-Fatah Movement, led by Arafat (the main 
organisation of the PLO) supported the idea. Despite the tough conditions which 
were put forward by the Palestinian National Council to go through a political 
settlement, it was the first time that the Palestinians had mentioned a political 
settlement for solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The PLO's main objective 
was the creatingof a democratic state for the whole of Palestine (Mandate 
Palestine), where Arabs and Jews could live as equal citizens (Kalaf, 1978,215: 20). 
The PLO dealt more realistically with the political settlement during the eighties. 
The Soviet Union's Plan of February 1981, asked for a peaceful resolution to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, based on full Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Arab 
Territories; the establishing of an independent Palestinian state; and the right of all 
states to ensure their security and sovereignty, including those of Israel. The PLO 
accepted this Soviet proposal (Lukacs, 1992,20; al-Hoor and Mossa, 1983,201). 
This was the first time in Palestinian history that the PLO had accepted the 
existence of Israel and its right to live in security. The new aim of the PLO and its 
struggle became clearer than before; the setting up of a Palestinian state on the 
West Bank and in the Gaza-Strip with Jerusalem as its capital. The idea of a 
Palestinian state split the PLO itself, but finally the supporters of the new concept 
of the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in the Gaza-Strip 
managed to lead and direct the organisation towards this aim. 
1.9 Impact of the Palestinian Intifada over Palestinians and Israelis 
The Palestinian Uprising Intifada (15) was a result of Palestinian anger against the 
occupying authorities. This anger resulted from the political and economic 
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situation, which included daily harassment, arrests and humiliations. The 
Palestinian loss of land was one of the major factors that created the Palestinian 
Intifada. Johnson noted that the intensification of settlement building. the 
confiscation of land and repression since 1983 overwhelmed any Palestinian sense 
of having something to lose (Johnson & Others, 1990,32). 
Israeli activities in the Palestinian Occupied Territories changed its character. A 
large, new Palestinian working class had emerged (details regarding the Palestinian 
labour force in Israel are in chapter six), but there was much discrimination against 
Palestinian workers as opposed to Israeli workers. For example, the salary of an 
Israeli was twice that of a Palestinian performing the same task. Israelis received 
benefits from different institutions, whereas Palestinians received almost nothing 
(al-Ayyam June 1,2000), yet paid more tax than the Israelis. The latter hadone per 
cent of their salaries deducted by the Israeli workers association (Histadrut) but 
were ineligible to receive benefits and were denied membership. Large amounts 
were withheld for health, pension, and other funds for which Palestinians received 
little in return (Smith, 1992,292; Marshall, 1989,149). 
In December 1987, a popular uprising (Intifada) broke out in the Gaza-Strip and 
spread quickly throughout the West Bank. Israel used the harshest means (iron fist) 
to squash and stop the uprising. The Intifada affected both Palestinian and Israeli 
communities on both the political and socio-economic levels. The Intifada attracted 
international concern, and affected public opinion, and the policy makers (Marshall, 
1989,152). The Intifada lasted until 1993 when the PLO and the Israeli Labour 
government signed the Oslo Agreement. 
The Intifada adopted one aim -freedom and independence- (al-Hurria wa al- 
Istiglal). This created major changes in international politics with regard to the 
Middle East and the position of the Palestinian cause. As the Guardian commented 
the political achievement of the Intifada could be described in a few words: 
The uprising has succeeded brilliantly in many ways most of all in 
putting the Palestinian cause back on top of the international agenda 
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and creating unprecedented unity in Palestinian ranks (Cited in 
Marshall, 1989,152). 
The Intifada reinforced the position of the PLO both regionally and internationally. 
At the same time it forced it to deal with Palestinian aspirations more flexibly and 
realistically. As a result of the Intifada the international community became more 
prepared than ever before to strive for a political settlement to the Palestinian 
situation. 
Many Palestinian leaders reached the conclusion that at this stage of the Palestinian 
struggle they should be clear about their readiness to recognise the Jewish State, 
and to establish peace with it. The Palestinian National Council in its meeting in 
Algiers, November 1988 asked for: 
Convening an effective international conference on the issue of the 
Middle East and its core, the Question of Palestine ... 
based on the 
U. N. Security Council resolution 242 and the attainment of the 
legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people (Cited in Lukacs, 
1992,419). 
Officially the PLO had never accepted resolution 242 before as a basis for any 
political settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This new stand gave the PLO 
more freedom to move regionally and internationally. The PLO stand in recognising 
resolution 242 affected its unity. The DFLP, under Nayif Hawatmah, and the PFLP 
under George Habash, whose organisations were a part of the PLO, refused to 
recognise resolution 242. Outside the PLO body, the Islamic Resistance Movement 
(Hamas) also rejected the resolution (Smith, 1992,301). 
The Israeli reaction regarding the Intifada differed from one party to another. 
Shemon Perez, leader of the Labour Party at the beginning of the Intifada, realised 
that a return to the same situation in the Palestinian Occupied Territories as it was 
prior to the Intifada, was impossible. He understood that Palestinians in their 
Intifada wanted a fair solution to their cause. He supported the international 
conference in order to find a comprehensive answer to Arab-Israeli conflict, 
without mentioning the participation of the PLO at this conference. In September 
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1988 he asked Israel to enter into negotiations with the PLO. While Yitzhak Rabin. 
the Israeli Defence Minister of the national unity government (the second figure in 
the Labour Party) during the first years of the Intifada and later in 1992 the Israeli 
Prime Minister, recognised that the Israeli army was unable to resolve all security 
problems, especially on the Palestinian question. He asserted that a solution to this 
problem should be through negotiations (Abdulla, 1990,29: 33). Rabin did not 
mention with whom Israel should negotiate? But the Oslo Agreement was signed 
while he was leading Israel as Prime Minister. Finally, Rabin recognised the PLO 
as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 
Yitzhak Shamir, Israeli Prime Minister when the Intifada broke out in 1987, 
refused any political settlement based on Israeli withdrawal, even from the 
populated areas on the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. Shamir continued to consider 
Palestinian Occupied Territories as 'liberated areas' and part of the 'Land of Israel. ' 
(Abdulla, 1990,24: 25). 
The result of the Intifada forced Shamir to make a proposal for solving the situation 
on the West Bank and in the Gaza-Strip. He asked for negotiations in order to 
establish a self-governing authority in the territories. He included the condition that 
Palestinians should call a halt to the Intifada, which would be followed by free 
democratic elections to select a representatives with whom Israel would negotiate. 
The concept of achieving peace in return for land was rejected by Shamir. The 
Likud Party and the parties to the right turned down any political agreement on the 
basis of the concept of peace in return for land (Tessler, 1994,728: 29). 
The Intifada was considered the turning point in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It 
demonstrated the fact that things would never be the same as before. The political, 
social, and economical effect of the Intifada on both Palestinians and Israelis was 
great. This meant that the search for a political settlement to the Palestinian 
question was taken more seriously than before. 
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In October 1991 during the Intifada period, the Madrid Conference was convened. 
The Intifada was one of the factors that convinced the PLO to accept the tough 
Israeli conditions in order for the Palestinians to take part in the conference (chapter 
three discusses in detail the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations that resulted from the 
Madrid Conference). The Intifada enforced the political position and gave strength 
and credibility to the PLO in the region. The Intifada slogan of "freedom and 
independence" was very realistic and it received support from the great majority of 
the international community. The Israeli voices that asked for Palestinian self- 
determination increased and became louder. The notion spread among many Israelis 
that controlling other people by force was impossible and not consistent with the 
concept of human rights at the end of the twentieth century. 
1.10 Conclusion 
This chapter shows the history of the land conflict between Palestinians and 
Israelis, and investigates the root cause of this conflict. I have provided a backdrop 
to the history of land conflict between both sides as without it, the conditions 
surrounding the present conflict would be difficult to comprehend and interpret. 
The Palestinian struggle to own and control their land is a continuous process 
which has been ongoing since the mid 19tß' century. This historical chapter has 
reviewed and clarified the issues relating to the land conflict in the post-Oslo 
Agreement period. There is no doubt that the implementation of the land tenure in 
Palestine was a catalyst for social transformation in Palestinian society. 
It is obvious that Palestine was never in its ancient nor modem history a land 
without people. This Zionist slogan was only to justify the Zionist's ambitions of 
creating a homeland. Zionism was a direct reaction to the Jewish persecution in 
Europe. This chapter has clarified the Zionist expansionism strategy. The basis of 
which was to start controlling small tracts of land, and then concentrating their 
efforts in the area to expand their tracts and link them together. When Zionists 
accepted the political proposals (Peel Plan or Partition Plan in maps 1.3 and 1.4 
respectively) to resolve the Palestinian-Jewish conflict, they had their eve on nearby 
land which was allocated to the Palestinian proposed state. The core of the Zionist 
81 
expansionism strategy (controlling more land) was applied in the post-1967 War 
period. 
This chapter shows the importance of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip in both the 
Palestinian and Israeli agenda of the post-1967 War period. For Israel the outcome 
of the June 1967 War was of great consequence with regard to territorial expansion. 
Israel acquired improved strategic borders of better topographic positioning and 
greater strategic depth. This chapter has clarified the notion that this period of 
Israel's history witnessed the biggest changes in the settlement map. Israel tried to 
create a Jewish community in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. 
This chapter has also showed that all the Israeli settlement plans (Labour and 
Likud) concentrated activities on the West Bank rather than the Gaza-Strip. The 
reason for this was that the Labour Party needed to maintain control over certain 
parts of the West Bank because of Israel's national security concerns. Labour's 
readiness to withdraw from the remaining parts was aimed at achieving peace with 
the Israelis' Arab neighbours by trading land for peace. Conversely, the Likud 
party's objectives were to control all the West Bank as a security measure. Likud 
believed that without the whole of the West Bank, Israel's security would be in 
danger. In addition it was perceived to be the heart of the `land of Israel', and it 
drew on religious-nationalist fervour to support this view. The position of the 
Labour Party and Likud Party towards the Palestinian Occupied Territories helps us 
to understand the coming chapters about the Israeli intention to sabotage the peace 
opportunity of the Oslo Agreement. 
From the early days of the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip, 
Palestinians were struggling for their land despite the fact that it was taken from 
them by every means possible. The most influential method was the occupation law 
(Military Orders). The decades of the Palestinian national struggle that were 
crowned by the Intifada, forced the Israelis to recognise the existence of Palestinian 
peoplehood. The reality that was created as a result of the daily contact (peaceful or 
violent) between Palestinians and Israelis, and the daily loss of land pushed the 
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Palestinian Intifada to raise realistic objectives. The PLO showed much flexibility 
towards the Intifada's objectives and was able to raise the issue of the Palestinian 
sacrifices during the Intifada period into the regional and international agenda. The 
PLO congress session of 1988 was considered revolutionary compared to its 
previous stance towards a solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The chapter 
also proved that every decade from the 1960's until the 1990's showed a 
fundamental change in the PLO's political stance which may have allowed it to 
remain and continue despite its military loss and the blockade from both Israel and 
some Arab states. 
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Foot-Notes 
1. It should be become in mind that the specific number of two waves of the Jewish 
migration up to 1914 are according to Zionist sources, as there are no other sources 
that estimate the number of immigrants. 
2. In 1919 the Zionists had access to the draft of the Land Transfer Ordinance, 
while the Palestinian Arabs did not. The Zionists along with British official 
prepared a report on the land regime which affirmed article four of the Mandate. 
Stein illustrated how the Zionists worked to serve their own interests in this report. 
With reference to the Zionist intervention in the draft of the Land Transfer 
Ordinance, He noted: 
moreover the British tended to become reliant and then dependent upon Zionist 
material andcooperation concerning land. The British lacked such information, but 
Zionist officials possessed vast amount of it based upon more than four decades of 
official and unofficial experience in land acquisition (Stein, 1984,44). 
3. For more details about Zionist society in Palestine prior to 1948, see Tessler, 
1994,185-210. 
4. Article 6 and the full text of the Mandate over Palestine, see Caftan, 1973. 
5. For more details about the Palestinian revolt, see Kalkas, 1971,257-295; Abu 
Yasser, 1988,197-232. 
6. For further details about the Palestinian catastrophy and refugees, see Palumbo, 
1987; Hazboun, 1994; Kimerling & Migdal, 1993,127-156, Karmi & Cortan, 1999. 
7. For the full text of the U. N. General Assembly resolution No. 194, see Caftan, 
1988, Caftan, 1973, and the United Nation electronic home page. 
8. See Allon, 1970, Rabin, 1993, 
9. For more details about the Palestinian exodus of 1967 War See Masalha, 1999, 
63-102, Harris, 1980, Dodd & Barakat, 1969. 
10) Abdul Jawad Saleh (1986) covered all the Israeli military orders relating every 
aspect of Palestinian life in the occupied territories. 
11. The U. N Security Council and General Assembly resolutions which consider 
the West Bank and Gaza-Strip as an occupied territories are Security Council 
resolutions No. 2421 of November 22,1967: No. 259 of September 27.1968; No. 
446 of March 22 1979: No. 452 of July 20,1979. No. 465 of March 1,1980. The 
Latest General Assembly resolutions are, A/RES/53/55 of December 3,1990: 
A/RES/47/172 of December 22.1992: A/RES/51/133 of December 13,1996: 
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A/RES/51/233 of March 13,1997; and A/RES/52/66 of December 10,1997. And 
for all UN resolutions regarding the Palestinian Isuuse, see the UN homepage 
(www. cyberus. ca/' baker/UN-Palestinian-resolutions. htm). 
12. For details about the Israeli settlement in the Syrian occupied territories, see 
Harris, 1980; Jaffari 1981. 
13. The full text of the UN Security Council resolution appears in Lukacs, 1992. 
14. Mohammed Kamel (1987), the Egyptian Foreign Minister during the 
negotiations in Camp David gave details of the Egyptain-Israeli negotiations that 
reached to the Camp David Accord. 
15. The Palestinian Uprising, the Intifada, broken out in October 1987 and 
continued until 1993. See Marshall, 1989; Lockman & Beinin, 1990. 
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Chapter Two: The Conflict Over Land in the Palestinian- 
Israeli Negotiations 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the conflict over land in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip in 
the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, from the Madrid Conference to the Oslo 
Agreement, leading to the Wye River Memorandum November 1998. Sections two 
and three attempt to illustrate the causes that faced both the PLO and Israel into 
accepting the Madrid Conference and later to choose the back door in Oslo in order 
to reach a peace settlement. 
The West Bank and Gaza-Strip came under Israeli occupation as a result of the 
Arab-Israeli War in June 1967. At the end of the third decade of Israeli occupation 
in the Palestinian territories a peace agreement was signed between the PLO and 
Israel. Sections four and five deal with Palestinian and Israeli attitude towards a 
solution to the conflict. A brief summary of the letters of mutual recognition 
between the PLO and the State of Israel, and the main points of the Declaration of 
Principles (DOP) regarding land, are presented in section six. 
There is no doubt that any agreement between the parties is likely to involve 
changes to the original goals of each party. There will be positive and negative 
implications for both parties and the movement concerning different interests is 
reflected in the Oslo Agreement itself, together with the later Cairo Agreement 
1994 (Gaza-Jericho First), the Taba Agreement 1995 (Oslo II), the Hebron Protocol 
1997, and Wye River Memorandum in 1998 are of this nature. This chapter 
addresses: what has changed following the agreements regarding the original 
official position of the negotiations. What are the negative and positive aspects of 
the agreements in regard to land for both sides? Did the Agreement create new 
realities on the ground? I also discuss the division between Palestinians and w-hN- 
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opposition parties and movements rejected the Agreements and some of the 
proposed alternatives. 
2.2 The Madrid Conference 
The Madrid Conference was convened by an agreement of all parties (Palestinians, 
Israelis, Jordanians, Lebanese, and Syrians) through the initiative of the United 
States. Israel preferred to maintain the status quo (no peace, no war), Syria 
preferred an international conference, the PLO asked for the same degree of 
participation in the conference as the other parties, but the PLO was officially 
driven away from taking part in the Madrid Conference (Massalha, 1994,29: 51). 
Several issues led to the possibility of the Madrid Conference. These were 
domestic, regional and international. The first one was the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, considered a main ally of the Arabs. Syria and the PLO again found 
themselves without an international ally. Israel's main ally, the United States, 
became sole leader of the international community. There is no doubt that the 
collapse of the Soviet Union strengthened the American role and the Israeli position 
in the region, because no such conference would have been held if the Soviet Union 
had remained a superpower. This was because the Soviet Union favoured an 
international peace conference as the way to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, not the 
peace conference planned for Madrid (Toak, 1993,24; Massalha, 1994,29; Shanab, 
1995,37,67; Habbash interview, December 12,1998). The United States accepted 
the presence of the Soviet Union, only because it was totally weak and on the verge 
of collapse, and could not, therefore, affect the direction of the conference. The 
Soviet Union, later as the Russian Federation, and the European Union, as well as 
the United Nations, witnesses and observers without any specific role attended the 
conference (Hussein, 1993,21). U. S. domination of the conference became a fait 
accompli for Russia and regional organisations such as the European Union, the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). the Arab Cooperation Council, and the United 
Nations. 
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Second, the Gulf War of 1991 finished with a dramatic defeat of Iraqi forces in 
Kuwait and even inside Iraq itself. The implementation of Security Council 
resolutions relating to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait recreated a persistent question in 
international politics regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. Why had these resolutions 
concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict not been implemented for decades? To keep its 
credibility and to avoid the accusation of a double standard in its regional policy, 
President George Bush initiated his plan for a peace process in the Middle East. 
The U. S. Plan was based on four premises. First, land in return for peace. Second, 
the implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 
338. Third, legal and political rights for Palestinians. Finally, peace and security for 
the state of Israel (Massalha, 1994,30: 51; Shanab, 1995,15; Hass, 1995,136). 
However, the Gulf War severely weakened the PLO because of its support for Iraq 
during the war. This encouraged the United States to convene the Madrid 
Conference without official PLO participation. The conference could not have been 
successfully arranged if the PLO had opposed it (Corbin, 1994,24; Dajani, 1994, 
75). 
Prior to the Gulf War the United States Secretary of State, James Baker, declared in 
the presence of American Jewish leaders in Washington that the Israeli goal of 
establishing a `Greater Israel' was unrealistic, and that Israel and International 
Zionism should eliminate this from their agenda (Cited in Dajani, 1994,32). 
The third reason, the Madrid Conference became possible was the increased need to 
resolve the Palestinian Intifada. Yitzhak Rabin recognised in the 1970's that there 
could be no comprehensive peace in the Middle East without resolving the 
Palestinian question. Yet he suggested that Arabs had caused the Palestinian 
problem and in so doing he reduced the significance and history of the Palestinians 
as a people and a nation (Rabin part-two, 1993,273). This was also the view of 
Golda Meir. Daran, and Galili which undervalued Palestinians as people (Schiff 
and Fabian, 1977.1 3). The Intifada then brought the Palestinian question to the 
fore of Israeli policy and on to the international agenda (Hussein. 1991.5). 
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The above reasons help to explain why the Arab States and the PLO looked to the 
importance of Madrid. International and regional conditions would not serve them 
if they did not accept the American conference. However, they were ready to make 
a deal with Israel if it showed a readiness to enter into constructive negotiations. 
The first three rounds of negotiations in Washington between Israelis and a 
Palestinian delegation lacked any initiative from either side. In the fourth round of 
Washington negotiations two documents were submitted; the first from the Israeli 
side (Likud government) regarding Palestinian self autonomy in the West Bank and 
Gaza-Strip. The Israeli proposal was rejected by the Palestinian delegation, because 
it made no link between the Palestinian people and their land. The second proposal 
came from the Palestinian delegation. This was a detailed document about the 
Palestinian interim self-government arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. 
This proposal was rejected by the Israelis as they believed it to be a systematic 
programme for the establishment of a Palestinian independent state (Hussein, 1993, 
100: 04). 
In the sixth round the Israeli Labour government proposed a new plan for 
Palestinian self-autonomy. The Palestinian delegation rejected it, because it was 
drafted in the same spirit as the previous Likud government recommendation; i. e. 
there could be no link between the Palestinian people and land in the West Bank 
and Gaza-Strip, this meant that Palestinians could have authority over themselves 
but have no sovereignty over the land. The control over land is an Israeli affair. 
This was less than the self-autonomy given to Palestinians in the Camp David 
Accord in September, 1978, which was also rejected by the PLO at that time 
(Hussein, 1993,138: 140). Israel would control all the natural resources of the 
Palestinian territories including water. Israel would also have the legislative 
responsibility which meant that land tenure would be in Israeli hands. 
The Madrid Conference continued for three days, after which the negotiations were 
then transferred to Washington D. C. Twelve rounds of negotiations were held in the 
U. S. over a period of more than twenty-two months. No peace settlement was 
89 
reached for three main reasons. Firstly, Israel refused to halt the settlement 
activities in the Palestinian territories (Abdul Shafi, 1997,10). Secondly, Israel 
refused to implement Security Council resolution 242 as the basis for a peace 
accord. Thirdly, Israel refused to allow Palestinians to have control and sovereignty 
over their own land and the natural resources. Israelis agreed that the Palestinians 
had the right to govern themselves as long as the Israelis were able to maintain 
control over the land. 
2.3 The Back Channel of Oslo 
Terry Larson, a Norwegian academic and his wife Mona Jool (the Norwegian 
Assistant Foreign Minister) succeeded in January 21St, 1993 in bringing three PLO 
officials and two Israeli academics to Norway to discuss peace issues. The 
Norwegian government facilitated the meeting which lasted for two days and was 
considered later as the first round of the Oslo negotiation (Corbin, 1994,50). 
Both the PLO and Israel left the negotiations proceed in Washington, and in secret 
moved negotiations to Oslo which led to the signing of a Declaration of Principles. 
The Madrid Conference, and its consequent Washington rounds, removed previous 
obstacles to a direct meeting between Israelis and Palestinians. It paved the way for 
the Oslo negotiations, and reduced the psychological barrier that existed between 
both sides (Massalha, 1994,27; Shanab, 1995,37; al-Ahmed interview, February 
2nd 1998). Nabeel Shaat, the Palestinian Minister of Planning and International 
Cooperation described the Madrid Conference and rounds as immensely useful and 
that the success of the Oslo negotiations depended completely on the documents 
that were prepared for the Washington rounds. He also added: 
This is the first time since 1948 that Palestinians have been involved 
directly in negotiating matters relating to their own land, future, and fate 
... we put together a 
body of documents, doctrines, principles, 
strategies, and tactics with all the nuances and the legal terms required 
to get our rights (Shaat, 1993,8). 
2.3.1 The PLO and the Oslo Channel 
The PLO had for a long time tried to establish channels of communication with 
Israel. The PLO had previously refused all Self-Autonomy plans during the 
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seventies but the appearance of new conditions in the nineties led to their 
acceptance. As a result of the Gulf War a majority of Arab states, especially the 
Gulf states, removed their political backing for the PLO (Hussein, 1993.17). Arab 
financial support for the PLO totally halted after the Gulf Crisis. At that point the 
PLO faced a financial crisis, in addition to the political blockade which many Arab 
states had imposed on it. Salaries for workers in the PLO (political and military 
levels) were withheld for several months. The ending of Arab financial support 
from the Gulf States was the result of an American request (Shaheen interview, 
August 18,1998; al-Ahmed interview, February 2nd, 1998). 
Salah Tamari, a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council (the head of the land 
on settlement affairs committee of the PLC), also noted that if the PLO had not 
gone through the Oslo channel, it would have collapsed. Its presence in 
international politics would have been no more than that of an office or radio 
station in Tunisia, Jordan, or Damascus (Interview October 11,1998). 
As a result of the PLO financial crisis some of its activists migrated to 
Scandinavian countries and asked for asylum. In Norway their activities were 
investigated by Israeli intelligence officers (Mossad). The asylum seekers believed 
that these officers belonged to the Norwegian Intelligence Agency which was a 
view the Norwegian government wanted to encourage. However the media 
disclosed that the investigators were in fact Israelis, not Norwegians (Corbin, 
1994). The PLO reduced its staff and official representatives throughout the world 
(Safieh Manchester (UK), June 13,1999). The Oslo channel and other channels for 
discussion with the Israeli Authorities can be seen as a response by the PLO to 
these pressures. 
The Madrid Conference had also deprived the PLO of taking part in the conference, 
which had been an Israeli precondition. Israel even rejected the participation of a 
Palestinian delegate from East Jerusalem. The Palestinian delegation at the 
conference was made up of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip 
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which was an Israeli precondition. No Palestinian from the Diaspora ,x as part of the 
delegation. 
Israel prohibited Palestinians who were living in Jerusalem from attending the 
conference because they (Israelis) wanted to prove that Jerusalem was not a subject 
open to negotiation but was, according to the Israelis, the united capital of Israel. 
The reason for Israel prohibiting Palestinians from the Diaspora from attending the 
conference was because Israel wanted to prove that it was prepared to negotiate the 
future of Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip and that the Palestinian 
refugee question was not its responsibility. The Israelis repeated many times that it 
was an Arab duty to resettle the refugees in Arab countries. 
Yet it is also useful to show here that the Oslo track was not the only one open 
between the PLO and the Israelis. In the Oslo negotiations, officials from the PLO 
and Palestinians from the Diaspora negotiated with Israelis. 
In the Washington rounds negotiations became a war of words in the presence of 
the international media; each party was keen to express its view strongly without 
concessions. These conditions were not helpful to the two parties for them to have 
the opportunity to make concessions in the peace talks. Both the PLO and Israel 
preferred to choose a secret back channel for solving this conflict (Shanab, 1995, 
71). 
The Palestinian Minister of Public Work Azam al-Ahmed noted in regard to the 
Washington rounds, 
I challenge any one of the Palestinian delegates to say that both parties 
agreed or reached a single point. I did not hear that we agreed with the 
Israelis on any issue during the Washington rounds. If there was any 
result from the Washington rounds the people will know about it ... 
if 
there was any possibility of having a positive result from these rounds. 
the Israeli government would not go through a secret channel in Oslo 
(al-Ahmed interview. February 2,1998). 
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The right-wing of the American Jewish community opposed the Oslo Agreement. 
But their opposition was different to that expressed by Palestinians. The Zionist 
Organisation of America (ZOA) adopted a new tactic of rejecting the agreements 
with the PLO by "embracing the details of the Oslo Agreement to kill the process 
the Oslo partnership was to produce" (Lustick, 1997,63). The role of the rightist 
Zionists in the U. S. administration such as Denis Ross (U. S. Co-ordinator to the 
Peace Process in the Middle East) was to try their best to block and prevent any 
agreement between Palestinians and Israelis through the Washington rounds. This 
attitude continued in the post-Oslo negotiations (Dahalan interview, January 15, 
1999). 
Mohammed Dahalan, a Palestinian negotiator in the Palestinian team, head of the 
Palestinian Interior Security/Gaza-Strip noted that once in negotiations in the post- 
Oslo Agreement when the Palestinians and Israelis had reached an agreement over 
one particular issue, Ross intervened and convinced the Israelis that such an 
agreement would not serve their interests. As a result of his intervention the Israelis 
backtracked to their previous stance. Dahalan added that the Palestinians were 
unable to reach a settlement with the Israelis due to the presence of U. S. Zionists 
such as Ross, and therefore the Palestinians searched for a back channel (Dahalan 
interview, January 15,1999). 
2.3.2 Israel and the Oslo Channel 
After long negotiations in Washington D. C, Israel preferred the back channel in 
Oslo. Rabin promised the Israeli people in the general election of 1992, that a peace 
settlement would be reached within a year. He was convinced that the Washington 
rounds would not lead to any agreement with the Palestinians. Rabin did not trust 
the PLO leaders, he believed that if he entered into secret negotiations with them 
the secrecy of the negotiations would end. This was the reason for the start of the 
Oslo track between officials of the PLO (Abu Ala, Hassan Asfour, and Maher al- 
kurd) and two academic Israelis. (Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Bondak). who had no 
official position within the Israeli hierarchy. However. they were supported directly 
by the Israeli Vice Foreign Minister. Yossi Beilin. Peres, the Foreign Minister. was 
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aware of this. In this situation, if the track continued in secret for a reasonable 
length of time, it would indicate that the PLO were concerned about successful 
negotiations. At this point Israel would send officials to join negotiations, and this 
is exactly what happened (Corbin, 1994,31: 57). 
Rabin had also recognised that he was negotiating indirectly with the PLO during 
the Washington rounds. A member of the delegation Fareeh Abu Medain said that 
"we were no more than messengers for the PLO" (Abu Medain interview, February 
17,1999). Rabin thus believed that his only partner in the peace negotiations was 
the PLO. He said: 
I have no partner except the PLO. The views of the Palestinian 
delegation at the Madrid Conference became more uncompromising 
than the views of the PLO itself (Cited in Shanab, 1995,91). 
Another reason why Israel preferred the Oslo back channel was the fear that the 
financial crises of the PLO would lead to the collapse of the organisation. If this 
happened, Palestinian religious fundamentalism may have been a substitute, which 
Israel did not want. Israeli leaders believed that the poor conditions that the PLO 
were experiencing presented an opportunity to gain concessions from the peace 
negotiations (Hirschfeld Report, 1992 cited in Bakri, 1993,53-68; Corbin, 1994, 
39). This was ironical because Israel had indirectly supported the Palestinian 
Islamists by allowing Islamic activities (in the seventies and up to the mid-eighties) 
because they were against the PLO (Massalha, 1994,234; A convocation in Hanan 
Ashrawe, November 11,1998). And, by controlling the mosques, and opening 
different social and religious centres in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip, such as the 
Islamic Society in Gaza headed by Ahmed Yassen (present leader of the Hamas 
Movement). This society was officially permitted by the Israelis (Sha"er, 1999,20). 
Both the PLO and Israel had an interest in pursuing secret negotiations in Oslo. 
2.4 Israeli Perspectives on Peace 
There has been much debate among Arabs about the differences between the Likud 
and Labour parties. Some believe that Likud is less sympathetic to the Arab cause. 
due to its ideology of the concept of (Ei-et- I'craef Land of Israel. Heikal (the well- 
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known Egyptian intellectual) did not perceive matters that simply, because the two 
big parties contain overlapping currents of opinion. He also reminds us that Israel's 
main periods of expansion were carried out under left wing governments during the 
Arab-Israeli wars of 1948, and 1967 (Heikal, 1996b, 250). For Avi Shlaim, most 
Arabs believe that there is no significant difference between the two Parties 
(Shlaim, 1994,6). 
I have already indicated in the previous chapter the link between the Israeli Labour 
government and Israeli expansion. Sa'dy al-Kuronz (The Palestinian Minister of 
Industry) saw as the difference between the Israeli Labour Party and the Likud Party 
that both wanted to keep a great area of the West Bank under its control. The 
Labour Party wanted a pure Jewish state, therefore the annexation of the Palestinian 
people by Israel was not favoured. The Labour Party entered into the peace 
negotiations to avoid such an annexation and were ready to return some land 
inhabited by Palestinians. Labour was also ready to recognise an independent 
Palestinian state in some parts of the West Bank. For Likud, there is no problem in 
annexing the Palestinian people as citizens of Israel to keep the `Land of Israel' 
under their control (al-Kuronz interview, October 26,1998). 
Jameel Hilal explains this difference between the Likud and the Labour Party from 
an economic angle. The Labour Party sought to establish economic relations with 
the Arab states following the peace agreements with the Palestinians and the Arab 
states. The Labour Party is ready to trade land for a peace that will bring economic 
relations with neighbours. This will be a step towards Israeli economic expansion 
and acceptance in the region. For Likud, keeping control over the `Land of Israel" is 
more important than the economic relations and the assimilation of the region 
(Hilal, 1995,44). 
2.4.1 Likud Perspective on Peace 
Likud believed that Palestinians should rule themselves in many fields such as 
education, health, personnel affairs, etc, whilst control over land of the West Bank 
and Gaza-Strip should be in the hands of Israel. This belief was demonstrated by 
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the actions of the Likud to solve the Palestinian question since they came to power 
in 1977 and up till the party lost the general election in mid-1992. Menachem 
Begin, the founder of the Likud Party (in 1973, Herut merged with other right-wing 
Parties to form Likud), was considered part of the hard wing of the IZO. He led 
Likud to victory in the Israeli general election in 1977, and was the head of Likud 
until the early eighties. He repeated many times that this was the official stand of 
his party and government for the solution of the Palestinian question. (Shazli, 1992, 
89; al-Hayyat al-Jadedah, December 31,1998). 
We can conclude that the Likud approach to the Palestinian question came through 
Menachem Begin's peace plan announced during his speech to the Israeli 
Parliament (Knesset) on December 28,1977. The issues of land and security in his 
plan were based on the following points. First, self-rule for Arab residents (not 
Palestinian people) of Judia, Sumaria and the Gaza-Strip. Second, the 
administrative issues of the Arab residents would be in the hands of an 
administrative council. Third, security issues and public order would be under 
Israeli control. Fourth, Arab residents could ask for Israeli nationality or Jordanian 
nationality. Fifth, Israelis had the right to settle and own land in `Judia', `Sumaria' 
and Gaza-Strip. Sixth, Israel had sovereignty rights over `Judia', `Sumaria' and 
Gaza-Strip (Masalha, 1994,386-88). 
To achieve such a target, the Likud government tried to create a Palestinian 
leadership in the occupied territories. In the early eighties Israel established the 
Village Leagues in the West Bank, to represent the Palestinian people in the 
negotiations based on the Camp David Accord. The Village Leagues were a group 
of Israeli collaborators (Chomsky, 1983,56; A convocation from Hanan Ashrawe, 
November 11.1998). Likud tried many ways to ignore the PLO as representing the 
Palestinian people. Political and social activities by Palestinian movements which 
opposed the PLO were ignored by Israel and the military government did not follow 
them. 
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Begin's plan was to dispossess the Palestinians regarding the Begin's Plan. Jimmy 
Carter, the U. S. President responded that no single Arab who respects himself will 
accept this plan, and if I were an Arab person I would prefer occupation to what the 
Israelis are proposing (Cited in Hussein, 1991,17). 
The Likud did not recognise the Palestinian people. They were seen merely as 
residents, or inhabitants never citizens within the land of Israel. Menachem Begin 
stated this in his interview with the Israeli Ma'aref daily newspaper, three days after 
the signing of Camp David Accords in September 17,1978. He declared: 
we did not use and do not use the term Palestinian people, even if it is 
present in the English text of the Camp David Accords. I agreed with 
President Carter that he will send a letter informing me that these words 
mean the Arabs of the land of Israel ... as the 
West Bank will be called, 
according to our language and our concepts, Judia and Samaria 
(Ma'aref, September 20,1978, Cited in Baker, 1992,457). 
For Begin the West Bank was part of Israel, there could be no hope of granting 
concessions over this land. He may allow some civil authority to inhabitants in the 
area, but no type of authority to those inhabitants over the occupied territories. It 
would only be an Israeli authority, because he saw the territories as a part of the 
`Land of Israel', which was owned by the Jewish people. He repeated this several 
times, as did his successor, Yitzhak Shamir, using the same tone when he led the 
Israeli Likud government in the eighties and early nineties (al-Quds, September 29, 
1986). 
Shamir rejected any idea that required Israel to give up any part of the West Bank 
and Gaza-Strip. He believed that such a concession, or `partition' as he called it, 
would lead to everlasting conflict between Palestinians and Israelis (Cited in 
Hussein, 1993.58). 
Shamir was looking to achieve peace with the Arabs in return for peace without 
conceding territories, this meant that Israel would not have to withdraw from the 
Occupied Arab Territories. Here land would not be traded for peace. He said in 
December 5.1991 that the Israelis would attain peace with their neighbours as «ell 
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as continuing to control the 'land of Israel'. After his defeat in the Israeli election in 
1992 he said that he would negotiate with Arabs for ten years without reaching any 
settlement (Cited in Hussein, 1993,63). 
Benyamin Netanyahu, the successor of Shamir, was elected as the Israeli Prime 
Minister in June 1996 in order to form a coalition government from a of Zionist 
rightists, ultra-nationalists, and religious extremists parties. The Palestinians called 
Netanyahu's government a government of settlers, because all parties in the 
coalition strongly supported Israeli settlement in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip 
(Shaheen interview, August 18,1998). 
The Likud Party election programme of 1996 was important for what it revealed. Its 
views towards settlement activities, and private and government land; the peace 
process and the signed agreements between the PLO and the Labour government; 
the withdrawal or redeployment from other parts of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip 
according to the Oslo II Agreement. The question of East Jerusalem as an occupied 
territory would also be spelled out. 
Likud view towards the Israeli settlement activities and government 
land 
With regard to Israeli settlement activities and government land in the West Bank 
and Gaza-Strip, the Likud programme of 1996 stated that, 
Settlement in all parts of the Land of Israel is of national importance 
and part of Israel's defence strategy. The government will allocate 
special resources for settlement in border and sparsely-populated areas. 
The right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is an eternal right, 
not subject to dispute, and includes the right to security and peace 
... and settlement will 
be strengthened. The decision to freeze 
settlements will be rescinded ... Jewish settlement, security areas, water 
resources, state land and road intersections in Judea, Samaria and the 
Gaza Strip shall remain under full Israeli control (www. nedernet. nl/ 
likoed/prog. html). 
Likud considered Israeli settlement in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip as a 
realisation of Zionist values. It also believed that occupation of the land was a clear 
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expression of an unassailable right of the Jewish people to the `Land of Israel'. The 
Likud would prevent the uprooting of these settlements in the permanent agreement 
(www. likud. org. il/ english/index. html). 
If such a settlement policy were to be implemented, therefore, thousands of dunums 
would be confiscated. The confiscation of land would become private lands, as 
happened later under the Netanyahu government. 
As with previous plans of Likud, the programme tried to create a difference 
between the ruling of Palestinians themselves, and the ruling of their land, through 
the following stand: 
The government of Israel will enable the Palestinians to manage their 
lives freely, within the framework of self-government. However, 
foreign affairs and defence, and matters which require co-ordination, 
will remain the responsibility of the State of Israel (www. nedernet. nl/' 
likoed/prog. html). 
Likud and the peace process (the signed agreements between the PLO 
and the Labour Government) 
With regard to the peace process Likud policy noted: 
The government of Israel (Likud elected government) will honour 
international agreements, and will continue the diplomatic process to 
achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. It will recognise the 
facts created on the ground by the various accords, and will act to 
reduce the dangers to the future and security of Israel resulting from 
these agreements (www. nedemet. nl/'Iikoed/prog. html). 
Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Minister of Infrastructure and then the Foreign Minister in 
the Netanyahu cabinet, and the interim successor of Netanyahu after his defeat in 
the Israeli general election of 1999, described the Oslo Agreement as an "ill- 
founded Agreement'" (wý, ww. likud. org. il/english/index. html). 
When the Likud Party was in opposition from 1992-1996, its leaders directly 
opposing a signed agreement by the Labour Party with the PLO. Likud believed that 
the consequences of such an agreement would work against Israeli interests. But 
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when they assumed power they had to appear to honour the agreement. Therefore 
they adopted an alternative strategy of opposing the agreement and its 
implementation. This was by highlighting how the PLO had not fulfilled its 
commitments to the provisions of the agreement. The Likud policy aimed to prove 
that if the PLO was not willing to carry out its obligations why should the Israeli 
government implement its obligations. 
Likud and the Israeli Withdrawal or Redeployment from the West 
Bank: 
Regarding Israeli withdrawal and redeployment from other parts of the West Bank 
and Gaza-Strip according to the Oslo II Agreement, the programme did not mention 
that it would comply with Israeli obligations according to the signed agreements, 
but asked for negotiations with Palestinians to achieve a permanent peace 
arrangement. With a precondition that Palestinians should fully honour their 
obligations, such as the annulment of the clauses in the PLO Charter which calls for 
the destruction of Israel, in an unequivocal manner, and also that they should wage 
war against terrorism. Subsequently Likud programme of 1996 asked for the 
starting of negotiations for a permanent peace agreement without putting into effect 
the other two Israeli redeployment phases which preceded the negotiation of the 
permanent solution. The Likud Party decided that the permanent solution in regard 
to land would be the Jordan River as the eastern border of the state of Israel. It 
would be the permanent frontier between the State of Israel and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan and the Jordan Valley and the territories that it controlled 
should be under Israeli sovereignty. It also declared that the Likud government 
would oppose the declaration of an independent Palestinian state and adopt 
immediate stringent measures in the event of such a declaration 
(www. nedemet. nl/'Iikoed/prog. html- www. likud. org. il/english/index. html). 
Limor Livnat, the Minister of Communications in the Netanyhu's government, 
considered an Israeli Labour government withdrawal from some parts of the 
populated areas of the West Bank and the greater part of the Gaza-Strip. and that 
Labour would give up large parts of the Jewish homeland to Palestinians for 
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nothing in return (www. likud. org. il/english/index. html). In the Likud Party 
Platform of 1999, the Party believed, with regard to an Israeli withdrawal and 
redeployment from areas in the occupied territories, that their government had 
succeeded in significantly reducing the extent of territory that the Palestinians 
expected to receive in the interim arrangement (www. likud. org. il/english/ 
index. html). 
Likud and the Issue of East Jerusalem: 
The Likud Party has long since considered Jerusalem as the capital of the State of 
Israel and that it would continue to be united and undivided (www. likud. org. il/ 
english/index. html). As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the United Nations, 
through many resolutions by the General Assembly and the Security Council, 
rejected the Israeli decision of an annexation of the eastern part of Jerusalem, and 
asked Israel to cancel its decision. The only international resolution which dealt 
with the status of Jerusalem was General Assembly resolution 181, issued in 1947, 
and known as the Partition Plan (see section 1.3.7). At that time Israel accepted the 
resolution, whereas in the late 1990's it no longer accepted it. The international 
community refused to recognise Jerusalem as Israel's capital, and still deals with 
Tel Aviv as such. In the Oslo Agreement the question of Jerusalem is one that was 
delayed until final status negotiations following implementation of the interim 
period. 
Ariel Sharon said with regard to the international resolution 181. and the future of 
the City of Jerusalem: 
The U. N. resolution which is therefore, calling for the 
internationalisation of Jerusalem is null and void; it no longer exists ... 
Jerusalem has always been the national capital of the Jewish people, 
and of no other ... 
Full Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem, the united 
and eternal capital of the Jewish people, is not and will never be a 
subject for negotiation with any foreign entity. The Netanyahu 
government will continue to insist on this, and I am confident that with 
v, 'il1 and determination, our effort will be successful ("N-VN-V'-. likud. org. il/ 
english/ index. html). 
101 
The Labour Party has taken the same stand on Jerusalem as the Likud Party. The 
leaders of Labour repeated many times the same speech as Likud and Rabin 
informed Arafat many times to forget about Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine 
(al-Hoot, 1994,26). 
The issue of security is present in every sentence of the Likud's election 
programme. Security for Likud is the basis for durable peace in the region, and it 
will make it a first condition in any peace agreement. Therefore, the Likud Party 
election programme asked to establish for the first time in Israel a National Security 
Council headed by the Prime Minister. 
2.4.2 Perspectives of the Labour Party 
Since the Labour Party came to power in mid-1992, the policy of their government 
was announced as of achieving peace and security. Rabin considered both these 
goals as the most important for Israel. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin addressed the 
American Israeli Public Affairs Committee Annual Conference in Washington, via 
satellite from Jerusalem on March 21,1993 (www. Israel-mfa. gov. il/mfa/go. asp? 
MFAHOcatO). For Rabin security was a vital point for Israel, whereas Peres argued 
that political accords and mutual economic relations through the new Middle East 
Order, would bring security for Israel. He illustrated his approach to national 
defence in his book The New Middle East: 
It was not I who shifted course from the traditional concept of national 
defence, which depends mainly on military and weapons systems, to the 
modern concept, which is necessity based on political accords, and 
embraces international security and economic considerations. Rather, 
the world has changed. And the process of change compels us to replace 
our outdated concepts with an approach tailored to the new reality 
(Peres, 1993.34). For Likud's critique of this see www. likud. org. il/ 
english/index. html. 
Peres believed that a new order in the region would prevent conflicts. He briefly 
announced the agenda of his government in his speech to the Jewish Community 
Advisory Council"s Annual Meeting in Washington on February 14,1993. He said: 
We are decided on peace morally and politically ... we understand that 
peace calls for a compromise and we are read}, to pay our share and 
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have not just a general compromise. but a territorial compromise as 
well (www. Israel-mfa. gov. il/mfa/go. asp? MFAHOcarO). 
"The Israeli government do not want to dominate the Palestinian people". Peres, in 
his speech at the ceremony of the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim 
Agreement on September 28,1995, declared that this would to be the aim of his 
government. Ori Saveer, the Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry during 
Rabin's government, and the head of the Israeli delegation to the Oslo negotiations. 
believes that occupation and human rights are incompatible (www. Israel- 
mfa. gov. il/mfa/go. asp? MFAHOc8iO; Corbin, 1994,84). Rabin, in his memoirs of 
1979, recognised the problem of domination over Palestinians, because they are 
rancorous towards Israel, and a source of hostility that will always try to hit Israelis 
(Rabin, 1993b, 189). 
When Israel gave the go-ahead for a territorial compromise, it was a real change in 
Israeli official policy towards the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. Previously Israel had 
been ready to grant concessions on population issues, but not on issues of territory. 
Since the late seventies, Israeli governments have offered a solution based on the 
population level, which means they accept Palestinian self-autonomy, but without 
any authority or sovereignty over land. 
In 1980 when Peres was head of the Labour Party and head of Israeli opposition in 
the Knesset, he proposed the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. He called his proposal, 
Gaza first (Corbin, 1994,50: 58). It may be that the idea remained in the mind of 
Peres, which he subsequently applied when his party came to power in 1992. Peres 
noted: 
I thought it (Gaza first) would make a thin Gaza-Strip easier if we could 
reach an arrangement in two strokes - first Gaza, then the West Bank. I 
preferred Gaza first because, unlike Jerusalem (I was convinced we 
would make no compromise there), it was not emotionally or politically 
sensitive, and unlike the West Bank, it was not peppered with Israeli 
settlements (Peres. 1993,20). 
In fact, however there are eighteen Israeli settlements in the Gaza-Strip (see maps 
4.1 and 5.1), it has the most settlements in the occupied territories in relation to its 
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area. These occupy with their security zones more than thirty per cent of the Gaza- 
Strip. It became clear after the implementation of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement in 
1994, that this ratio should remain. 
Gaza was proposed first by Peres for withdrawal of Israelis for a number of reasons. 
The Gaza-Strip is one of the most populated areas in the world. Between 1998 and 
2010 the population will have doubled. Three out of four males were unemployed 
during the period of the Intifada; most females in the formal employment sector did 
not work. The Gaza-Strip is very poor economically with limited agricultural and 
other resources where other Arab States such as Egypt and Jordan had no interest in 
(Corbin, 1994,14; Toak, 1993,53). The Palestinian Intifada, especially in the 
Gaza-Strip also put such pressure on the Israelis that Peres was forced to come up 
with a solution for the Palestinian people through (Gaza first). He described the 
Gaza-Strip as an impossible burden, so it was in the Israeli interest to withdraw 
from such an area. 
It is important to mention that the majority of the founders of the al-Fatah 
movement in the 1950's formed Palestinian national ideology in the Gaza-Strip, 
where support for religious groups was also strong. Furthermore, the key figures of 
the founders of Hamas were also from Gaza. 
Rabin considered Palestinians to be the basis of the peace process, and favoured a 
Palestinian independent delegation, so that other Arabs would not speak in their 
name (Hussein, 1993,90). He proposed a solution to the Palestinian question based 
on the Camp David Accords. He told Israeli ambassadors and the head of 
delegations to Washington on January 28,1993, 
An interim agreement for a transition period for five years. Not later 
than the beginning of the third year, negotiations will be conducted , 
with the Palestinians on a permanent solution, based on Resolutions 
242 and 338. Practically to hand over to the Palestinians almost all the 
duties of the civil administration and to abolish it (www. Israel- 
mfa. gov. il'mfa. 'go. asp? MFAHOcaj0). 
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He also made a political distinction between the PLO and Islamic groups when he 
said, 
In terror maybe there is no difference between the PLO and the Islamic 
extremist terror groups. But the political purposes are entirely different. 
The Islamic extremist terror groups declared goal is to put an end to 
the peace negotiations, which was not the aim of the others 
(www. Israel-mfa. gov. il/mfa/go. asp? MFAHOcaj0). 
In his speech on the eve of the signing ceremony the Israeli-Palestinian Interim 
Agreement (Oslo II Agreement) September 28,1995, Rabin reached a point which 
many Israelis had tried to ignore throughout the Arab-Israeli conflict. He believed 
that Israelis were not alone on the land, they were sharing with Palestinian people 
the good earth in order make living. But again he returned to the old Israeli tone in 
the same speech, that the land is the `land of Israel' (www. Israel-mfa. gov. il/mfa/ 
go. asp? MFAHOc8j0). 
After the implementation of the Gaza-Jericho First, Israel declared its policy 
towards the land and settlements in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip as Israeli Prime 
Minister Rabin stated after a meeting with President Arafat in the Gaza-Israeli 
border -Bet Hanoon crossing or Erez- in January 19,1995: 
I informed the Chairman (Arafat) about decisions related to settlements 
and land in the territories - decisions that were made by the government 
of Israel in 1992 when we took over. I quote the decisions that were 
made by the government of Israel: First, to freeze all the decisions of 
former governments of Israel about new settlements in the territories - 
and we did so. Second, to make sure that we will not allow, beyond 
what was agreed then about building in the Gaza-Strip that were built, 
that government money will be spent for housing in the territories. 
Third, that there will be no confiscation of land for housing in the 
territories. Fourth, that government money will not be given in case of 
private building within existing settlements. And, of course, fifth, that 
came about after the DOP, that during the period of interim 
arrangements, no settlement will be uprooted. I am informed that all the 
stories about confiscation of land lately were made only to build by- 
pass roads, in preparation of the implementation of the second phase of 
the DOP - to have a by-pass of Tulkarem, to have a by-pass of 
Ramallah, for the Israelis, in order once we will implement the second 
phase, to make it more secure, without friction. No land was 
confiscated for building houses or anything of this kind (wAw-w. Israel- 
mfa. gov. il/mfa/ýgo. asp? MFAHOc860). 
Map 2.1 
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For Rabin the main goal of Israeli policy was achieving security. For him security 
meant, at that time, the halting of `terrorism' by Palestinian Islamic groups, such as 
Harnas and Islamic Jihad. He believed that terrorism was the main obstacle to 
peace. On the other hand, he believed that the Palestinian target was to control the 
territories and halt Israeli settlement activities in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip 
(www. Israel-mfa. gov. il/mfa/ go. asp? MFAHOc860). 
Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli extremist in early 1996. Some Israeli rightist 
parties and groups considered Rabin as a traitor to Zionist ideology. While he was 
Prime Minister some of the `Land of Israel' was withdrawn and handed over to the 
PLO authority (map 2.1). It was the first time in Zionist history that a head of the 
Israeli State had been assassinated. The main reason for the assassination was 
conflict over land. For Israeli rightists the West Bank is the most holy place on 
earth. It is not the same as Sinai. When Israel withdrew from Sinai the majority of 
Israeli rightist parties and groups supported the government's decision. On the other 
hand, the decision to withdraw from small parts of the West Bank saw all Israeli 
rightists strongly opposed to the decision. This is what happened in the post-Wye 
River Memorandum in late 1998. It may be they accepted the Sinai withdrawal 
because it was made by the Likud government under Begin, whereas they rejected 
the second withdrawal because it was made by a Labour government. Conflict 
emerged between Israeli political Parties and groups affecting Israeli political 
decisions relating to the peace process, in particular the issue of land. 
2.5 The PLO Perspective for Peace 
There were fundamental changes in the policy of the PLO during the 1980's. Shafiq 
al-Hoot (the PLO executive committee member who resigned on the eve of the 
signing of the Oslo Agreement) illustrated improvements in the PLO political 
programmes; the Palestinian revolution in Lebanon initially proposed the historical 
dream, that of establishing a Palestinian state throughout Palestine (Mandate 
Palestine). The Intifada, however, proposed a new vision, the creation of a new 
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip, with Jerusalem as its capital (al- 
Hoot, 1994,19, A convocation to Hanan Ashrawi November 11,1998). 
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The Palestinian National Council's (PNC) political programme of November 1988. 
was considered revolutionary compared with previous PLO policy. It accepted the 
existence of the state of Israel, and its right to live in peace and security. This plan 
introduced a change to the Palestinian Covenant, because what came under this 
project did not match the provisions in the Covenant (A convocation for Ma'ree 
Abed-Alrahman, November 4,1998). The Council declared the Palestinian state as 
a basis for the United Nations resolutions relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
beginning with General Assembly partition plan No. 181. The declaration asked for 
the establishment of a state in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. More than ninety 
states recognised the declared state even before its existence. This number was 
higher than those states which recognised the state of Israel before 1988. 
The PLO showed a great deal of flexibility towards the American initiative. A 
meeting between the U. S. Secretary of State James Baker and the Palestinian 
leaders from the occupied territories was approved by the PLO leadership. The PLO 
also accepted the Madrid Conference, and approved those attending the conference. 
There is no doubt that the Palestinian delegation to the conference enjoyed the 
approval and support of the PLO. The delegation was nominated indirectly by the 
PLO to avoid an Israeli veto (Hamad interview, January 30,1999). 
Shamir succeeded in imposing his position on the character of the Palestinian 
delegation. His precondition for attending the Madrid Conference was that the PLO 
would not represent the Palestinians, Arafat or any other leader based in Tunis. He 
also placed a veto on the participation of any Palestinian residents of Jerusalem. 
The Palestinian team was formed solely from local leaders of the West Bank and 
Gaza-Strip as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation (Shlaim, 1994,8; 
Hussein, 1993,32). Avi Shlaim described Israeli preconditions in attending the 
Madrid Conference as one of those rare international disputes in which one Party 
chose not only its own team for the match but also that of the other Party" (Shlaim, 
1994.8). 
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Israel encouraged the leadership of Hanan Ashrawi and Faisal Husseni as 
substitutes for the PLO leadership. They were clever in that they enjoyed the loyalty 
of the PLO, while at the same time they depended on international support (Corbin, 
1994,20: 27). The Oslo channel enabled Arafat to exclude them from the main 
political issues, where they appeared as secondary actors in deciding the Palestinian 
future. 
The events of the Washington rounds showed that Arafat and the PLO leadership 
were the only people who could make a deal with Israel. None of the local leaders 
could achieve such a settlement with Israel (Corbin, 1994,145). What the Israeli 
Labour Party found during the Washington rounds was that the Palestinian 
delegation were taking orders from the PLO leadership. Peres concluded that Arafat 
did not give the Palestinian delegation in Washington the opportunity to reach a 
peaceful settlement (Peres, 1993,17). 
The political philosophy of Mahmoud Abbas, head of the Palestinian committee, 
which was formed according to the PLO executive committee decision on May 
1987 was to follow the dialogue with Israelis, (Abbas, 1989,30). He was also the 
engineer of the Oslo Agreement from the Palestinian side. Abbas' political ideology 
was similar to the Zionist pioneers, who adopted a policy of accepting any land 
offered to them, and then expanded on that small beginning (Atari, 1997,25). This 
pragmatic policy could be described as the PLO policy in the decade of the mid- 
eighties and nineties. The pragmatic wing showed enough flexibility towards 
political matters, but if this wing failed to obtain a reasonable political achievement 
for the Palestinian people, the Palestinian leftists and Islamic opposition would 
emerge as the main power among Palestinians (Hasasyan, 1995,88). 
Abbas believed that politics is the art of achieving the best possible result. During 
the time of the Palestinian struggle, the PLO leadership became more pragmatic 
than ideological. This can be deduced from the PLO programmes issued by the 
Palestinian National Council (PNC), during different stages of the struggle (Abbas, 
1989.11). 
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Abu Ala, the head of the economic department of the PLO. and a member of the 
central committee of the al-Fatah movement, led by Arafat, head of the Palestinian 
delegation to the Oslo negotiations, drafted a document which was considered 
something new in the PLO political thinking. He favoured a political solution to the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and economic cooperation among Middle Eastern 
States, with Israel as a part of it (Corbin, 1994,30; Toak, 1993,256). 
Peres' proposal of the Gaza first attracted Abbas. He tried his best with the Israeli 
delegation during the negotiations in Oslo to include Jericho as part of the Gaza 
first proposal. They believed that if any part of the West Bank would be included in 
an Israeli withdrawal, it could mean that the Israeli withdrawal would occur in other 
parts of the West Bank. The PLO succeeded in convincing the Israelis to add 
Jericho to their proposal. This may have been the idea that gave the Oslo channel an 
opportunity to succeed. It was also a success for Abbas himself (Corbin, 1994,71; 
Shehadeh, 1997,17). 
The Palestinian proposal to the Washington round of interim self-rule government 
for a transitional period of five years maximum, accepted the self-rule condition of 
the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. It was a PLO suggestion, 
because the Palestinian delegation to the round could not submit any 
recommendation without discussion with the PLO leadership. Fareeh Abu Medain 
noted that everything was prepared by the PLO and they were just carrying it to the 
negotiation rounds. He added, that before every round the delegation visited Tunis 
(headquarters of the PLO) to discuss and receive plans, and when the round 
finished they returned to Tunis again to put them in the picture about proposed 
Israeli plans (Abu Medain interview, February 17,1999). 
2.6 Mutual Recognition 
Twelve rounds of negotiations in Washington between Palestinians and Israelis 
failed to reach a peaceful settlement. Negotiations were of the dialogue deaf. The 
Palestinian delegation asked for a declaration of principles. but they did not receive 
it. Suddenly both the PLO and the government of Israel announced that both sides 
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had reached a Declaration of Principles (DOP) on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements; this happened through secret negotiations in the Norwegian capital. 
These discussions took place in many different places in Norway under the 
supervision of the Norwegian Labour government, who have good relations with 
both the PLO and the Israeli government. This declaration was known as the Oslo 
Agreement. 
The Agreement was signed in Washington D. C on September 13,1993. On 
September 9,1993, both the PLO and the government of Israel recognised each 
other. Yaser Arafat sent a letter of recognition of Israel through the Norwegian 
Foreign Minister, Johan Jorgen Holst. Holst took Arafat's letter of endorsement and 
flew to Jerusalem. Rabin on his return submitted the Israeli recognition of the PLO 
to Holst. 
In Arafat's recognition letter to Rabin, he recognised the right of the state of Israel 
to exist in peace and security, and PLO acceptance of Security Council resolution 
242. Arafat affirmed that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny 
Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the covenant, which are inconsistent 
with Arafat's letter, are inoperative and no longer valid. The PLO undertook to 
submit the Palestinian Covenant to the PNC for formal, necessary changes. In 
Rabin's short recognition letter to Arafat, he recognised the PLO as representative 
of the Palestinian people and commenced negotiations with the PLO within the 
Middle East peace process (www. Israel-mfa. gov. il/mfa/go. asp? MFAHOOpzO). 
PLO recognition of the state of Israel and its right to live in peace and security, put 
an official end to the Palestinian national dream of establishing an independent 
state over the whole of Mandate Palestine. Mutual recognition between the PLO 
and Israel ended what had seemed an immutable premise of the irreconcilability of 
Zionism and Palestinian nationalism (Abu-Amr, 1994.76). 
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2.7 The Declaration of Principles (DOP) 
One Palestinian negotiator in the post-Oslo Agreement considered that this 
Agreement provided justice and logic for both sides. The justice of the agreement is 
that it delayed all the dangerous issues such as, the return of the refugees. the 
control over the West Bank and Gaza-Strip and East Jerusalem as a part of the 
occupied territories. It did not prevent Palestinians asking about their rights on 
these issues, and they did not give legal status to the Israeli settlements. The logic 
of the agreement was that it gave Palestinians part of their symbolic rights, but did 
not deny their historical rights. This was the balance in the agreement (Dahalan 
interview January 15,1999). 
There was a deal in the Oslo Agreement where the PLO accepted the Interim self- 
government Arrangements, whilst Israel recognised the PLO. Without this deal 
there could be no agreement. The final draft of the agreement was given a title by 
the Palestinian delegation in the Joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation to the 
Madrid Conference without mentioning the PLO. Their logic was to redesignate the 
PLO team in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Madrid Conference (the 
Palestinian delegation). In Oslo II the PLO team in the Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation to the Madrid Conference (the Palestinian delegation) was replaced 
solely by the PLO (Shaheen interview, August 18,1998). 
The major points of the Oslo Agreement which was issued in the home page of the 
Israeli Foreign Ministry (www. Israel-mfa. gov. il/) and published by the Palestinian 
National Authority in 1995 may be noted briefly as follows: 
First, both sides recognised the mutual, legitimate and political rights of each other. 
Second, the establishment of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority for 
the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza-Strip, for a transitional period 
not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on 
implementation of U. N. Security Council resolution 242. 
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Third, direct free and general political elections will be held for the Council. where 
the Palestinian council will have executive power and will be empowered to 
legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities 
transferred to it. 
Fourth, the Jurisdiction of the Council will cover the West Bank and Gaza-Strip 
territory, except for issues which will be negotiated in the permanent status 
negotiations (Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, security 
arrangements, borders, mutual relations and cooperation with other neighbouring 
states, and other issues of common interest), as the West Bank and Gaza-Strip will 
be considered a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the 
interim period. 
Fifth, Israel will conduct a withdrawal from the Gaza-Strip and Jericho area, where 
a redeployment of Israeli military forces will take place later from the populated 
areas in the West Bank, not later than the eve of the Palestinian political elections. 
Further redeployment of Israeli military forces to specified locations will be 
gradually implemented, commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for 
public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force. 
Sixth, arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the 
Gaza-Strip and Jericho area. 
Seventh, Palestinians will form a strong police force, in order to guarantee the 
public order and internal security for Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. 
Israel will continue to carry responsibility for defence against external threats, as 
well as responsibility for overall security of Israelis, for the purpose of safeguarding 
their internal security and public order. 
Eighth, Palestinian-Israeli cooperation in the economic and development 
programmes, concerning water, electricity. energy. finance, transport and 
communication, trade, industry, social welfare, and environmental protection. 
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Ninth, establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Co-ordination and Cooperation 
Committee for mutual security purposes. 
The Oslo Agreement distinguished between two stages in the Palestinian-Israeli 
political process. The first was an interim phase and the second the permanent 
status settlement. The interim arrangements were an integral part of the whole 
political process and will lead to the permanent solution (Shehadeh, 1997,17). 
According to the DOP the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not 
be prejudiced or pre-empted by the agreements reached for the interim period 
(DOP, article V4). 
Many writers and newspapers which opposed the DOP talked about secret annexes 
signed between the PLO and Israel. The annexes talked about were many issues 
such as political cooperations, the closing of the PLO embassies, dismissing 
representatives and integrating them with the Israeli missions abroad, no issue of 
Palestinian passports by the PNA, and the PNA budget to be part of the Israeli 
budget (al-Mojtama al-Madani, November 1993; Reffat and Shaban, 1994,58; 
Bakri, 1993,5: 6). The events followed the DOP clearly showed that there is no 
such secret annexes, and everything agreed had been issued to the public by the 
Israelis and Palestinians. 
2.8 The DOP and the Previous Fundamental Goals 
The Oslo Agreement halted the status quo no-peace, no-war in the Palestinian- 
Israeli conflict. Palestinians did not want this situation to continue, whereas Israel 
as a state preferred it. Israelis benefited from the afore-mentioned status quo, 
because it was receiving support in billions of US dollars from the United States, in 
many forms such as military and economic support. One of the main Palestinian 
goals was to end this situation (Shaheen interview. August 18,1998). The 
aforementioned reasons (see 3.2) that forced Israel to attend the Madrid Conference 
(based on resolving the Palestinian question) led to negotiations with the PLO and 
was the turning point that put an end to the status quo. 
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The Israeli taboo on dealing with the PLO ended. From the signing of the 
agreement Israel dealt and negotiated with the PLO who were now recognised as 
representative of the Palestinian people. This was a significant political 
achievement for the Palestinians (Dar El-Jaleel, 1998,7). For decades Israel 
considered the PLO as a terrorist organisation and attempted to destroy its military 
and political institutions. Another Palestinian achievement in the agreement was the 
return of some of their land to their own jurisdiction. It put Palestinian people back 
on the political map, as they had been previously in history. 
Mahmoud Abbas told the al-Wassat newspaper, that the DOP dealt with 
Palestinians as a people (nation) who had their own political aspirations and legal 
rights. Palestinians had been removed from the Middle East map during the 20th 
century, but the DOP brought them back again (al-Ayyam, September 8,1998). 
There were only two options available to the Israelis for solving the Palestinian 
question. First, the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip to Israel, (as they 
did with the Syrian Golan Heights in 1980) and then the form action of a dual 
nation state between Palestinians and Jews in Mandate Palestine. This opposed the 
Zionist ideology of a Jewish homeland only for Jews, therefore, Israel would not be 
a pure Jewish state. The second option was to concede the West Bank and Gaza- 
Strip. In that case, Palestinians would enjoy their rights to the land and legal 
political rights. The Labour Government preferred the second option, but not that of 
conceding all the territories. During the interim period Israel aimed to isolate and 
disconnect the territorial integrity of the areas that it withdrew from. 
The Israeli strategy of controlling more land continued during the negotiations of 
the Oslo II Agreement. In the DOP there were no areas such as A, B, and C. There 
were two areas, one called the populated areas, and the second the non-populated 
areas. According to the DOP all the populated areas will be transferred to 
Palestinian control in the first redeployment, and in the second and third phase of 
the redeployments. non-populated areas would be transferred to area A. Area B was 
not mentioned in the DOP. What later became area B (map 2.1) was a Palestinian 
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concession and it was the most serious Palestinian strategic and political mistake to 
be made in whole of the agreements. If the classification was implemented 
according to the original agreement, the situation would be better for Palestinians. It 
meant more areas would come under PNA control. The Israelis succeeded in 
increasing their security control over the largest area of the West Bank (Dahalan 
interview, January 15,1999). The creation of area B came to prove the continuation 
of the Israeli strategy of controlling as much territory as they could. This control 
was to be an introduction to Israel's annexation of these territories. 
2.8.1 Problems of Interpretation 
The Oslo Agreement constitutes various propositions for the solution of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. There were no details as to how the agreement was to be 
implemented, it dealt only with general concepts. If the agreement had tried to enter 
into detail, it is likely there would not have happened (Dahalan interview, January 
15,1999). The agreement's language is often been vague, and almost every item 
requires further negotiations between both sides. A Palestinian leader describes it as 
a mine field. The provisions of the agreement could be interpreted according to 
each party's wishes and needs (Habbash interview, December 12,1998). For 
example, the term Military Locations was vague, the agreement did not give 
example closed military areas, camps, or temporary military encampments 
(Shehadeh, 1997,21). 
The agreement took the name of Declaration of Principles (DOP). The DOP offered 
general concepts for a solution. It did not mention the mechanism and details of 
how to implement these concepts. According to the DOP, both parties needed to go 
through further negotiations in order to detail Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza- 
Strip and Jericho area. Both sides were required to reach an agreement for the 
establishment and transfer of authority to the PNA for those areas. A second series 
of negotiations was expected to begin after the implementation of the Gaza-Jericho 
agreement and would deal with the first phase of the Israeli redeployment from the 
populated areas of the West Bank. 
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When these negotiations took place in 1994-1995 they produced two settlements 
known as the Cairo Agreement of 1994 and the Oslo II Agreement of 1995. 
Palestinians believed that the Israeli side refused to execute many of the agreed 
matters in the two accords, because Israelis felt that certain aspects would be 
interfered with and would work against Israeli interests. The Israeli interest was to 
control as much of the land as they were able to and at the same time undermine 
and isolate the PNA in small and fragmented areas. The DOP was clear enough 
with regard to the Israeli control of land. It stated that within the third and final 
redeployment from the West Bank, Israel should keep Israeli settlements and the 
military bases under its control. Those two issues were to be addressed in the final 
status negotiations. (Shaheen interview, August 18,1998; Abu Medain interview, 
February 17,1999). 
Officials of the PNA believe that if the Oslo Agreement and other deals signed in 
1994 and 1995 had been implemented, it would have created Palestinian 
sovereignty over the land. What actually happened on the ground was the 
establishment of `semi-sovereignty'. For example, the Gaza-Jericho Agreement was 
not implemented as both sides had agreed. Israel implemented no more than 
seventy per cent of this Agreement (Dahalan interview, January 15,1999). 
Palestinians also interpret the meaning of the first Israeli military redeployment and 
the further redeployments, as the PNA will be able to control at least eighty per cent 
of the West Bank, according to their understanding of the Oslo Agreements. Article 
IV of the DOP clarifies: 
Jurisdiction of the Council (Palestinian) will cover the West Bank and 
Gaza-Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the 
permanent status negotiations. 
Palestinian interpretation of the provision is that settlements and military bases are 
the only subject of final status negotiations. The area covered by both is not more 
than ten per cent of the West Bank, therefore, ten per cent will remain under Israeli 
control and the remainder NN ill come under Palestinian jurisdiction. The Israelis 
interpreted the provision differently. This was because it did not specific the 
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percentage of redeployment in numbers. They could therefore redeploy their 
military forces from any area they wished. Israel knew that it was the most powerful 
party in the agreement, this meant that they could implement the provision 
according to their own interests. The absence of international adjudication, in the 
case of any conflict of interpretation of the agreements, served Israeli interests 
(Dahalan interview, January 15,1999; al-Ahmed interview, February 2nd, 1998; al- 
Masri interview, September 10,1998; Tamari interview, October 11,1998). 
Palestinians recognise that their definition of the above article, would not be the 
same as that of the Israeli Labour Party in. Palestinian leadership believed that 
Labour would. not withdraw or redeploy Israeli military forces from more than fifty 
to sixty per cent of the West Bank, but the percentage with a Labour government 
will be more than with a Likud government. Palestinians believe that Israel wants to 
control as much area as it can in the interim period, in order to be able to make a 
positive deal in its own interest in the final status negotiations. The deal meant no 
return to the borders of June 1967, because Israel has the appetite to annex parts of 
the West Bank (al-Masri interview, September 10,1998). 
The Oslo Agreement considered the West Bank and Gaza-Strip as a single 
territorial unit whose integrity would be preserved during the interim period. 
Arrangements for two safe passages for persons and transportation between the 
Gaza-Strip and West Bank would be carried out. The agreement was signed in late 
1993, and this provision was reconfirmed in all following agreements. Neither the 
integrity of the West Bank nor Gaza-Strip was preserved, nor was the safe passage 
opened. This continued till mid-1999 (al-Ahmed interview, February 2nd, 1998; al- 
Masri interview. September 10,1998). In this instance the Israeli settlements and 
military bases breached the integrity of the areas. The presence of these locations 
violated the provision itself. 
Even in the Wye River Memorandum signed between both parties in late 1998, 
which clearly determined the percentage of Israeli military redeployment. the date 
for executing the process was fixed, but Israel did not fulfil its obligation. 
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Netanyahu had learnt from Rabin that there are no holy dates; Rabin had repeated 
this many times during the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza-Strip and Jericho. and 
later in the first Israeli redeployment from the West Bank. The difference between 
Rabin and Netanyahu is that Rabin delayed the execution of the withdrawal and 
redeployment although finally he implemented the process. On the other hand, 
Netanyahu had not the will to do so, he started the first phase of the second further 
redeployment and then froze the execution of the memorandum. 
Since signing the DOP in Washington, on September 13,1993, Israel has tried to 
fulfil those provisions of the agreement that serve its own interests. According to 
the agreement, two delegations should be formed as a result of the signed 
agreement. The first was to negotiate the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza-Strip and 
was to be in Egypt; the second was to discuss the interim agreement for the West 
Bank in Washington. Both delegations were to be formed and proceed parallel with 
each other. What happened in reality was that the second was cancelled according 
to Israeli wishes. Palestinians acknowledged that they indirectly helped the Israelis 
in this, because they did not vigorously resist the Israeli demand. (Dahalan 
interview, Jan15,1999). 
The by-pass roads that were constructed in the post-Oslo Agreement (see chapter 4) 
clearly showed the Israeli wish to cut the link between the Palestinian communities 
in the villages, towns, and cities. Since the signing of the Oslo Agreement, Israel 
has constructed many by-pass roads in the West Bank. These kinds of activities 
increased sharply during the period of the Likud government in June 1996-1999. 
The by-pass roads that link Israeli settlements together are well constructed. They 
are better than roads that link Palestinian cities, where the population is more than 
ten times that of the settlements. The by-pass roads divide the West Bank into many 
sections. In the future this will create a cantonisation of the West Bank, whilst the 
Israeli settlements will be linked to each other to form one territorial unit as an 
introduction to annexation by Israel. In such a case it will annex both thwe people 
and the land, and the people here will be Israelis not Palestinians. In the past many 
Israeli settlements were isolated and surrounded by Palestinian cities, towns, and 
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villages, but as a result of the by-pass roads, the situation has been totally reversed. 
The cantonisation of Palestinian territories (Map 2.1) will reduce any hope of 
establishing their statehood (Tamari interview, October 11,1998). 
2.8.2 Zionist ideology and Land Concession in the Agreements 
The recognition of Palestinians as a people, having political and legal aspirations. 
and the control of the Palestinians over some of their land hit at the heart of Zionist 
ideology of land without people (Shaat, 1993,6). 
Tamari believes that the main question for Zionist ideology in the post-Oslo 
Agreement is whether there is a Palestinian people in Palestine and if so was 
Zionism wrong to choose Palestine as the Jewish homeland? The recognition of the 
Palestinian people by the Israelis severely damaged Zionist ideology. He regards to 
this point as a defeat for Zionist ideology. Zionism means transferring land to 
Zionists, and transplanting Palestinian people abroad. The existence of the 
Palestinian people and the return of thousands of them to Palestine is considered a 
victory against the Zionist enterprise in Palestine (Tamari interview, October 11, 
1998). This is what some Israeli intellectuals thought in the late 1970's during a 
discussion among them to find a solution to the Palestinian issue. When an Israeli 
discusses the Palestinian issue he is in fact discussing his perspective toward 
Zionism (Schiff and Fabian, 1977,6). 
The rightist Zionists believed that Oslo had achieved great things for Palestinians, 
which would put an end to their own ideology. They had proposed a Jewish 
homeland located from the Nile River in Egypt to the Euphrates in Iraq, but the 
Oslo Agreement terminated this idea. Also, from an ideological perspective, their 
homeland was smaller than previous by, the `land of Israel', had two banks (those 
of the Jordan River. One was already under Israeli control. The second, (the East 
Bank) which according to their belief, was meant for them, was not. The Oslo 
Agreement even took some of the first bank from them. It also deprived them of the 
`land of Torah', situated between Ethna and Sabastia in the north of the West Bank 
(Shaheen interview, August 18.1998). 
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In the Hebron Protocol introduced during the Likud government under Netanyahu, 
Israeli troops were withdrawn from three-quarters of Hebron City. A large part of 
the city came under PNA control. This was the first time that Likud had conceded 
land to Palestinians. The holy places in Hebron remained under the Israeli control. 
It is important to point out that Hebron is holy for Muslims as well as for Jews. 
Hassan Asfor the Palestinian Minister of the Negotiations Affair said in regard to 
the Wye River Memorandum signed in November, 1998 between the PLO and the 
Likud government, that it was important and this was so because the Likud Party 
signed it. Netanyahu believed that the most dangerous threat facing Israel was the 
DOP. He was convinced that these agreements would divide Israel. When 
Netanyahu accepted a transfer of thirteen percent of the West Bank from areas C to 
areas B, he also agreed to transfer fourteen percent of area B to area A. In that case 
area A would increase five ones. Netanyahu proposed to negotiate the agreement 
itself and he was unable to so. The Memorandum, clearly based on the DOP, was 
no more than a practical method of how the previous agreement should be 
implemented. The same was repeated in the Hebron Protocol (A convocation for 
Hassan Asfor, December 1998). Abbas also had the same idea that Likud believed 
that the Oslo Agreement was a historical concession from Israel and the Likud 
should not pass it (al-Ayyam, September 8,1998). 
According to the Wye River Memorandum, Netanyahu agreed to transfer twelve 
per cent of area C in the West Bank to area B, and three per cent of the area B 
would designated as Green Areas and/or Nature Reserves. One per cent of area C 
would be transfered to area A. He also agreed to transfer fourteen per cent of area B 
to area C, so that area A would increase five fold as a first redeployment under a 
Labour government. This percentage was not what the Palestinians wished to be 
given to them, but according to Netanyahu's speech of `Land of Israel' it was a 
fundamental change for the main extremist party in Israel (A convocation for 
Hassan Asfor, December 1998). On the eve of the signing of the Wye River 
Memorandum, Netanyahu said in regard to land. 
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It was very difficult to concede some of our land, it is painful, we tried 
our best to decrease the area we have to redeploy our forces from ... we 
succeeded to decrease the Palestinian expectancy of transferring more 
land to them ... Palestinians expected to receive ninety percent of the West Bank in the interim period (al-Quds October 26,1998). 
The question for many Israelis was what was the difference between Netanyahu and 
Rabin? Both conceded parts of the `land of Israel' to the Palestinians. Why did the 
Israeli extremists (part of the Israeli right-wing) create a climate of hatred against 
Rabin that led to his assassination? Why was Rabin considered a traitor for many 
right-wingers whereas Netanyahu was considered `king of Israel'? 
The signing of the memorandum created a division within the rightist block in 
Israel. The settlers believed that Natanyahu had betrayed them, which is why 
Yitzhak Shamir did not vote for Netanyahu in the Israeli general election of May, 
1999. Shamir said that Netanyahu had destroyed the Likud party. For Shamir this 
was the case because Netanyahu had conceded some parts of the `Land of Israel, to 
the Palestinians. Some believed that Netanyahu froze on the Wye River 
Memorandum due to the Israeli election. However, anyone following the events 
might conclude that the freeze came before the voting for an early election in the 
Israeli Knesset, especially when the Israeli Vice Defence Minister for settlement 
issues stated, before parliament was dissolved, that the maps for the second phase 
of the Israeli military redeployment, according to the memorandum, were not ready 
from the Israeli side (al-Ayyam December 27,1998). 
2.8.3 Israeli's Negotiations Tactic in the Post-DOP and the Land Classification 
Israelis also tried to prevaricate in the Taba negotiations. The first Israeli attempt 
was to change the withdrawal by redeployment, which was rejected by the PLO. 
They then proposed a withdrawal from Gaza-Strip and Jericho area. In their 
proposal, as admitted by the Israeli commander of the southern area, the proposal 
required more Israeli troops to be located in the Gaza-Strip than the number of 
troops present on the eve of the Intifada. Israeli strategy in regard to land was clear 
from the first rounds of the negotiations in Taba and continued during subsequent. 
It is based on the disruption of the integration of Palestinian land. which Israel may 
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be compelled to transfer to Palestinians. This disruption means many by-pass roads, 
new military bases, new settlements, and an expansion of present settlements and 
these zones. Therefore, if these areas are transferred to the PNA, Israel will have a 
security role there because they have created a situation requiring it. This will 
derogate Palestinian sovereignty in the area (Dahalan interview, January 15,1999). 
Rabin announced that there are two types of Israeli settlements, political and 
security (chapter four), and that political settlements could be traded for peace, 
whereas security settlements should remain in Israeli hands even if peace was 
achieved with Palestinians. The question that arises here is, if Rabin was ready to 
trade political settlements for peace, why did he not do so as part of the Oslo 
Agreement? Israel refused to grant any concessions on the issue of settlements in 
the agreement Palestinians tried their best during negotiations with the Israeli 
Labour Party in the Washington rounds, and also during those in Oslo, to realise 
this concept, but they failed to convince Israelis to implement their own theory 
(Abu Medain interview, February 17,1999). The existence of the Israeli settlements 
is the main Israeli plea for dividing the Palestinian's control over their land into 
different fragmented cantons. Rabin's theory of trading peace for a political 
settlement may be achieved in the final agreement but not during the interim period. 
During the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in Taba, Israel wanted to swallow as 
much land of the Gaza-Strip and Jericho area as possibly. They wanted to decrease 
PNA control over the land. What Israel was also after to control the settlement 
zones in these territories, and another fifty meters beyond the border of the 
settlements. They also asked for a protection area and in addition an area devoid of 
any Palestinian civil construction. Also an additional area, which would have 
Palestinian civil control without security control (Dahalan interview, January 15, 
1999). 
The classification of areas in the West Bank into three categories came from the 
Israeli-Egyptian Accord of 1979, which divided Sinai into three categories A, B. 
and C (Dahalan interview. January 15.1999). Egypt could deploy one military 
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brigade in area A. Four Egyptian battalions in area B with light weapons, and in 
area C the Egyptians had only civil police power. The size of areas B and C in Sinai 
equal two thirds of the Sinai Peninsula (Hussein. 1991,23). While the area of Sinai 
is equivalent to more than ten times that of the West Bank, the population of Sinai 
is relatively very small in relation to its size. The peninsula is a desert and its 
character is fundamentally different from that of the areas of the West Bank. 
The classification of the areas in the Palestinian territories into A. B, and C was an 
Israeli goal (al-Kuronz interview, October 26,1998). Israel wants the Palestinians 
to live in many cantons in the cities, therefore it will expand its territories in the 
West Bank so as to annex them to Israel. Israel plans to annex a considerable area 
of the West Bank. Israel also plans to have its eastern border along the Jordan 
River, therefore, the Palestinian entity in the West Bank will not have access to the 
Arab world. It will be isolated from all sides inside Israel. 
The Oslo II Agreement divides the concept of jurisdiction into three types: regional, 
functional, and personal. Regional jurisdiction means, control over the land and 
regional water. Functional jurisdiction means, control over civil and security affairs, 
but it does not include Israelis who are present in the Palestinian area, or issues of 
final status negotiations such as settlements, Jerusalem military bases and borders. 
Personal jurisdiction means, all Palestinians except the Palestinians of Jerusalem 
are under PNA jurisdiction. The PNA has regional jurisdiction in areas A and B 
which is equal to five times that of the total area of the Gaza-Strip. Functional 
jurisdiction covers area A. In area B, functional jurisdiction covers civil affairs and 
public order, but excludes interior security. Personal jurisdiction covers the 
Palestinian people in all the West Bank except those who live in East Jerusalem 
(Shikaki, 1995,8). 
Since 1967-1993 Israel has refused to give Palestinians security control over the 
West Bank and Gaza-Strip in any solution to the Palestinian question. The only 
control Israel was ready to concede was civil and administrative control (though not 
covering all civil sectors). This means that Palestinians would play a functional role 
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in populated areas. but security would be by Israelis. What the changes brought by 
the Oslo Agreement and following agreements, was a situation in which most of the 
Gaza-Strip and some areas of the West Bank were to come under full Palestinian 
control. However, a large majority of the West Bank was to be placed under Israeli 
security control. 
Area A in the West Bank stretches from north to the south without territorial links. 
Therefore, this situation in partitioning the West Bank will injure both Palestinians 
and Israelis at a security level: no territorial links will also mean no security links 
for both sides. Responsibility for security matters will be fragmented. If there is no 
link between the Palestinian areas, Palestinians can deny responsibility for 
following up any security matter. The lack of territorial links is a dangerous strategy 
for the Palestinian side as well as being a weak point for Israeli security. In the 
post-Oslo Agreement, interference in security matters came into existence. Even in 
the Gaza-Strip, where a great part of the area is under Palestinian security control, 
security matters are interfered with, due to the presence of Israeli settlements in the 
strip. Settlements are at present everywhere from north to the south. The eighteen 
settlements in the Gaza-Strip created a big obstacle for the PNA security agencies. 
They are close to Palestinian populated areas in Gaza-Strip, but there is no doubt 
that security efforts by Palestinians regarding the halting of military attacks against 
Israelis in the Gaza-Strip are better than their efforts in the West Bank, due to the 
area being under PNA control (Dahalan interview, January 15,1999). 
The PNA has security control in area B, where its security agencies exist as official 
offices, but the overriding security in this sector is by Israel. Israelis believe that 
whoever has final security control over any zone has sovereignty over the land 
including every thing in that area. This is what happens in practice in area B in the 
West Bank and also in the Mawasi Area in the Gaza-Strip (Dahalan interview 
January 15,1999; al-Masri interview. September 10.1998). 
More than ninety-five per cent of the Palestinian people of the occupied West Bank 
came under PNA jurisdiction, however, one outcome of the Palestinian-Israeli 
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agreements was that only three per cent were brought under full PNA control and 
26 per cent under its administrative control. There was no balance of transferring 
people and land to the PNA in these agreements. Therefore, the Palestinians will 
continue to oppose and fight this situation created after the Oslo Agreements. The 
Agreements talk about moving people and land to PNA jurisdiction. Israeli 
interpretation means transferring all people, but not all land, not even one quarter of 
the land (Abu Medain interview, February 17,1999). This unbalanced transfer of 
people and land has created a socio-economic crises in Palestinian society. This 
will be discussed in more detail in chapter five. 
According to the Oslo Agreement the PNA was to prevent any `terrorist' operations 
against Israelis coming from its territories. As a matter of fact the great majority of 
the Palestinian people came under Palestinian rule (security and civil). Therefore 
the PNA needed to prove its ability to maintaining security over its territories. Israel 
always insists that the PNA must take security measures against `Palestinian 
terrorist activities' as a precondition of any further redeployment. In many cases the 
abuse of human rights against the Palestinian opposition from the PNA side was 
recorded merely to meet Israeli and American demands. The first priority of the 
PNA was to achieve further Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territories, but 
there is no doubt that there was no excuse for the PNA to violate human rights. 
The Palestinians gave more concessions on the matter of security in the Wye River 
Memorandum. Dahalan recognised these, but he has suggested that they tried their 
best so that they would not harm Palestinian interests. He added, "through these 
concessions we removed the Israeli pretext of security for not conducting further 
redeployment"' (Dahalan interview. January 15,1999). The Palestinian opposition 
saw the Memorandum as something built on a new Israeli concept, which is land in 
return for security. This was a new Palestinian concession. 
2.9 The Division Between Palestinians 
There is no doubt that the Madrid Conference and its consequences left the 
Palestinians divided into supporters and opposers. Under the terms of the Oslo 
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Agreement the divisions among Palestinians remained. The supporters of the DOP 
argued that the agreement and the Gaza-Jericho First option embodied only a first 
step, and that its conclusion represented a wise course in pursuit of the declared 
national Palestinian objectives, including the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state. Its Opponents, on the other hand, saw in the agreement an 
abandonment of legitimate Palestinian rights. Supporters organised motorcades, 
processions, and mass rallies celebrating the agreement, the opposition did exactly 
the same but denouncing it. The supporters were and continue to be in the majority: 
polls conducted after the signing of the agreement indicate that about 65 per cent of 
Palestinians in the occupied territories approved of agreement, 30 per cent opposed 
it, and about 7 per cent were undecided (Abu Amir, 1994,76; Reffat and Shaban, 
1994,74). Palestinian public support for the peace process continued in the late 
1990's. Polls that were conducted by the Centre for Palestine Research and Studies, 
showed that the Palestinian public continued to accept the peace process despite the 
obstacles put forwards by Israel. In July 1998 the centre conducted a poll which 
clarified this support. Sixty eight percent were in the favour of it, whereas twenty- 
nine present were against it. In March 1997, a poll showed seventy three per cent 
supported the peace process (A poll for Centre for Palestine Research and Studies, 
July/August, 1998; A poll for Centre for Palestine Research and Studies, March, 
1997). 
The Palestinian supporters of the Oslo Agreement are the al-Fatah Movement (led 
by Arafat), the Palestinian People's Party (the former Communist Party), and the 
Palestinian Democratic Union-Feda (the Yasir Abed-Rabbuh wing of the DFLP). 
The Palestinian opposition is divided into nationalist and Islamic trends. The main 
nationalist groups are the PFLP led by George Habash and the DFLP headed by 
Nayif Hawatmah. The Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) and Islamic Jihad 
form the Islamic opposition. Their opposition comes from their doctrinal and 
political rejection of Israel, while nationalist opposition is tactical and focuses on 
the terms of the agreement (Abu-Amr, 1994,78). 
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At their convocation in Abed-Araheem Maloh, and Qais Abu-Lila (members of the 
Political Office of the PFLP and DFLP respectively) argued that the problem of the 
agreements for Netanyahu was that they gave Palestinians some land before a 
permanent solution, therefore, Netanyahu tried to end this process and move direct 
by to permanent status negotiations. Netanyahu's focus was to make interim issues 
the permanent issues that would be negotiated in final status negotiations (A 
convocation for Maloh and Abu-Lila, October, 1998). 
One respondent, the leader of the PFLP in the Gaza-Strip, Jameel Majdalawi 
(Member of the Political Office of the PFLP) noted in an interview that when the 
PFLP accepted the PLO phased programme of set up an independent state in the 
West Bank and Gaza-Strip in the seventies, it did not mean that the PFLP cancelled 
its goal of establishing a Palestinian state over Mandate Palestine. The organisation 
accepted this proposal due to circumstances created as a result of the war of 1967. 
The fact is that the international community perceives Mandate Palestine as two 
entities; the first is Israel which came into existence as a consequence of the Arab- 
Israeli war in 1948. The second are the Palestinian Occupied Territories (the West 
Bank and Gaza-Strip, including East Jerusalem). The international community 
recognised Israel, but at the same time dealt with the West Bank and Gaza-Strip as 
occupied territories. Within these territories the PFLP intended to establish the 
Palestinian state (Majdalawi interview, February 11,1998). Majdalawi added: 
Palestine is for its people and for whoever is living on this land (Jews 
and Palestinians) ... a 
democratic and human relations between 
Palestinians and Jews should be formed on an equality basis. This 
means that the unification of Mandate Palestine should not be based on 
the destruction of any party (Palestinians or Jews). Each party could 
preserve its own culture and civilisation as well as its religion ... 
it is 
good to accept the division now, but this solution would not work over 
the long term... it will work only for the short time (Majdalawi 
interview, February 11,1998). 
Edward Said preferred this solution (dual nation state), because the conflict 
between Israelis and Palestinians is a conflict over the same land where both 
peoples believe each party has its own right to live on it, and hopes the second party 
will leave or abandon it. Oslo isolated these two peoples into two entities. A 
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Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip is not a practical idea (al-A` yam, 
February 2,1999). 
As Majdalawi explained to me opposition to the Oslo Agreement by the PFLP was 
due to the following reasons: first, the majority of Palestinian land in the West 
Bank and Gaza-Strip remains under Israeli occupation. Second, the agreement does 
not force Israel to withdraw from all occupied territories until five years after the 
agreement. Third, the PNA has no sovereignty over the sea and its air space. Fourth, 
the agreement did not open the border for Palestinian people to enter and exit 
abroad, or to and from the West Bank and Gaza-Strip, which is still in the hands of 
Israelis. Fifth, there are no provisions about the halting of Israeli settlements. Sixth, 
the agreement is no more than a systematic Israeli occupation of the occupied 
territories. The PNA controls about ninety eight percent of the Palestinian people, 
and Israel controls ninety three percent of the land. What developed during the post- 
Oslo Agreement was that the Palestinian people became isolated under PNA 
control, and now that the confrontation between Palestinians and Israeli occupied 
forces no longer exists, the Agreement in its core is negative, but I can't ignore its 
positive aspect. These aspects are secondary and minor. For example, the return of 
several tens of thousands of Palestinians including those involved in the PLO 
struggle; the wane of Israeli occupation from some parts of the occupied territories; 
and some symbols of Palestinian sovereignty such as the Palestinian flag, the 
national anthem, and the presence that President Arafat is trying to create in the 
world (Majdalawi interview, February 11,1999). 
Throughout the interview majdalawi did not offer a practical plan for solving the 
Palestinian question. He believes the implementation of international resolutions to 
be the basis for a solution to the Palestinian question. He knows quite well that 
neither the United States nor Israel is ready to deal with these resolutions, especially 
the U. N. General Assembly resolutions. This can also be deduced from other 
Palestinian opposition parties and movements. They lack any proper political 
strategy. whereas the PLO has its own agenda for the solution of the Palestinian 
question. irrespective of NN-hether or not this plan will achieve Palestinian 
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aspirations. The Palestinian opposition is always criticising the PLO political plans 
without proposing any practical, detailed, or realistic substitute. 
The DFLP rejected the Oslo-Agreement on the same basis as the PFLP. The DFLP 
asked for national unity in order to face May 4,1999, the expiry date of the 
Palestinian-Israeli interim agreement. The DFLP together with all opposition 
parties and movements called for the creation of an independent Palestinian state in 
the West Bank and Gaza-Strip by this date (DFLP Official Document, May, 1998, 
102) 
It is said that military operations conducted by Hamas and Islamic Jihad brought 
Netanyahu to power. The character of Israeli society is formed according to security 
threats. Israelis looked to these operations as a weakness on the part of their 
government, led by Peres after the assassination of Rabin. It was logical that the 
Israelis would vote Likud as a guarantee of security, especially when we know that 
the Likud election plan concentrated on security issues, particularly the efforts that 
it would pursue to put an end to these operations (al-Ayyam, September 8,1998). 
Hyder Abdul Shafi the head of the Palestinian delegation to the Oslo Conference 
believes that the Hamas military operations were wrong and provided Israel with 
the excuses it needed (Abdul Shafi, 1997,58). 
2.10 Conclusion 
There is no doubt that the Oslo Agreement tried to put an end to the Palestinian- 
Israeli conflict. It was the first time that both sides had sat down together to try to 
draw their future without any mediator. During the negotiations in Oslo the balance 
of power favoured Israel. The outcome of the negotiations of what is now known as 
the Oslo Agreement was unbalanced. The Palestinian side gave more concessions 
on fundamental issues than the Israelis. 
Progressive steps taken at the Oslo negotiations were due to Israeli readiness to 
discuss the idea of withdrawal from parts of the Palestinian Occupied Territories. 
This played a major role in the success of the Oslo negotiations. The Palestinian 
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goal which remained constant was; to achieve a total Israeli exit from Palestinian 
territories by phased withdrawals and redeployments, which was rejected by 
Israelis. Controversial objectives on both sides regarding the notion of Israeli 
withdrawal from the West Bank sharply decreased the speed of achieving a 
comprehensive peace. 
The Agreement has positive and negative points for both sides, but the negative 
aspects on the Palestinian side were greater than on the Israeli side. Palestinians 
from both sides (supporters and opponents) recognised this fact. Supporters tried to 
stress the positive features of the agreement and decrease the negative ones, 
whereas opponents believed that it was impossible to avoid the negative aspects 
because they had become fact. The agreement put an end to the Palestinian dream 
of establishing a national state over Mandate Palestine, at least in the short term. 
However, this idea still persist inside Palestinian hearts. 
The `historical Jewish kingdoms' existed in the highlands of Palestine, therefore, 
the West Bank is considered to be the heart of the `land of Israel'. As a result of the 
Oslo Agreement the Zionist ideology of the `Land of Israel' no longer exists. This 
land is shared with Palestinians, and now they (Palestinians) are ruling some parts 
of the `Land of Israel'. Israel's major parties (Likud and Labour) believe that this 
land is theirs, but the presence of the Palestinian people compels them to leave 
some parts of their land. The Oslo Agreement showed that the political realities are 
stronger than the historical or religious demands. As a result of the Wye River 
Memorandum the PNA control 42 per cent of the West Bank `the heart of the land 
of Israel'. Jaffa is more important for Israelis than any settlement in the Palestinian 
Occupied Territories, however Jaffa was never part of the `historical Jewish 
kingdom'. 
Many observers and analysts expected that in the post-Oslo Agreement, the 
Occupied Territories, especially the Gaza-Strip, would have one of the worst civil 
wars in contemporary history. The reason being that step-by-step withdrawals and 
redeployments of Israeli military forces would carry, daily dangers. However, events 
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during more than five years of the post-Oslo Agreement show that civil war among 
Palestinians is not an option for all Palestinian political parties and movements, and 
is also condemned by the public. To avoid any clash among Palestinians the 
Palestinian entity which is now forming should be based on democratic measures. 
This is the only way for Palestinians to survive and to avoid any such disruptive 
future, especially when we know that a Palestinian independent entity is not in the 
interests of Israel, Jordan and some other Arab states. Therefore, Palestinians have 
to struggle politically on many fronts, but this may not have to continue 
indefinitely. 
The agreement brought `peace', and the results of the agreement proved that peace 
could be attained between Palestinians and Israelis. Yet the peace has to be lasting, 
just and comprehensive. Justice for Palestinians means the right to establish an 
independent state; the return of more than four million Palestinian refugees, at least 
in short immediate period to return to the Palestinian state without prejudice to their 
right to return to their villages and cities in Israel; and finally, a reasonable solution 
to the control of Jerusalem which will preserve political and religious rights for 
both. This may seem an injustice for the Israelis, but we have to remember that 
when the Palestinians accepted the establishment of their state in the West Bank 
and Gaza-Strip they conceded eighty-two percent of Mandate Palestine (their 
national goal) to Israelis. Why should the Israelis then not concede eighteen percent 
of the `Land of Israel' to the Palestinian state? Both parties should recognise these 
facts in their political calculations in order to attain justice and lasting peace. 
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Chapter Three: Israeli Settlement in the Post-Oslo 
Agreement 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip, Israel has continued 
to keep statistics of settlements, but these are not made public. Israel's dealings 
regarding settlement policy are a state secret. However, this does not mean that 
settlement activities are totally unknown. Speeches made by Israeli officials, 
governmental plans, media, private institutions, settlement experts, as well as 
Palestinians, do show a proper picture of settlement activities and this is what this 
chapter intends to explore. 
The US State Department annual report regarding the Israeli settlements in the 
occupied territories noted that "Rabin's government has made no commitment to 
halt or reduce construction in East Jerusalem ... 
in fact it has done the very 
opposite, declaring its intention to continue expanding in the area" (www. fmep. org/ 
jul93. html). This chapter will attempt to clarify Labour settlement activities from 
1992 to 1996 in what Israel calls `Greater Jerusalem' which combine a large area of 
the West Bank. The above mentioned U. S. State Department report also noted that 
under the Labour government, "there has not been a complete freeze on settlement 
activity" (www. fmep. org/jul93. html). The Labour's settlement activities (section 
three) were conducted in all the Palestinian territories with settlement concentrated 
in specific areas where Labour wanted to continue its control in the final status 
resolution with the Palestinians. 
In June 1996, as a result of the Israeli general election, Netanyahu the leader of the 
Likud Party formed the Israeli government. The Palestinian Minister of 
Transportation described his government as the settlers government. Netanyahu's 
government supported the settlements by all available means. Section four of this 
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chapter illustrates the Likud settlement activities during the time of peace and the 
attitudes of the leaders of Likud towards the final solution with Palestinians. This 
section reveals that Likud policy during the post-Oslo Agreement dealt with the 
settlement activities but no peace agreement was signed with the Palestinians. The 
Netanyahu settlement activities were similar to the previous leaders of Likud 
(Begin and Shamir) in mid-1970's and 1980's. 
3.2 Settlement Policy in the Post-Oslo Agreement 
For the Israelis the settlement question tends to be concerned with whether they 
serve Israeli security needs. Yet for the Palestinian officials the settlements can 
never serve Israeli security concerns: only through peace can Israel maintain 
security. The Israeli theory on security of lines of defence may have proved valid in 
the late sixties with the Allon plan and in the early seventies, but at the end of the 
twentieth century with advanced and accurate weapons, it no longer applies (Peres, 
1994,21: 34; Tamari interview, October 11,1998). Some Israeli politicians and 
military believe that the old theory is inappropriate for the present time. Shimon 
Peres and General Chaem Barliev (former Israeli Police Minister) are two of them. 
They believe that settlements are obstacles in a time of war, because the Israeli 
army will have to guard settlements and settlers as well as fighting the enemy 
(Harris, 1980,23). 
However, nobody can ignore the fact that the great majority of Israelis consider 
settlements vital for Israeli security. This was reflected in the post-Oslo Agreement, 
in which the Palestinians control many zones close to vital Israeli areas on the 
coast. Palestinian cities such as Tool Karm and Qalqilya on the West Bank are only 
fifteen kilometres from Natanya City, one of the biggest in Israel. It will be 
interesting to see whether the new situation created by the post-Oslo Agreement 
reinforces the importance of the Israeli settlements in the period of peace. It is 
pertinent to state that in addition to Israeli political, security, and ideological 
dimensions, settlements also clearly serve to expand Israel if there are to be two 
states. 
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The struggle in Palestine between Palestinians and Israelis is a struggle for land and 
for a distinctive national entity on that land; it is not a religious struggle (Coon, 
1992,8). Since Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza-Strip, it conducted a large 
settlement policy in order to control Palestinian land. The settlement activities 
varied from one government to another, but the constant policy for all Israeli 
governments (Labour and Likud) has been that settlements should be built and 
continued in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip despite the fact that the only differences 
have been in deciding which places should be designated for settlement. 
The Oslo Agreement affected the Israeli settlement activities. Settlement policy 
embodies the Israeli concept of a permanent status solution with Palestinians that is 
to be reached within three to five years of the interim period. It has been a policy 
that did not allow for any comprehensive Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank 
and Gaza-Strip (Beshara, 1995,4). The Arab member of the Israeli Knesset noted 
that the Israeli governments spent billions of shekels during the post-Oslo 
Agreement on settlement activities. Just for by-bass roads, Israel spent 1 billion 
shekels (Mahameed, 1995,7). According to the Israeli Ministry of Finance, the 
government spent a minimum of $700 million across the `Green Line' from 
October 1992- September 1993. This excluded the aid from the IZO and the Jewish 
Agency (Shaw-Smith, 1994,105). If we accept this $700 million, this means that 
during the interim period Israel spent at least $3,5 billion, while the aid that donors 
pledged to support the development plan of the PNA was $2,4 billion for the same 
period. The figure for Israeli settlements excludes that spent on other activities such 
as creating new settlements, building new units, and expanding existing 
settlements. This might suggest that the final status with Palestinians will be 
determined through settlement policy and not at the negotiation table. 
The General Director of the Palestinian Society of Human Rights and the 
Environment stated in a message that was submitted to the Swedish Cooperation 
Minister, that 10 per cent of land on the West Bank has been confiscated by Israeli 
governments since the signing of the Oslo Agreement up to the end of 1997. This 
message also revealed that during that period Israel demolished 540 houses on the 
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West Bank (al-Ayyam January 27,1997). But according to a BBC reporter, the 
number of demolished houses is amounts to more than 540. Israel pulled down 
around 3,000 houses from the signing of the Oslo Agreement till August 1999 
(BBC News 24, August 13,1999). 
Israeli settlement activities during the post-Oslo Agreement (Map 3.1) have three 
characteristics: first, intensive settlement close to the West Bank border with Israel, 
known as the `Green Line'. These activities such as new buildings, expanding 
existing settlements, and intensifying the number of settlers occured on the West 
Bank side of the `Green Line'. Second, expanding settlements situated in the north, 
middle, and south of the West Bank, and linking these settlements by the 
construction of new by-pass roads. In this case Israeli settlements will be joined 
together to form a territorial link with Israel. Third, the annexation of the group of 
settlements which form a security belt around Jerusalem and are located outside the 
border of the municipality of Jerusalem (Khatib, 1995,34). 
3.3 Settlement under a Labour Government 
Israeli settlement activities under the Labour Party government 1992-1996 raise a 
number of interesting issues. Previous Likud governments made no secret of their 
intention to continue settlement activities, and their behaviour on this issue has 
been criticised almost unanimously by the international community. However, the 
situation regarding Rabin's policy towards the settlement issue was different; 
announcing official policy is one thing, but reality on the ground is quite another. 
The Israeli Labour Prime Minister, Rabin, adopted a more sophisticated strategy for 
his settlement policy (Habbash interview, December 12,1998). 
The Oslo II Agreement mentioned the Israeli chain of settlements in the Gaza-Strip 
(Gush Qatif chain), but did not include any mention of settlements in the West 
Bank. Rabin's speech to the Israeli Knesset approving the Oslo II Agreement. 
confirmed that the will of Israeli was to establish chains of those on the West Bank 
(Cited in Shikaki. 1995.15). In this case the chains that Rabin planned for the West 
Bank would swallow a great part of area C. which represents the largest area of the 
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West Bank. Maher al-Masri, Palestinian Minister of Trade and Economy. believed 
that Labour's intention is to assimilate 50 per cent of the West Bank in the final 
arrangement at best (al-Masri interview September 10,1998). 
The largest settlement construction drive in the history of Israeli occupation of the 
West Bank and Gaza-Strip happened under Rabin. He described Israeli settlement 
activities under his government after returning to Israel from his August 1992 
meeting with President Bush in this way: 
Look, I do not know what you mean when you say settlement freeze, 
when we are talking of the continued construction of 11,000 units in the 
territories, I do not remember a time even after cancelling the 
construction of 6,000 to 7,000 housing units, such a drive ever took 
place ... 
The Arabs are very critical of the United States in view of the 
fact that, the way they see it, not only is there no settlement freeze, there 
is even a hastened pace of construction when compared to two-and-one 
half years ago ... the construction of 
11,000 units continues. Is this a 
freeze? (www. fmep. org/ reports/v3nl. html). 
3.3.1 Labour Perspective on Settlement 
In April 1994, Rabin argued that settlements would be a threat to the peace process 
in the Middle East rather than enhancing this process. He also confirmed that 
settlements not only failed the historical role of marking out Jewish sovereignty, but 
that the majority of settlements provided only marginal security advantages. He also 
pointed out that settlements established by the Likud governments had no 
advantages. Rabin believed that the Israeli army was to defend towns in Israeli, not 
Israeli settlements. Months prior to his assassination in November 1995, Rabin had 
acknowledged that a generation of settlement from 1967 onwards had failed to 
achieve its mission in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. The target of this mission had 
been to make Palestinian territories part of Israel (Cited in Aronson, 1997,14). It is 
worth mentioning here that shortly prior to his murder Rabin had pledged to Arafat 
that he would freeze all settlement activities (Dahalan interview, January 15,1999). 
Rabin classified settlements in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip into two types (map 
3.2); security settlements which had military and strategic importance, and political 
settlements which were created to increase the Jewish population in some parts of 
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the occupied territories by the Likud governments. The political settlements are 
located along the central mountains north from Ramallah and a few in or near 
Hebron. Until January 1994, the population of these settlements was 20,000 and 
occupied about fifty settlements. Rabin decided to continue activities in the security 
settlements, and halt those in the political ones (government decision No. 360). 
Rabin hoped that by not favouring political settlements they "will despair of the 
future and that their numbers at least will not increase -and at best will dwindle- 
during the interim period" (Corbin, 1994,29: 100; Hussein, 1993,125; Palestinian 
Information Service, 1997b, 3; www. finep. org/ jan94. html). Rabin did not mention 
the security settlements by name, but it can be concluded that these settlements are 
classified as a national priority and operate under the term of security settlement, 
although this does not apply to all settlements. This chapter and the following 
chapter will help to differentiate between the two types of settlements according to 
Rabin's classification. 
According to Rabin's ordering, security settlements cover those the Jerusalem area, 
the Jordan Valley area and settlements near the `Green Line'. This security area for 
Rabin covered about 2,800,000 dunums (fifty one per cent) of the West Bank 
(Massalha, 1994,226). Rabin believed the security contribution of political 
settlements to be zero (www. finep. org/jul94. html). Security settlements were 
classified as those national of priority; under a Labour government, 39 were put in 
this category (Baba, 1997b, 1). The above-mentioned were concluded after the 
announcement of the Likud new settlement policy 1996-1999. 
The U. S. welcomed the Labour classification as a positive step towards peace in the 
Middle East, but this was not based on any international resolution concerning 
Israeli settlements. The European Union dealt with these settlements as an illegal 
action, and even recommended a boycott of settlement building. 
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Maher al-Masri interprets the delay of a solution on the settlement issue to the final 
status negotiations. These settlements already existed when the Oslo Agreement 
was signed and the delay was not to allow them expand, as did eventually happen. 
The final status negotiations will solve the settlement problem that existed in 1993 
(al-Masri interview, September 10,1998). The Israeli settlement of Palestinian 
territories was accepted by both parties (Palestinians and Israelis) as an issue 
requiring a solution. When Israel conducted more settlement activities according to 
Rabin's classification of settlements, the problem became more complicated. 
The Shimon Sheves report (chief of staff in Rabin's office) was adopted by the 
government in 1992 and known as decision No. 721, which changed the national 
priorities of Rabin's government. The decision considered security settlements and 
those in `Greater Jerusalem' as national priorities for areas eligible for the 
government's most generous benefits and incentives (Ha'artz 21 July, 1992 cited in 
Baba, 1996,14; www. finep. org/ jul93. html). The government would give all types 
of political and financial support and encouragement to building and expanding 
these areas. 
The Labour Party election plan of 1992 stated that, "the Labour government would 
not establish new settlements, and it would also not intensify the existing 
settlements except those located in `Greater Jerusalem' and the Jordan Valley". The 
programme also demanded a freeze on beginning any new settlements for one year. 
`Greater Jerusalem', as Israeli Minister of Housing in Rabin's cabinet defined it, 
consists of West Jerusalem, East Jerusalem, and a group of settlements to the south 
of the West Bank, such as Ma' ale Efraim, Petar, Gef at Za'aef, Ma' ale Adomim, 
and Gush Etsion (Aronson, 1997,17; Hussein, 1993,58). Hashem Mahameed, a 
member of the Israeli Parliament, expected the area of `Greater Jerusalem' to cover 
twenty five per cent of the West Bank (Mahameed, 1995,8). Whereas Nafez Abu 
Hasnah expected (according to an Israeli report what he believed was adopted by 
Rabin's government) that `Greater Jerusalem' would extend from Gush Etzion 
(between Bethlehem and Hebron) in the south, Ramallah in the north, Ma'ale 
Adomim in the east, and Bet She'ash in the west. The diameter of this `Greater 
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Jerusalem' would measure up to twenty-three kilometres, which meant it would 
occupy 10-15 per cent of the West Bank (Abu Hasnah, 1997,69). 
as mentioned in chapter two, the Jordan Valley is a strategic area for Israel. Israel's 
Labour Party plans to annex the valley to Israel in any final settlement with the 
Palestinians. David Libai, the Minister of Justice in Rabin's government noted: 
Ma'ale Efraim (overlooking the Jordan Valley) and the Jordan Valley 
are located, according to the Labour Party platform, within Israeli 
territory, and they are an important part of the security and settlement 
alignment (Ha'aretz newspaper, November 17,1993 cited in 
www. fmep. org/jan94. htlm). 
The settlement activities in the Labour Party programme of 1992 in the West Bank 
were close to the Allon Plan of 1967 (chapter two). Over time the Israeli policy of 
creating faits accomplis in the Palestinian territories amended the Allon Plan 
through Israeli governments activities (Newman, 1996,61; Abu Hasnah, 1997,182; 
Massalha, 1994,227). Therefore, in theory Labour settlement policy did not 
change. The change came about with the expansion of the borders of Jerusalem, 
known as `Greater Jerusalem". During an interview with Maher al-Masri in 
September 10,1998, he explained that officially Labour was saying that its policy 
coincided with the Allon Plan, but on the ground Labour activities actually went 
beyond the plan. 
The settlers of `Greater Jerusalem' on the West Bank accounted seventy seven per 
cent of the total number and the units under construction in this area were 16,247. 
This represented seventy one per cent of the total of units under construction in the 
West Bank and Gaza-Strip (Aronson, 1997,17). 
3.3.2 Settlement Construction under Labour 
The Labour government started to build more than 10,000 units in different 
settlements in the Palestinian territories. This meant that 40.000 new settlers would 
be settled in the territories (if wie consider that the average settler family consists of 
four members) and this number would be equal to one-third of all Israeli settlers in 
the occupied territories (Coon. 1995.251; Massalha. 1994.226). Arafat said that 
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Rabin's government approved the building of 14,000 units in Jerusalem between 
1992-1994, excluding the 11,000 on the West Bank. The Israeli Minister of 
Housing in Rabin's government confirmed the construction of 13,000 in annexed 
Jerusalem (www. fmep. org/jan94. html). 
TABLE 3.1 
SETTLER POPULATION 1990-1995 IN THE WEST BANK AND 
GAZA-STRIP'S (EXCLUDING EAST JERUSALEM) 
Year Population % increase over 
previous year** 
1989 69,000 9.5 
1990 76,000 10.1 
1991 92,000 21.0 
1992 112,000 21.7 
1993 120,000 7.0 
1994 135,000 12.5 
1995 145,000 7.4 
Source: Foundation of Middle East Peace, cited in Aronson, 1996 
* Population figure vary - sometimes by as much as 20 per cent - depending on the 
source. 
** The author's calculation 
In June 1992 the Labour government decided (decision No. 360) to freeze building 
in some areas of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. The 
decision was a result of the Israeli-American agreement for ten billion U. S. dollars 
as loan guarantees, which preconditioned that Israelis use this amount to build 
inside Israel, not in the Occupied Territories. The Labour government evaluated the 
previous Likud government decisions and activities with regard to settlement in the 
West Bank and Gaza-Strip. It then delineated its policy as follows: first, a freeze on 
building 2,136 units, where the construction contracts of these units had not yet 
been signed, but approved by the Likud government in 1992. Second, the freeze on 
building 31,545 units, where the construction contracts of these units had been 
signed, but work not yet started. Third, a temporary freeze on 2.300 units where the 
work had already started, but was at an early building stage. Fourth, the 
continuation of building 8.781 units. whose construction building was already in 
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progress. Fifth, the continuation of building 1,686 units in `Greater Jerusalem*. On 
July 19,1992 the Labour government cancelled the introduction of 14 new Israeli 
communities in the occupied territories which had been approved by previous 
governments between 1981-1985, where building had not yet begun on the ground 
(Baba, 1996,13). The Labour government of 1992-1996 approved 84 development 
plans for Israeli settlements in Palestinian territories (Talkaji interview, November 
13,1998). The approved construction of the units mentioned above refers only to 
units built under government or agencies with whom the government had contracts. 
Private units under construction are excluded from these figures. Rabin's 
government approved the continuation of the erection of 10,467 units, a temporary 
freeze on 2300 units would be imposed later. The only complete freeze was on 
buildings still at the planning stage. All building that began during the Likud 
government continued under Labour. The Israeli director general of the Ministry of 
Housing said: 
When I gave the information to the Minister of Housing (Benjamin Ben 
Eliezer) I told him that it included only our (government) building or 
agencies with whom we have contracts. There was nothing in these 
numbers on private construction, because we have no power over it ... 
when I pass my estimate to the Prime Minister's office, I inform top 
Rabin aide, Shimon Sheves, that the figure of 10,000 did not include 
1,500 additional units under private construction (www. fmep. org/ 
reports/v3nlhtml). 
The above-mentioned Israeli-American Agreement of loan guarantees tacitly 
considered the Israeli concept of `Greater Jerusalem' as part of Israel, therefore, the 
American loan could be used for this area. The agreement also implicitly accepted 
the continuation of construction which was conducted during the Likud 
government. (Baba, 1996,13). Edward Djerejian, the U. S. Assistant Secretary for 
Near East Affairs noted in congressional testimony that, "U. S. policy permits some 
allowance for ... construction activities 
in existing settlements". The U. S. State 
Department in its annual report of 1993 regarding Israeli settlements noted that, 
"there has not been a complete freeze on settlement activity" (xvxwAw'. finep. org/ 
jul9 3. html). 
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The only side that benefited from the American loan was the Jews. There «-as no 
Arab site in East Jerusalem (for Israelis this is a part of the Israeli capital) that 
benefited from the loan. The Arab communities were omitted from any 
development after the Israeli occupation of the eastern part. This would be clear 
from the speech of the Israeli Mayor of Jerusalem Teddy Kolik (Labour Party), who 
continued as Mayor of the `unified Jerusalem' from 1967 till 1992. He stated 
"many times we talked about improvement of the conditions of the Arab inhabitants 
and their rights in Jerusalem, nothing was done for them such as schools, cultural 
centres, streets, and pavements. We (Israelis) only provided sewage and water 
networks only because some cases of cholera were found among them, and we were 
afraid it would infect the Jews of Jerusalem" (Cited in Baba, 1997c, 19). 
In 1992, the Israeli Finance Ministry estimated at the sum of $700 million per year 
invested by Israel beyond the `Green Line'. The same kind of figure continued to be 
invested in the later years under Rabin (www. finep. org/jan94. html). 
On January 22,1995, the Labour government set up a ministerial committee headed 
by Rabin to supervise settlement activities. Its function was based on the above- 
mentioned Israeli government decisions No. 360 and 721. The committee approved 
the construction of 3,942 units in `Greater Jerusalem' (these are excluded from the 
1,686 mentioned above, and whose building was completed). The units were 
distributed as follows: 1,100 in Petar, 500 in Gev'at Za'ef, 250 in Gev'on, and 42 in 
Kidar. The ministerial committee also approved the building of 50 units in the 
Jordan Valley and these were also finished. Later the committee decided to erect 
2,640 in `Greater Jerusalem' as follows: 779 in Ma'ale Adomim, 900 in Petar, 340 
in Gev'at Za'ef, 400 in Keryat Sefer, 221 in Efrat (A'yed, 1996, cited in Baba, 
1996,16: 20). 
The Israeli Ministry of Housing under the Labour government announced that it had 
bought all the vacant units in the settlements (3500). and prohibited their 
occupation. The government preconditioned that any person wanting to live in these 
units should already be a resident of the settlement where the unit was located. The 
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distribution of these units was as follows; 1,500 in Are'el, 69 in Kefar Tafooh. 97 
in Kadomim, 52 in Kadeem, 147 in Elone Moreh, 45 in Hefts, 52 in Kerny 
Shomron, 38 in Harmesh, 29 in Karmel, 369 in Gush Qatif, 25 in Eli Sinai, 83 in 
Nesanet, 160 in Benfadakalim, 22 in Netsarim, 40 in Fe'at Sadeh, and 3 in Kefar 
Darom (the last seven settlements are located in the Gaza-Strip). These units 
formed part of the 10,000 approved by Rabin's government as an extension of the 
building programme inherited from the previous Likud government (Yede'ot 
Ahronot cited in al-Quds, August 10,1996). Certain sources state that 1,243 units 
of the 3,000 were inhabited by force, but the Labour government did not compel 
these settlers to evacuate them (Baba, 1996,19). These settlements fall into the 
political settlement category 
According to the Israeli Peace Now Movement, during the first two and a half years 
of the Rabin government construction in the settlements continued in all locations, 
while in the last eighteen months building was concentrated in `Greater Jerusalem' 
and the Jordan Valley (Cited in Baba, 1996,18). 
3.3.3 Confiscation of Land 
According to the Palestinian Land Research, Israel confiscated 61,321 dunums 
during the period from the signing of the Oslo Agreement in September 1993 till 1 
March, 1995. This number was based on a field survey conducted by the centre 
(Land Research Centre, 1995,3). Whereas other sources calculate the Israeli 
confiscation of Palestinian land at 150,000 dunums (Baba, 1996,15). The second 
number is an exaggerated one. The largest percentage of confiscated land was listed 
under settlement activities such as, expanding the existing settlement, erecting 
governmental and public buildings, building new roads for settlements, and 
widening existing roads. For example, in 1995 the Israeli Labour government 
confiscated 18,180 dunums. 13,580 dunums went for settlement purposes and 
public enterprises -these enterprises only served Israeli settlers (Ha'arz July 25, 
1996 cited in Baba, 1996,16). 
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Khalil Tafkaji has argued that the Israeli Labour government changed the 
traditional method of confiscating Palestinian land (known to Israelis as state land). 
It designated Palestinian land as areas of `natural reserves', confiscated to install 
Israeli petrifactive plants (the great majority of the West Bank is mountainous), and 
confiscated land for by-pass roads. Tafkaji argued in regard to the `natural reserve" 
that by international standards this means maintaining certain kinds of animals, 
greenery or waterflow. Israeli standards in the West Bank are different. When Israel 
declares an area as a `natural reserve', it implies that this is a strategic reservoir for 
settlement expansion. Tafkaji gives examples such as the Abu Ghanim natural 
reserve, al-Raas natural reserve, and Nabi Samoe'el Palestinian village, where the 
first of these two areas became sites for two new settlements. In Abu Ghanim the 
settlement is planned to house 6,500 units. Under Netanyahu the infrastructure of 
Abu Ghanim (Har Homa) settlement was completed, and in al-Raas 2,200 housing 
units have been built. In al-Nabi Samoe'el, Israel destroyed the village and declared 
it a `natural reserve'. At the present time the neighbouring Neve Shomoe'el 
settlement is expanding into this `natural reserve' (Tafkaji interview, November 13, 
1998). 
Israel, under the Labour government, confiscated 16,000 for petrifactive plants, 
12,000 for natural reserves, and 30,000 for the by-pass roads. Meanwhile other 
methods of confiscation also took place, but in small numbers (Tafkaji interview, 
November 13,1998). 
3.3.4 The two Faces of Labour Policy 
A year after Rabin assumed power, the earliermentioned U. S. State Department 
annual report regarding the Israeli settlement of 1993 noted an important Israeli 
change in public discourse on settlements initiated by the Rabin government. The 
report also observed that the Labour government had made a conscious decision not 
to confront settlers, and the government offered little substantive evidence that 
Israeli settlement-related allocations of funds had been significantly reduced during 
Rabin's first year of 1992/1993 (,, N-xw-NNw. finep. org/ju193. html). 
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Rabin's government announced in 1992 the following policy regarding settlement: 
first, a commitment not to construct any new settlements. However, new ones were 
set up under Rabin's government in the shape of new neighbourhoods at some 
distance from existing settlements. A farmer from Salfeet indicated a new location 
for the Ariel settlement. The location was two kilometres away from the Ariel 
fence, but the Israelis considered it as a part of Ariel. The fact that the nucleus of a 
new settlement was being installed but it lay on top of an old settlement. The farmer 
indicated that within 2-3 years Israelis would rename re-name the spot and it would 
become a separate settlement (Interview December 9,1998). 
Second, a decision to cancel contracts for the construction of around 5,000 
additional housing units. This policy was adopted because of falling demand for 
housing in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. This was a result of a building 
boom over the last two years of the Israeli Likud government under Shamir, and 
also the failure of Russian immigration to reach anticipated levels. Shamir's 
government had conducted a large scale building programme. Nevertheless, more 
than 10,000 additional units were approved by Rabin's government, even though 
there was no need to complete the 10,000 units approved by Shamir 
(www. fmep. org/reports/v3ml. html). 
Third, a decision to ban settlers from using mobile homes in the West Bank and 
Gaza-Strip. The Israeli daily Jerusalem Post noted that more than 2,000 such homes 
were standing empty in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip settlements. The end of the 
surge in immigration from the former Soviet Union had resulted in a glut of mobile 
homes in Israel, as well as in the Palestinian territories. Settlements could not afford 
their upkeep. The Labour government decided to close all such homes within a 
period of four years and sell them to the private sector (www. fmep. org/jul93. html). 
Fourth, a decision to halt new declarations of state land. As mentioned in chapter 
two , this was an 
Israeli means of land acquisition, and the most popular method 
used by Israeli Likud governments (1976-1992) was to declare land to be state land. 
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Rabin adopted another procedure for land acquisition, this was to reclassify' land for 
it be included in `closed military areas' (Tafkaji interview, October 25,1998). 
Fifth, a decision to suspend the construction of some settler 'roads". Rabin 
postponed the building of a number of roads on the West Bank proposed by 
Shamir's government, but decided to continue construction with others. Referring 
to the high way that cost $42 million, connecting Jerusalem by means of a series of 
tunnels and bridges with Israeli settlements south of the city, Peres said "who says 
that this tunnel is an obstacle to peace? The tunnel between France and Britain does 
not indicate that France is going to be settled by the British". 
Yet the Israeli tunnel only serves Israelis, and it divides Palestinian society within 
the area. There is no doubt that there is a fundamental difference between the 
colonial tunnel between Jerusalem and its southern outskirts, and the mutual 
interest tunnel between France and Britain (www. finep. org/1jul93. html). 
Sixth, adoption of government decision no. 721, which reduced settlement 
incentives. The Foundation for the Middle East Peace in its Bi-monthly report (July 
1993) noted that reductions have only been made in the local loan programme and 
in incentives available to industrial sites in some West Bank settlements. In 
settlements such as Ma'ale Efraim overlooking the Jordan Valley, subsidies for 
industrial development are going ahead without disturbance. The security 
settlements were excluded from the decision (www. fmep. org/jul93. html). 
Seventh, implementation of the military order restricts settlements. Israeli Military 
Order no. 1325 of January 1993, freezes all planning or construction of new master 
plans for settlements, and bans all building in areas not now covered by existing, 
approved planning documents. The order seems good, but according to the 
Foundation of Middle East Peace-Bi-monthly report (July 1993) most settlements 
have the required planning papers. The effect of the order was minor 
(,, w-x\N, \-. finep. or(, /jul93. html). Tafkaji confirmed that 84 settlement plans were 
approved during the Labour government. This number is relatively high compared 
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with the approval of settlement plans occurred during the previous Likud 
governments (Tafkaji interview, October 25,1998). 
3.3.5 By-Pass Roads under a Labour Government 
Israeli military order no. 50 of 1982 allowed the military occupying government to 
swamp by-pass roads. These new roads were a new form of Israeli control over 
land. The policy of the by-pass roads was intensified by the post-Oslo Agreement as 
a result of the Oslo II Agreement 1995, which allowed Israel to establish by-pass 
roads in order to avoid the passing of Israeli settlers through Palestinian cities, 
refugee camps, and villages. When Israel started to prepare the redeployment of its 
military forces from the West Bank the agreement confirmed Israeli security and 
civil control over the settlements and settlers in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. The 
Agreement also confirmed that Israel had the right to take all necessary measures to 
guarantee security and civil control (Oslo II Agreement). 
_keeping 
the settlements 
and many areas under Israeli control was always linked tot he idea of security. 
National security always determines Israeli foreign policy (Jones, 2000). 
The Labour government confiscated 21,000 dunums in order to build twenty-eight 
by-pass roads; the combined length of these roads equals 228 kilometres 
(Newsweek magazine, August 12,1996). Khalil Tafkaj i, the Palestinian expert on 
settlement issues, estimates confiscated land under the Labour government for 
settlement activities and public enterprises June 1992-June 1996 at 30,000 dunums 
(Tafkaji, 1996,1). Tafkaji noted that Israel confiscated more than 35,000 dunums 
for the purpose of by-pass roads. However, this number was not appropriated 
during the Labour government only. He added that some of this land was sieged 
prior to 1990, and the remainder was commandeered under the Labour government. 
Tafkaji is certain that Israel constructed more than 1,000 kilometres of by-pass 
roads during the post-Oslo Agreement, and spent around $300 million (Tafkaji 
interview, November 13.1998). The Palestinian Land Research Centre stated, with 
regard to the roads and by-pass roads, that from the signing of the Oslo Agreement 
up to May 4.1994 (seven and a half months) the Labour government had 
announced 22 roads and by-bass roads on the West Bank (Land Research Centre. 
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1995,12). Rabin's government spent not less than one billion shekels in 
constructing the by-pass roads in the West Bank (Mahameed, 1995,8). 
3.3.6 Settlers under Labour 
The number of settlers in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip increased by 33 per cent 
after Rabin assumed power in July 1992-October, 1995. Numbers went up from 
105,000 to 138,000. Four per cent came about as a natural rise in the settlement 
population, others, numbering 27,750, were from Israel. Half the latter were 
concentrated on the Israeli border of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip, `Green Line. 
For example, in Petar and Ma'ale Efrat, a part of `Greater Jerusalem' (Statistical 
Abstract of Israel, 1997 cited in www. finep. org/charts/chart9811_gif). 
If we examine the chart, prepared by the Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1997 and 
published in the Judea Magazine, November-December 1997, we can obtain a clear 
idea of the largest settlement activities under the Israeli Labour government. 
Population of settlements such as Betar, Efrat, Ma'ale Adomim, and Etzion Bloc, 
grew during the four years between 1992-1996 by 370 per cent, 79 per cent, 45 per 
cent and 44 per cent respectively (Cited in www. fmep. org/charts/ 
chart9811_3. html). All the above mentioned settlements are located in `Greater 
Jerusalem', and were designated under the Labour plan as priority settlement zones. 
Those settlements situated outside the security settlements saw a small increase in 
population. For example, Hebron and Kiryat Arba (a very religious place for 
Judasim) were 16 per cent and 11 per cent respectively (Cited in www. fmep. org/ 
charts/chart9811 3 . 
html). 
Geoffrey Aronson observed in July 1993 that a small minority of settlers on the 
West Bank were attempting to create a second military force in the occupied 
territories, with an agenda far more radical than Israel's army of occupation and not 
subject to any authority other than the settlers and their rabbis (wNANw. finep. org/ 
jul93. html). Ze'ef Schiff, a well known Israeli military analyst noted: 
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The moment of truth is approaching ... 
A further deterioration of the 
existing situation will lead to the Lebanonization of the territories (the 
West Bank and Gaza-Strip). We will then belatedly realise that Jews are 
capable of creating their own Hizballah movement under rabbinical 
leadership. Anarchy will then be unavoidable (www. fmep. org/ 
jul93. html). 
If this were to happen it would not be the first time in Israel's short history. A 
month following the declaration of the Israeli state in May 1948, Menachem Begin 
who was head of the Irgun underground organisation, was due to receive military 
arms transported to Tel Aviv port by the S. S. Altalena. But the Israeli Prime 
Minister, David Ben Gurion, who was determined to assert the supremacy of the 
Israeli official army, prevented the boat from unloading. He ordered the army to 
shell the boat. Irgun forces came to assist their friends on the boat, but Ben 
Guriun's order was carried out and the boat was sunk with the loss of many lives 
(www. fmep. org/jul93. html). 
As a result of the Oslo Agreement these settler organisation faced their greatest 
challenge. A joint committee of Israeli rightist parties and movements was created 
to coordinate the response on the ground of the implementation of the Agreement. 
The four parties were Likud, Tsomet, the National Religious Party and Moledet. 
Alongside the major parties were unaffiliated political organisations such as the 
Yesha Council, Amana (resposible for setting up new settlements; Yesha (for 
existing settlements), the Chabad-Lubavitch Movement (the Israeli wing of the 
Brooklyn-based group), Emunim (an offshoot of Gush Emunim), the `one Israel' 
Movement, the Golan Settlements Committee, the Betar Youth Movement 
(founded by Ze'ev Japotinski), and other amorphous groups. The Joint Committee 
has offices all over Israel and the Palestinian territories to organise demonstrations 
transportation, and publicity (Shaw-Smith, 1994,99: 100). In the Israeli rightist 
demonstrations against Oslo, they depicted Rabin variously in Nazi Regalia or 
swathed in a Palestinian Kiffeveh. Two influential West Bank (settlers) Rabbis Dov 
Lior and Nahum Rabinovich, were accused of issuing a religious edict, declaring 
the Israeli Prime Minister to be a traitor. Under religious (halachic) law it is 
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permissible to kill such a person if there is evidence that life is endangered by his or 
her treacherous actions (Jones, 1999,10: 14). 
The settlers' council (Yesha) was founded in 1979. The importance of this council 
in looking after settler interests and implementing a unified settler strategy to 
confront the Oslo Agreement cannot be overestimated. Every settlement in the 
West Bank, Gaza-Strip, and the Syrian Golan Heights is represented on the 
Council. These settlements comprise seven regional and fourteen local committees. 
The Yesha council excels at political lobbying where its leaders have easy access to 
the highest echelons of the government as well as to the media. The functions of the 
Yesha council are territory-wide coordination, fundraising, absorption of 
newcomers and coordinating security affairs. In the wake of the DOP, the Yesha 
has as its short-term aim to rattle the government through mass demonstrations and 
its long-term objective is to make sure that not a single settlement is threatened 
(Shaw-Smith, 1994,100). After the signing of Oslo Agreement, the Yesha council 
successfully mounted many demonstrations and interrupted the movement of 
Palestinians in the West Bank by closing more than 50 roads (Yediot Aharonot 
November 2,1993). These activities were repeated in the wake of the signing of the 
Wye River Memorandum. 
During Rabin's period the settlers announced the formation of a settler police force 
and paraded weapons before television cameras. Yet they already had policing 
powers prior to the Oslo Agreement. Since April 1968 when the first settlement 
was installed in the Hebron, settlers have had an armed presence. They work in 
cooperation with the Israeli army, undertaking police functions in their settlements 
and in Palestinian villages and towns. Raphael Eitan, Israeli Chief of staff in the 
early 1980's, integrated settlers into a `regional defence network'. Over the years 
settler power and capabilities have grown along with their numbers 
(www. finep. org/jul93. html). The settlers of Hebron joined with the Israeli Interior 
Intelligence Agency (Shabak), in interrogating and torturing prisoners at the Hebron 
prison in late 1960's (Shaheen interview. August 18.1998). The Hebron 
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settlements were an example of settlers' behaviour towards Palestinians, with 
support from Labour and Likud governments. 
Aronson observed that the target for settlers would not only be Palestinians, but the 
Israeli army as well if the Israeli government accepted a withdrawal from the West 
Bank and Gaza-Strip (Aronson, 1993,6; www. finep. org/jul93. html). However, it 
should be noted that they did not move against the army when the government 
forced them to evacuate the settlements of Sinai, following the Camp David Accord 
of 1979. They may nevertheless resort to political assassination, as they did with 
Rabin in November 1995. 
3.4 The Settlement under the Likud Government 
The Likud government plan of June 17,1996, considered the issue of Israeli 
settlements as one of its main priorities for the next four years. The plan insisted 
that settlements in the Jordan Valley, Judea, Samaria, and Gaza were of national 
importance in the defence of Israel. It also confirmed that these settlements would 
maintain the loyalty of Zionist promises. The government would change Labour's 
settlement policy to enhance settlement enterprises and allocate the necessary 
financial resources (Baba, 1997a, 2). The plan proposed to increase their numbers 
from 150,000 to 500,000 within four years of the Likud period of government. 
Netanyahu explained his government's policy towards settlements in an interview 
on the day the new policy was announced: 
We are stopping the artificial drying out that was the previous 
government's policy for the Judea and Samaria settlements ... the 
previous government imposed all kinds of decrees, restrictions, chains, 
and bonds on the natural development of the settlements. It did not 
impose similar restrictions on the Arab settlement of Judea, Samaria, 
and Gaza, nor did it impose such restrictions on Jewish settlements 
inside the Green Line. Naturally, we do not accept this policy. Hence. 
today we lifted the ban. At the same time, every orderly government has 
its checks and balances and means to control building and settlement 
policies, which are part of today's resolution. This is what it means: 
lifting the ban; we have not decided yet what we will do as far as 
initiated policy is concerned. If [the issue of establishing new 
settlements] comes up as part of the cabinet policy. we will bring it up 
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for the ministers to decide. We did not decide so today. Today. we 
created room to manoeuvre, if you will. We cancelled past restrictions. 
but we left the issue of policy for our future discussions ... 
I cannot tell 
you now what the scope of our decision will be, the amount of resources 
we will invest in Judea and Samaria, or whether or not we will set up 
new settlements. This is for the future. What could be more natural for a 
government with a commitment to Jewish settlement in Eretz Yisra'el 
and to full equality between all the citizens of the State of Israel than to 
lift these bans ... 
I already told the American ambassador that he can 
rest easy about one thing that Labour's policy of massive settlement will 
not change (www. fmep. org/sep96. html). 
As with the Labour government stand previously mentioned, the Likud government 
dealt with Jerusalem as Israel's unified capital and would not include it on the 
agenda of negotiations with Palestinians. A Likud official explained the stand of his 
government, "when we say settlements, we are not talking about construction in 
Jerusalem. As far as we are concerned, Jerusalem is not on the agenda" 
(www2. ari. net/fmep/1 998reports/198. html). 
The Minister of Finance, Dan Meridor, put the Likud government's intentions into 
proper perspective. On July 19,1996 he explained to the Israeli newspaper, Yediot 
Ahranot, the Likud aim with regard to settlement was "to prevent once and for all 
the possibility of withdrawal from the occupied territories" (www. fmep. org/ 
sep96. html). 
Directly after Netanyahu assumed power he met U. S. President Bill Clinton in 
Washington in June 1996. The two leaders reaffirmed previous understandings 
reached between President George Bush and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 
August 1992. Through this agreement the U. S. accepted Israeli policy of settlement 
expansion according to the ambiguous definition of `natural growth' of the 
settlements. Israel promised the U. S. it would not construct any new settlements in 
the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. However, in the meeting of June 1996. Netanyahu 
gave no commitment on the setting up of new settlements or conducting a 
limitation on settlement expansion (NA-NN-ýN-. fmep. org/sep96. html). 
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3.4.1 Settlement Construction under Likud 
The government empowered the Minister of Defence to rule on all new residential 
construction planning and zoning applications in the settlements. In November 
1997, the military authorities under the Likud government approved transferring 
several military bases and training camps into small settlement posts (al-Quds, 
November 7,1997). Policies announced in 1996 by Netanyahu's government. 
regarding settlement activities, were that the Israeli population should increase in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip by 50,000 to 200,000 settlers during the following 
four years. This increase was little different from the expansion recorded under the 
previous Labour government. Pinchas Wallerstein, chairman of the Council for 
Jewish Settlements in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza-Strip (Yesha), confirmed the 
expectation of an increase in these numbers. Wallerstein estimated that 10,000 new 
dwelling units would be constructed during the coming four years at a rate of 2,500 
annually (www. fmep. org/sep96. html). 
During the first six months of the Likud government it approved official plans and 
construction for more than 10,000 housing units. The decisions of the Likud 
government were as follows. First, in August 12,1996, it approved the locating of 
300 mobile houses on the West Bank. Second, in August 21,1996, the Likud 
government approved the building of 900 units in Kriat Sefer. Third, in August 29, 
1996, it approved a plan for 3,550 units in different settlements, such as Kriat Sefer 
(again) (700), Hashmona'em (1,050), Mettatyaho (200), Betar (700), and O'r 
Tsemeh (900). Fourth, in October 25,1996, a plan for 1,806 units in the north of 
Kriat Sefer settlement was approved. This plan had been authorised by the Shamir 
government and then frozen by Rabin's government. It was to build a new 
settlement, but the Israeli authorities said that the units were part of the Kriat Sefer 
complex. Fifth, in November 1996, Israel supported a plan for 1.200 units in 
Emanuel settlement. All these plans were backed by the Israeli Minister of Defence, 
as the person authorised to endorse any plan or construction in the West Bank and 
Gaza-Strip. None of the approved plans were located in the Gaza-Strip (Baba, 
1997a, 3). If these plans to construct thousands of new dwellings were executed on 
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the ground, and they were filled by settlers, their number would be increased to at 
least 200,000. 
Six months after Netanyahu assumed power in June 1996, his government decided 
to increase the numbers of settlements as a national priority. Eighty-four 
settlements were included in this category, adding 39 to those from the previous 
Labour government. Religious settlements benefited most from Likud's decision; 
39 of them became settlements of national priority. Fifty-four settlements with a 
low population (less than 500), and close to Palestinian communities, were also 
listed as settlements of national priority. The number listed as of national priority 
under the Likud government was 123. Only four in Jerusalem and Jericho benefited 
from this government decision, because settlements in these two areas had already 
been classified as settlements of national priority and security settlements under 
Rabin (Baba, 1997b, 1: 2). 
During the second six months of Netanyahu's government, the building of 830 
units was approved in different settlements of the West Bank, such as the Jordan 
Valley (250), Elkana (49), Ganeem (310), Ma'ale Adomim (60), Ma'a1e Efraim 
(60), Came Shomrom (53), and etc. The government approved plans for Geva'at 
Zeief (1,550 units), Har Huma (2,500 units, and Ma'ale Adomim (1,500 units and 
3,000 hotel rooms) (Baba, 1997c, 4). 
The picture of Netanyahu's settlement activity regarding the building of new units 
completely changed in the third year of his government. This can be seen from the 
speech by Me'er Forosh, the Israeli Deputy Minister of Housing, when he explained 
in January 1998, Likud government policy regarding the constructing of housing in 
the West Bank in 1998 and 1999. He stated that the Israeli government would 
build 5,200 new housing units in 1998, and his ministerial plan was to build more 
than 15,000 housing units in 1998 and 1999". He confirmed that "60 per cent of 
these new buildings would be in `Greater Jerusalem'"". He also acknowledge that 
"there was a total of 1,180 vacant units in all settlements"' (Cited in al-Avvam 
January 27.1998). Ho« ever, the Israeli Peace Now Movement confirmed that '"up 
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to November 1997, there was some 3,183 vacant units, and 4,714 units under 
construction. The General Secretary of the Settlements Council (Yesha) guaranteed 
the completion of 6,500 units" (al-Quds November 10,1997). The numbers given 
above express the large-scale activities regarding the construction work in the 
settlements of the West Bank carried out within the first 18 months of Netanyahu's 
government. 
On August 2,1996, his government revoked all restrictions, put in place under 
Rabin's government, providing financial incentives to the settlers in the West Bank 
and Gaza-Strip, including the rental or sale of 1,500 apartments, whose disposal 
had been frozen by Labour (www. fmep. org/ sep96. html). 
Although the Palestinian Ministry of Information stated that the above-mentioned 
number of 1,500 units was much less than the actual one, in its decision no. 150, 
the Likud government, approved the sale of 3,500 units to Israelis. These, as 
already mentioned, were bought by the previous Labour government which forbade 
Israelis from moving into them (Palestinian Ministry of Information, 1998,1). 
These decisions would increase the number of settlers by 15,000 over the following 
months of 1997. 
As a result of the Likud government lifting these restrictions, sales in the 
settlements increased by 56 per cent during the first six months of 1997. The 
government made financial incentives very attractive to persuade Israelis to come 
and settle on the West Bank. For example, to buy a residence in Jerusalem cost 
$170,000, while a similar residence in a settlement on the West Bank, a 45-minute 
drive to Jerusalem, cost less than $41,000, with a monthly payment of only $126 
(al-Quds November 10,1997). Housing prices in the settlements from Gaza to the 
Golan increased. In some cases they had risen by 50 per cent since Netanyahu's 
victory in mid-1996. Under Netanyahu the Israeli settlements were once again on 
the map (www2. ari. net/finep/1998reports/198. html). 
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According to the Israeli Peace Now Movement, the settlement budget of the Likud 
government for 1997 was 900 million shekels (one dollar is equal to 3.3 shekels). 
This budget included an expansion of the settlements, the bulldozing of roads and 
by-pass roads, the offering of a variety of facilities for settlers. and security 
protection for those who lived in the Palestinian town of Selwad near Jerusalem. 
after they had taken over a number of houses in that town (Ministry of Information 
1,1998, Baba, 1997a, 7). 
Yerushalim reported that Likud's plan for 1998 was to build 1,000 units starting in 
Jabal Abu Guniem `Har Homa', (covered in more detail in this chapter). In its 
report of November 14,1998, Yerushalim stated: 
that during the first nine months of 1997, the Ministry of Housing sold 
only 232 dwellings in Ma'ale Adumim, compared to 613 in all of 1996. 
In Section 06 of the town (Ma'ale Adumim), however, 1,470 of 1,600 
units had been sold and almost half were to be occupied in the coming 
months. Land for the last 400 units in section 06 will be marketed soon. 
When Section 06 is completed the population of Ma'ale Adumim will 
reach 23,000 (Yerushalim report cited in www2. ari. net/fmep/1998 
reports/ 198. html). 
Yerushalim also reported that during 1998 plans for the construction of 3,000 units 
in section 07 were expected to progress (Yerushalim report cited in 
www2. ari. net/fmep/1998 reports/ 198. html). An official Palestinian document states 
that section 06 of the Ma'ale Adomim settlement allows for the erecting of 2,000 
units, while in section 07 of the same settlement, the building of 4,500 units was 
ongoing (Orient House Official document sent to president Arafat, June 1998). In 
late 1997 the Israeli Ministry of housing planned to market 7,135 units in the 
settlements on the West Bank during 1998 and 1999 (al-Ayyam November 5, 
1997). In November 1997, the Likud government approved the building of 300 
units in Alef Meneshe settlement (Qalqilya District of the West Bank) near the 
`Green Line', under the pretext of natural growth of the colony. The settlement 
resumed work on 72 units that had been halted under the Labour government (al- 
Quds. November 7.1997). 
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During the first half of 1997, The Likud government confiscated about 33,000 
dunums in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. The reasons for this confiscation were to 
expand the settlements, and bulldoze roads and by-pass roads (Yediot Ahranot May 
26,1997 cited in Baba, 1997c, 6). 
The Israeli Peace Now Movement revealed that a new settlement in the West Bank 
was constructed in secret. The movement stated in its report that the new settlement 
(Kfar Oranim) was not registered in the settlers' registry, or in any other institution. 
50 dwellings were built there, and a plan to install 600 units was approved on July 
17,1990 under the Shamir government. The report said that this settlement was the 
first to be erected since 1992 (Cited in Baba, 1997c, 10). 
In 1998, the Likud government was ready to consider halting, curtailing or slowing 
down any settlement expansion. This could be interpreted as a Likud wish for 
peace, but a senior Israeli official noted, 
Israel will be willing to consider halting, curtailing or slowing down 
any settlement expansion in the pipeline, but will not stop any 
settlement construction that has already begun, we have enough 
settlement activity under construction to last us for this period 
(www2. ari. net/fmep/1998reports/ 198. html). 
Ha'aretz, the Israeli newspaper reported that the Israeli Likud government is 
contemplating a new plan that will quadruple the number of Israeli settlers in the 
Etzion settlement area of `Greater Jerusalem'. The plan is intended to raise the 
number of Jewish settlers in Etzion area from 13,000-50,000 (Ha'aretz cited in al- 
Ayyam February 3,1998). 
In the last three months of the Likud government, the settlement activities speeded 
up very sharply. The Palestinian daily, al-Hayat al-Jadedah, stated in July 31,1999 
that the Palestinian leadership in its weekly meeting on 30 July noted that the 
Netanyahu government sited 37 posts on the hilltops and around the cities. The 
posts were located during the election campaign. Israeli daily newspaper confirmed 
that 42 new posts had been set up from the signing of the Wye River Memorandum 
up to the Israeli election of May 1999 (Ha'artz August 1-1.1999). 
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3.4.2 Sharon and the Ministry of National Infrastructures 
The key minister of Israeli settlement in Netanyahu's government was Ariel 
Sharon. He was the Minister of National Infrastructures, which was arranged 
especially for him. He had a budget of half a billion dollars in 1996. Sharon earned 
the nickname `bulldozer', for ignoring or brushing aside whatever obstructed his 
path. Sharon was effective in making headlines, and in getting things done. 
Sharon's agenda in Netanyahu's government was; to create and plant physical and 
demographic obstacles (settlements and settlers) for any Israeli retreat from the 
territories captured in June 1967. His strategy was to let the diplomats chatter, when 
the maps were drawn it would be `facts' which he had created through his various 
posts since 1967 which would determine the future of the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict. Under Netanyahu he worked to expand Israel's civilian presence in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. Creating Israeli settlements formed was the keystone to 
Sharon's strategy (www. finep. org/sep96. html). He outlined this in an interview in 
1995, when he and Likud were in opposition: 
were there not Jewish settlements today on the Golan Heights and Judea 
and Samaria, Israel would long ago have returned across the Green 
Line. The Jewish settlements are the only factor that has prevented the 
agreement of this [Rabin] government to withdraw and created 
difficulties for it in negotiations (www. finep. org/sep96. html). 
Under Netanyahu, Sharon developed the Israel Land Authority (ILA) which 
advanced his vision for the future of the occupied territories. The importance of the 
ILA was that it controlled over 93 per cent of land within Israel and tens of 
thousands of dunums in the occupied territories. This provided Sharon with an 
enormous land reserve that he could allocate to suit his settlement objectives. He 
described the ILA, thus; "it is not only a source of state revenue. As I see it, it is the 
main tool the government has to attain national goals" (Cited in 
www. fmep. org/sep96. html). 
Sharon's promotion of new roads was a consequence of his authority over the 
Public Works Department, formerly part of the Ministry of Housing (ww'ý-\Nw. finep. 
or(y/sep96. html). Extensive powers were given to Sharon over the control of 
electricity to the settlements. a key element in a settlement's ability to expand and 
161 
accommodate industrial development. This brought him face to face with 
Palestinian negotiators. Sharon also led negotiations with the PNA, Jordan, Syria. 
and Turkey on water issues. He devised a consultative mechanism with the 
important Ministry of Housing and Construction in order to prepare a 
comprehensive plan for development and construction in the occupied areas. 
Control of land, water, electricity, and transport issues in Sharon's newly formed 
ministry offered him the opportunity to successfully carry through his settlement 
strategy. His plan for any peace settlement with the Palestinians was the 
cantonization of Palestine. He envisaged the creation of non-contiguous Palestinian 
cantons in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, surrounded by Israeli settlements and 
roads. 
3.4.3 Three Maps for the Same Purpose 
The key leaders of the Likud Party government, Benjamin Netanyahu, Ariel Sharon 
(Minister of Infrastructures), and Yetzhak Mordechai (Minister of Defence), 
reached the conclusion in 1998 that they could not preserve the integrity of the 
whole `land of Israel'. This was clearly understood from maps which appeared in 
the public domain. The maps of the key leaders from the Likud Party illustrate their 
intention to concede more than 40 per cent of the West Bank to PNA control. None 
of these maps meet the minimum expectations of the Palestinian leadership or the 
general public (Aronson cited in www2. ari. net/fmep/1998reports/198. html). 
There are three maps at issue: Netanyahu's map known as the `Allon Plus' (Map 
3.3), the Sharon map known as 'Sharon's security map', and the Mordechai map 
known as the `Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) security interest map'. The latter was 
prepared by the IDF Planning Branch during the Rabin government. following 
Rabin's request during the Taba talks preceding the signing of Oslo II Agreement. 
This map was adopted by the Likud Minister of Defence Yetzhak Mordechai. It was 
prepared for the three stages of Israeli redeployment according to the Oslo II 
Agreement. but not for the final status agreement. The Likud Minister of Defence 
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adopted the map for the final agreement (Yediot Ahranot cited in al-A`-yam 
December 15,1997; Aronson cited in www2. ari. net/fmep/1998reports/ 198. html). 
The maps also give an idea of how Netanyahu, Sharon, and Merdachai are viewing 
to the settlements as a major factor in determining the final border with the 
Palestinians in the permanent status negotiations. None of these maps has been 
published in any authorised or detailed fashion, leaving many inconsistencies and 
much speculation about issues as important as the inclusion or exclusion of certain 
settlements on the West Bank, due to be annexed to Israel in the final agreement. 
Netanyahu's map will leave fewer than 20 isolated, sparse settlements in 
Palestinian territory. Sharon's security map will annex all the settlements to Israel, 
and the IDF security interest map will leave about 45 settlements on the West Bank 
outside Israeli sovereignty (Yediot Ahranot cited in al-Ayyam December 15,1997; 
Aronson cited in www2. ari. net/finep/1998reports/198. html). Meir Shitreet, the 
Israeli Coalition Parliament Chairman, said with reference to the future of the 
Israeli settlements, that the Likud Party, as part of a final status agreement with the 
PNA, was prepared to evacuate settlements in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip and to 
exchange territory in Israel's Negev (a desert south of Mandate Palestine) region in 
return for Israeli sovereignty in the Etzion Bloc near Bethlehem (www2. ari. net/ 
finep/ 1998reports/ 198. html). 
The three maps did not mention the future status of the Gaza-Strip, if Israel were to 
conduct total withdrawal from the area, or maintain control over the settlements 
there. Joseph Alfeer (an aide to Rabin) proposed the total withdrawal from the 
Gaza-Strip in his study regarding the final solution between the Palestinians and 
Israel. He argued that, there are 4,000 settlers and they occupy 30 per cent of the 
land in the Gaza-Strip, which is needed by any Palestinian entity or state to develop 
the area. The uprooting of the settlements in the Gaza-Strip would not form a 
critical demographic problem for the Israelis (Alfeer, 1995.280). 
In December 18,1997, the Israeli daily newspaper Ma'arev described the maps in 
the following way: 
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According to Sharon's and Mordechai's maps. Bosnia will look like the 
Garden of Eden compared to what Jews and Palestinians in Judea and 
Samaria (West Bank) can look forward to Strips from north to south, 
roads from east to west, and mutually antagonistic populations extend 
into one another like pieces of a puzzle created by the devil for the 
punishment of man. Prime Minister Netanyahu rightly said that we will 
not commit suicide in order to please the United States. So we are 
committing suicide in order to please ourselves (Ma'ariv, December 18, 
1997 cited in www2. ari. net/finep/1998reports/198. html). 
3.4.4 Settlement Activities are Preferable to Peace with the Palestinians. 
The Labour government's tactic in regard to settlement activities was to disguise 
continued building while simultaneously hiding an advance in the peace process. 
For Likud, the attitude was different. Likud did not believe that `peace' was going 
to be created as a result of the Oslo Agreement, thus the party leaders tried their 
best to destroy the peace process. The announcement to set up new settlements or 
prepare new plans in the occupied territories were a Likud tactic to demolish the 
Oslo process. 
We can first look at the Abu Ghnaim (Har Homa) settlement: The Abu Ghanim 
forested mountain is located less than two kilometres north of the City of 
Bethlehem with an area of two square kilometres. The mountain was historically 
owned by the Palestinians from Bethlehem, Beit Sahour, Village of Um Tuba, and 
the village of Sur Baher. In 1967 Israel decided unilaterally to carve it out of the 
Bethlehem district and annex it to the Jerusalem municipal boundaries. Since 1967 
the mountain has been designated by the Israeli Jerusalem municipality as a `Green 
Area', where development is restricted to preserve the beauty of its landscape and 
ecological diversity. On June 1991, Israel expropriated land on and around the 
forest mountain of Abu Ghnaim (1,850 dunums). The largest tracts of this land are 
privately owned by Palestinians (www. arij. org/paleye/abugnam/). 
The Likud government approved the creation of the Har Homa settlement in 1997. 
The Israeli government plan for the Abu Ghnaim `Har Homa' settlement included 
the building of at least 6,00 housing units in three stages, with standard 
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infrastructure such as roads, schools, shops, hotels, a tourist village, and an 
industrial zone (Baba, 1997c, 18). 
The effect of building Har Homa settlement is that it completes a ring of Israeli 
settlements around Jerusalem and Bethlehem and will seal off Jerusalem. killing 
any hopes for Palestinians with regard to Jerusalem in the final status negotiations 
based on the Oslo Agreement. The above-mentioned settlement completing the 
encirclement of Jerusalem, will sever any connection between north and south of 
the West Bank. This has also isolated Bethlehem and generated an alternative 
tourist village and has effectively engineered the seizure of the town of the Nativity 
and ensured that all Palestinians who want to get to Ramallah have to go through 
the mountains by the Wad al-Nar road to avoid passing through Jerusalem. This 
colony, moreover will leave the Palestinian cities of Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and Beit 
Sahour with little land to accommodate their natural growth. It will badly affect 
Christian sights in the area, particularly in the Mar El-Yas priory. Also, the Har 
Homa settlement will redraw the northern boundary of the Bethlehem area; the 
Israeli Chain of Gush Etzion limits any southern expansion of Bethlehem. From the 
west, the town is surrounded by the Betar settlement and two by-pass roads, and 
from the east the holy city is also circumscribed by the Taqooh settlement and a by- 
pass road. A fenced military by-pass road will connect Har Homa with the Gilo 
settlement; this road will cut the connection between Bethlehem and East 
Jerusalem. The Israeli plan to build the Har Homa settlement will result in a 
disruption of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations (www. arij. org/paleye/abugnam/; 
Baba, 1997c, 18). 
A secondly example is the E-1 Plan: Netanyahu's cabinet approved the E-1 
development scheme in March 1997, a week after the decision to begin 
construction of the Har Homa settlement suburb in East Jerusalem. January de 
Jong, a Dutch cartographer described the plan, 
The E-1 scheme has significance beyond the territorial area that it 
encompasses, demonstrating the degree to which settlement expansion 
has been seamlessly integrated into Israel's national planning 
framework. F-I controls the main axis of socio-economic development 
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for Israel itself, as outlined in Israel's Metropolitan Master Plan, 
completed in 1994-1995. This critical area runs along the trajectory of 
Road 45, which originates in Greater Tel Aviv and leads via Ben 
Gurion Airport--scheduled to be greatly expanded in conjunction with 
large industrial zones around the new city of Modi'in--to Greater 
Jerusalem at the West Bank settlement of Givat Ze'ev. The road 
continues along the recently developed archaeological site next to the 
prophet Samuel's tomb--to be surrounded at a distance by gentrified 
housing estates--and passes the East Jerusalem settlement community of 
Ramot and the expanding industrial park of Har Hotzvim to arrive at 
the projected `Eastern Gate' settlement site in East Jerusalem. From 
here it passes to Ma'ale Adumim, with its industrial zone, also 
scheduled for expansion, and another residential area projected at Tibek 
Kuteif 9, on the heights above the Jordan Valley (Jan de Jong cited in 
www2. ari. net /finep/1998reports/ 198. html). 
The significance of the execution of the E-1 plan is that it ties the largest and most 
populated settlement of the West Bank to the municipality of Jerusalem. The plan's 
implementation will lay territorial and infrastructure foundations for the Israeli 
capital to double in size in its metamorphosis into `Greater Jerusalem' (Baba, 
1997c, 21). Jan de Jong perceives the implementation of the plan as that of 
disrupting the only prospective Palestinian passage route still capable of linking not 
only the Arab city's currently scattered neighbourhoods, but also the discontinuous 
Palestinian territories of the northern and the southern West Bank. It will suffocate 
the Arab city and disable its prospects for comprehensive rehabilitation (Jan de 
Jong cited in www2. ari. net/ finep/1998 reports/198. html). At the end of the interim 
period, the area lying between Ma'ale Adomim and East Jerusalem is desolate. This 
region will be used in various ways, such as an industrial zone, or residential area. 
In that case the area between East Jerusalem and Ma'ale Adomim will be filled, and 
Ma'ale Adomim will become a natural extension of `Greater Jerusalem'. It is a step 
towards a natural annexation of Ma'ale Adomim. 
3.4.5 By-Pass Roads under Likud 
Netanyahu outlined his view towards by-pass roads on July 12.1996 during an 
interview with Israeli television, 
The other thing on which there is agreement is the by-pass roads, which 
were agreed upon in the Oslo process, which is something I welcome 
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since they reduce the friction between the Jewish and Palestinian 
populations (www. finep. org/sep96. html). 
Netanyahu used the provision of the Oslo Agreement relating by-pass roads to 
secure the Israeli settlements and settlers- a strategy worse than that of Rabin's 
government. 
Likud's ministerial committee for Jerusalem decided on February 18,1997, to lay a 
group of by-pass roads in `Greater Jerusalem'. Road 4, and the third stage of road 
45 were approved { Road 45 which links Tel Aviv with Jerusalem from the north 
and passes Kalandia military airport north of Jerusalem is considered one of the 
most strategic roads in Israel. The building of this road was divided into three 
stages beginning in 1982}. Route 4 was to link Jerusalem with route 45, which is 
considered the northern passage to the city. Work started on these two by-pass 
roads directly after the decision. Confiscated land for route 45 is estimated to be 
2,200 dunums of land belonging to 15 Palestinian villages. The terrain confiscated 
for route 4 is estimated at 2,300 dunums, and this road will reach the Etzion 
settlements south of Bethlehem. Another by-pass road which will join route 45 will 
reach Gillo settlement, south west of Jerusalem. For this high-way road Israel 
expropriated 1,550 dunums. It is known as route 70. For route 5, around 95 dunums 
were expropriated from Sor Bahe village (Orient House Official document sent to 
president Arafat; al-Ayyam February 20,1997). 
In the Hebron district, Israelis bulldozed a new road to connect the Kriat Arba 
settlement with the holy site in Hebron city centre (al-Ayyam March 12,1997). 
Around Shofat (a Palestinian town) construction of a new road began to connect 
two Israeli settlements (Bezgat Za'ev and Shofat Rekz). Bulldozing commenced in 
order to connect a new by-pass west of Betonia, near Ramallah (al-Ayyam April 13, 
1997). 
Working on the `Samaria crossing" which will divide the north of the West Bank, 
and connect Israel with the Jordan Valley was started during Netanyahu" s 
government. Its length is 18 kilometres, and its width 100 meters. The new higwav 
will eat up to -15,000 dunums (Palestinian Ministry of Information 1.1998,17). 
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Sharon announced in July 1996, that construction would commence before the 
year's end on two new West Bank roads, the rehabilitation of a third, and the 
construction of new bridges linking Israel and the Golan Heights (www. fmep. org/ 
sep96. html). Sharon considers roads on the West Bank as a key element, which will 
ensure Israeli control over the occupied territories, as well as the expansion of an 
Israeli presence. In addition to the by-pass roads, Sharon's ministry wrested control 
in July from the civil administration over a 1,500 kilometre network of main and 
arterial roads in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Sharon intends to tie the West Bank 
to Israel by creating a modem integrated road-system of east-west and north-south 
highways, and he wants to establish a modem network to tie Israeli settlements to 
each other, to the by-pass roads, and to the metropolitan areas of Tel Aviv and 
Jerusalem (www. finep. org/sep96. html). 
The new road construction, for example, was first conceived in a plan authorised by 
Sharon in 1984. The two routes were supported in principle by Rabin and Peres but 
no moneys were allocated to construct them (www. finep. org/sep96. html). For 
Sharon, the $10 million rehabilitation for the main road through the Jordan Valley 
was budgeted by the previous government. 
On December 18,1998, the Israeli daily newspaper Yediot Ahranot brought to light 
that Ministers Ariel Sharon and Yitzhak Mordechai had agreed to support the 
construction of Route 80 along the western ridge of the Jordan Valley, linking the 
Israeli town of Bet Shean with Arad via the West Bank settlements of Ma'ale 
Ephraim and Ma'ale Adomim located in `Greater Jerusalem'. Sharon considered 
this road to be the western border of the Jordan Valley security zone that Isreal had 
proposed to annex as part of a final status agreement. 
As a consequence of the Wye River Memorandum October 1998, the Likud 
government approved the construction of twenty by-bass roads throughout the West 
Bank. By early January 1999, fourteen of the twenty highways were in an advanced 
stage of construction. On January 20.1999, the Tel Aviv Higher Planning 
Committee approved (subject to environmental review) the paving of 35 km of 
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Road 80, between Mishor Aumim and Tekoa on the West Bank. For 1999, the 
Likud government allocated $28 million for the new roads on the West Bank 
(www. fmep. org/home. html). 
3.4.6 Israeli Settlers and the Likud Government 
As mentioned in chapter three, there are three types of Israeli settlers: secularists, 
orthodox, and normal. The orthodox and the extreme orthodox form more than 
forty per cent of Israeli settlers, while the secularist form more than 30 per cent. 
However, the vote of settlers in the Israeli parliament goes with Likud and its 
rightist coalition. In the Israeli general election of 1996 more than 65 per cent of 
settlers voted for the Likud Party and the extremists, either religious or nationalist. 
Less than 10 per cent voted for the Labour Party and it main ally Meretz. The 
majority of Israeli settlers opposed the Oslo Agreement (A poll by the Centre for 
Palestine Research and Studies, December, 1995). 
As a result of Likud's victory in the Israeli general election, the settlers are being 
welcomed once again into the Israeli political mainstream. In 1996, after Likud 
assumed power, the Yesha Council announced that expansion in the settlements 
would begin even before required permits from the government had been awarded, 
despite the fact that the Minister of Defence was considering 200 construction plans 
at that time (www. fmep. org/sep96. html). The Palestinian Minister of 
Transportation described the Likud government as the settler's government. He 
believed that it did not reject any of the settler's demands, and which were always 
concerned with settlement activities. The level of these activities increased sharply 
under the Likud government (Qawasmi interview. September 23,1998). 
Settlers were not comfortable with a Labour government, despite Labour's 
intensive activities regarding the settlements. Shoki Kara, the secretary of the 
Talmoon settlement located near Ramallah and classified as a `political settlement'. 
during Rabin's government described the difference between the Labour and Likud 
governments thus: "Labour government isolated us, but this government (Likud) 
gave us the feeling that the time for work is due" (al-Quds November 10.1997). 
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Dov Odster the secretary of the Aliah settlement which is located between Nablus 
and Ramallah, expressed his view after a visit from the Israeli Prime Minister 
Netanyahu to the colony, 
In 1990's, neither Rabin nor Peres visited us or even bothered to contact 
us. But in the time of this government (Likud), there is action on the 
ground. It is not satisfactory, but it is better than nothing ... we now feeling that we belong to this people (al-Quds November 10,1997). 
Extensive construction was in progress during the governments of both Rabin and 
Netanyahu. But there is no doubt that the morale of the 160,000 settlers in the West 
Bank and Gaza-Strip became stronger and more aggressive after Netanyahu 
assumed power in mid-1996. This may be due to an ideological convergence 
between the settlers and Netanyahu. A Palestinian from Salfeet Province informed 
me that the head of Ariel is a member of the Israeli Parliament and is one of the 
leaders of the Likud Party. The Likud hold many party activities in the Ariel 
settlement. Likud leaders such as Netanyahu and Sharon are frequent visitors to 
Ariel (Interviews, December 1998-March 1999). 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the historical and contemporary importance of the 
Israeli settlements in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. The continuation of 
settlements activities in the post-Oslo Agreement period at a very high level proved 
the importance of the Israeli settlements. The chapter proved that both Israeli 
governments, Labour and Likud, consider the settlements as a vital element for 
Israeli security in any final solution and the expansion of Israel as its main strategy. 
The question raised here is, if the settlements are not vital and important for Israel 
why then have Israeli governments spent so much money constructing hundreds of 
new units, expanding existing settlements, linking settlements by very sophisticated 
by-pass roads and so on? The Israeli settlement activities in the post-Oslo 
Agreement showed clearly that Israelis have no will to return to the 1967 borders in 
any future peace agreement with the Palestinians. The Israeli settlement activities 
(particularly on the West Bank) in the post-Oslo Agreement were linked to Israeli 
considerations for the final solution ww ith the Palestinians. 
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The continuation of settlement activity has had almost unanimous support from 
within Israel. The differences among the Zionists were related to the question of 
whether settlement activities should continue and at what speed, and whether it 
might be possible for some limited activities to be halted. At the turn of the 21St 
century, the settlements in Jerusalem had and continued to have the unanimous 
support of the Zionists. 
This chapter demonstrates that the Israelis, particularly within the Labour Party 
believed that settlement activities and `peace' could last together. Yet actions on the 
ground demonstrated that these housing estates isolated Palestinian communities in 
the occupied territories. These communities are already isolated and surrounded by 
Israeli settlements. This chapter has also shown that `peace' for the Israelis means 
more land-grabbing and the further surrounding and isolation of Palestinian 
communities. 
This chapter shows that settlement for the Zionists is still a valuable factor. 
Moreover, we proved that the Zionists believe that the halting of the settlement 
activities is impossible. For them they should continue in war or peace this is 
because of the belief that settlements are the `secret' continuation of the Zionist 
State. Here Zionism and settlement are two concepts linked together. There is no 
Zionism without settlement (land) and there are no settlement activities in Palestine 
without the Zionist catalyst. 
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Chapter Four: A Case Study of Salfeet Province and the 
Mawasi Area 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides two case studies of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. It focuses 
on Salfeet district and the Mawasi Area. It helps to reinforce the argument of the 
previous chapters regarding the Israeli settlement policy and the Israeli theory of 
`creating facts on the land' which have been adopted by different Israeli 
governments in the post-Oslo Agreement to implement Israeli expansionist 
ambitions. 
This chapter uses interviews with Palestinian public and officials to assess the 
continuance of Israeli settlement activities in the areas where the two case studies 
were conducted (Mawasi Area and Salfeet District). Sections three and four deal 
with the settlement activities in the Mawasi Area and Salfeet District. Although the 
Palestinians have resisted Israeli settlement activities in the West Bank and Gaza- 
Strip and were able to rescue some confiscated sites, they failed to recover other 
appropirated land in the majority of locations especially on the West Bank. In the 
Gaza-Strip, due to the proximity of the PNA and the settlement areas Palestinian 
resistance managed to redeem many areas, Israel was about to confiscate. Section 
five discusses the Palestinian resistance to the settlement activities in the Mawasi 
Area and Salfeet District. 
The Israeli retreat from parts of the West Bank was halted due to the fact that 
continued Israeli withdrawal from the region would isolate some Israeli settlements. 
Sections six and seven investigates this matter through interviews with Palestinian 
officials and members of the public. Section eight examines the settlers behaviour 
and the possibilities of co-existence between them and the Palestinians. 
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4.2 The West Bank and Gaza-Strip in Numbers 
The West Bank and Gaza-Strip cover 6,000,000 dunums. During one of the 
Washington rounds (November 1992), Israel presented a breakdown of land 
ownership in the West Bank (excluding annexed Jerusalem). It claimed that 61.5 
per cent of the West Bank is privately owned by Palestinians, 30.5 per cent is `state 
land' administered by Israel as de facto sovereign, and 8 per cent belongs to Israeli 
settlements (more than 110,000 acres). 6.5 per cent of the eight per cent is `state 
land' and the remaining 1.5 per cent is privately owned Jewish property, acquired 
pre-1948 (www. finep. org/reports/v3nl. htlm). The privately owned Jewish property 
is exaggerated; pre-1948 War the Israelis owned 23,000 dunums. During the Israeli 
occupation period from 1967 up to the signing of the Oslo Agreement, there were 
many cases of property being sold, but the majority of these cases were reportedly 
to be forgeries (Abu Medain interview February 17,1999; Tafkaji interview, 
October 13,1998). 
In 1998 there were 3,000,000 dunums in Israeli hands, and there were 176 
settlements in the West Bank (including Jerusalem). The constructed area was 
about 81,242 dunums, 1.47 per cent of the West Bank. There now are 18 
settlements in the Gaza-Strip and its built-up area is 6,248 dunums, 1.71 per cent of 
the Gaza-Strip. Therefore, there are 194 Israeli settlements in the West Bank and 
Gaza-Strip and the total constructed area is 87,489 dunums, 1.49 per cent of 
Palestinian territories (Palestinian Geographical Centre, 5; Baba, 1996,14). It is 
worth mentioning here that according to a report issued in 1992, by the Israeli 
Civilian Administration (Israeli military government) for the West Bank, the 398 
Palestinian communities now cover only 68,310 acres, less than five per cent of the 
entire West Bank (www. finep. org/reports/v3nl. htlm). 
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4.3 The Muwasi Area 
The Mawasi Area is situated in the south west of the Gaza-Strip (maps 4.1). It 
covers the territory between the chain of Israeli settlements in the southern Gaza- 
Strip in the east, the shore of Rafah and Khan Younis cities in the west, the 
Egyptian border in the south and Der El Balah Town in the north. The region 
consists of agricultural land; Palestinian farmers grow vegetables and fruit. The 
most popular vegetables planted in Mawasi Area are tomato, cucumber, and 
eggplants. The most popular fruits are guava, mango, and fig. Mawasi Area is 
considered the vegetable garden for Palestinians of the southern area of the Gaza- 
Strip (Baba, 1997d, 2). In addition to agriculture, some residents of the Mawasi 
Area depend on fishing for their living. 
4.3.1 Israeli settlements in the Mawasi Area 
The number of Israeli settlements in the Gaza-Strip are not easy to determine. This 
can be concluded from both Palestinian and Israeli sources. Omran Subeh mentions 
in his book, that there are 23 Israeli housing estates in the Gaza-Strip. The Yesha 
Council mentions only 18 (Subeh, 1993,11; www. yesha. virtual. co. il/ hoflst. htm). 
The Palestinian Geographic Centre shows 17 colonies on its map of the Gaza-Strip. 
The contradiction in numbers could be the result of. first, Sabeh, for example, 
mentions four settlements: Qatif 1, Qatif 2, Qatif 3, and Qatif 4, but the Yesha 
Council and the Palestinian Geographic Centre mention only one by the name of 
Qatif. This may be because from an administrative point of view the four locations 
come under one unit, and there is no distance between them. Second, Sabeh, for 
instance refers to two settlements having Israeli official approval as residences, but 
he does not say if these were located on the ground, or how many dwellings, or how 
many people have settled there. Third, semi-military bases (Nahal) were set up and 
eventually some of them were annexed to large civilian settlements. 
According to the Settlers' Council Yesha, there are 12 settlements situated between 
the Mawasi Area in the west, Rafah and Khan Younis cities in the east. Der al-Bala 
city in the north, and the Egyptian border in the south, hereinafter called the Qatif 
Chain or the Maw asi settlements. These residential areas and its population are 
176 
shown in table 5.1. The chain that the Mawasi settlements made, isolated the 
southern Palestinian shore from its main cities of Khan Younis and Rafah. The 
Mawasi beach is the only place that the people of Rafah and Khan Younis can go 
during their vacations, because the Gaza-Strip is closed from all directions (see map 
4.1). A Palestinian from Mawasi Area described the Gaza-Strip as "a big prison and 
that the Palestinians of the Mawasi Area are living in an even smaller prison than 
that of the Gaza-Strip (Interviews, Decemberl 998-March 1999). 
Table 4.1 
Israeli settlements in the Mawasi Area 
Name of Settlement No. of settlers 
Atzmona 450 
B'dolach 220 
Gadid 200 
Gan Or 280 
Ganei-Tal 450 
Kfar-Yam 5 
Netzer-Hazany 380 
Neve Deqalim 1,800 
Peat Sadeh 85 
Qatif 250 
Tel-Qatifah 6 
Rafiah Yam 90 
Total 4,216 
Source: Data collected by the author from the homepage of the Israeli Settlement 
Council Yesha www. yesha. virtual. co. il/hofl st. htm 
The population of the Gaza-Strip housing estates is 5,676. There are 4,216 settlers 
in the Mawasi estates and the settlers of these form 74 per cent of all those in the 
Gaza-Strip (www. yesha. virtual. co. il/hoflst. htm). The number of settlers according 
to the Yesha council is exagerated. As Yesha mentions, in two settlements there are 
only five and six settlers, and the average number of settlers in each settlement is 
35 1. Palestinians in the Maßt asi Area estimate that there are not more than 1,500. A 
Palestinian who has agricultural land near Atzmona settlement confirmed that the 
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population of this settlement was not more than 200 while the Yesha estimated its 
population as 450 settlers (Interviews, December1998-March 1999). 
It is important to mention that just as the Mawasi settlements have isolated the 
Palestinians of the Mawasi Area from their natural links with Rafah and Khan 
Younis cities, these two cities have also isolated the Mawasi settlements from their 
link with Israel. In any future violence between Palestinians and Israelis in the 
Mawasi Area and its surroundings, the position of the settlers and Palestinians will 
be very critical (see maps 4.1). The position of the Palestinian and Israeli areas is as 
follows: 
The sea is west of the Palestinian Mawasi Area which is located next to the Israeli 
settlements which in turn are next to the Palestinian Cities of Rafah and Khan 
Younis, which are adjacent to Israel. 
For the safety of the movement of settlers from the Mawasi Area and Israel, the 
Oslo II Agreement (Annex I, Article VI, Provision 7) assured three Lateral Roads to 
the settlements. These roads are Kissufim-Gush Katif road, Sufa-Gush Katif road, 
and Karni Netzarim road including the adjacent sides upon which the security of 
traffic along these roads is dependent upon the Israeli authorities who have all 
necessary responsibilities and powers in order to conduct independent security 
activity, including Israeli patrols. Joint patrols will operate along the Lateral Roads. 
Such joint patrols will be led by an Israeli patrol. 
During mid 1997, both Palestinian and Israeli forces were about to clash. The 
interference of the locations of both forces were obvious and the Lateral Roads 
were closed by the Palestinian Police forces. Settlers of Mawasi settlements were 
isolated in their settlements. If the clash had broken out the casualties among both 
would have been very high. This incident raised the question of the future of the 
Israeli settlements in the Gaza-Strip. 
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4.3.2 The Mawasi Area in the Post-Oslo Agreement 
As mentioned in previous chapters, according to the Cairo Agreement in 1994, 
Israel withdrew from a large part of the Gaza-Strip. The agreement divided the 
Gaza-Strip into three categories: area A, the settlement area, and the Yellow Area, 
which contains the Mawasi, and other areas. The PNA has full control over Area A, 
which forms about 70 per cent of the strip. In the settlement areas, Israel has full 
control (security and civil) over the Israeli settlers and settlements. The overriding 
responsibility and power for security over the Yellow area lies with Israel, but 
public order and civil control are under the PNA. (Cairo Agreement, article IV). 
The Cairo Agreement was replaced by the Oslo II Agreement in 1995. The 
classification of land in the Gaza-Strip did not change in this agreement. Article IV 
was reconfirmed in the Oslo II Agreement, however, the land in the Yellow area 
was to be treated the same as Area B on the West Bank (The Preamble of the Oslo 
II Agreement and Annex I, Article VI). But Israel did not treat the Mawasi Area as 
Area B in the West Bank. The Israeli attitude towards the Mawasi Area did not 
change from that of the pre-Oslo Agreement period. A Palestinian from the Mawasi 
Area believes that "the Israeli occupation of this area continued in the `peace 
period' nothing changes, the changes are getting worse" (Interviews, 
December 1998-March 1999). 
The area covered by Israeli settlement in the Gaza-Strip is about 46,000 dunums. 
This figure includes the constructed area, the agricultural area, and the security area 
around the settlements. This forms about twelve per cent of the Gaza-Strip (40 per 
cent of government land ). The Mawasi Area is 8,200 dunums and forms two per 
cent of the region. Within the Yellow area the Israelis created alone a new area 
which they call the White Area, under full Israeli control. This terrain is present 
neither in the Cairo Agreement nor in Oslo II (Ay'ob interview, October 3.1998). 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the settlement sector and the Yellow zone form 
30 per cent of the strip. Both the Yellow zone and the Mawasi one included in an 
area close to the Egyptian border, one close to the `Green Line' in the north and 
east of the Gaza-Strip, and areas close to the lateral roads leading to the settlements 
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and the Dahania village where Israeli collaborators from Egypt and the Gaza-Strip 
fled and settled under Israeli protection. 
The Palestinian population of the Mawasi Area is around 5,000. They are 
surrounded by the Mawasi settlements (Baba, 1997d, 2). Many people who 
cultivated the land of Mawasi Area are living in the cities of Rafah and Khan 
Younis and are daily entering and leaving the area. 
Roads and Inspection Points 
Oslo II Agreement (Annex I, Article IV, Provision 5) prescribed the movement of 
Palestinians from the Mawasi Area to the remaining areas of the Gaza-Strip should 
be by the following roads: 
i) Rafah-Tel Sultan-Mawasi. 
ii) Khan Younis-EI Bahr Village. 
iii) Deir El Balah-along the beach to the Mawasi. 
The Deir El Balah-along the beach to the Mawasi Area was closed since the signing 
of Gaza-Jerich First Agreement untill mid 1997 despite the fact that the agreement 
confirmed the Palestinian right of free movement along this way (Oslo II 
Agreement, Annex I, Article VI, Provision 3b). There was no justification to not 
open this road. This road is serving Palestinians more than the other two roads that 
link the Mawasi Area with the rest of the Gaza-Strip. It links the northern Gaza- 
Strip with its southern part. Palestinians from the southern Gaza-Strip, particularly 
from Rafah City that are working in Gaza City can reach there within twenty five 
minutes if they pass through the Deir El Balah-along the beach road to the Mawasi 
Area. However it will take more than sixty minutes by car if the road crosses the 
cities of Rafah and Khan Younis. 
Israelis established their inspection points on these three roads and started to inspect 
every Palestinian coming to the Mawasi Area. The Israeli procedure of inspection is 
a form of humiliation. In 1996 and 1997 the author was a witness to how the Israeli 
army were treating Palestinians. A car has to stop opposite the Israeli inspection 
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point, the driver of the car collects the identification of the passengers and take 
them to the Israeli soldier where the Israeli soldier checks the document. Then the 
soldier comes to the car and confirms the paper of the passengers and then he asks 
the driver to open the front and the boot of the car to search it. On some occasions 
the soldier will ask the passengers to evacuate so that he can search them and then 
search the car. This process at the inspection point in Rafah-Tel Sultan-Mawasi as 
the writer passed through it took around ten minutes for each car. A Palestinian 
resident of Mawasi told me that 
During the days of summer I spend at least two hours getting to 
Rafah City, because many people from Rafah want to go to the 
Mawasi Beach to enjoy their time. A queue of cars will wait for the 
Israeli process of inspection at this point (Interviews, 
December 1998-March 1999). 
These inspection points were established as a result of the signing of the Gaza- 
Jericho First Agreement. They started as small military points and then started to 
expand. In 1999, Khan Younis-El Bahr Village inspection point expanded into a 
military location not an inspection point. The Israelis tried to make this inspection 
point similar to the Eriz check point which connects the Gaza-Strip with Israel. 
Palestinians who pass through the Eriz check point to Israel or the West Bank are 
like people travelling from one country to another and having to submit to rigorous 
immigration procedures where all luggage, clothing and body searches are carried 
out meticulously. In the Khan Younis-El Bahr Village inspection point Israelis 
created the same conditions. Cars have to go through a comprehensive inspection 
including the bottom of the car which is checked by driving over a hole which 
enables the guard to check that the car is not transporting explosives or ammunition 
etc. The inspection of each car will take at least twenty minutes. A Palestinian from 
the Mawasi Area said that Israelis are doing their best to make our stay in the area 
impossible (Interviews, December 1998-March 1999). A small inspection point was 
established in the post-Oslo Agreement near the road that connected Nezarim 
settlement (south of the Gaza City) with Road No. 4 which linked all the Gaza-Strip 
cities from the north to the south. 
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The car with only its driver will not be allowed to pass any of the three inspection 
points that link the Mawasi Area with the Gaza-Strip. At least two people have to 
cross the inspection point in one car. This rule was issued after the Palestinian 
suicide attacks against Israelis in the post-Oslo Agreement period. The 
implementation of this rule was to prevent the Palestinian suicide attacks. However 
several suicide attacks were conducted at a later date and this rule could not prevent 
these attacks occurring. A military organisation that can send one person alone to 
blow up in an Israeli target can also send two pople. A Palestinian taxi driver told 
me that 
I have often had to wait for a long time to find a customer so that I 
could pass through the inspection point. If though this customer 
wanted to travel late at night, it can sometimes take at least an hour 
to find someone else to return back with (Interviews, 
December 1998-March 1999). 
Israel did not implement this rule only in the Mawasi Area but it also applied it in 
the road that linked the beach road with road No. 4 which passed near Nizarim 
settlement south of the Gaza City (map 4.1). This lateral allows the Palestinians 
from the middle and the south area of the Gaza-Strip to reach the weste of Gaza 
City within minutes. However, in order to reach the west of Gaza City by the other 
roads it could take at least twenty five minutes. The same rule of travelling in twos 
was applied to Palestinians who wanted to pass from Qrarah village to Der El Balah 
Town passing near Kefar Darom settlement that is part of Road No. 4. This road is 
the main road in the Gaza-Strip and links all the Gaza-Strip cities together. 
In the Mawasi Area the roads that linking the settlements together are only allowed 
to be used by settlers. Palestinians are prohibited from using these roads. These 
roads are well constructed, while the roads of the Mawasi Area are damaged and 
since the early 1980's there have been no improvements made. The PNA have 
successfully rehabilitated and widened the beach road from the northern Gaza City 
till Der El Balah Town. This road made movement between Gaza City and the 
Middle Area of the Gaza-Strip easier and decreased the pressure on Road No. 4. The 
PNA was prohibited from continuing its plan to link all the Gaza-Strip cities 
together by the Coastal Road. The plan was stopped at the south of Der El Balah 
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due to Israeli opposition. The Israeli settlements were the main obstacle to continue 
this project which could have linked the southern Gaza-Strip with its northern 
areas. This type of road could have solved many problems for the movement of 
Palestinians in the Gaza-Strip (al-Ahmed interview, February 2 "d 1998). 
According to the Agreement, in area like Mawasi, the Palestinians can erect new 
buildings, maintain roads, open sport and recreation facilities, including those for 
boat hiring, operate food establishments, enlarge the wharves, and expand the 
facilities for fishermen, such as workshops, warehouses and cold storage plants 
(Oslo II Agreement, Annex I, Article VI). Israel however, has violated this 
agreement. The Mawasi Area, has been dealt with instead as a locality under Israeli 
control (security and civil). 
The Mawasi in the post-Cairo agreement has been treated the same as zone C on 
the West Bank. The PNA could inaugurate none of the above-mentioned facilities 
because of official Israeli refusal (Debari interview, October 6,1998). A Palestinian 
from the Mawasi explained that: 
Only one school, and less than 20 houses were built in the post- 
Cairo Agreement period. These were subject to endless negotiations 
with the Israelis, and many demonstrations occurred in the area 
demanding the faithful implementation of the accord in relation to 
the Mawasi Area (Interviews, Decemberl998-March 1999). 
Schools 
There is no school located in the Rafah part of the Mawasi Area. Israel rejected the 
PNA proposal of establishing a school in this part (Shaheen interview, August 18, 
1998). The parents of the children of this area have to choose which schools they 
will send their children to. Either to the school in the Khan Younis location 
(approximately seven km) or to the schools of Tel Sutan which is the nearest suburb 
to the Mawasi Area of Rafah City (five km). People in the south of the Rafah part 
of the Mawasi Area send their children to Tel Sutan while the residents of the 
northern part send their children to the new school in the Khan Younis part of the 
Mawasi Area (Interviews, December 1998-March 1999). There is small refugee 
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camp (Swedi Camp) located in the northern part of the Mawasi Area. A refugee 
residing in the Swedi Camp told me that 
The great majority of our children are walking to school. They are 
walking more than twelve km daily. This is due to poverty among 
the residents of the camp. The non refugee children are walking to 
schools too because all the people of the Mawasi Area are poor and 
their standard of living has become worse in the post-Oslo 
Agreement period [details about the Palestinian economy in the 
post-Oslo Agreement in chapter six] (Interviews, December1998- 
March 1999). 
As a result of the implementation of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai according to 
the Camp David Accord, the southern part of the Swedi Camp comes exactly in the 
Israeli-Egyptian border. As this part is located in the security area of the border 
Israel demolished the houses of the camp that were located in the security area. The 
demolished houses formed around one-third of the camp. The Moktar (head of the 
camp) of the Swedi Refugee Camp told me that Israel tried to demolish all the 
houses of the camp even those far from the security zone needed for the border. In 
the early 1980's the residents of the camp protested aganst the Israeli plan of 
demolishing their homes and they went to the Israeli High Court. The court's 
decision was in favour of the refugees and asked the Israeli government to demolish 
the houses that were located in the security zone of the border and cancel any 
attempt to demolish any house not located in the security zone. 
Utility Supplies and Telecommunication 
The Mawasi Area lacked an electricity supply. Palestinians in the Mawasi Area had 
electricity in their area only in 1998. Every settlement in the Mawasi Area was 
connected with electricity since the first day of the settlement's establishment. The 
PNA tried many times with Israeli authorities to connect the area with electricity. 
The connection would have to cross the Mawasi settlements. Finally Israel agreed 
to supply electricity in this area by allowing the PNA to bring electrical generators 
which work up to 10: 00 PM only. A Palestinian from Mawasi expressed to me his 
feeling that: 
We could finally see the electricity in our homes, in Europe they had 
electricity a century ago. Our new neighbours (settlers) whose homes 
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are not further than one km from ours had electricity since the first 
day of their arrival. I am asking the question of how much it would 
cost to connect us with the settlement electricity, and if they supplied 
us with electricity we will pay the cost of our consumption, we are 
not looking of a free charge. It is clear that the Israeli strategy here is 
to push us to leave the area not to ease our life. The Israeli 
opposition to connecting us to the settlements electricity supply 
raises the question of why then will they not allow us to connect 
instead with Rafah municipality electrical supplies, who in contrast 
to the Israelis are willing to make the connection (Interviews, 
December 199 8 -March 1999). 
The telecommunication services such as the telephone did not yet reach the area. A 
Palestinian of the Mawasi Area is thankful for the technology of the mobile phone 
that connected him not with the world but at least with his relatives in Rafah City. 
This man confirmed to me that Israel will not allow the Palestinian Tele- 
communication Company to connect this area with the telephone facility 
(Interviews, Decemberl998-March 1999). 
Health 
In the Mawasi Area there is no health service such as hospitals and ambulances. In 
the past emergency cases were transported to the hospitals by the cars of the 
residents due to the absence of any telephone services. The Palestinians of the 
Mawasi Area had to go to Rafah or Khan Younis medical institutions for treatment. 
In the Mawasi Area the basic requirements for any civil society are absent. This 
situation continued in the post-Oslo Agreement. Palestinians of this area did not see 
the fruit of the `peace' but in actual fact their conditions became worse. They 
became more isolated from the Palestinian society than before and Israel rejected all 
the PNA demands to conduct any development activity in the area. The question 
that arises here is why does Israeli insist in putting obstacles in the way of 
developing this area? Does Israel plan to annex the Mawasi Area to Israel in the 
final status solution? 
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Building Regulations 
Regarding buildings or installations which are constructed in the Mawasi Area, the 
Oslo II Agreement (Annex I, Article XII, provision 3) illustrated the Palestinian 
rights that within the next 500 meters of the Yellow Area, buildings or installations 
may be constructed under the following conditions; Firstly, one building or 
installation may be constructed on each plot, the size of which shall not be less than 
25 dunums. Secondly, such a building or installation shall not exceed two floors, of 
a size not exceeding 180 square. meters per floor. The provision also confirmed that 
buildings or installations shall not be constructed on either side of the Lateral Roads 
up to a distance of 75 meters from the centre of these roads. Israel considered the 
Mawasi coastal road as a Lateral Road. 
The photograph in plate 4.1 shows a construction of a planned hotel in its primary 
stage. The distance between the hotel and the centre of the coastal road is less than 
75 meters. The owner of the project was asked to stop the construction which he 
adhered to as he feared the Israeli's would demolish what he had achieved. 
Israeli regulations of this nature makes the Palestinian right of building difficult and 
in some places impossible. It is difficult to transport materials needed for 
construction such as cement, iron and bricks to the Mawasi Area because of the 
presence of the Israeli inspection points. The Israelis are returning all materials 
required for house construction. A Palestinian from Ezbat al-Nada near to Tel 
Sultan-Beach road told me that "Four houses were constructed in Ezbat al-Nada 
where the materials were smuggled in small amounts. People of these houses 
behaved like thieves who were forced to steal what they needed, piece by piece" 
(Interviews, December 1998-March 1999). 
The expansion of the Swedi Camp is prohibited and people cannot build outside the 
plan of the camp nor can they build higher than one floor. A refugee from the camp 
told me that many people build one or two rooms inside their old houses. The 
materials needed for the building were smuggled from the cities of Rafah and Khan 
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Younis. The same tactic was used by the people of Ezbat al-Nada (Interviews. 
December 1998-March 1999). 
Fishing and Coastal Resources 
The main source of income for the majority of the Swedi Camp and some people of 
the Mawasi Area is through fishing. The economic conditions for the fishermen are 
very bad, and poverty is wide among them. Fishermen are fishing in a very limited 
area from Rafah in the south to the northern Gaza City in the north. 
The Gaza-Jericho First Agreement divided the sea of the Gaza-Strip into three 
maritime activity zones, K, L, and M. Zone K extends to 20 nautical miles into the 
sea from the coast in the northern part of the sea of Gaza and 1.5 nautical miles 
wide southwards. Zone M extends to 20 nautical miles in the sea from the coast, 
and one nautical mile wide from the Egyptian waters. Zones K and M will be 
closed areas, in which navigation will be restricted to Israeli Navy activity. Zone L 
bounded to the south by zone M and to the north by zone K extends twenty nautical 
miles into the sea from the coast. This zone will be open for fishing, recreation and 
economic activities. Fishing boats will not exit Zone L into the open sea and may 
have engines of up to a limit of 25 HP for outboard motors and up to a maximum 
speed of 18 knots for inboard motors. Residents of Israeli settlements in the Gaza- 
Strip Fishing in Zone L will carry Israeli Licenses and vessel permits (Annex I, 
Article XIV, Provisions 1& 2). 
The head of the Palestinian Fishermen Society in the Mawasi Area described the 
conditions of fishing in the post-Oslo Agreement period as the same of that of the 
pre-Oslo Agreement. The only positive step that took place after the agreement is 
that fishermen can go to sea and return back at any time during the day and night. In 
the pre-Oslo Agreement period fishermen can go to sea not later than 4: 00 PM and 
they cannot leave the sea until the next day in the morning after 7: 00 AM. Under 
the emergency situation the fishermen faced pressure from the Israeli army to leave 
the sea. Fishermen suffered from this rule which totally changed in the post-Oslo 
Agreement period. The fishing area is now limited. The head of the Fishermen 
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Society confirmed that the Camp David Accord negatively affected their business. 
In the pre-Camp David Accord they were fishing in the Egyptian Sinai sea because 
Sinai and Gaza-Strip were both under Israeli occupation, which meant that 
fishermen had absolute freedom of movement in those fishing areas (Interviews, 
December1998-March 1999). A Palestinian fisherman said that 
The range that Israel allows us for fishing is very poor. The sea of 
the Gaza-Strip is a very poor area. If we will not be allowed to go 
fishing in the open sea our situation will become worse ... Israel 
is 
restricting our life in the sea by limiting the range of our movement 
in the sea and in the land through confiscating our land (Interviews, 
December 1998-March 1999). 
Fishermen who go beyond their specified fishing area will be jailed. A fisherman 
told me that 
Because I exceeded the limited range that is allowed for fishing, the 
Israeli Navy arrested me, my colleagues, and sent the boat to Israeli 
Ashdod port (about sixty km from the Gaza City). We spent twenty- 
three days in an Israeli prison" (Interviews, December 1998-March 
1999). 
Palestinians may have access to sections of the Mawasi beach for a variety of 
activities (Oslo II Agreement, Annex I, Provision 5c) extending to the east up to the 
coast road, which together with the Rafah and Khan Younis wharves is estimated to 
be five km Israel has notified the PNA of the locations of these sections. These 
sections may be used for the following purposes: 
i) Sport and recreation, including boat hire facilities. 
ii) Operating food establishments. 
iii) Enlarging the wharves. 
iv) Expanding the facilities for fishermen, such as offices, warehouses and cold 
storage facilities. 
v) A Hotel. 
The head of the Palestinian Fishermens Society noted that none of the above 
mentioned provisions that were established or implemented except for a small cold 
storage facility. The situation of the Mawasi beach continued as it was in the pre- 
Oslo Agreement. The tourist nature of the beach is great but no noticeable 
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development took place in the area. Israel continues to put obstacles in front of the 
PNA and the private sector for conducting tourist development projects to make the 
Mawasi beach unattractive to tourists or tourist institutions. They have succeeded 
(Interviews, December 1998-March 1999). The Palestinian attempt to establish a 
hotel failed due to Israeli obstacles and the building of the hotel ceased. 
After a period of three months from the signing of the Gaza-Jerich First Agreement, 
the Israelis pledged to consider, in light of the security situation, the use of 
additional beach sections by the PNA (Oslo II Agreement, Annex I, Provision 5c). 
A Palestinian fisherman confirmed that "since the implementation of the Gaza- 
Jerich First Agreement, no additional sites were given to the Palestinians and the 
situation currently is the same as it was previously" (Iterview with Public). 
Several small coffee shops opened in the Mawasi beach in the post-Oslo period. 
These sites are still using electrical generators due to the absence of electricity. The 
change that took place in the `peace period' was that the Palestinian public can use 
the beach during the night-time. In the pre-Oslo period Palestinians were prohibited 
from using the Mawasi beach from 7: 00 pm till 7: 00 am. The area was considered a 
closed military area during the night. The mayor of Khan Younis City confirmed in 
a public meeting that 
The Municipality of Khan Younis is willing to conduct development 
projects to the Mawasi Area. The Palestinian side asked the Israeli 
side many time to accept the Palestinian demand to develop the area. 
Israel rejected all Palestinian demands. The Israeli policy in the 
Mawasi Area is witness to the Israeli violation of the signed 
agreements (al-Far'ah, November 1998). 
The agreement assured that Israel would not construct new sites along the Mawasi 
beach (Oslo II Agreement, Annex I, Article VI, Provision 5c). But in January 1997 
Israel fenced a tract of land in Khan Younis beach as an introduction to conduct 
construction on this tract. The Palestinian public are prohibited from using the 
Israeli sections of the Mawasi, such as swimming areas, hotel and restaurants. 
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Confiscation of land in the West Bank is taking place in area C. where the PNA has 
no control over the land registration office. Mohammed al-Debari. the director of 
government land in the Gaza-Strip, explained that the situation there is quite 
different. Israeli military forces handed over all land registries apart of Land 
Registries of Israeli settlements to the PNA in 1994 following the Israeli 
withdrawal from the Strip. Therefore, Palestinian ownership of land in the Gaza- 
Strip is known to the PNA. Area A and the Israeli settlements are close to each 
other. When Israel wanted to expand its settlement activity in the strip, its pretext 
was twofold; firstly that expansion would take place in security areas of the 
settlement for security reasons. This policy was used for many settlement 
expansions in the strip. The second pretext; that land expropriated for the expansion 
of thesettlements had already been sold by Palestinians to Israelis. Israelis, in the 
course of several attempts in meetings with PNA officials, failed to prove any land 
had been sold in the Gaza-Strip except 150 square meters in Khan Younes from one 
Israeli collaborator (al-Debari interview, October 6,1998). 
Rabin approved the continuation of building 1,200 units in the Gaza-Strip 
(Aronson, 1997,17). A Palestinian whose agricultural land is located near Peat 
Sadeh settlement in the Mawasi Area confirmed that building in this settlement 
continued in the post-Oslo Agreement period. This settlement had mobile houses in 
the pre-Oslo Agreement period, while after the signing of the agreement new 
houses were built. Construction during Netanyahu's government was intensified 
more than that of Rabin's government (Interviews, December 1998-March 1999). 
The Palestinian farmer described how Peat Sadeh settlement was established and 
how it expanded: 
The settlement was established in 1989 with several mobile houses 
occupied by the Israeli army. At the beginning we thought that it was 
a military base. With time these houses increased and immovable 
houses units built. The army was replaced by civilians but still there 
is some military personnel living in the settlement. The area of the 
settlement expanded with time and new housing units were 
established. The number of settlers in the Peat Sadeh are fifteen 
families but although many units are vacant the construction 
continues. The expansion of the fence of the Peta Sadeh settlement 
is taking place nocturnally. Every tract not used by Palestinians is 
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subject to confiscation. Many tracts have been confiscated because 
they were not cultivated. But we should keep in mind that many 
cultivated tracts have been confiscated for Israeli settlements. Some 
of my cultivated land has been confiscated and now it is part of the 
settlement. I inherited this land from my father; it is mine and it will 
never be for the settlers (Interviews, December1998-March 1999). 
During the night the Israelis are also transferring the sand of the Mawasi Area to 
Israel. The area is rich with what is considered the best quality sand in Palestine and 
can be used for concrete and the manufacture of bricks. This sand could also be put 
in the garden. A Palestinian peasant and his brother confirmed that "during the 
night the Israeli trucks start to carry the sand of the Mawasi Area and then they 
transport it to Israel, This Israeli activity of stealing the sand began in August 1998" 
(Interviews, December 1998-March 1999). 
Settlements in the Gaza-Strip have provided Israel with a compelling rationale for 
maintaining a significant military presence. It is clear without the settlements, that 
Israel would have no justification for demanding any continuing military presence 
in the Gaza-Strip. Israeli settlement strategy here serves Israeli interests in times of 
war and peace. 
4.4 Salfeet Province 
The Palestinian province of Salfeet is situated 15 miles south-east of Nablus city in 
the West Bank (see map 3.1). The population is about 50,000 and its area is 210 
square kilometres. The main towns are Salfeet (the centre of the province), Bedia, 
and Kafr al-Deek with populations of 7,870,6,815, and 3,350 respectively 
(National Institutions Office, Salfeet PNA, 5). The province is located in a strategic 
area. It is a tongue of land which stretches from the `Green Line' into the heart of 
the West Bank. It is isolated within the northern West Bank (Nablus. Jenen, Tool 
Karm, and Qlgilia) from Ramallah. Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Hebron (Palestinian 
Information Service, 1996,1). 
Until 1967 the province was a part of the Nablus governorate, then subsequentl\ 
under Israeli occupation it came under the Tool Karm governorate. There are two 
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towns and 17 villages in Salfeet Province. The towns are Salfeet, Kafr al-Deek, and 
Bedia. The villages are Yasof, Eskaka, Farkha, Kirbat Qais, Marda, Kofol Hares. 
Hares, Kira, Der Estia, Karawat Bani Hassan, Sarta, Massha, al-Zawia. Broqeen. 
Deer Baloot, and Rafat. The province borders with Ramalla province in the North. 
Nablus province in the South and the East, Qalgilia province in the South, and the 
`Green Line' in the West. The area is rich in olive trees. The olive is considered the 
main income for Palestinians in the province. (National Institutions Office, Salfeet 
PNA, 5). Salfeet Province is situated in `Western Samaria' and is one of the richest 
areas of water aquifers on the West Bank. The main reasons for Israeli settlement in 
`Western Shomron' were to do with the importance of security and the quality and 
quantity of the water aquifers (Alfer, 1995,287). 
4.4.1 Israeli settlements in Salfeet District 
There are 12 Israeli settlements in Salfeet Province. The largest is Ariel which was 
built in 1978. It is 60 kilometres east of Tel Aviv and another 60 south of 
Jerusalem. It is 600 meters above sea level. Until 1996, its population was 15,000 
from 3,500 families (www. yesha. virtual. co. il/shomronlst. htm). Its inhabitants 
increased from 12,000 to 15,000 between 1992-1996. It was established on 300 
hectares in the north of the province, where in 1996 Ariel had occupied 5,000 
dunums as a result of the expanding policy of Israeli governments 
(gis6/paleye/salfit/index. htm; Palestinian Information Service, 1996,8). Ariel was 
constructed on the land of Salfeet town and expanded onto the land belonging to 
the villages of Eskaka, Marda, and Kofl Hares. It was built on an area of 600 
dunums. Ariel is considered the centre of the Israeli settlements on the north West 
Bank (National Institutions Office, 1997,5). 
A Palestinian farmer described to me how the Ariel settlement began and how it 
had affected him. 
In 1978 Ariel began with the establishment of 6 mobile houses as a 
military base, then Israeli civilians settled instead of the army. when 
the latter left the base. The settlement was transformed into a civil 
post. The mobile units increased, and over time they became 
permanent houses. The first settlers numbered less than 50. Now 
they are in their thousands. The first mobile units were far away 
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from my land, more than half a kilometre, until they reached my land 
as a result of the continuation of the expansion of Ariel ... 
but the 
position under the Netanyahu government has changed things, now 
my land is fenced off by the government. The only way to reach my 
land is to enter from a gate and they have given me a key to this 
gate. I have one key and the Israeli army have another one. They told 
me that this land is yours, but we want to fence it, so after the huge 
construction in Ariel the only way for me to reach my land is to walk 
11 kilometres from Salfeet town because many old pathways were 
closed due to settlement expansion in all directions (Interviews, 
December 1998-March 1999). 
Israeli settlements in Salfeet Province are close to each other and spread 
everywhere in the area, with a maximum distance of three kilometres between 
each.; from one place a person can view three settlements. For example, south of 
Ariel you can see, both Yakeer and Barkan settlements. An elderly Palestinian man 
believes that 
The Israeli settlements are like a cancer surrounding the Palestinian 
populated areas from all directions. The settlements make every 
village isolated without any link to their neighbour. These sorts of 
settlements surround and isolate every Palestinian populated area 
easily enable the Israeli army during the days of closure to divide 
and control every Palestinian village and city separately (Interviews, 
December 1998-March 1999). 
The first settlement set up in the province was Elkana 1977, on the top of a hill 
belonging to the land of Massha village. It expanded onto the land of the villages of 
Azon Atmeh, Seneria, and al-Zawia. Elkana is three kilometres away from the 
`Green Line', and now there are three settlements known as Elkana A, Elkana B, 
and Elkana C. Table 5.2 illustrates the Israeli settlements in Salfeet Province and its 
population according to Settlers Council (Yesha). 
The number of settlers mentioned above may be exaggerated because Yesha wants 
to show the Israelis that these settlements are well populated in order to encourage 
them to settle in the region. 
Settlements in the Salfeet District are of three types: secular. religious, and mixed. 
The secular settlements are Alei Zahav, Barkan, Nofim with a total of 1.520 
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settlers. The religious settlements are, Emanuel, Kefar Tapuach, Kiryat Netafim, 
P'duel, Revava, and Yakir, total number of settlers 6,790. The mixed settlements 
are Ariel, Elkana, Etz Efraim, and Nofim with a total population of 18,900 
(www. yesha. virtual. co. il/ shomronlst. htm). If we accept the Yesha statistics, the 
percentage of the secular, religious, and mixed settlements are 5,25. and 70 per 
cent respectively. 
Table 4.2 
Israeli settlements in the Salfeet Province 1996 
Name of Settlement No. of Settlers 
Ariel 15,000 
Barkan 800 
Elkana 3,000 
Emanuel 5,000 
Etz Efraim 400 
Kefar Tapuach 300 
Kiryat Netafim 140 
Nofim 500 
P'duel 450 
Revava 200 
Yakir 800 
Alei Zahav 420 
Total* 27,010 
Source: Data collected data by the author from the homepage of the Israeli 
Settlement Council Yesha www. yesha. virtual. co. il/shomronist. htm 
* The author's calculation 
The mixed settlements are those where the majority of the inhabitants settlers are 
economic settlers and young people. They are looking to benefit from the 
government incentive of owning a cheap flat in the settlement that is located not far 
from their work in the main cities. The distance between the Salfeet settlements and 
the `Green Line" is less than ten km (Tafkaji interview. October 13,1998). A 
Palestinian landlord some of whose land was confiscated said, 
My standard of living was negatively affected as a result of the 
confiscation of my land and the bad economic position in the 
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Palestinian Occupied Territories. I worked in Ariel settlement, where 
I discovered that many settlers are living in Ariel while their work is 
in Israel" (Interviews, Decemberl998-March 1999). 
The irony of the story is that this Palestinian become a labourer in his own 
confiscated land while the people who occupied it work elsewhere in Israel. 
Some settlers bought houses in the settlement of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip just 
to ensure they were entitled to compensation from the government in any future 
agreement with the Palestinian side. Ofir Pines, a member of the Israeli Parliament 
(Israeli Labour Party) said that 
20 per cent of people listed as residing in settlements do not actually 
live in settlements, but nonetheless take advantage of the income tax 
reduction of 7 per cent afforded to settlers (www2. ari. net/fmep/ 
1998reports/ 198. html). 
Tafkaji estimated this number at more than 25 per cent. He believes that Jews list as 
residents of settlements and live in Israel waiting for the final solution between the 
Palestinians and Israelis in order to receive compensation (Tafkaji interview, 
October 13,1998). A poll conducted among settlers showed that around 30 per cent 
of owned a house in Israel in addition to one in a settlement (A poll by Centre for 
Palestine Research and Studies, December, 1995). In Salfeet province a peasant 
believes that, 
Some settlers of Salfeet settlements, particularly in Ariel came from 
the Israeli settlements of Sinai after the Israeli withdrawal from the 
peninsula. Those settlers received high compensation and are willing 
to receive more compensation in the final status agreement if their 
settlement is to be evacuated. These settlers will not accept living 
under Palestinian control and to be treated as Palestinian citizens 
(Interviews, December 1998-March 1999). 
-1,4.2 Salfeet District and Settlement Activities 
According to Netanyahu's government decision at the end of 1996. all the religious 
settlements of Salfeet Province were included under thoseof national priority. Two 
of them were classified as settlements of national priority A, and the remainder of 
national priority B. Only two of Salfeet Province were excluded from those of 
national priority: one was a secular settlement (Alei Zahav), and the second was 
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Elkana, one of the mixed settlements in the province (Baba, 1997b, 8). This is an 
indication that the Likud government was more interested in supporting religious 
settlements. This could be due to the nature of the Likud coalition between 1996- 
1999, which was dependent on minor Israeli religious parties, such as Tswmet, 
Shas. 
Through fieldwork in Salfeet Province, a Palestinian member of the Salfeet Public 
Committee for Resisting Settlements explained that 
Under the Likud government the fence of the Ariel settlement was 
moved onto Palestinian land. The area of the settlement increased; 
the committee member estimates the confiscated area to be 2,000 
dunums, but this does not mean that the 2,000 dunums were annexed 
to the settlement border. Regarding Labour settlement activities in 
the province during the post-Oslo Agreement. confiscation of land in 
this area under the Labour government was halted. Palestinian 
workers in the Ariel settlement told him that construction of new 
housing was frozen and some buildings in the first stage of 
construction were halted, some building companies did not carry out 
any work in the area. All settlement expansion took place under 
Likud. Bulldozing on route 100, which Israelis call the `Peace Road' 
or the `Samaria Crossing' Aber al-Samerah, began when Likud was 
in power during the 1980's. Work on this highway was frozen by the 
Labour Party, but the Likud government of 1996 continued 
bulldozing (Interviews, December 1998-March 1999). 
Yediot Ahranot confirmed what a previous Palestinian had said; that 2,000 dunums 
were confiscated in the province in the first half of 1997 for the benefit of 
settlements, such as Ariel and Emanuel (Yediot Ahranot may 26,1997 cited in 
Baba, 1997c, 6). On Mayl4,1997, the Israeli daily newspaper Ha'artz stated that 
the Israeli Ministry of Housing had declared the government's intention to build 
287 dwellings in the Ariel settlement (Baba, 1997c, 10). A Palestinian farmer 
whose agricultural land is located near the Ariel settlement confirmed 
There is a visible monthly expansion of the Ariel settlement. Since it 
was established in the late 1970's it has expanded. The expansion 
results in confiscation of the Palestinian land, particularly the 
agricultural land. I challenge Israeli propaganda that the settlements 
are being built on Vacant land (non agricultural land). The 
Palestinian olive trees that were planted in Ariel settlement are still 
in the settlement as a witness that these trees are ours and we planted 
them. Some trees are older than me. If this tree w ill speak, it will tell 
198 
our story, it will tell the world the story of our land and how it has 
been inhumanely confiscated without justification (Interviews, 
Decemberl998-March 1999). 
The Ariel settlement and the settlements in Salfeet Province are designated as 
political settlements according to Rabin's classification. Labour does not demand 
control over the area because it is located neither in the Jordan Valley nor in 
`Greater Jerusalem'. The area has a reasonable Palestinian population, where the 
Israeli settlements and the Palestinian towns and villages are involved with each 
other. Therefore, it was not surprising when a Palestinian member of the Salfeet 
Public Committee for Resisting Settlement explained the Labour Party policy 
towards these settlements to the author. Classification of settlements under the 
labour Party revealed Rabin's intention to build a Jewish state that would be 
different from that envisaged by Likud. But we should keep in mind that Salfeet 
settlements are connecting the Jordan Valley with Israel (see maps 1.5 and 3.1), and 
this explains the strategic importance of these settlements for Israeli security and 
their ambition of annexing the Jordan Valley. 
Salah Tamari believes that the Labour government implemented the policy of 
settlement classification mentioned above. He stated that for Labour the political 
settlements have no security or strategic role, but represent a military and financial 
burden on Israel and will also increase friction between Palestinians and Israelis. 
Tamari added that the Labour government fixed the border of a settlement at 50 
meters from the last dwelling in every settlement, but did not in fact respect this 
distance. He also perceives no difference between the Labour and Likud 
governments in their respective settlement policies regarding Bethlehem district, 
because of to the Israeli plan in which settlements in that area are to be found in the 
plan for the `Greater Jerusalem'. He believes that the Labour government was ready 
to evacuate some settlements which classified as political during the peace process. 
This readiness is preconditioned by the positive improvement of the process itself, 
one of the reasons leading to the assassination of Yetzhak Rabin in late 1995 
(Interview. October 11.1998). 
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The Palestinian consider Rabin's settlement classification of political and security 
categories as totally unacceptable. Palestinians from Salfeet do not differentiate 
between the two categories of settlements. A Palestinian from Salfeet asked, 
If Rabin differentiated between the two, why then did not he 
evacuate the political settlements and trade them with peace. This 
was a new slogan raised from the Israeli Labour government to 
justify their action for the international community, particularly the 
U. S. I heard that the majority of the settlements around Salfeet are of 
a political category (see map 3.2) so why are the building and the 
expansion of these settlements continuing. Every year these 
settlements are expanding either under Labour government or under 
Likud government (Interviews, December1998-March 1999). 
The Palestinian Minister of Justice said related this classification as illegal. Neither 
the political nor the security settlements have any legitimacy according to 
international law. Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip, whether 
military or civilian, is according to international law, illegal and the nature of this 
presence is one of foreign occupation (Abu Medain interview February 17 1999). 
There has been no resolution issued by the U. N. General Assembly or the U. N. 
Security Council which recognises the legality of these categories. The settlement is 
a form of foreign occupation. The U. N. Charter is clear on the illegal action of 
transferring civilians from an occupier state to occupied territories (see footnote 4 
in chapter 1). 
A field survey confirmed that under the Labour government 379 dunums were 
confiscated for the Ariel settlement, as well as 300 dunums for the Nofim 
settlement (both are situated in the Salfeet District). It also confirmed an 
appropriation of land in the Gaza-Strip in different places from north to south. This 
terrain is estimated at 295 dunums near the Nofim settlement (Palestinian Land 
Research Centre, 1995,5: 6). It is clear that the Labour government did not fully 
adhere to its announced policy on political settlements. There were violations of the 
policy in many places in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. The Labour government 
froze the selling of 1,500 units in Ariel, but allowed them to be sold to its residents 
(Yediot Ahranot cited in al-Quds August 10,1996. cited in Baba, 1996,19). Those 
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units were sold under Netanyahu's government when he banned the restriction that 
had been imposed on the settlements under Labour. 
A new Plan for building more housing units and public places in the Emanuel 
estate, the largest populated religious settlement in the province, was approved by 
the Likud government (Minister of Defence). The plan approved the building for 
1,159 new units, a swimming pool, hotel, synagogue, schools, etc, on a site of 394 
dunums (Israeli Civil Administration in the West Bank, Plan 120/6). The Ministry 
of Housing approved this construction plan and sold 300 dwellings from the 1997 
total already built (Baba, 1997c, 14). 
The settlers from Emanuel have their own plan, known as Emanuel 2000. In 
addition to the 1,159 units, a scheme was approved for an additional 1,100 units, 
which was frozen under the Labour government as a result of its policy of halting 
construction in political settlements (Yediot Ahranot, 1997, no specified day or 
month). However, the same Israeli newspaper stated on January 15,1997 that this 
freeze was due to financial trouble involving the construction company. 
During the first six months of the Likud government the building of 120 new 
dwellings took place in some settlements of Salfeet Province, namely; Yakir (40), 
Alei Zahav (30), Kiryat Netafim (20), P'duel (30) (Baba, 1997a, 7). The 
government approved the building of 779 and 1,353 units (Ha'artz February 4, 
1997; papers from Takfaji). Tapuach was stanted in 1983, and in 1998 the Israeli 
civil administration of the West Bank announced its intention for the formulation of 
its new plan on settlement (al-Quds June 19,1998). This Tapuach settlement is a 
religious one and the settlers of Tapuach belong to Khahana Hay extremist group. 
A Palestinian living near to Tapuach said that 
The settlers themselves are the people who expand the settlement 
not the Israeli government as expected. Israel confiscated land for 
the expansion of the settlement, but in Tapuach the settlers are 
moving the fence of the settlement. I know one extremist in this 
settlement who is always moving the fence of the settlement. He 
does this during the day and not during the night. If I did the same as 
this settler by moving the fence of my land inside the settlement 
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area, what will happen to me (Interviews, December 1998-March 
1999). 
Mohammed Darweesh, head of the National Institution Office in Salfeet Province 
noted: 
Under the Likud government, about 5,000 trees were uprooted on 
the pretext that the trees were planted on state land. These trees were 
outside the border of the settlements. The settlers uprooted the olive 
trees under the protection of the Israeli army. There were also about 
20 houses demolished in this area between 1996-1998, and there are 
over 30 houses where owners have received warning of demolition. 
In Brokeen village there are 20 houses where owners have received 
warning of demolition (Interview, December 11,1998). 
Under Netanyahu' government the settlement activities in Salfeet Province 
intensified sharply. A Palestinian described these activities as crazy and he defined 
the Netanyahu's government as the government of settlers. He believes that "the 
settlers are ruling Israel, under Netanyahu every settlement is expanding now with 
the construction of new units". This Palestinian reminded me that, 
The most important factor for the future and safety of the settlements 
is the construction of by-pass roads. The settlers will not feel safe 
and secure if their settlements are not connected together and at the 
same time with Israel. at the early stages of the Israeli settlement in 
the West Bank, settlers used the Palestinian roads where they were 
not safe. Stone throwers always attacked them when they crossed the 
Palestinian cities and villages. Now due to the by-pass roads which 
are far from the Palestinian populated areas they feel more secure. 
The by-pass roads give the settlers the opportunity to move quickly 
between the settlements and to reach Israel within minutes 
(Interviews, December 1998-March 1999). 
A Salfeeti old man commented with regard to the by-pass roads that 
The settlements surrounded us from all directions, now it is the turn 
of the by-pass roads. These roads are putting an end to our dream of 
independence. How will this independence be achieved if the West 
Bank is more isolated and is surrounded by settlements and the by- 
pass roads. This is in addition to the spatial isolation between the 
West Bank and Gaza-strip. The sophisticated construction of the by- 
pass roads gives an impression that these settlements not be 
removed in any final solution. If we accept the Israeli demand of not 
removing these settlements and annexing them to Israel, will we be 
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able to establish our full independent state. It will be impossible to 
do so (Interviews, Decemberl998-March 1999). 
Another one asked 
how will our grandsons draw the map of their state? This state will 
not be geographically cohesive. This state will be fragmented parts, 
particularly in the West Bank. I think no such clever grandson will 
be able to draw the map of his country. If politics will bring any 
map, the real map is present at least in our heart (Interviews, 
December 1998-March 1999). 
4.5 The Palestinian Resistance to the Settlement Activities 
Every action has a reaction, and this is true in the case of Palestinian-Israeli 
relations regarding settlement policy. Palestinians resisted and continue to resist 
this programme by peaceful or violent means. When the Likud government 
approved the building of Har Homa settlement, the Palestinian public and officials 
organised a sit-in tent located on the hill opposite the settlement. Sallah Tamari led 
the Palestinian protest. Palestinians in Salfeet also organised a sit-in tent on the hill 
opposite the Ariel settlement, facing recently annexed land. This was not the first 
time residents of Salfeet had organised such demonstrations. Several public rallies 
were organised against Israeli settlement activities in the province. The mass 
meetings were supported by the people of Salfeet and nearby villages and towns of 
the West Bank. In 1997, close to Morag settlement in Rafah in the Gaza-Strip, a 
Palestinian protest continued for more than a month against Morag's expansion at 
the expense of Palestinian agricultural land. The protest developed and violence 
broke out between Palestinians and the Israeli army. A Palestinian boy of 13 was 
killed. In 1998, members of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) were 
severely punished by the Israeli army, when they objected to the setting up of a new 
Israeli settlement in East Jerusalem. Many demonstrations have taken place in the 
West Bank and Gaza-Strip against Israeli occupation. Near to Morag settlement the 
author noticed that all Palestinian political parties, movements and public share in 
the Palestinian protest against the confiscation of the land that locates near Morag 
settlement. A Palestinian youth from Shaporah refugee camp said 
This land (that is to be confiscated for Morag settlement) is not mine 
and I do not even own any land in the Gaza-strip. I own my small 
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house in the refugee camp. My land, I mean the land that my father 
left in his village is Yebna in Ramllah Provine. But I am coming to 
protest here because this is the land of my people. Here you will find 
all Palestinians protesting against the Israeli policy of confiscating 
land. Politically, Palestinians are divided as a result of the Oslo 
Agreement, but all of them are united in regard to the question of 
land. I do believe that land and martyrs will always unite us 
(Interviews, Decemberl998-March 1999). 
The PLC Committee of Land and Resisting Settlement have used other methods in 
addition to the above in resisting settlement policy. Tamari, head of the committee, 
explained that Israel, in general, is confiscating uncultivated land. Therefore, the 
duty of the committee is to enforce Palestinian steadfastness (Somood) in villages 
and encourage peasants to reclaim land. Reclamation of land could occur if the 
PNA and non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) supported these peasants. He 
also explained that in order to assit villagers, the PNA should resist migration from 
villages to the city. Migration could be prevented if the following action were 
taken: schools of all levels opened; villages connected with electricity, especially 
the smaller villages which still have no electricity; villages connected by telephone; 
community centres founded; agricultural roads paved; old roads repaved (pre-1967 
War) to connect villages together and to the nearest cities. It is necessary to ease the 
lives of villagers to encourage them to be steadfast. (Tamari interview, October 11, 
1998). 
In Bethlehem district the PNA and the NGOs could accomplish many activities 
similar to those mentioned above. But in relation to the Israeli settlement activities, 
these operations seem very poor. The Palestinian entreprises in the villages could 
succeed in some locations in protecting the land from expropriation. Israelis are 
looking to empty land (uncultivated and non-populated) as an easy target for the 
takeover. This does not mean that populated and cultivated land is not an Israeli 
target. But there is no doubt that it is easier for the Israelis to seize the empty land, 
because no protest, demonstration or violence will take place (Tamari interview 
October 11,1998). The author saw the activity of the Palestinian Agricultural 
Relief whose bulldozers cultivate the land and prevent further Israeli confiscation. 
A peasant in Salfeet whose land was cultivated by the Palestinian Agricultural 
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Relief was satisfied of this assistance and described it as a positive measure, but he 
wondered if this will protect every tract which is threatened from confiscation. The 
peasant confirmed that he paid twenty five per cent of the cost of the bulldozers and 
he assured me that he is satisfied about the amount he pays (Interviews. 
December 1998-March 1999). 
In the Mawasi Area, throughout the interviews conducted by the author with the 
Palestinian public, no one mentioned the receiving of assistance from the official or 
Non-Governmental institutions. In the Palestinian land near the Morag settlement, 
the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture provided the owners of the land with 
hundreds of olive trees in order to prevent the Israelis from reattempting to 
expropriate the land. And the Municipality of Rafah City linked this land by an 
agricultural road to ease the movement of the Palestinian farmer to their land. The 
landlords of this land were not satisfied with this help. They expected more 
assistance from the Palestinian official and non-official institutions (Interviews, 
December 1998-March 1999). 
According to the agreement, the bulldozing of roads that serve Palestinian villages 
in area C in the West Bank, should have approval from the Israelis because they fall 
under their security and civil rule (all the roads out side the Palestinian villages, 
towns, and cities are situated in Area Q. The PNA has asked many times for 
permission from Israelis to bulldoze new roads or pave old roads that connect 
villages with each other. No permission has ever been given to the PNA since it 
was founded in 1995. Approval of such small projects involves difficult 
negotiations with the Israelis, and they always procrastinate. In the Jordan Valley, 
the Ministry of Public Works bulldozed a road connecting the villages of Kardala 
and Gardala, located some three kilometres west of the Jordan River. The work was 
carried out by Palestinians on Saturdays, because of the Israeli weekend holiday 
when they would not notice the work being done. When the Israelis discovered the 
road. they destroyed it, despite the fact that it did not affect the movement of the 
Israeli army or the settlers (al-Ahmed interview November 2,1998). The Israelis do 
not want to encourage villagers in the area to become more steadfast. They want to 
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persuade Palestinians in the Jordan Valley to migrate to the cities. Evacuation of 
Palestinians is a step towards future annexation. The Jordan Valley, as previously 
mentioned, is a strategic location, and Israeli policy seeks complete annexation of 
this Valley. In Elkana valley, a Palestinian peasant whose home was demolished by 
the Israeli authorities noted that 
The road from the main way to my land is about one and a half km. 
And if you want to reach it by car it will take around fifteen minutes. 
Israelis prohibited any organisation from constructing new roads or 
rehabilitating the old road. The Israelis do not want us to remain in 
our land, all of their activities are to encourage us to leave or to sell 
our land to them. However I am determined to remain under these 
harsh conditions. I am living with my family in a container. Settlers 
start with caravans but end up with houses, in contrast I originally 
owned my house which was demolished and I ended up with a 
container. I have a house in the village, but I choose to live in this 
container on my land to protect it from being confiscated. I am ready 
to rebuild my demolished house (Interviews, December 1998-March 
1999). 
Another peasant whose family consisted of fifteen members told the author that 
I was working in Kuwait until 1980. When my relatives told me 
about the Israeli settlement activities in my village and confirmed 
that the confiscation of land reached my land, I left Kuwait and 
returned to my land. I took the responsibility of cultivating my land. 
Now the land is close to the fence of the Israeli settlement of Yakir. 
If I had not returned back to my village, my land would have been 
confiscated under the Israeli law of absentee property. I am happy to 
save my land which is the land of my fathers and grand fathers. I am 
ready to sacrifice my life to prevent it from falling into the settlers' 
hands. I was beaten up several times from the settlers of Yakir 
(Interviews, December 1998-March 1999). 
The main entrance of the Ariel settlement is very near to the main road that 
connects the Jordan Valley area with Israel. The settlement runs all along the main 
road. To enter Salfeet Town, a person needs to follow an indirect route for about 3 
km. The head of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Salfeet Province 
confirmed that "Israelis rejected a plan to link the town with the main road (3 km) 
by a direct and more sophisticated road" (Ozreel interview. January 10.1998). 
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It is quite obvious to the visitor of Salfeet Town that the Salfeet settlements 
surround the town from every directions. There is no chance for Salfeet to enjoy a 
natural expansion in the future, especially when we know that the land between the 
town and the settlements is agricultural and it is forbidden for Palestinians to 
convert it to a housing area: being situated in area C the decision to change the 
status of the land is in Israeli hand's. A Member of the Palestinian Public 
Committee of Resisting settlement wondered "why the Ariel gate is directly 
connected with the main road while Salfeet Town which has thousands of people 
cannot be connect with a sophisticated road such as that of Ariel" (Interviews, 
December 1998-March 1999). 
It is very clear that PNA efforts to rehabilitate the roads in area C have always 
failed due to Israeli obstacles. All the Palestinian communities are isolated by area 
C which occupied (until the implementation of Wye River Memorandum) more 
than 70 per cent of the West Bank. The total length of roads in the West Bank is as 
follows: 88 km in area A, 636 km in area B, and 1,276 km in area C. The majority 
of roads in the West Bank fall under Israeli jurisdiction and are prohibited from 
maintenance or improvement. Israelis only maintain roads used by the military 
forces and settlers, but it is important to note that the great majority of rural roads 
are not used by the Israelis. Therefore, since Israeli occupation of the West Bank of 
June 1967, many routes have not been maintained. The distance between Jenin city 
on the northern West Bank and Fako'ah village is about eight kilometres. However, 
to reach Jenin from Fako' ah, a person must drive for about 75 minutes. Many 
emergency cases have died on the way to hospital in Jenin. The Palestinian Ministry 
of Public Works succeeded in bulldozing this road. Work on agricultural roads by 
the Ministry of Public Works and the NGOs has been prevented by the Israelis. 
Israelis have often confiscated bulldozers belonging to the PNA and the NGOs (al- 
Ahmed interview November 2.1998). 
Palestinian resistance to settlement activities rescued some areas in the West Bank 
and Gaza-Strip, but in many places it failed. Palestinian resistance saved land from 
confiscation near Morag settlement in the Gaza-Strip. 
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In Salfeet, the Palestinians massed against expropriation of their land. A peasant 
reported: 
During the night, we heard a voice from the town mosque calling us to 
go to a land situated west of Ariel settlement, and we were informed 
that settlers were trying to fence the area and annex it to Ariel. The 
public ran to the location, and we found the settlers doing their job. The 
Israeli army and the Palestinian police, District Co-ordination Office 
(DCO), came to prevent friction between us and the settlers. The next 
night the same attitude was repeated by the settlers, and the voice from 
the town mosque asked the people to go to the same land. We went and 
found settlers doing the same work as the previous night. The Settlers 
withdrew under Israeli army protection, and we organised a sit-in tent, 
where people from Salfeet came regularly. Some people slept in the tent 
to guard the land. This situation has been dragging on for two months 
(Interview December 1998-March 1999). 
A youth from Salfeet whose turn was to sleep in the Palestinian sit-in-tent of Salfeet 
during the author's visit confirmed that 
It is my duty to protect the land. I believe that the land that is being 
subject to confiscation is not my own, it belongs to my neighbour in 
Salfeet Town. This land does not only belong to my neighbour, but 
to the Palestinian people. This land is not ours to concede to the 
Israelis but it is for the coming generation (Interviews, 
December 1998-March 1999). 
Palestinian efforts are not united under one organisation or institution and this has 
hindered effective opposition to settlement. There has been no real effort to unite 
public organisations. The NGOs have also experienced a lack of co-ordination 
among themselves. At the PNA level, five Palestinian ministries are involved with 
the settlement issue; the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Housing, the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Public works, the Ministry of Justice, and the 
Ministry of Local Governorate. In each ministry you will hear the same criticism of 
a low level of co-operation and co-ordination. 
4.6 Settlements and the final agreement 
The Israeli settlements represent the Israeli will to remain permanently on 
Palestinian soil. Without the existence of the settlements the Israeli military 
presence would represent an `occupying army'. That situation would weaken Israel 
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in the final status negotiations. The Israeli settlements strengthen the Israeli 
negotiators in their final status negotiations to try and achieve their goal of 
controlling the required areas. On the Palestinian side the presence of the 
settlements is, therefore, the primary obstacle to their political and legal aspirations. 
In the Mawasi Area a Palestinian replied that there are some settlements almost 
vacant in the region (section two). The question raised by the person from Mawasi 
Area is why Israel did not concede the vacant settlements to Palestinians? If Israel 
did so, it would give the Palestinian people an impression of the Israeli will of 
establishing peace with them. He noted if decades of Israeli settlement activities in 
the Mawasi Area attracted only several hundreds settlers in semi-vacant settlements 
again he asked why they do not concede these settlements. He noted that these 
settlements surrounded tens of thousands of Palestinians in a narrow and crowded 
corridor in Rafah and Khan Younis which is not more than five to seven kilometres 
wide and around ten kilometres long (Interviews, December1998-March 1999). The 
Palestinian General Director of Planning in the Ministry of Housing said that 
The only areas that the two cities of Rafah and Khan Younis can 
expand into and absorb the housing need of the high increase of the 
population is in the western side of the two cities. This means the 
area of the Mawasi (Abu Hameed interview, February 8,1999). 
During the Washington rounds 1991-1993, the main issue in the Palestinian-Israeli 
negotiations was that of settlements. The Palestinian delegation were against any 
kind of the Israeli settlement activities, such as; confiscation of land, construction 
work in the settlements, and creating new settlements. This issue formed the main 
obstacle to achieving any progress in the negotiations. Abdul Rahman Hamad, the 
Palestinian Minister of Housing, and the Palestinian delegate to the Washington 
rounds confirmed the Palestinian demand, but he added that the Palestinian 
delegation to Oslo was dealing with the settlement issue as one of the major issues 
of the negotiations, but it was not the first or the main one. This could represent the 
difference between the negotiations during the Washington rounds and the Oslo 
channel (Hamad interview. January 30,1999). 
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Land became the most important factor in the Israeli strategy during the post-Oslo 
Agreement. Israel was trying to retain its interests in any final agreement. The 
preparations towards the final agreement were based on the situation that existed in 
the Palestinian territories since the signing the Oslo Agreement. Israeli interests in 
the West Bank and Gaza-Strip are; security, settlements, Jerusalem, and water. To 
preserve these interests, Israel seeks to control land and avoid control by the 
Palestinians (www. finep. org/reports/v8n4. html). To retain these interests in the 
final agreement, Israel has to exercise control over some specific locations, 
especially on the West Bank. This will come about as a consequence of settlement 
activities in those areas. One Palestinian from Salfeet observed regarding Israeli 
activities in the post-Oslo Agreement that "every two-three months they (Israelis) 
are bulldozing a new road and constructing new houses". The meaning of Israeli 
control over some areas varies between the Labour Party and the Likud Party. 
Therefore, the settlement policy for both parties in the post-Oslo Agreement has 
similarities in some locations and variety in others. 
For Labour, the party demanded that there should be no return to the borders of 
June 1967, and it favoured control of three major areas in the West Bank; the 
Jordan Valley, Jerusalem, and the mobilisation of the `Green Line' to the east 
(www. finep. org/jan94. html). More than 300,000 Palestinians live in the `Greater 
Jerusalem' area, from Ramallah in the north to Bethlehem province, including East 
Jerusalem; this `Greater Jerusalem' is artificial (www. finep. org/reports/v3nl. html). 
Regarding the Labour Party notion of not returning to the pre-June 1967 War 
borders, a Palestinian University student noted that 
In this case there is no difference between the Labour and the Likud 
parties. Both are demanding the annexation of certain areas of 
Palestinian land. I believe that practically there is no difference 
between them in regard to acquiring land. The Labour Party is more 
sophisticated than the Likud Party in that they say one thing and do 
another in order to avoid international criticism. He asked the author 
what is the difference between what Labour party demand and the 
Netanyahu's final status map (see map 3.3). Both are looking to 
annex at least forty per cent of the West Bank (Interviews. 
December 1998-March 1999). 
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The above-mentioned areas are ones that the Labour Party is looking to control in 
any final agreement with Palestinians. Therefore, according to Labour's final 
demand, some Israeli settlements will be located under non-Israeli rule. It is worth 
noting how the Labour Party intends to deal with these settlements. Israel's Deputy 
Foreign Minister in the Labour government 1992-1996 and the Minister of Justice 
in Barak's government, Yossi Belin, said on November 10,1993 in regard to the 
solution of some settlements, 
It is clear that if there is a government that is speaking of the territorial 
compromises, there will be settlements lying outside ... those 
settlements outside the rule of Israel ... we will make every effort that 
there will not be a need, God forbid, to destroy them, but to enable their 
residents to choose whether to remain there under non-Israeli rule or to 
choose another path, but it will be their choice (www. fmep. org/ 
jan94. html). 
In this respect Shimon Peres also remarked "Just as Arab settlements exist in Israel 
under Jewish rule, there is no reason Israeli settlements should not remain intact 
under Arab rule" (Ha'aretz October 24,1993, cited in www. finep. org/jan94. html). 
Likud's stand has similarities and variations with Labour's. These similarities 
demand sovereignty over the above-mentioned three areas. The difference is that 
other additional areas should be included in Israeli rule of the West Bank in a final 
agreement. The leaders of the party are looking to govern additional areas, as is 
clear from the Netanyahu, Sharon, and Mordechai maps mentioned in chapter four. 
A great majority of settlements in the West Bank will come under Likud rule due to 
these maps. For Sharon none of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank will come 
under Palestinian rule. 
There is no doubt that the Israeli leadership in both main parties, Labour and Likud, 
through their settlement activities gave up the idea of the preservation of the what is 
known in Israeli ideology as the `Land of Israel'. Both believe in conceding some 
land to the Palestinians. The shared idea of both parties is that there can be no 
return to the borders of June 1967. Territorial concession is becoming a fact of 
Israeli policy. 
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Through Palestinian-Israeli negotiations between 1993-1998, Israel succeeded in 
changing the Palestinian goal for the implementation of the U. N. Security Council 
resolution 242 of total withdrawal from the Palestinian Occupied Territories into 
one of a phased withdrawal, or redeployment of military forces from different areas. 
A major Palestinian mistake in these agreements was that they failed to mention in 
the text at least an Israeli freeze on settlement activities. The result of the 
agreements was that the Israelis now propose a partition of the land with the PNA. 
They consider the land in occupied territories as disputed areas, not as occupied 
territories, hence this can be solved through partition. Therefore, Israeli proposals 
for the annexation of some areas to Israel, both Labour and Likud parties believe, is 
based on this concept. The classification of land in the West Bank in three areas, A, 
B, and C, coincides with the above Israeli concept (Hamad interview, January 30, 
1999). In Salffeet Town a Palestinian believes that peace can be accomplished, he 
stated 
There is no peace which can be achieved while Israel continues its 
settlement activities particularly in the West Bank. These activities 
are directly opposing the Palestinian demand of total Israeli 
withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza-strip. If Israel is 
concerned with achieving peace with the Palestinian people, it 
should return to the pre-June 1967 War borders. How can peace be 
in harmony with the action of occupying the land of others. Only 
through total Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza-strip 
will peace and security be accomplished. During three decades of 
occupation, Israel failed to achieve a comprehensive security for its 
citizens (Interviews, December I 998-March 1999). 
The situation in the Gaza-Strip differs from that of the West Bank. No Israeli 
official from Labour or Likud offered any proposal for the future of the Israeli 
settlements in the Gaza-Strip. It can be understood this that Israel is ready to 
concede all the Gaza-Strip as a nucleus for the emerging Palestinian State. Israeli 
settlement activities in the Gaza-Strip during the post-Oslo Agreement were 
somewhat neglected in relation to the activities in the West Bank. Neither Labour 
nor Likud concentrated their efforts on the construction of new housing units, or in 
bulldozing by-pass roads. On the one hand, this is due to a high-density Palestinian 
population in the strip, and on the other, to the lack of existing Israeli settlers. 
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Hamad believes that Israeli settlements in the Gaza-Strip have no hope of 
remaining there. The dense Palestinian population will automatically pressurise the 
daily life of settlers in the strip; the settlers' life which is already difficult will 
continue to be so. The conditions they are now living under are restricted and 
isolated. Their main concern is security. He added that Israel had not withdrawn 
from these settlements because they intend to use them as a pressure point for the 
final negotiations. Israel intends to exchange these settlements for the permanent 
presence of some settlements on the West Bank (Hamad interview, January 30, 
1999). Describing the life of the Israeli settlers in the Gaza-strip settlements as a 
'miserable'. A Palestinian from the Gaza-strip said that 
The settlers are living inside their fenced settlements and the fence 
of each settlement is electrified. When they move from their 
settlements to Israel, two Israeli military patrols will accompany 
them with their buses or private cars, one at the front and one at the 
back. They are always expecting military operations, suicide attacks, 
or at least stone throwers from Palestinians. I wonder how those 
settlers who are living in settlements can have eight or even fifty 
settlers socialised. Their life is miserable and they made our life 
miserable too because their settlements and its security zone occupy 
thirty per cent of the land of the Gaza-strip. All of the land of the 
Gaza-strip is not enough for its original inhabitants (Interviews, 
December 1998-March 1999). 
Two opinion polls were conducted among Israeli settlers, one in December 1995 
and the second in June 1997, by the Centre for Palestine Research and Studies in 
cooperation with the Pessa Centre for Strategic Studies/Bar Elan University-Tel 
Aviv. The first survey was carried out during the Labour government, and the 
second during the Likud government. 38.7 per cent of the settlers in the first poll 
believed that the peace process will lead to a Palestinian independent state within 5- 
10 years to, while this percentage decreased to 30.1 in the second poll. In December 
1995,22.3 per cent believed that the great majority of Israeli settlements in the 
West Bank and Gaza-Strip would be removed, while in the second poll the 
percentage decreased sharply to 6.7 per cent. The readiness of Israeli settlers to sell 
their homes to Palestinians in return for a reasonable price was 15.3 per cent and 
12.8 per cent respectively. These polls indicate that the settlers had become more 
extremist under the Likud government and that their morale had increased during 
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this period. The freeze of the peace process under Likud with its active settlement 
policy made them more confident about their future (A poll by the Centre for 
Palestine Research and Studies, December 1995; and a poll by the Centre for 
Palestine Research and Studies, July 1997). 
One of the Palestinian farmers from Salfeet the Author met stated: 
According to my knowledge of the settlers of Tapuach (300 settlers), 
they will not accept the selling of their homes in the settlement, and 
they will even reject any compensation if their settlement is evacuated 
in any peace deal between the PLO and Israeli governments. These 
settlers are very fanatical and extremist, they belong to the most racist 
group in Israeli society (Kahana Hai). It is possible that these settlers 
will use military means against the Israeli army in any peace deal that 
may lead to the evacuation of their settlement ... 
in Ariel there are 
settlers who will accept compensation, even though some of them had 
settled in Ariel following evacuation from their settlements in Yameet 
(Sinai). They had accepted compensation in the past, and I think they 
will accept any future compensation (Interviews, December1998-March 
1999). 
A poll conducted in 1995 showed that two per cent of settlers believe in the use of 
military arms against the Israeli army if the army accepts a political order to 
evacuate settlements by force (A poll by Centre for Palestine Research and Studies, 
December, 1995). Palestinians believe that if Israel conducted a withdrawal from 
certain settlements, there would been no noticeable resistance from the settlers side. 
The settlers know well that the Israeli army is the sole protector for them and 
without the presence of the Israeli army they will not stay an additional day. 
A Palestinian worker in Ariel settlement told me that 
He knows of some settlers who bought houses in the settlements only to 
obtain compensation. They are convinced that one day via the 
Palestinian-Israeli peace process, Ariel will be evacuated, thereafter, 
they will receive very reasonable compensation (Interviews. 
December 1998-March 1999). 
Israel compensated each settler of the Sinai settlements with $0,000 as a result of 
the Camp David Accord (Hussein, 1993,49). 
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4.7 The implementation of the Israeli redeployment over the 
settlements 
An official U. S. report, issued in February 1997, shows that 26 per cent of housing 
units on the West Bank are vacant. The report mentions that there are 41,000 units 
on the West Bank, 31,060 of these are inhabited. In the Gaza-Strip, 56 per cent of 
housing units are vacant. There are 2,300 units in settlements on the Gaza-Strip: 
1,200 are vacant (Baba, 1997c, 2). The question arises; if there are more than 
10,000 units vacant in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip, why are Israeli governments, 
both Labour and Likud, engaged in the building of thousands of new units in 
Palestinian territories? If there are large numbers of vacant units, why do Israelis 
continue to say that building in the settlements is merely to meet the natural growth 
of the settlements? More than 10,000 vacant units means that more than 40,000 
settlers could settle in these units, if we take the number of settlers in the 
Palestinian territories as 160,000. The above mentioned 40,000 represent 25 per 
cent of the settlers. The Israeli excuse is that construction in the settlements is 
merely for assimilation of natural growth in the existing settlements, but the fact is 
there is no community in the world that has a natural growth of 25 per cent per 
annum. Therefore, we can conclude that building in the settlements is not a matter 
of housing need, rather it has a political dimension. These realities, created during 
the interim period of the post-Oslo Agreement, are related to final status 
negotiations. This reveals the Israeli intention to annex some parts of the 
Palestinian territories, particularly on the West Bank. Israel's acceleration in 
building new units in the settlements is to show that not only Palestinians are living 
in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. There are also large numbers of Israeli civilians 
present in the same area and Israel is attempting to show itself as protector of this 
civilian population, and not as an occupation power. There is no doubt that the 
settlement activities, particularly in the West Bank, are of a political nature. An old 
man from Salfeet said that 
All the Israeli settlers are equipped with machine guns. and I do not 
see any difference between the Israeli army and settlers. The only 
difference I see is their clothes. The army are wearing the khaki 
uniform while the settlers wý, wear civilian clothes (Interviews. 
December1998-March 1999). 
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According to the Israeli-Palestinian agreements signed in 1993.1994, and 1995 the 
PNA will receive more control over the land in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. 
Some settlements will be enclaves surrounded by a Palestinian controlled area, 
which is what has happened to Israeli settlements in the Gaza-Strip 
(www. fmep. org/reports/ v8n4. html). For example: Netzarim, an Israeli community 
situated to the south of Gaza city and to the north of a group of high-density 
populated Palestinian refugee camps, is a solitary settlement. The Gaza-Jericho 
First Agreement left this settlement isolated. Other settlements in the Gaza-Strip are 
in the same situation, such as Mawasi settlements and Kefar Darom. If violence 
between Palestinians and Israelis breaks out in the Gaza-Strip it will result in much 
bloodshed. 
A complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from 13 per cent of the West Bank, 
according to the Wye River Memorandum signed in November 1998, would leave 
15 Israeli settlements on the West Bank surrounded by Palestinian-controlled land 
(www. cnn. com/ WORLD/meast/ 9907/27/barak. arafat. 03/). It is clear then why the 
PNA should be concerned about the implementation of this memorandum, and the 
Israelis, both Labour and Likud, are procrastinating over its implementation. 
Israelis continue to avoid such conditions. Regarding the situation that a further 
Israeli redeployment will leave certain settlements isolated, a peasant replied "why 
then are the Palestinian villages and towns isolated. Is it allowed for Israelis to 
surround us and isolate us in tens of cantons while they will not be surrounded by 
Palestinian populated areas". The peasant did not answer the question of what he 
would do if the settlement near to him was surrounded and isolated; he just said 
"better for them to leave" (Interviews, December1998-March 1999). 
Despite the agreements with Palestinians, Israel did not concede the idea of a total 
withdrawal, particularly from the West Bank. Israel's ambition is to have security 
rule and economic domination (this will be discussed in detail in the next chapter) 
on the West Bank. The classification of land on the West Bank into categories will 
pave the way for this aspiration. Israel believes that Palestinian sovereignty over 
their entity should be faulty. This defective sovereignty would be maintained 
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through what is known as zones A, B, and C. The creation of these land categories 
would be imposed and represent a fait accompli that would remain for a very long 
period. Over time Palestinians would accept this as fact, and the Israeli target would 
be achieved. al-Ahmed rejected this Israeli ambition and added: In this way of 
thinking peace would not see life. This solution should take into consideration the 
Palestinian political and legal aspirations" (al-Ahmed interview, November 2, 
1998). 
4.8 Palestinians-Settlers Relations during the Post-Oslo Agreement 
The Palestinian-settler relationship is one of enmity rather than amity. There is no 
doubt that the Palestinians suffered because of the settlers. They believe that settler 
existence in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip is at the expense of Palestinians, who 
have lost their agricultural land (their main income resource) to the benefit of the 
settlers. Palestinian cities, towns, and villages were unable to expand naturally due 
to the presence of Israeli settlements (Interviews, December1998-March 1999). 
A villager from Salfeet explained that his olives trees were burned three times 
during the post-Oslo Agreement by settlers from Ariel" (Interviews, 
December 1998-March 1999). The aggressive attitude of settlers towards 
Palestinians during the post-Oslo Agreement under Labour was the same as during 
the pre-Oslo Agreement. Under Likud, settlers became more hostile; the uprooting 
of trees increased, the burning of trees also increased, and trouble caused to 
peasants during their daily work also increased. 
A Palestinian peasant from El-Khana Valley said: 
After the demolishing of my home (the writer saw the wreck of the 
house) by the Israeli government, the settlers turn came ... 
Emanuel 
settlement is on the top of this mountain. What I see of them is their 
sewage which falls from the settlement to the water source which 
passes behind my farm. This water source is used to irrigate my farm. 
The water source became polluted, and it seriously affected my citrus 
farm 
... settlers always 
impede our ways and disturb our life 
(Interviews. December 1998-March 1999). 
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Another peasant assured me that the settlers attacked his land many times and they 
repeatedly uprooted his olive trees on his farm. The last settler's attack took place 
in mid 1998 where they uprooted more than thirty olive trees near to the fence of 
their settlement. The Peasant said "their plea was that these trees located near the 
fence would affect the security surveillance of the settlement". The peasant once 
was punished by the settlers. He confirmed that this happened under the eyes of the 
Israeli army (Interviews, December1998-March 1999). 
The possibility of a co-existence between the Palestinians and the Israeli settlers 
will be very difficult. Israeli settler dealings with Palestinians is based on 
superiority. This type of relation cannot be accepted by Palestinians. Many believe 
that co-existence with settlers is possible only if settlers are rehabilitated to accept 
the presence of Palestinians as a people with at least human rights. 
Under any circumstances it is impossible to co-exist with the 
settlers, I will not accept them in the Palestinian state. They have to 
evacuate the settlements and go back to Israel. Those people will not 
understand the meaning of co-existence. They used to consider 
themselves superior to others. They believe that this land is their 
land, and we have to leave it. In late 1970's one of the pioneers of 
Ariel settlers came to my home and visited me, she tried to convince 
me of her right in Ariel and the West Bank (Interviews, 
December 1998-March 1999). 
Another Palestinian confirmed that he is rejecting the scenario of accepting them as 
Palestinian citizens under Palestinian law. He argued that If settlers reject this plan 
why should I accept it". But another peasant said that 
If they accept to be equal Palestinian citizens under the Palestinian 
law not the Israeli one and that their settlements will be occupied by 
Palestinians, and not only for settlers, I will accept this type of co- 
existence. This is of course after the returning of the expropriated 
land to its original owners (Interviews, Decemberl998-March 1999). 
Regarding compensation to be given to Palestinians in return for their land that was 
confiscated for settlement establishment and expansion a Palestinian from Mawasi 
Area said "I am not ready to take any compensation in return for my land. I want 
my land, and this is my right" this peasant considered that the people who sold their 
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land to Jews were traitors to the Palestinian people and should be killed 
(Interviews, Decemberl998-March 1999). 
4.9 The Settlements and Peace 
For Palestinians, peace and settlement are not incompatible. In Salfeet the author 
did not meet a single Palestinian who believed that a settlement policy could co- 
exist with a just and comprehensive peace. As a farmer from Salfeet stated, 
What is the meaning of peace? Is it to uproot the trees? Is it to burn the 
trees? Is it to confiscate more agricultural land? Is it to construct new 
empty dwellings? Is it to put more than a million Palestinians in the 
Gaza-Strip with over 70 per cent of the land, and only 5,000 settlers 
with over 30 per cent? If I uproot any tree in the settlement they will 
shoot me, but when they uproot our trees, nobody cares. Is this the 
meaning of peace? How can those people ask for peace? How can peace 
be achieved whilst our land is confiscated? How can peace be preserved 
when Israelis are not willing to meet the basic requirements for peace? 
Peace in my opinion can only be preserved when Israel returns to the 
borders of 1967. A dual state is the only solution. I want Palestinian 
control over our land (Interviews December1998-March 1999). 
Another Palestinian explained that 
Israel is prohibiting us from constructing new houses outside the 
Salfeet plan. The Israeli excuse is that the erecting of houses on 
agricultural areas is prohibited, but if you look at all settlements in 
the Salfeet District you will find they are built on our agricultural 
land (Interviews, Decemberl998-March 1999). 
What applies for Jews does not apply for Palestinians, double standards govern 
Israeli policy in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. Building for the Palestinians in this 
area is prohibited. Palestinians can only build inside the town plan, and the 
boundary for Salfeet has not expanded since 1967. A youth said: 
Under such conditions achieving peace is impossible, Netanyahu 
was always saying that he wants to make peace. How could peace be 
achieved whilst the land of the Palestinians is confiscated? How can 
peace be achieved if the Israelis and settlers are not behaving in a 
peaceful way towards us. Peace in my opinion could only be 
accomplished when Israel returns to the borders of 1967. Let settlers 
return to Israel where there is sufficient land for 200.000 of them. 
Israelis took the paradise of Palestine (Coastal Area). why do they 
not leave the land of the West Bank and Gaza-strip to us. This the 
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only way to sustain peace with Israelis (Interviews, December1998- 
March 1999). 
Peace means giving consideration to the Palestinian future. This future will be 
based on the establishment of the Palestinian independent state. How can such a 
state be formed in the presence of the classification of land in the West Bank and 
Gaza-strip. The classification of land is the worst of the Palestinian-Israeli 
agreements. What Israelis tried to establish during the Palestinian-Israeli 
negotiations regarding the Israeli further redeployment from the West Bank is the 
creation of a new area named Area D. The irony of the Netanyahu proposal of Area 
B+ is that the presence of three types of areas A, B, and C is not sufficient for this 
government. The Palestinian University student questioned what type of peace can 
be achieved with four categories of Palestinian land (Interviews, December1998- 
March 1999). 
A real peace between Palestinians and Israelis has not yet been achieved. The 
conflict between both still exists, the political process has merely changed the form 
and mechanisms of the conflict. This conflict will remain in existence for a long 
period. The existence of Israeli settlements and military forces in Palestinian 
Occupied Territories are a form of occupation. Compatibility between this 
occupation and peace is impossible. The Palestinian Minister of Public Works 
continued by saying that Israel has to choose one of these two terms (al-Ahmed 
interview, November 2,1998). 
Calling to halt Israeli settlement would give the Palestinians some hope of 
establishing their own independent state. In that case a reasonable solution could be 
maintained. Without this halting, no solution would be successful. Land means 
sovereignty, water resources. international-independent access, and a bright future. 
Abu Medain noted that the PNA did exploit the Israeli concept of a political 
settlement. Rabin had classified the settlements into political and security (see 
chapter four), and according to him, he would compromise the political ones for a 
peace deal. The PLO had entered into a peace deal through the Oslo Agreement, but 
wily had not the PLO asked Israel to withdraw from these settlements in its deal 
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with Israel? He wondered why did settlements like Kfar Darom and Netzarim in the 
Gaza-Strip remain? These provide no benefit to Israel. He added that the removal of 
140 extremist religious settlers from the city centre in Hebron was possible only 
after the Hebron massacre (al-Haram al-Ibrahimi Massacre). After the signing of 
the Oslo Agreement, the international community and even many Israelis would 
have accepted this demand (Abu Medain interview, February, 17,1999). 
Throughout the interview a Palestinian member of the Public Committee for 
Resisting Settlement maintained that Israeli settlement activities had increased over 
the last five years (1994-1999) more than in any other period prior to the Oslo 
Agreement. Since the Likud Party had assumed power Israeli settlement activities 
had reached their peak. By-pass roads are more dangerous for the Palestinian future. 
They surround Palestinian villages, towns, and cities, in contrast to the past when 
the settlements were surrounded by Palestinians. These roads create Palestinian 
ghettos in their own land. The conditions of these roads which serve the settlers on 
the West Bank are better than those serving the Palestinians. They are also longer 
than Palestinian roads (Interviews, Decemberl998-March 1999). 
But this does not mean that the Israeli settlement activities were negatively affected 
under the Labour government. These activities increased noticeably and went 
through a sophisticated plan (Interviews, December 1998-March 1999). The 
Foundation of the Middle East Peace is based in Washington and is a specialist in 
monitoring Israeli settlement activities in the Palestinian Occupied Territories 
noted: 
The only success of the Rabin government, regarding the settlement 
issue, is the return of the dynamics of Jewish settlement in the 
occupied territories to a situation that prevailed before the beginning 
of the 1990 housing boom. Settlers have emerged from the Rabin 
years more confident of Israel's permanent control over the 
territories than they might have if Likud had retained power 
(www. fmep. org/ report/v3nl. html). 
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All the actions were undertaken by Rabin are less indicators of a new era of drying 
out' settlements than a rationalisation of overly ambitious Likud settlement plans 
(www. fmep. org/jul93. html). 
Talab al-Saneh (Arab member of the Israeli parliament) does not see any 
fundamental difference between Israeli political parties regarding the settlement 
issue. He believes that all parties want control over the land of the West Bank and 
Gaza-Strip. The fundamental difference he believes, between Labour and Likud is 
that Labour does not want to create a dual-nation state through annexation of the 
West Bank, because in that case two and a half million Palestinians would become 
citizens of the state of Israel. Therefore, the Labour government tried to find a 
formula that would isolate both peoples and decrease the level of conflict, but at the 
same time control more land (al-Saneh, 1995,40). The difference between the two 
parties is that the Likud party proposes a unification of the `Land of Israel', whilst 
the Labour Party proposes unification of the Jewish people. 
Likud government intentions for settlement expansion during the coming four years 
do not exceed Labour's settlement programme. Dan Meridor, Minister of Finance 
for Netanyahu's government, told the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharanot on July 
19,1996 how the Likud government regarded to the previous Labour government 
of 1992-1996, 
We have to praise Yitzhak Rabin, may he rest in peace, and Shimon 
Peres who during the last four years raised the number of Jews in Judea 
and Samaria by 40 per cent. During their tenure, thousands of homes 
were built in Judea and Samaria (West Bank) and the number of Jews 
increased from 100,000 to 140,000 ... 
but we need not be thankful only 
to them. We should also praise the Israeli left which didn't utter a word 
about this for four years.... It is clear as can be that we will not do less 
in this regard [settlement construction] than the Labour Party. I have 
already told the American ambassador that he can rest easy about one 
thing--that Labour's policy of massive settlement will not change. 
Maybe we will do it a little differently.... But it is clear that if we are 
serious in our intention not to return to the 1967 lines, words alone will 
not suffice. Settlement is one of the things that determines the borders 
of the country. Therefore. if we stop settlement in one place or another 
it means that we have surrendered that place.... but it is necessary to 
continue the settlement enterprise in Judea and Samaria in a sober and 
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controlled manner, and within our economic limitations. There are 
communities which for sure were dried out in recent years, and that will 
certainly be rectified (www. finep. org/sep96. html). 
Netanyahu told Israeli television in July 12,1996 
The United States understands that there is a natural process of 
development of the Jewish settlements in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. I 
showed President Clinton and Congress the table demonstrating the 
expansion, the growth of the Jewish population in Judea, Samaria, and 
Gaza by 50 percent under the Labour government, not the Likud 
government. It is the outcome of natural growth. ... 
Natural growth 
within the framework of the municipal boundaries of the existing 
settlements is not something that appears to be in dispute ... regarding 
new settlements, we will have to discuss in the cabinet and decide how 
and when to do it. We have not yet decided. The areas of agreement up 
to now have in fact permitted a 50 percent natural growth of the Jewish 
population in Judea and Samaria, which is not unimportant (Israeli T. V. 
July 12 1996 cited in www. fmep. org/sep96. html). 
Pinchas Wallerstein, chairman of the Council for Jewish Settlements in Judea, 
Samaria, and the West Bank (Yesha), noted in mid-1996: 
There is no practical need to establish new settlements, but that the 
ideological imperative to undertake such a policy cannot be disregarded 
... 
it is necessary to thicken and to strengthen that which already exists 
... the growth of settlements will continue 
in much the same way as it 
has during the last four years (Labour government) in communities 
close to the metropolitan areas of Israel, places like Adam near 
Jerusalem, and Na'ale and Ofarim near the Green Line (www. fmep. org/ 
sep96. html). 
A Palestinian from Salfeet confirmed that the Israelis do not need to announce their 
plans of establishing new settlements. Israel under both Labour and Likud 
governments established new settlements. The Israelis announce that new dwellings 
will be build in this settlement. When they start building, it will become clear that 
the actual dwellings are not inside the boundary of the settlement. After a few 
months the number of these dwellings will increase slowly or quickly while a new 
name will be given to the location. Thus a new settlement will come into existence 
(Interviews, December 1998-March 1999). 
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4.10 Conclusion 
The two case studies used in this chapter demonstrated that the Israeli policy in the 
West Bank and Gaza-Strip had not change during the `peace period' (1993-1999) 
from that 1967-1993. The chapter showed that Palestinians who are living close to 
settlement (Salfeet Province and the Mawasi Area) did not see the fruits of peace. 
In fact, more land was confiscated and several Israeli attempts to attack the 
Palestinian land took place. The signing of the peace agreement between both sides 
did not improve the socio-economic (see details of the Palestinian socio-economic 
conditions in the post-Oslo Agreement in chapter six) and the political conditions 
of Palestinians. The chapter showed that the Palestinian efforts to resist Israeli 
settlement activities in the post-Oslo Agreement period lacked a systematic 
approach and were fragmented between the PNA official institutions and the 
NGO's. Even the PNA itself did not have a cohesive policy of resistance. 
With regard to the Israeli settlers, they became even more aggressive because they 
were afraid of losing even more land, which would come under PNA control. This 
chapter proved that Palestinians-settlers relations worsened in the post-Oslo 
Agreement period and that in fact the Palestinians suffered more acutely as a result. 
During this period the settlers insisted even more strongly to both the Israeli 
governments (Labour and Likud) with equal force, that there was no possibility of 
making a political compromise with the Palestinians based on trading land for 
peace. Through their activities regarding the Oslo Agreement they confirmed that 
they would not accept the evacuation of any settlement under any circumstances. 
The Israeli settlement activities shaped Israeli policy for the final status Agreement 
strategy of not returning to the pre-1967 War borders. The construction of several 
important by-pass roads which divided the Palestinian territories into several 
cantons, were witness to Israeli intentions regarding the permanent status Accord. 
The Palestinian resistance against Israeli settlement activities increased the 
possibility of breaking out of another Intifada. The violence of September 1996 and 
May 2000 is proof that this is maybe an effective Palestinian alternative to peace. 
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Chapter Five: The Socio-Economic Impact of the Oslo 
Agreement Regarding Control of Land 
5.1 Introduction 
Palestinian optimism after the signing of the Oslo Agreement in 1993 was twofold; 
political and economic. This chapter deals with the economic issues in the post- 
Oslo Agreement. It aims to evaluate the Palestinian economic conditions as a result 
of the signing of the Oslo Agreement and Paris Protocol and how the division over 
controlling Palestinian land affected the Palestinian economy. The provisions of the 
Oslo Agreement for dividing the Palestinian territories into categories tried to make 
the Palestinian-Israeli economic agreement compatible with this division. Section 
two therefore deals with Palestinian hopes resulting from the peace agreement, both 
political and economic. The Paris Protocol dealt with the economic relations 
between Palestinians and Israel and these are examined in section three. 
Section four highlights the provision that the Palestinian economy should be 
characterised as a free market. This was the PNA's pledge before its people and 
donors but the Protocol prevented the Palestinian economy of becoming as a free 
economy. 
The Israeli measure which most seriously injured the growth and development of 
the Palestinian economy in the post-Oslo Agreement was the policy of closure. This 
is in addition to the spatial separation between the West Bank and Gaza-Strip and 
the isolation of the West Bank from East Jerusalem. Israel resorted to close both the 
West Bank and the Gaza-Strip from Israel and the world. The cities and villages of 
the West Bank were isolated according to the different ways of controlling the land 
agreed between Israel and the PNA as a result of the Oslo II Agreement. Section 
five explains to what extent the closure affected the Palestinian economy. 
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There is no doubt that the various ways of controlling land in the West Bank and 
Gaza-Strip and the controlling of the crossings that linked the Palestinian territories 
with the neighbouring countries and the world was a major factor in the 
improvement of the Palestinian economic sectors and this is examined in sections 
six-eight. 
Section nine deals with one of the most dangerous crises related to the prospects for 
economic development: water. The pre-Oslo Palestinians were the main losers in 
the region and this situation continued in the interim period. This section describes 
this and the position of water use in the pre-and post-Oslo Agreement. Palestinian 
expansion in the agricultural sector could not be isolated from an increase in the 
Palestinian water-quota. Here an increase in the quantity of water may be achieved 
if Palestinians managed their water resources, and this is related to control of land. 
There can be no control of water resources if there is no control over land. Section 
ten deals with the situation of the Palestinian agriculture during the water crisis. 
Reconstruction in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip was the target of the donors. The 
category of land determined the possibility of undertaking economic projects from 
the donor's side. This affected the Palestinian economy, particularly, the standard of 
living. Section eight deals with this standard of living. 
5.2 The Hope and the Reality 
The preamble to the Paris Protocol announced that Palestinians and Israelis shall 
co-operate in the economic field. This should be governed by the principles of 
mutual respect for each other's economic interests, reciprocity, equity, and fairness. 
Both sides also acknowledged that the Protocol lays the groundwork for 
strengthening the economic base of the Palestinian side and for exercising its right 
of economic decision-making in accordance with its own development plan and 
priorities (Preamble of the Paris Protocol). What happened in the post-Protocol 
period proved Israel's unwillingness to fulfill its commitments. 
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When the PNA began in May 1994, it inherited many problems from the Israeli 
occupation, especially in the economic sector. There were a high percentage of 
unemployment among Palestinians, a high ratio of poverty in the Palestinian 
territories, and a distorted economy. 
This economy was characterized as, first, a total economic subordination to the 
Israeli economy, because of the former dependence on exporting cheap Palestinian 
labour and importing commodities. Second, a considerable lack of Palestinian 
institutions, especially those that should be in charge of the economic 
reconstruction and administration of international foreign aid in the interim period. 
Third, the devastated Palestinian infrastructure, where no noticeable development 
has taken place since the Israeli occupation in 1967. Fourth, the destruction of the 
legal environment due to Israeli military orders, which governed the Palestinian 
economy during the Israeli occupation. Fifth, the weakness of the Palestinian 
productive base, where the industrial sector remained without any observable 
development. This sector remained as it was in 1967 when its contribution was 10 
per cent of real GDP (Abdulla, 1994,33: 34; UNCTAD, 1996,23: 24; Roy, 1999, 
66). 
The reform of the economy required two immediate actions, i. e. the building of new 
institutions for the newly born government administration, including the 
rejuvenation of existing institutions, and dealing with high unemployment 
(UNCTAD, 1996,11). 
Palestinians hoped that a process of strategic planning could be initiated in the West 
Bank and Gaza-Strip. But this could not be implemented on the ground because of 
the following constraints. Firstly, the continuation of the Israeli occupation of the 
greater land of the Palestinian territories with control over natural resources such as 
water and land; secondly, Palestinian economic dependency on Israel due to three 
decades of occupation; thirdly, the fragmentation of the PNA areas; finally. 
Palestinian dependency on international assistance in order to finance investment 
projects (Baidoun, 1998.6). 
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5.3 The Paris Protocol 
In April 29,1994, in Paris, the PLO and Israeli economic teams drafted a Protocol 
on Economic Relations, known as the Paris Protocol (1). This Protocol was 
incorporated into an Agreement on The Gaza-Strip and The Jericho area which was 
signed in Cairo on May 4,1994, and was included in Annex IV of the agreement. 
When the PLO and Israel signed the Oslo II agreement in Washington DC on 
September 28,1995, the Protocol was incorporated in Annex V. Under Annex V 
the Protocol contained the same number of articles as was signed in Paris. There 
could be no change to the Protocol, apart from an expansion of the PNA's 
economic responsibilities in areas coming under its control as a result of the 
implementation of the first stage of Israeli military redeployment, according to the 
Oslo II Agreement. 
The Protocol defined Palestinian-Israeli economic relations during the Interim 
period of Palestinian self-autonomy. It was a natural result of the political 
agreement (Declaration of Principles or Oslo Agreement) between both sides. 
Because the Oslo Agreement did not give the Palestinian people full political 
independence, the Paris Protocol also deprived them of economic independence. 
This Protocol had both positive and negative aspects. Some Palestinian economic 
rights were reclaimed through it, whereas other rights remained in the hands of 
Israelis (Awartani, 1994a, 7). During the interim period, the Protocol affected the 
Palestinian economy, and played an important role in directing and administering 
both the growth and collapse of the Palestinian economic sectors. 
This Protocol allowed Palestinians to re-inforce their economic base and exercise 
decisions over economic issues. It also allowed them to export freely their products 
to Israel, especially industrial and agricultural products (with limitations on some 
agricultural products). The Palestinians had the opportunity to adjust the balance of 
trade with Israel, which had been working to Israel's advantage during pre-Paris 
Protocol period (Makhool. 1994,11: 14). In the interim period the balance of trade 
continued between the West Bank. Gaza-Strip and Israel. to work in Israel's 
230 
advantage. Table 6.1 shows the deficit in the balance of trade between the two sides 
according to the direction of movement of trucks between both sides. 
According to the Al, A2 lists, presented in the Paris Protocol, Palestinians have the 
opportunity to import goods from Arab and Islamic states, particularly from Egypt 
and Jordan. Therefore, they will be able to import in quantities agreed upon by both 
sides to meet Palestinian market needs. The import policy of the PNA for the Al, 
A2, and B lists (list B could not be imported from the Arab or Islamic states) will 
include independently-determined and changeable customs rates, purchase tax, 
levies, excise, and other charges (Paris Protocol, article III). This could be an 
important step towards diversification of Palestinian trade flows and to the 
reintegration of a Palestinian economy in a wider regional context than that which it 
was deprived of during three decades of occupation. 
Table 5.1 
Estimates of monthly WBGS truckload commodities exports and imports of 
commodities through monitored commercial crossings, second half of 1997 
Month Monthly Exported 
Truckloads 
Monthly Imported 
Truckloads 
July 2,103 14,029 
August 907 8,758 
September 1,504 14,663 
October 1,313 12,835 
November 2,884 15,113 
December 3,941 16,304 
Source: U. N., 1998,5; 
The PNA will use Israeli customs rates, purchase tax, levies, excise, and other 
charges for all goods not specified or mentioned in the three lists, and for the 
quantities of goods of the above mentioned three lists that exceed Palestinian 
market needs. Experts of a sub-committee of the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) 
would determine the quantities of Palestinian market needs of the items listed in the 
Al. A2. and B lists ((Paris Protocol. article III). 
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If Israel changed the customs rate, purchase tax, levies, excise, and other charges, 
the PNA should adjust their rates accordingly. In this matter the Palestinian 
economy is at the mercy of the Israeli economy, therefore this change may injure 
some sectors of the Palestinian economy. 
The goods in the Al, A2, and B lists amount to around 500 items. In the pre-Oslo 
Agreement, all the goods mentioned were imported from Israel or from abroad 
(except those Arab and Islamic states that had no diplomatic relations with Israel). 
The importers were Israeli agencies. The Protocol gave Palestinians the right to 
import all their needs without Israeli mediation as was the position in the pre- 
Protocol period. This process will decrease the price of commodities and will open 
up opportunities for Palestinians to enter and benefit from competition in the 
international markets (Makhool, 1994,14: 17; Abdulla, 1994,29). 
The Protocol gave Palestinians the right to export their products without Israeli 
obstacles or mediation. Israeli controlled Palestinian foreign trade in the pre-Paris 
Protocol, and all such trade was passed through Israeli companies and trade 
agencies (Abdulla, 1994,29). In the pre-Oslo Agreement direct international trade 
with the West Bank and Gaza-Strip was $56 million through 60 merchants. This 
trade rose to $700 million in 1997 through 1,600 merchants (Helelah, 1997,45). 
The Protocol set up the Palestinian-Israeli Joint Economic Committee (JEC). Its 
function is to follow up the implementation of the Paris Protocol, and to solve 
problems relating to the protocol that may arise from time to time. Each party may 
request a review by the JEC of any issue relating to the protocol. The committee 
reaches its decisions through consensus (Article II). However within the first four 
years of the interim period no evaluation regarding provisions of the Protocol had 
occurred. Israel had rejected repeated Palestinian requests to negotiate any revision 
(Shaheen interview, August 18.1998). Until May 1999, no such review took place. 
Man}, cases relating to the Palestinian economy will be decided through the JEC. 
because Israel has a right to share in any of its decisions and can reject any 
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Palestinian proposal. Of course, the committee will not discuss or deal with any 
Israeli economic issue occurring in Israel, but will deal only with issues relating to 
the Palestinian economy. This means that in the post-Oslo Agreement Israel will 
continue to interference in the Palestinian economy. This Israeli intervention 
ensures domination over the Palestinian economy, enabling them to run it as 
subordinate to its own economy. There is no doubt that the PNA wants to decrease 
Palestinian economic subordination to a minimum. The Palestinian Minister of 
Trade and Economy stated that we are looking forward to the day when this 
subordination ends and we are able to link our economy with our natural links; the 
Arab and Islamic states (al-Masri interview, September 10,1998). 
Because of the Protocol, the PNA can inaugurate a Palestinian Monetary Authority 
(PMA), which will have the power and responsibility for the regulation and 
implementation of monetary policies, and will act as the Palestinian official 
economic and financial advisor (Paris Protocol, article IV). The function of the 
PMA is the same as that of any central bank in any independent state, except for the 
right of issuing a national currency. The Protocol confirmed the use of Israeli 
currency (New Shekel) in the PNA's territories as also the U. S. and Jordanian 
currencies (UNCTAD, 1996,13; Makhool, 1994,17). Here changes in the value of 
Israeli currency will affect the Palestinian economy, which is what happened in 
1998 when Israel decided to devalue its New Shekel by around 20 per cent. The 
Palestinian economy suffered from this decision and the Palestinian standard of 
living was badly affected. In this instance the Palestinian people will pay the price 
for any fault in Israeli monetary policy. 
The PNA has the right to determine and regulate independently its own tax policy 
in matters of direct taxation, including income tax on individuals and corporations, 
property taxes, municipal taxes and fees. The PNA adopted the same standards for 
collecting these taxes that were used in the pre-Oslo period. 
Israel will transfer to the PNA a sum of 75 per cent of the income tax collected 
from Palestinians employed in Israel. and the full amount of income tax collected 
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from Palestinians employed in Israeli settlements (Paris Protocol, article V). Here 
the PNA showed that the position of the Israeli settlements was different from that 
of Israeli cities. 
The tax system in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip regarding direct tax rates on 
personal incomes and corporate profits is identical to that in Israel. This is not 
suitable for the Palestinian economy. There is a fundamental disparity between the 
two economies with regard to size, structure, and stages of development. Therefore, 
the PNA should amend the Palestinian direct tax system to reflect its economic 
character. During the transitional period, the PNA failed to bring about any real 
change in this matter, despite many Palestinian key economic officials wanting a 
decrease in tax on personal income. 
As for indirect taxes on local production, Palestinian and Israeli tax administrations 
will levy and collect VAT and purchase tax, as well as any other indirect taxes in 
their respective areas. The purchase tax rate for both sides will be identical as 
regards locally produced and imported goods (the Israeli rate would be used), so 
that the Palestinian VAT rate should not be 2 per cent less than the Israeli rate (The 
Israeli VAT is 17 per cent). This means that Palestinian VAT should not be less 
than 15 per cent (Paris Protocol, article VI). 
Therefore, the PNA would be deprived of support for some of its economic sectors, 
particularly the industrial sector. The provision seems beneficial in that both sides 
will use the same rate of tax on local production, so it will not prejudice either 
party. But we should bear in mind that the Palestinian industrial sector was 
damaged during the Israeli occupation and deprived of any kind of support, in 
contrast to the Israeli industrial sector which received many forms of support for 
decades. This will raise the issue of the Palestinian right to compensation due to 
Israeli damage done to all the Palestinian economic sectors during the occupation 
period. 
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Palestinian industrial goods would be unable to compete with Israeli industrial 
goods, when there is free flow of such items from one party to the other. Unfair 
competition would occur between Israel and the Palestinian territories. This 
situation may indirectly encourage the Palestinian industrial sector to develop 
without depending on governmental support such as the lowering of some industrial 
taxes. The Palestinian industrial sector could have other forms of support from the 
PNA, such as bank loans, a drop in direct taxes, opening new markets especially in 
the Arab and Islamic states, and benefiting from PNA economic agreements with 
the U. S. and European Union. 
The Palestinian Under-Secretary for the Ministry of Finance described the Paris 
Protocol in relation to foreign trade as a mixture of two economic models; a 
customs union and a free trade zone. Alawna called it "a free customs union zone". 
Foreign trade, as the Protocol specifies, is not to become a customs union, nor a 
free trade zone. The Protocol guaranteed the PNA an independent customs policy 
on the number and quantities of goods on the one hand, but on the other the 
Palestinian customs rate should be identical to the Israeli one on the number and 
quantities of other goods which exceed Palestinian needs (the three lists). Alawna 
believes that the Protocol is not an agreement between two independent states, the 
Protocol is a contractual agreement between the PLO and Israel for five years 
(Alawna, 1994,41: 43). 
Makhool believes that the Paris Protocol formed a positive and qualitative move for 
the Palestinian economy. The PNA will determine the character of the Palestinian 
economy for the first time in modern Palestinian history. The Palestinians 
themselves will run their economic structure. But he does not ignore the negative 
aspects of the Protocol (Makhool, 1994,24). Palestinian economists believe the 
Protocol has negative and positive points (Awartani, 1994a, 7: 8). 
Among the negative, the protocol did not address the issue of natural resources. 
There will be no change in sovereignty over land, water, and settlements in the 
interim period. Prevailing Israeli restrictions on the Palestinian control over land 
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and water thus remain in place. Control of water resources in the West Bank and 
Gaza-Strip will continue to constrain development of modern Palestinian 
agriculture (UNCTAD, 1996,20). Seventy per cent of the West Bank is outside the 
PNA's jurisdiction and entirly under Israeli control. This situation severely affects 
expansion of the Palestinian agricultural and industrial sectors. 
The protocol did not place any obstacles in the way of Israeli settlers in introducing 
new manufacturing in the settlements (Abdulla 2,1994,29). A settlement like 
Barkan in Salfeet Province, which is considered the biggest industrial settlement in 
the Palestinian territories, continues to expand. It signs its products "Made in 
Israel". 
Therefore, these products are considered to be Israeli and all kinds of taxes go to 
Israel, despite the fact that the industrial production is located in the Palestinian 
territories. The settlement's products enter the Palestinian market easily, 
particularly in the West Bank, where they escape Palestinian taxation on Israeli 
products, as per the Paris Protocol. 
It is difficult for the PNA to follow products which are manufactured on the West 
Bank and move about within the West Bank. The PNA could take effective steps to 
eliminate the flow of the settlement products in the Gaza-Strip, whereas it could not 
in the West Bank. This is due to the location of the settlements in the Gaza-Strip 
where all are separated from Palestinian society. The situation in the West Bank is 
different as the settlements are spreading everywhere. In some places such as Azon 
Atmeh in Salfeet Province there is no visible border between the houses of the 
settlement and the Palestinian houses (al-Escafee interview, September 4,1998). 
5.4 The Character of the Palestinian Economy 
The PLO and the PNA adopted a strategy of a Palestinian free market economy. 
Arafat's economic adviser, confirmed that the strategy of the PLO was to establish 
a free market economy. This has been presented and stressed on many occasions, 
including in the document of the declaration of independence 1988. which was 
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made five years prior to signing of the Oslo Agreement (Salam, 1998,46). When 
Arafat formed his second and third governments in 1996 and 1998. he pledged 
before the Palestinian Legislative Council that the Palestinian economy would be a 
free economy without state interference. He declared that the PNA would give the 
private sector the opportunity to invest in Palestinian economic development and to 
lead it (Arafat cited in al-Majlis al-Tashreei, 1998,5). 
However, Salam believes that the Palestinian economy of the post-Oslo Agreement. 
and particularly since the PNA was established in mid 1994, is not a free economy. 
rather is it a constrained economy due to the implementation of the Paris Protocol. 
To describe and define the Palestinian economy as a free economy in the post-Paris 
Protocol is unfair and unrealistic. Salam described the situation of the Palestinian 
economy thus: 
The core of the issue is that we (Palestinians), along with Jordanians 
and other parties, should be entitled to free exchange of all types of 
goods, as well as to determine the appropriate means of transportation. 
Upon examining our situation we discover that we have lists with 
limited types of goods, lists with limited quantities of goods, and 
predetermined import and exports procedures (according to the Paris 
Protocol). The limitations and restrictions extend to include limited 
days for imports, as well as limited numbers of allowed truckloads per 
day... the truck passes through 13 inspection points (Israeli) from the 
factory in Jordan until its destination in area A. A truck may stay from 
three minutes to two hours at each point (Salam, 1998,45). 
The Israeli policy of implementing the Paris Protocol did not characterize the 
Palestinian economy to be a free one. The atmosphere which Israel created in the 
post-Paris Protocol was not that of a free economy and this type of economy is not 
the economy which the PLO and the PNA planned to implement in the West Bank 
and Gaza-Strip. Without Palestinian sovereignty over the international crossings, 
the PNA are unable to run a free economy in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. The 
crossings are a vital element in the building a free economy. 
The Palestinian Under Secretary for the Ministry of Industry confirmed that the 
PNA does not direct the Palestinian industrial sector because it is private and this 
sector knows its interests. He confirmed that the ministry of industry has a right to 
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supervise and observe the performance of this private sector. It has the right to 
intervene when this sector appears to be working differently to the Palestinian 
industrial standard and specifications as laid down in Palestinian law. He believes 
that the economic role of the PNA is to help the private sector. He added that the 
PNA has to provide a vital infrastructure for economic development and sign 
agreements with other countries in order to open up new markets for the private 
sector, and to enact new and modern laws in order to encourage private sector 
business (Samara interview, January 15,1999). 
The PNA pledge in the presence of donor countries and the World Bank meeting in 
Paris was to halt all aspects of intervention in the Palestinian economy by the end of 
1998. The PNA interferes and monopolises in only two areas; petroleum and 
cement. Salam confirmed that these two areas are still being examined intensively 
and will be dealt with (Salam, 1998,49). Vital economic sectors of the Palestinian 
economy are in the hands of the private sector: banks, transportation, 
communication, agriculture, industry, energy, etc. 
The Minister of Justice explained that the PNA is carrying out two integrated 
programmes for administrative and institutional development. The World Bank and 
the IMF are financing these programmes. The two programmes belong to the most 
influential PNA ministries; Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Finance (Abu 
Medain interview, February 17,1999). 
It is well to remember that during three decades of occupation Israel manipulated 
commercial agencies and distributed them among selective merchants (Salam. 
1998,47). For example a few merchants monopolised petroleum during the Israeli 
occupation. The PNA want this sector to be free from monopoly; It needed at least 
30 merchants are interested in taking over this commodity. 
The PNA distribution of commercial agencies was different. It could be interpreted 
as PNA favouritism. There is no doubt that some PNA officials exploited their 
position in order to serve their own interests. However, corruption is not part of the 
238 
PNA general practice. Most criticism against corruption is coming from PNA 
institutions, such as the PLC, the cabinet, and the state inspector. 
5.5 Israeli Closure of the Palestinian Territories 
The U. N. Special Co-ordinator in the Palestinian Occupied Territories noted in 
1996 that the Palestinian economy had been in a state of depression since 1993 
except for some brief periods. The report argued that the cause of the economic 
depression was the Israeli closure of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. The Palestinian 
Ministry of Finance and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) expected that the 
real growth rates for GNP and GDP of the Palestinian economy for the year 1997 
would reach 8 and 5.5 per cent respectively. This could only be achieved if Israel 
did not impose a closure in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip (U. N., 1997a, I : iv). 
The closure not only affects the Palestinians. The U. N. Co-ordinator in the 
Occupied Territories believes that the greatest loss attendant on the Israeli closure is 
the separation of the two peoples (Palestinians and Israelis), because the West Bank 
and Gaza-Strip had been opened to Israel and vice versa since 1967. He argues that 
the closure and the separation blocked the people-to-people interaction that is 
necessary to sustain any durable peace in the long-term (U. N., 1997a, iv). 
Continuous separation of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip divided the Palestinian 
market into two areas. The market of both the West Bank and Gaza-Strip is already 
small, based on 3 million people. The dividing of this small market into two will 
undermine initiative and production development (al-Masri interview, September 
10,1998). The separation has also significantly affected the opportunity to 
exchange goods and human experts. Many agricultural products are cheap in the 
Gaza-Strip because they do not find an export outlet, owing to Israeli restrictions, 
simultaneously these products are very expensive in the West Bank. 
Al-Masri estimated the daily trade between the West Bank and Gaza-Strip in the 
post-Oslo Agreement only in thousands of $US, did not reach one million, whilst 
trade between these areas and Israel continued in millions of SUS. In 1997 the trade 
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between Israel and the West Bank reached around $US 2.5 billion (al-Masri 
interview, September 10,1998). Despite the political accord confirming the West 
Bank and Gaza-Strip as one territorial unit, and the economic agreement confirming 
free movement of agricultural and industrial goods between the West Bank and 
Gaza-Strip, trade between both Palestinian areas remained insignificant. The Israeli 
plea for separation rests on security requirements, but there is no doubt that this 
division also represents an economic target. 
In addition to these partitions Israel resorts to the imposition of a collective penalty 
against Palestinians, that of using the closure of Palestinian territories. The Israeli 
closure takes four shapes; first, the comprehensive closure of the West Bank and 
Gaza-Strip simultaneously from Israel, second the complete closure of the West 
Bank from Israel. Third, complete closure of the Gaza-Strip from Israel. Fourth, 
internal closure of the West Bank itself, where each city is closed off from the 
others. 
The quarterly report from the office of the special co-ordinator of the U. N. in the 
occupied territories estimated Palestinian losses from March 1993 to the end of 
1996 as a result of Israeli closures: 
Closures have reduced by over 20 per cent the total number of days 
during which normal economic interaction between Israel and the West 
Bank and Gaza-Strip could take place. The aggregate economic effect 
has been to reduce by about half the long-run real GNP growth rate 
after 1993 (2.5per cent) as compared to the period 1980-1992 (4.9 per 
cent). The resulting estimated cumulative losses in income-generating 
opportunities are estimated at $6,450 million for the period 1993-1996 
which, when distributed over the total number of calendar days, yields a 
loss of $4.4 million per day (U. N., 1997a, iii). 
The Palestinian Ministry of Labour estimated direct daily losses from the closure at 
$6 million (Report from the Palestinian Ministry of Labour in Palestinian Ministry 
of Information, 1996,12). It is clear from table 6.9 that Palestinian real GDP and 
GNP declined in 1996 by 1.60 and 2.9 per cent respectively. Repeated Israeli 
closures were the main reason for this drop. 
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The heaviest and longest closure of Palestinian territories took place under the 
Labour government, however this does not mean that under a Likud government 
there were no closures. Netanyahu's government used this collective penalty several 
times 1996-1999 (Palestinian Centre for Human Rights 1,1998,4). 
The direct effect of Israeli closures on the Palestinian economy was to paralyse the 
movement of Palestinian labour to Israel. Around 1 /3 of the Palestinian labour force 
works in Israel (Makhool, 1994,19; Naqib, 1997,10). Therefore, during days of 
closure we can imagine the effect on the Palestinian labour force caused by these 
measures. As shown in (table 6.9), Palestinian GNP declines more than GDP, 
because real GDP is GNP minus the incomes earned by Palestinian workers in 
Israel. 
Since the establishment of the PNA in May 1994 up to February 25,1996, Israel 
imposed 23 closures covering 121 days for the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. Ten 
were imposed as a result of suicide attacks, and the rest during Israeli national and 
religious days, or as a result of information on expected suicide attacks (Palestinian 
Ministry of Labour, 1996 in (Report from the Palestinian Ministry of Labour in 
Palestinian Ministry of Information, 1996,12). 
On the subject of the above mentioned 23 closures, a Palestinian labourer working 
in Israel would have applied 23 times to obtain work permit, because during that 
period Israel closed the Gaza-Strip on 23 occasions on the security plea (Report 
from the Palestinian Ministry of Labour cited in the Palestinian Ministry of 
Information, 1996,13). According to Israeli rules, after every closure Palestinian 
labour must apply for fresh permission to enter Israel. To obtain this authorisation a 
worker loses a working day, because he has to apply at the Erez checkpoint. This 
takes at least a full day waiting in a long queue. Usually the procedure takes more 
than five hours. Over two years Palestinian workers of the Gaza-Strip lost 23 
working days just to regain the right to enter Israel, in addition to the 121 closure 
days. There is no doubt that Israeli businesses depending on Palestinian labour was 
badly affected by the closures. A Palestinian trader from Gaza said that the Israeli 
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businessmen were dispirited by their government's policy towards the Palestinian 
labour. Their business was entirely frozen during the days of closure (interview 
with al-shareef, august 1999). 
Israeli closure does not only affect the flow of Palestinian labour to Israel. It also 
affects all Palestinian sectors such as industry, agriculture, health. the flow of 
Palestinian labour within the Palestinian territories (particularly within the West 
Bank), trade movement between Israel and abroad, trade between Palestinians, 
tourism, and transportation. During days of closure Palestinian life is paralysed. 
The raw material needed for Palestinian industry is imported through Israeli ports, 
therefore, industrial production is halted during days of closure, and the owners of 
factories also have to pay the Israeli port authority for storage of their raw materials 
in the ports. The loss to the Palestinians is doubled (Qidwa, 1996,7). Palestinian 
investment in the industrial sector is very weak. Where an investor may have a 
business plan, the closures can deter him from developing his ideas, because he 
cannot determine the dates of closures or how long they will last. Under such 
conditions investment in this sector would be too risky. Very rarely do people 
venture under such unstable conditions. 
Closure also damages Palestinian agriculture in several ways: firstly it prevents the 
export of all kinds of agricultural products. According to the World Bank, 
agricultural production accounts for 25 per cent of Palestinian GDP (World Bank, 
1994 cited in Elmusa, 1997,38). In the early 1990's the agricultural sector in the 
West Bankand Gaza-Strip absorbed around 30 per cent of the Palestinian labour 
force (Elmusa, 1997,38). The economy of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip is highly 
dependent on the export of these products. For example, the Gaza-Strip exports 90 
per cent of its vegetable products to Israel, Jordan, Europe, and the West Bank. 
Secondly, the raw materials on which the agricultural sector depends are imported 
from Israel or from abroad through Israel. During the closures, the flow of these 
materials is halted. In such a case Palestinian farmers lose the opportunity to export 
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their products both during the season of closure and the following season, because 
of the lack of inputs. Thirdly, the closure has the effect of increasing unemployment 
among Palestinian agricultural workers. Palestinian farmers cannot afford to 
employ labourers if their products cannot find a market. In this situation many 
farmers prefer to leave their produce on the trees. 
At a social level, the Israeli closure threatens the health and the food security of 
Palestinians, as it disrupts the flow of medical supplies and food, causing acute 
hardship (U. N., 1997a, iii). The Palestinian Ministry of Health stated that during the 
closedown of February 25,1996, five Palestinian patients died at Israeli check 
points waiting for permission to go to Israeli hospitals or to Palestinian hospitals in 
other cities. Among the five were three children. The ministry also added that many 
Palestinian patients suffering from heart disease and cancer died in Palestinian 
hospitals while waiting for Israeli permission to transfer to Israeli or Jordanian 
hospitals, because Palestinian hospitals have no medication to treat these conditions 
(Report of the Palestinian Ministry of Health in Palestinian Ministry of Information, 
1996,36). There is no hospital in Salfeet for example, the nearest being in Nablus 
City. Whenever closure takes place, Salfeet town and its villages are isolated from 
the rest of the world by Israeli military check points, preventing local people from 
reaching Nablus (Interview, December 1998). 
The closures of 1996 created chronic food shortages for the first time. The 
Palestinian Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Supplies informed me, that we found 
ourselves facing a real food crisis, including a shortage of bread flour, which is a 
staple food for most Palestinians. This shortage led to the price of bread doubling 
(al-Qudsi interview. January 9,1999). 
The movement of the university students in the West Bank was also affected by the 
Israeli closures. The Palestinian Ministry of Education stated that thousands of 
university students were prevented from reaching their colleges and universities 
during the February-March 1996 closure. The majority of the West Bank students 
could not leave their villages and cities to travel to the five universities and many 
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colleges of the West Bank. (Report from the Palestinian Ministry of Education in 
Palestinian Ministry of Information, 1996,50). University students from the Gaza- 
Strip have faced severe problems in reaching their universities in the West Bank 
since Israel used the closure as a tool of collective punishment against the 
Palestinians in 1993. The problem of the Gazian students in the West Bank 
Universities had not been solved by the end of the interim period. No students have 
been granted permission to move from the Gaza-Strip to the West Bank since the 
early 1990's (Friends of Birzeit University, 1998,4). 
A month after the closure of March 1993, the UNRWA found itself running four 
emergency centres supplying food to 69,000 refugee families and 30,000 non- 
refugee families as a result of the closure. The applications submitted to the 
UNRWA seeking food, money, and jobs outmatched its capabilities of supplying 
emergency aid (Roy, 1994,30). 
The Israeli closure also disrupted the PNA's efforts to develop its new institutions, 
as well as badly affecting the role of international organisations and aid donors in 
the process of capacity-building (U. N., 1997a, iii). The Under-Secretary of the 
Ministry of Supplies confirmed that because of the internal closure of the West 
Bank, employees of the ministry could not reach their work in the main government 
buildings in Ramallah. More than 90 per cent of the employees of the Ministry are 
not from Ramallah City. All other Palestinian ministries face the same problems 
because of the closures (al-Qudsi interview. January 9,1999). 
It is important to note that the spatial separation of both West Bank and Gaza-Strip 
compelled the PNA to establish two main offices for each PNA institution and 
ministry, one in the West Bank and the second in the Gaza-Strip. This has created 
two separate institutions with no administrative and functional link between the two 
offices of the same ministry. The only persons who can move freely between the 
West Bank and Gaza-Strip are the VIP holders (Israel issues a VIP cards to high 
Palestinian officials allowing them to pass freely between the West Bank and Gaza- 
Strip). Usually, Israel issues these cards to ministers, under-secretaries, and director 
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generals of the ministries who are the only people who can move between the two 
ministerial offices in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. However, during some of the 
closures, Israel prevented even the VIP holders from moving between the West 
Bank and Gaza-Strip. 
Salam Fayyad, the resident representative of the International Monetary Fund in 
Palestine described the PNA as operating under very difficult conditions and with 
modest capabilities during its early days. But with time the structure of the 
Palestinian institutions emerged. The Palestinian economy made reasonable 
progress. For example, the experts of the International Monetary Fund expected that 
revenues in 1995 would reach 6.7 per cent of GDP, whereas in reality revenues 
managed double that level. The experts of the Fund also expected the revenues of 
the PNA in 1996 to reach 17.2 per cent of the GDP, when in fact revenues attained 
20.7 per cent (Fayyad, 1998,4: 5). 
Fayyad believes that the difficulties faced by the PNA in infrastructure and 
institution-building are due to the Israeli closures in 1994-1998 and the halting of 
the Palestinian-Israeli peace process (Fayyad, 1998,6). There is no doubt that the 
closures seriously affected Palestinian institution-building. However, the main 
difficulty faced by the PNA in infrastructure and institution-building was the 
fragmentation of Palestinian territorial integrity. The Oslo Agreement classified 
three categories of land: the PNA could work freely in Zone A, and some 
restrictions were put on Zone B, while Zone C were entirely under the Israeli 
occupation. The PNA has no responsibility over that zone. Zone C, as mentioned in 
the previous chapters, covers around 70 per cent of the West Bank, and 30 per cent 
of the Gaza-Strip. 
The PNA has responsibility for all Palestinians (though not all the land) in the West 
Bank and Gaza-Strip, since more than 90 per cent of Palestinians live in Zones A 
and B. The PNA controls populated areas without having access to natural 
resources, which are mainly located in Zone C. It is extremely difficult for any 
government to carry out successful development plans under such conditions. 
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5.6 Sovereignty 
During the interim period, Israel continued to control all the crossing points linking 
the Palestinian territories with the world. The movement of Palestinian trade fell 
under the Israeli control, and Israel had the right to halt this movement at any time 
during the closures as discussed above. Vital issues for the Palestinian economy 
such as the movement of persons and goods, control of the crossing points with 
Egypt and Jordan, the use of an Israeli port (Ashdod), and the use of the Israeli 
international airport (Ben Gurion) came under Israeli control (al-Masrojy. 1998.40; 
Naqib, 1997,62). 
The PNA agreed with Egypt and Jordan separately to open a free border zone. This 
agreement was never implemented because the border lay under Israeli authority. 
Israel treats the question of sovereignty over the border as a matter to be addressed 
in the final status negotiations (al-Kuronz interview, October 26,1998). 
The Oslo Agreement allowed the Palestinians to open their own international port 
and airport in the Gaza-Strip (Oslo II, Annex I, Articles XII and XIV). But up to the 
end of this period work on the port had not started and Israel continued 
procrastinating over the implementation of the provisions concerning Gaza port. 
The Palestinian international airport was opened in early 1999 (according to the 
Wye River Memorandum). This means that it only opened in the final year of the 
interim period although the airport was in working order two years before. The 
International airport is only operational during the day. Gaza International airport 
only serves Palestinians from the Gaza-Strip. Palestinians from the West Bank 
prefer to use the Israeli or the Jordanian airports because of obstacles created by the 
Israelis which make it very difficult to enter the Gaza-Strip. 
The existence of the airport and Gaza port will enable the Palestinian private sector 
to establish direct trade relations with the international community without Israeli 
mediation which affects their benefits. Samara stated that the Ministry of Industry is 
encouraging Palestinian businessmen to organise direct relations with foreign 
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businessmen by organising mutual meetings, international industrial exhibitions, 
and training in different countries (Samara interview, January 15.1999). 
5.7 The Palestinian Labour Sector 
The restricted Palestinian economic growth of employment opportunities in the 
Israeli market reoriented the West Bank and Gaza-Strip labour force away from 
indigenous agriculture and industry which were critical sectors for the development 
of the productive capacity towards semi-skilled and unskilled labour (Roy, 1999, 
65). In early 1993, the Palestinian labour sector in Israel formed around 40 per cent 
of the Palestinian labour force. The total Palestinian of population of working-age 
(persons aged 15-64) was estimated in 1996 as 1,248,218. While the total labour 
force was calculated at 528,319. The annual growth of the Palestinian labour force 
in 1996 was estimated to be 40,000 persons (U. N., 1997a, 24; U. N., 1997b, 9). The 
table below illustrates the position of Palestinian labour. 
Table 5.2 
Estimates of the working-age Population, labour force, employment, 
underemployment and unemployment for the WBGS, 
average 1996 and first quarter 1997 
Rates Average 1996 First Quarter 1997 
Labour Force Participation Rates 42.33 % 40.91 % 
Full-Employment Rates 64.18 % 70.32 % 
Underemployment Rates 12.03 % 9.13 % 
Unemployment Rates 23.90 % 20.57 % 
Source: U. N., 1997b, 9. 
In 1992 the Palestinian labour force in Israel was judged in 1992 to be 116,000 
(about a third of the labour force at that time). Instead of allowing an increase in the 
Palestinian labour force in Israel to show Palestinians the benefits of peace, Israel 
sharply reduced this number during the peace period. In 1995, the number of 
Palestinian workers in Israel was thought to be 32,000 (U. N.. 1997a. 1. ESC WA. 
1997b, 2 1). During the peace period between Palestinians and Israelis, Israel reduced 
the Palestinian labour force by more than 70 per cent of that in the pre-Oslo 
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Agreement. This decline severely damaged the Palestinian economy. 
Unemployment among Palestinians reached its peak. As mentioned in chapter four 
the main slogan of the Israeli Labour Party in the pre and post-Oslo Agreement was 
that the party (who ruled Israel 1992-1996) would support social and economic 
improvement in the region especially between Palestinians and Israelis. The sudden 
decline in Palestinian labour in Israel (as a result of the security measures) created a 
critical economic situation which the PNA had to deal with. The improvement of 
Palestinian economic conditions is an Israeli slogan never an Israeli practice. 
The Palestinian Minister of Housing believed that Israel through its economic 
policy of putting restrictions, barriers, and obstacles on the free movement of the 
goods, labour and people wants the mission of the new-born Palestinian authority to 
fail. It wants to prove that the period of Israeli occupation is better than that of the 
PNA (Hamad interview, January 30,1999). 
To overcome the unemployment crisis that faced it, the PNA proposed the creation 
of industrial zones which would absorb thousands of employees. These zones were 
divided into three types. Border industrial zones, internal industrial zones, and 
industrial zones located within the borders of the municipalities. The border 
industrial zones were recommended to be set up close to the Palestinian-Israeli 
border; one in Gaza city and another in Jenen in the north of the West Bank. The 
industrial border zones would help Israel to overcome its security problems by 
decreasing the flow of Palestinian workers into its territories (Samara interview, 
January 15,1999, al-Kuronz interview October 26,1998). 
The PNA looked to the industrial border zones as an economic project, while Israel 
looked to them as a security scheme. The demands of security and the economic 
projects did not meet. The flow of raw materials, goods, trucks and persons such as 
experts, businessmen are essential to the economic success of such undertakings. 
These essential elements are in contradiction to the complex security measures 
taken by Israel. Therefore, the fundamental difference to the target and importance 
of the industrial zones between Palestinians and Israelis could undermine these 
248 
project in the interim period. The idea of the industrial zones was welcomed by the 
aid donors and they showed readiness to support these ventures. The U. S, EU, and 
the World Bank supported the creation of the Gaza industrial zone, a part of which 
became operational by late 1999. 
As the reason for instituting the industrial zones was concerned with the absorption 
of Palestinian unemployment, the Palestinian public sector took on thousands of 
Palestinian workers. In May 1994 the PNA began its work of institution-building 
efforts in the Gaza-Strip and Jericho region. In late 1995, the PNA's responsibilities 
expanded to the rest of the cities of the West Bank. There is no doubt that the 
PNA's institution-buildings absorbed assimilated number of the many unemployed. 
Sara Roy estimated the jobs created by the PNA in the public sector until mid-1998 
as 89,130 (ROY, 1999,71). Salam Fayyad, evaluated the Palestinian Labour force 
in the public sector in 1998 to be 14 per cent of the total labour force. This ratio 
seems reasonable in relation to neighbouring Arab countries such as Lebanon, 
Egypt (except for the military forces) and Jordan where the public sector labour 
forces account for 15,34, and 37 per cent respectively. However the wages of the 
Palestinian workers in the public sector constitute 54 per cent of the recurrent 
expenditure of the PNA. This ratio is very high in relation to the neighbouring Arab 
states. In 1996, the wages in Lebanon, Egypt and Jordan make up of the 28.6,24.4, 
and 37.7 per cent current budget respectively. The wages in those states also 
comprise 6.1,30.0, and 11.1 respectively of GDP, whereas in Palestine the wages 
for the public sector labour force amounted to 15 per cent of GDP. This is a cause 
for concern for the future development of the Palestinian economy (Fayyad. 1998, 
7). The average number of employees in the PNA was 71.654 in 1996, which 
increasesd to 78,215 in the first quarter of 1997. According to the Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), this represented 17.81 per cent and 18.72 per 
cent of the Palestinian labour force for the years 1996 and 1997 respectively 
(PCBS. 1997 cited in U. N.. 1997b, 14). 
249 
The Palestinian expansion of the labour force in the public sector came about as a 
result of two conditions; the first was the demand made by the PNA by virtue of the 
shortage in Palestinian society of many necessary institutions vital to any 
community (following three decades of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza-Strip). Second the result of the repeated Israeli closures which increased the 
rates of unemployment to 40 per cent during the days and months of the 
closedowns. The PNA attempted to solve this problem by expanding employment 
in the public sector. This decision might solve some of the social problems 
attendant on the Israeli closures which affected Palestinian society and threatened 
the existence of the PNA itself. The Palestinian private sector was also badly 
affected by Israeli closures, so it could not absorb the huge numbers of jobless. 
Such a solution to the unemployment problem which happened as a result of the 
closures will not allow the PNA to solve its economic difficulties. 
The development expenditure of the PNA during 1995-1997 came to 7 per cent of 
GDP. This number should rise to 9-10 per cent to be consistent with other 
developing countries in the same situation as the Palestinian economy (Fayyad, 
1998,8). 
5.8 Industry 
The result of the Israeli policies towards the pre-Oslo Agreement was the steady 
weakening and disablement of Palestine's economic base, an erosion of its 
productive capacity and the growth of the service sector as the largest domestic 
employer (Roy. 1999,65). The Palestinian industrial sector forms a small part of 
that Palestinian economy as a whole. Palestinian industry accounts for only 10 per 
cent of GNP and it shares 15 per cent of the labour force (Awartani, 1996b, 8). 
In the post-Oslo Agreement period the production of Palestinian goods and services 
suffered from declining competitiveness. Joseph Saba, the director for the World 
Bank mission to the West Bank and Gaza-Strip since 1997, believed the decline 
was due to a number of constraints faced by Palestinians. First were obstacles 
erected by Israel. Second. Israeli control and limitation of land and water were 
250 
reflected in high prices. Third was the small size of the Palestinian market that was 
fragmented further because of the division into very small markets according to the 
classification of land and the spatial separation of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. 
Fourth the halting of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process since 1996 created an 
uncertain political environment. Fifth, was the weakness of the Palestinian 
industrial sector, where more than 90 per cent of the industrial establishments 
employ less than seven workers. Sixth, there were difficulties in obtaining finance, 
due to the lack of collateral. Seventh, was there was a lack of raw material, where 
almost all the inputs are imported from Israel and abroad. Finally, the lack of 
development in the Palestinian legal system for business, particularly the low level 
of courts' effectiveness and enforcement of contracts (Saba, 1998,61). 
Saba believed that the first six points mentioned above are due to Israeli behaviour 
towards the Palestinian economy, where the PNA is responsible for the lack of 
development in the Palestinian legal system for business, particularly the low level 
of courts' effectiveness and enforcement for contracts. But he added that different 
active projects from the donors and the World Bank attempted to improve the legal 
and institutional system (Saba, 1998,60: 61). 
In this regard one Palestinian from the Mawasi Area noted that in this area: 
The PNA has no responsibility, everything we want to do has to get the 
Israeli approval. The quantities of our vegetables that we export to 
Israel and abroad is up to the Israeli decision. I cannot blame the PNA 
for such an attitude which is out of its hands. I only blame the PNA for 
accepting these types of measures and agreements (Interviews 
December 1998-March 1999). 
Saba also believes that the problem of competitiveness in the West Bank and Gaza- 
Strip cannot be separated from the implementation of the Paris Protocol combined 
with Israel's permanent restrictions on the movement of Palestinian people and 
goods. This restricted Palestinian access to external trade and fragmented 
Palestinian areas into small isolated cantons. All of these factors disadvantaged 
Palestinian consumers and damaged competitiveness. The Palestinian economy was 
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cut off from free trade and international markets and lay under the Israeli market 
which often has higher prices than the international prices (Saba, 1998,59: 60). 
Successful industrial development policy will require a reversal of the impact of the 
Israeli occupation. A skilled and trained labour force, access to capital, water, an 
increase in the supply of electricity, land, infrastructure, direct access to export and 
import commodities, transport facilities and political stability are required. Yet as I 
have demonstrated the West Bank and Gaza-Strip lack many of these elements. 
Skilled and trained labour in Palestine is rare, and the Palestinian skilled labour in 
the Diaspora could not return to Palestine because of Israeli restrictions on their re- 
entry. A small proportion of them returned after the Oslo Agreement. Palestinian 
capital in the Diaspora do not want to enter the risk due to an unstable political 
situation, where they do not know to what extent the Palestinian-Israeli peace 
process will continue to succeed. So the majority of them prefer to wait and see the 
result of this process. The electricity, water and land which are needed for industrial 
development are still under Israeli control. The Palestinian infrastructure was 
damaged during the Israeli occupation and no noticeable improvement was 
achieved during three decades of occupation. The export and import from and to the 
West Bank and Gaza-Strip were restricted due to the Israeli implementation of the 
Paris Protocol, the Israeli obstacles, and the Israeli comprehensive and partial 
closure that affected the movement of exports and imports. 
In the post-Oslo Agreement, some writers wrote about the way to improve the 
Palestinian industry as if the West Bank and Gaza-Strip were no longer under 
occupation. Basher al-Bargothy, the Palestinian Minister of Industry (1996-1998) 
believes that this is not true. Palestinians are not living in an independent 
Palestinian state, and the main obstacle to the improvement of their industry is the 
Israeli daily interference in their internal and external affairs. This interference 
came as a result of the Israeli control of the crossing points, land, and water. He 
also does not ignore the lack of financial and human skilled capabilities which is 
fundamental to the industrial development (Bargothy. 1996.10). 
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The largest Palestinian industry is in textiles and clothing. It accounts for 19 per 
cent of the industrial establishments, and absorbs 32 per cent of the Palestinian 
industrial labour force. This industry is linked with Israeli companies: as much as 
85 percent of Palestinian establishments in this sector are working as subcontractors 
to Israeli companies and manufacturers. As a result of the Israeli-Jordanian Accord, 
many of the Israeli companies shifted to deal with the Jordanian establishments as 
their new subcontractors. (Palestinian Ministry of Industry l, 1997,2: 8, Roy, 1999, 
73). 
More than 80 per cent of the total of Palestinian industries employ eight workers or 
less. These are workshops rather than manufacturers. The Palestinian industrial 
sector concentrates on the food industries, soda drinks, clothes and textiles (Samara 
interview, January 15,1999). The capital for individual establishment is 
approximately $ 10,000. This represents a major obstacle to economic growth and 
will continue to do so as long as Israeli closure remains in place. The largest 
component of private investment (85 to 90 per cent) has remained residential 
housing which makes little contribution to economic development. In 1993, private 
investment fell from 21 per cent of GDP in 1993 to 12 per cent in 1997 (Roy, 1999, 
71). 
Palestinian industry is mainly family industry, this means that the members of the 
family work in the manufacturing industry that they inherited. This affects 
production efficiency because the main reason for working in the factory is the 
worker's family relationship to the owner of the factory, not his skill and 
experience. 
The family structure of Palestinian industry may be an obstacle to modernisation, as 
experts will not take the opportunity to work in these industries and improve them. 
However, this type of family concern protected Palestinian industry during the 
occupation period. Samara believes that despite these negative aspects, Palestinians 
should be proud of their industry which developed during the years of occupation 
(Samara intervieww-. January 15.1999). There are some family industries which 
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recognise the benefit of modernising the technology and administration they use. 
Some that came into being in the post-Oslo Agreement period were not based on 
the family and these industries scored great successes in different fields. If the 
period of the Israeli occupation needed family businesses to protect this industry 
from collapse, the post-Oslo period required the modernisation of the Palestinian 
industry. 
The private industrial sector has not been able to obtain financial loans to widen 
and encourage its industrial activities. Such loans at a low rate of interest, provided 
by the Industrial Development Bank and other banks, would support the Palestinian 
private sector and assist it in spreading and diversify industrial production. The 
banks present in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip provide loans at a high rate of 
interest, aimed at achieving maximum profit with minimum risk (al-Masrojy 2, 
1996,20). But the existence of more than 30 banks and branches in the Palestinian 
territories in the post-Oslo Agreement has worked to benefit the Palestinian 
economy and particularly Palestinian industry. 
The absence of a Palestinian national currency and the use of more than one 
coinage tends to reduce the ability of commercial banks to perform their function of 
transforming debt maturities, because of the problem of currency mismatching 
inherent in their portfolios. This may play a reasonable role in extending long-term 
loans, which are considered essential for economic growth and investment 
(UNCTAD, 1996,13). 
In addition to the absence of feasible bank loans, the private sector have to provide 
their industry with the infrastructure for their projects, water, electricity, roads, and 
land. Here the cost of ventures increases sharply, so many businessmen avoid 
investing in the industrial sector (al-Masrojy 2,1996,20). 
In the post-Oslo Agreement period, Israel put even more restrictions on the 
movement of the Palestinian businessmen than during the occupation period 
(Samara interview. Januare 15,1999). Without the investment of the Palestinian 
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capital of the Diaspora, economic development would be very weak. This raises the 
question: If the peace period is worse than the occupation period, why should 
Palestinians support this process? Israel's failure to fulfill its economic obligations 
shows that Israel is not willing to give the Palestinian economy the opportunity to 
develop, improve and one day be independent. The Israeli control of the future of 
the Palestinian economy is as important a matter as the Israeli stranglehold over the 
international crossing points, airports and the Israeli port. 
The industrial areas in the Gaza-Strip faced more difficulties than on the West 
Bank. Here the flow of industrial products is easy. Israel cannot supervise (except 
during the closure days) all the dozens of routes connecting the West Bank with 
Israel, whilst the Gaza-Strip is linked to Israel by only two crossing points (Bet 
Hanoon and Almontar). The Gaza-Strip is totally enclosed within Israel and the 
Israeli military patrols make frequent checks of the fence. This condition is not 
present on the West Bank. Anyone who travels from the Gaza-Strip to Israel feels 
that he is going to another country. 
Israeli controls over the movement of Palestinian industrial and agricultural 
products in Bet Hanoon and Almontar (Eritz and Carni) the crossing points are 
extremely destructive. All the products are taken off the trucks and checked one by 
one. Then they are put back again. Through this process many items that are 
destined for export fall below export standards because of the rough checking by 
the Israeli army who are not specialised in this work. 
Israel argues these measures are necessary because of security concerns. But the 
question arises, are Palestinians from the Gaza-Strip a threat to Israeli security 
while Palestinians from the West Bank are not? Events have been shown that 
military operations (persons and materials) that were conducted against Israelis 
operated from both the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. Many Palestinians from the 
West Bank carried out suicide operations as well as from the Gaza-Strip. This 
should prove that these measures are not of a security nature. they are to damage the 
Palestinian economy in the Gaza-Strip. 
255 
The Palestinian Minister of Transportation said that Palestinian trucks are not 
allowed to carry Palestinian products from or to the Palestinian territories through 
the Israeli port of Ashdod. This is in spite of the fact that these trucks moved freely 
between Israel and the West Bank and Gaza-Strip during the Oslo Agreement 
period (Qawasmi interview, September 23,1998) Hundreds of Palestinian truck 
drivers found themselves jobless and the Israeli policy deepened the crisis of 
Palestinian unemployment. The Palestinian truck owners lost out and the value of 
their trucks fell sharply: the Israeli truck owners by contrast, benefited substantially 
from these restrictions. 
To amount any manufacturing industry one needs to acquire the land that the 
project will be built on. Many private industrial projects were cancelled because of 
the very high price of the land in areas A and B. Prices reached their peak in the 
post-Oslo Agreement period. The border of Areas A and B especially on the West 
Bank is placed in the main cities and the built-up area of the villages. The majority 
of Palestinian investments in the industrial sector are located in Zone A. This is due 
to three factors: firstly This Zone has a reasonable infrastructure that can serve any 
project; second, to avoid Israeli interference through security measures, third, to 
obtain permission for the project from the PNA. In the past the permit was obtained 
from the Israeli military authorities, and was usually rejected. The implementation 
of further Israeli redeployment will increase the area of Zones A and B. This will 
decrease the price of the land in these regions. 
In Area C the price of land is very cheap, but the Palestinian investors preferred not 
to invest or initiate any industrial project there, because it is under Israeli cauthority 
and Israeli military orders will regulate their projects if they get permission from the 
military authorities. The Palestinian Minister of Industry believes that the 
classification of land especially. in the West Bank is the main obstacle to 
Palestinian economic development. If these categories of land continue, there will 
be no opportunity for Palestinians to improve their economic sectors (al-Kuronz 
interviewe. October 26.1998). 
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The smuggling of industrial and other products between the West Bank and Israel 
enabled Israeli companies to dump spoiled food on the Palestinian market. The 
Palestinian Ministry of Supplies seized huge quantities of this spoiled food in the 
Palestinian market. For example in August 1998 the Supervision Department of the 
ministry destroyed 45,153 kilograms of spoiled food on the West Bank (Ministry of 
Supplies, August 1998). 
5.9 Water Crisis 
As the control over land has always been at the core of arguments and action in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, it is also a salient issue in the water dispute between Arabs 
and Israelis (Elmusa, 1996,69). Control over land is intimately connected to power 
over water resources. The water crisis in Palestine is a result of Israeli authority 
over Palestinian land. Despite the Israeli recognition of the Palestinian rights to the 
water resources in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip, the system of distributing water 
after Oslo is no different from the pre-Oslo Agreement period. 
The 28 million cubic metres (mcm) which were added to the Palestinian quota 
according to Oslo II Agreement (1995) will never meet the Palestinian demand for 
water. During the pre-Israel state period, the Zionist Movement estimates of the 
water resources in Mandate Palestine indicated that Palestine was rich in such 
resources. This estimate was adopted by the Zionists in order to convince the 
British Mandate to allow wide-scale Jewish migration to Palestine (Tantish, 1989, 
16: 120). The boundary for the `Jewish National Home' proposed in the Paris Peace 
Conference 1919 by the International Zionist Organisation (see map 1.1) was 
not only to secure all water resources already feeding Palestine, but also 
to be able to conserve and control them at their sources ... 
it is highly 
desirable in the interests of economic administration, that the 
geographical area of Palestine should be as large as possible (Cited in 
Elmusa, 1996,70). 
However, in the post-Israeli state period, Israeli official sources began to talk about 
a water crisis in Israel. Israeli estimates of water resources in Palestine are related to 
a policy of expansion rather than to the real quantity of water reserves. It is clear 
that the amount of water available is an Israeli state secret. No regional or 
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international party shared in determining the figures, and Israel has supplied 
different figures at different periods. Therefore, we shall look to these numbers with 
doubt, unless a neutral party conducts project and research to determine the final 
figures of water quantities in Mandate Palestine. 
5.9.1 Ground Water Resources 
The water resources of Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza-Strip are connected to 
each other. Ground water forms the main source of water for both Palestinians and 
Israelis. It is divided among four major aquifers; the eastern aquifer, the north- 
eastern, the western, and the coastal which covers the Gaza-Strip and the middle 
Israeli coastal area. The first three are called the Mountain aquifer (Elmusa, 1997, 
13; Betriji, 1997,46). Elmusa believes that the four mentioned aquifers could be 
classified as international water, because their parts are located within the 
Palestinian territories and Israel, therefore, their water should be distributed 
between the two sides (Elmusa, 1997,27). But this is true of the three aquifers 
other than the eastern one which is situated entirely on the West Bank, and its water 
goes to the West Bank. None of this aquifer's water leaks into Israeli territory. 
Therefore the water of this aquifer should be considered differently from the other 
three aquifers. 
According to the Oslo II Agreement, Israel provided data to the PNA concerning 
the Mountain aquifer, namely a total annual recharge of 679 million cubic metres 
(mcm) (Oslo II Agreement, Annex III, schedule 10). An Israeli academic study for 
the World Bank calculated the annual recharge of the mountain aquifer as 600 mcm 
and the annual recharge of the coastal aquifer as 350 mcm (Ben-Gurion University 
of the Negev with Tahal Consulting Engineering LTD, cited in Elmusa, 1997,12). 
While Betriji believes that the annual refill of the coastal aquifer is around 283 
mcm (Betriji, 1997,85). 
Israel consumes 85-90 per cent of the aquifers of mandate Palestine, using 483 
mcm/ annum from the Mountain aquifer (40 mcm/annum goes to the Israeli settlers 
in the Jordan Valley). while it pumps 118 mcm/annum to the Palestinians of the 
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West Bank (Elmusa, 1997,31; ). The British Middle East magazine estimated in 
1979 that Israel's pumps 600 mcm/annum from the West Bank aquifers (Middle 
East Magazine September. 5,1979 cited in Betriji, 1997,103). 
If we accept Elmusa's figure, then Israel is pumping from the West Bank aquifers 
more than four times what it is pumping to its original owners (Palestinians). This 
is a flagrant violation of international law concerning the occupied territories. The 
presence of the Israeli settlements is a reflection of Israel which transfers citizens 
(settlers) to the occupied territories, also pumps water to them and their settlements. 
5.9.2 Surface Water 
The main surface water for Palestinians and Israelis comes from the Jordan 
River(2), where Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee) is considered to be the largest 
reservoir for the river water and divides the river into two parts; the upper Jordan 
which is found to the north of Lake Tiberias, and the lower Jordan is which situated 
to the south of the lake. Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the West Bank share the 
water of the Jordan River, because the river and its branches pass through these 
countries (Tantish, 1989). The amount of water that flows through the upper and 
lower Jordan before it enters the Dead Sea is estimated to be one billion 
mcm/annum. Israeli and the West Bank water resources contribute less than seven 
per cent of the water of the Jordan River (Aqel, 1998,6). 
Palestinians on the West-Bank were prevented from using or benefiting from the 
water of the Jordan River basin, despite the fact that the West Bank has a 
considerable border on the river. The only source of water for Palestinians in the 
West Bank and Gaza-Strip comes from the aquifers. 
Until the early 1990's, Israel pumped 620-700 mcm/annum from the Jordan basin, 
while nothing had been delivered to the Palestinians since the War of 1967. The 
Johnston Plan of 1953 (3) gave Israel and the West Bank a quota of the Jordan 
basin of 400 and 215 mcm/ annum respectively (Elmusa, 1997.33; Israeli 
agricultural Ministry, 1959 cited in Tantish, 1989,123). During the years of Israeli 
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occupation and even during the interim period not a single drop of the Jordan Basin 
water was provided for the Palestinians of the West Bank. 
According to the Israeli-Jordanian Accord of 1994 (4), Israel and Jordan should co- 
operate in finding sources to supply the Jordan with an additional amount of 50 
mcm/annum of water of drinkable standards. To find such quantities, Israel will 
have to decrease its pumping from the Yarmouk River (a stream of the Jordan 
River). But according to the Johnston Plan (1953) Israel should decrease its 
draining of the Jordan Basin water by at least 220 mcm/annum. 
Despite the huge quantity of water Israel steals from Palestinians through 
controlling the aquifers of the territories, or through pumping double its quota of 
the Jordan River basin which was allocated to Israel by the Johnston Plan, Israel is 
still trying to solve its water crisis at the expense of others, particularly the 
Palestinians, who are facing a serious water shortage. 
5.9.3 Israel and its Neighbouring Countries 
Israel previously attempted to solve its water problem by conducting wars against 
its neighbours (such as the war of 1967) which enabled Israel to control the water of 
the West Bank. Through this war Israel increased its border with the Jordan River 
and its streams when it occupied the Golan Heights in Syria. In 1978 and 1982, 
Israel launched two wars against the military bases of the PLO in South Lebanon. 
Beside its political aim of destroying the PLO military and political presence in 
Lebanon, Israeli planned to reach the banks of the Litani River in southern 
Lebanon. This river is one of the most voluminous rivers in the region, with an 
annual recharge of 700 mcm (Tantish, 1989,252). When Israel withdrew from 
south Lebanon after the two mentioned wars, it maintained control of an area of 
Lebanese territory which it claimed was to protect its security, but this zone has a 
considerable border with the Litani River banks. 
Ariel Sharon told the Israeli Dafar newspaper in 1981 when he was the Israeli 
Minister of Defence that the only solution to Israel's water crisis would come 
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through the acquisition of land, because 2/3 of Israeli water needs are located in 
Lebanon, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank (Dafar June 14.1981 cited in 
Tantish, 1989,17). This means that Israel needs to continue to rule the three Arab 
occupied territories just to satisfy its water requirements. This is a fundamental 
violation of the main principle of the peace process of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
which is based on peace in return for land. 
Israel is using the river's water and pumping it into its territories. An American 
newspaper reported that, according to an American CIA source, Israel is 
constructing a tunnel (10-17 km) to reach the Litani water, where it has installed 
huge water pumps (International Herald Tribune, June 10,1983 cited in Betriji, 
1997,113). While the head of the Lebanese project commission for the Litani River 
claimed that Israel does not appear to have been tapping the Litani's water (Al- 
Hayat, December 1994 cited in Elmusa, 1996,71). 
5.7.4 Israel and the Water Issue in the Peace Process Period 
In the early 1990's, Israel changed its policy of war to one of making peace with its 
neighbours. Israel aims to solve its water crisis through the peace process, but again 
at the expense of its neighbours and in particular the Palestinians. 
Israel pumps between 1800 and 2400 mcm/annum from the different water sources 
(treatment of sewage 100 mcm/annum) of Mandate Palestine. More than 1,000 
mcm/annum from the West Bank aquifers and the Jordan River basin (Tantish, 
1989,134: 188). Despite this there is no doubt that Israel is facing a water crisis, 
Betriji estimated the Israeli water deficit in the year 2000 would be 1,500 
mcm/annum (Betriji, 1997,118). The table below illustrates Israeli per capita cm of 
water in 1993 in relation to other countries in the Middle East. The table also shows 
that the Palestinian water situation is the worst in the region. Palestinians only- 
receive 1/3 of the per capita water of Israelis. The Palestinian water crisis has come 
about as a result of the Israeli policy of stealing their water and pumping it to its 
territories and settlements. 
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Table 5.3 
Water quantities cm/per capita (1993) in 
some Middle-Eastern states 
The Country cm/ er capita 
Iraq 2,110 
Turkey 1,830 
Syria 1,420 
Israel 300 
Jordan 250 
WBGS 100 
Source: Betriji, 1997,177. 
Israel has recognised Palestinian water rights in the West Bank, but this issue will 
be addressed in the permanent status negotiations. The issue of ownership of the 
water and sewage-related infrastructure on the West Bank will also be addressed in 
the permanent status negotiations (Oslo II Agreement, annex III, article 40, 
provision 1: 5). 
Delaying the settlement of water rights until the permanent status negotiations 
indicates that both sides recognise that the distribution of water resources is of 
common interest. No party believes that it is a matter of its own interest embodied 
in its sovereignty. Water distribution is under Israeli control, and this situation will 
continue during the interim period. Therefore, Israel will continue pumping water 
from the West Bank and Gaza-Strip to its settlements and to Israel itself as it did 
before. The agreement did not prevent Israel stealing Palestinian water. On the 
contrary, Israel understood this provision to mean that it could continue its illegal 
activities in the occupied territories. 
None of the Israeli-Palestinian agreements mentioned, in particular Palestinian 
water rights in the Jordan basin, is an issue of the final status water negotiations. As 
I mentioned in chapters four and five, in the post-Oslo Agreement period, Israel 
concentrated its settlement activities on the Jordan Valley which is the West Bank 
border of the Jordan River. This demonstrated that the Israelis retained the ambition 
to annex the valley in the final status negotiations with the Palestinians. The valley 
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is considered to be a strategic location for Israeli security to defend it from any 
eastern threat during war time, and a strategic source of water. 
5.9.5 Settlements and Water 
The settlements' quota of water in the post-Oslo Agreement period did not change 
from that in the previous one. The agreement dealt with the water issue of the 
Israeli settlements in the West Bank in these terms: 
Existing water and sewage systems serving Israelis (settlers), [which] 
shall continue to be operated and maintained by the Israeli side solely, 
without interference or obstructions (Oslo II Agreement, Annex III, 
Schedule 8, provision 2c). 
Where the agreement dealt with the water issue in regard to settlements of the 
Gaza-Strip is said: 
The existing water systems supplying water to the settlements and the 
Military Installation Area, and the water systems and resources inside 
them shall continue to be operated and managed by the Mekoroth Water 
Co. (Israeli company) (Oslo II Agreement, Annex III, Schedule 11, 
provision 2). 
The pumping of water to the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip exceeded 
the Israeli official quota (Report by the Inspector of state of Israel cited in Elmusa, 
1997,84). With the government support settlers controlled their water resources by 
themselves. This could have been an official policy to provide more facilities to 
encourage Israelis to move and settle in the Palestinian territories. The ratio of 
settlers to Palestinians in the West Bank is less than 10 per cent (except settlers in 
East Jerusalem). 
According to the table below, Israeli settlers consume 8 per cent of the West Bank 
water. They consume half the amount of the Palestinians on the West Bank. Even 
this figure is small and far from the reality. If settlers on the Jordan Valley, who 
form no more than 5-10 per cent of the total number of settlers in the West Bank 
consume 40 mcm/annum, it is difficult to conclude that more than 90 per cent of 
the settlers are consuming only 10 mcm/annum of the total settlers' consumption. It 
is true that the settlements of the Jordan Valley are agricultural, but there are 
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industrial and even another agricultural and industrial settlements in other sectors of 
the West Bank. 
Table 5.4 
The West Bank's water distribution 
mcm/annum percentage 
Israel 413 65 
Israeli settlements 50 8 
Palestinians 110 17 
unused water 58 9 
Source: Wiski, 1995 cited in Betriji, 1997,141. 
What helps the Israeli settlers to pump more water from the Palestinian territories to 
their settlements is the advanced equipment that they use. Palestinians from Salfeet 
Province and Mawasi Area showed me the wells that were drilled by the settlers. 
These seemed well equipped with high-level technology. As a result of over-use the 
water level in the Gaza-Strip aquifer dropped sharply. Therefore, in the Mawasi 
Area some Palestinian wells were unable to pump water because the water level fell 
below the depth that they could reach. The primitive equipment of the wells was 
not capable of draining off the water. Israeli wells are deeper and well equipped 
with the latest technology. 
Until the late 1980's, the settlements' wells in the West Bank formed 5 per cent of 
the total number in the area, but their pumping capability accounted for 27 per cent 
(Tantish, 1989,214). Of course this percentage increased in the Israelis favour 
during the 1990's, due to the following: the occupation of the greater part of the 
West Bank continued, the Israeli settlement activities doubled (see chapters four 
and five for more details) The Oslo Agreement did not eliminate the Israeli draining 
of the West Bank aquifers, and finally, the Israelis gained access to further 
technological innovations. 
5.9.6 The Palestinian Water Crisis 
The Palestinians of the Gaza-Strip use 100 mcm/annum from the Gaza-Strip aquifer 
(apart of the coastal aquifer), where 8-5 per cent of the Palestinian consumption 
in 
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the strip goes for irrigation (Betriji, 1997,105). al-Najar confirmed that the capacity 
of the Gaza aquifer is 60-70 mcm/annum, and the Gaza-Strip is pumping 110-115 
mcm/annum (al-Najar, 1998,3). This means that there is a shortfall of 45-50 
mcm/annum, which has been made up by pumping most of this amount from the 
aquifer's reserves (Map 5.1). This has affected the quality of the water in the Gaza- 
Strip, where it is now salty. 
The poor quality of water in the Gaza-Strip renders it unfit for human consumption, 
because of the huge amounts that has been pumped from wells in the strip by 
Palestinians and Israeli settlers. al-Najar believes that many people, particularly 
children have become infected by water-borne diseases because of the poor quality 
of the water. (al-Najar interview, February 18,1999). 
The density of the Gaza-Strip is considered to be one of the highest in the world. Its 
aquifer cannot supply sufficient water for its original population (Palestinians). 
Even if the Israeli army and settlers completely withdrew from the area, the Gaza- 
Strip would face a water crisis. In any permanent peace treaty between Palestinians 
and Israelis, this catastrophe must be carefully studied and a reasonable and 
applicable solution be drafted, otherwise it will endanger peace in the region in the 
future. 
Israel informed the PNA that the settlement wells of the Gaza-Strip are pumping 5 
mcm/annum. This is the same quantity that the Israeli Water Co. Mekerot provides 
to the Gaza-Strip. But the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) confirmed that in the 
post-Oslo Agreement, the thirty Israeli wells of the settlements in the area were 
pumping 10-12 mcm/annum (PWA, 1997,6). As shown in chapter five, the 
population of the Israeli settlers in the Gaza-Strip who number less than 8.000 and 
form less than 1 per cent of the Palestinians of the Gaza-Strip, are using 10-12 per 
cent of the water of the area. 
According to the Oslo II Agreement, Israel is committed to providing the Gaza- 
Strip with an additional 5 mcm/annum (in the pre-Oslo II Agreement Israel 
provided just by mcm! annum). This amount is part of the 1-8 mcm/annum that 
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Israel is committed to supply the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. al- 
Najar assured me that since the signing of the Oslo II Agreement up till February 
17,1999, Israel had not supplied the Strip with a single cubic metre (al-Najar 
interview, February 17,1999). 
Despite the water crisis in the Gaza-Strip, Israel tries to pump out the water of 
Gaza-Strip before it reaches the Gaza aquifer. Israel drilled tens of wells close to 
the `Green Line' in the north and east of the strip. The Palestinian Ministry of 
Planning and International Cooperation drafted a map of these wells (Map 5.1). 
The Gaza-Jericho Agreement did not mention any additional quantities of water for 
the Gaza-Strip regardless of the fact that it was facing a serious crisis. In the Oslo II 
Agreement, 5 mcm/annum were added to the Palestinian quota. This will be 
provided through the Israeli company Mekerot. So the PNA and the company are to 
draft a commercial Agreement regarding this provision (Oslo II Agreement, annex 
III, schedule 11). The weak point of this provision is that the agreement is not with 
the government of Israel, it is with an Israeli company. In practice Mekerot treated 
the PNA badly. Many times the representatives of the company refused to sit with 
those of the PWA to solve the problem of implementing the provisions of the 
agreement. The company also halted the flow of water to the strip on many 
occasions. 
Palestinian water rights on the West Bank are between 600-800 mcm/year. During 
the Israeli occupation Israel allowed Palestinians to use 200-228 million cubic 
meter/year (World Bank, 1993, vol. 4,54). This amount was provided by the 
aquifer water rather than the Jordan Basin. The 28 mcm/year which were added for 
the domestic use of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip do not meet 
Palestinian needs. 
Map 5.1 
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Another important factor is the rising level of Israeli fresh water consumption 
which is currently increasing by 15-20 mcm/year (Betriji, 1997,89). This means 
that if Israel maintains its high level of water consumption, then despite an increase 
in the Palestinian water quota by 28 mcm/year, the huge gap in water consumption 
rates between Palestinians and Israelis will remain. 
If any party (Palestinian or Israeli) wants to purchase water from the other side, the 
buyer must pay in full the real costs incurred by the supplier, including the cost of 
production at source and conveyance all the way to the point of delivery (Oslo II 
Agreement, Annex III, article 40, provision 18). This mean that the Palestinians 
have to purchase the water which is pumped from their territories, because Israel 
extracts the water from wells located in its settlements in the West Bank and Gaza- 
Strip to Israel, and then back again to the Palestinians. 
The price of the water that Mekerot provides for the Gaza-Strip is relatively high. 
Mekerot raised the price more than ten times between May 1994 and October 1996. 
The water price rose by 65 per cent in two years. In October 1996, this reached 1.17 
Shekel/cm (excluded VAT), while the cost of a cubic meter was 0.2 Shekel (PWA, 
1997,18). 
The cost of electricity and water in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip is higher than in 
Israel and Jordan. In this situation Palestinian agriculture and industry will not 
improve because there are no incentives for industry or agriculture to raise 
production or irrigate more land (Baidoun, 1998,28). If we compare the cost of 
water relative to GDP per capita for Palestinians and Israelis (1,720 and 12,170 US 
Dollar respectively), it works out that Palestinians are paying seven times as much 
as Israelis for domestic water consumption. 
Al-Najar stated that Palestinians are purchasing water for the Gaza-Strip from the 
water that Israeli settlements are pumping out of the Gaza-Strip. They are being 
forced to buy their own water back from Israel. The water that they are purchasing 
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from Israel is more expensive than that sold to Israelis (al-Najar interview. February 
18,1999). 
Palestinians consume about 37 per cent of what they demand as a result of using 
what is supplied and not what is needed. The Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) 
and the German Agency for Technical cooperation (GTZ) estimated the average net 
per capita domestic water consumption of about 41 litre/capita/day. whereas, the 
Palestinian demand was estimated by the GTZ as 110 litre/capita/day as an average 
per capita volume of domestic water (PWA, 1997 and GTZ, 1994 cited in Baidoun, 
1998,19). The table below illustrates the lack of water supply in the Palestinian 
territories. It is the poorest area in the region. The per capita volume of water in 
Israel is more than four times that of the Palestinian territories, where both sides 
share the same water resources. 
Table 5.5 
Comparative Water Supply, Litter/capita per day in 
the WBGS with other countries 
Country Average water supply Litter/capita per day 
Egypt 230 
Jordan 137 
Israel 280 
WBGS 62 
Source: World Bank 1997 
The efficiency of the Palestinian water distribution network is very poor with losses 
ranging from 40-60 per cent in most municipalities (World Bank's report 1993 
cited in Baidoun, 1998.19). This situation is a result of the lack of maintenance of 
the water network during the years of occupation. The Palestinian water network 
has remained in pre-1967 War conditions. With time its condition deteriorated and 
its efficiency decreased. 
Al-Najar stated that the World Bank is financing a project for the renovation of the 
water network in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. She believes that this project 
could reduce water losses. The World Bank is also financing a scheme for the repair 
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of some wells in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip (al-Najar interview. February 17. 
1999). 
The Joint Supervision and Enforcement Team (JSET) on the West Bank will be set 
up under the control and supervision of the Joint Water Committee (JWC). The 
function of the JSET is that of monitoring, supervising, and enforcing so as to 
rectify the situation whenever an infringement has been detected (Oslo II 
Agreement, annex III, article 40, provision 16: 17 and schedule 9). This role will be 
implemented in the Palestinian territories but not in Israel. The JSET will operate in 
all categories of zones A, B, and C in the West Bank. Therefore, an additional form 
of indirect Israeli occupation will come into being zones A and B. 
The treating, reusing or properly disposing of all domestic, urban, industrial, and 
agricultural sewage is another serious problem. In another provision of the Oslo II 
Agreement, both sides gave assurances that they would take the necessary measures 
for the physical protection of the water and sewage systems in their respective area 
and each side would reimburse the other party for any unauthorised use of or 
sabotage to the water and sewage systems situated in the zones under its 
responsibility serving the other side (Oslo II Agreement, Annex III, article 40, 
provision 3: 22: 23). 
Abu Safieh confirmed that the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) protested to 
Israel through the Palestinian-Israeli Joint Water Committee (JWC), but no Israeli 
measures were taken to stop the flow of Emanuel sewage (Abu Safieh interview, 
September 14,1998). In Mawasi Area between Rafah and Khan Younis, a 
Palestinian farmer showed me how the Israeli settlement close to his land dumped 
its sewage onto his cultivated land. This damaged the fertility of his land, which 
could no longer be worked (Interview with the public in December/January 1998. 
1999). 
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Table 5.6 
The gap between the Palestinian and Israeli consumption of water (1993) 
Palestinian 
side 
Israeli side Palestinian/ 
Israeli (%) 
Total consumption (mcm/year) 210 1,754 12 
Irrigation use 130 1,112(1) 12 
House use 70 536 13 
Industrial use 10 106 9 
Water consumption in all sectors per 
capita cm/year 
105 330 32 
Consumption in Irrigation sector per 
ca ita cm/year 
65 210 31 
Household consumption sector per 
capita cm/year 
35 100 35 
Growth in water consumption 
(mcm)(2) 
25 345 7 
Cost of one cm for household 
consumption (Us dollar) 
1 1 100 
Cost of one cm for irrigation (Us 
dollar) 
17 13 
Irrigated areas (1,000 dunum) 200 1,864 11 
Irrigated area per capita (dunum) 0.1 0.35 29 
Irrigated/cultivated (%) 5 50 10 
Irrigated/irrigable (%) 33 90 39 
Growth (1,000 dunum)(3) 0 340 0 
source: Elmusa, 1997,43. 
(1) This is included 200 mcm from the sewage treatment. 
(2) For the period 1967-1973. 
(3) For the period 1970-1990. 
In al-Kana Valley in Salfeet Province, the author saw the sewage of the Emanuel 
settlement flowing through the valley. The flood of sewage mixes with the fresh 
water of al-Kana stream which irrigate the Palestinian farms in the valley. It 
destroys the agriculture of the Palestinian peasants in the valley. One peasant whose 
home was destroyed in the valley told me 
My home was demolished due to the Israeli plea that it was built 
without permission ... 
Do the settlers of Emanuel have permission to 
send their sewage to the stream that makes its water undrinkable? 
(Interview with the public in December/January 1998.1999). 
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5.10 Agriculture 
There are 1.7 million dunums under cultivation in the West Bank. The majority of 
this lands is planted with olives, grapes, citrus, vegetables, almond family. and yield 
fields. Only five per cent of this land is irrigated. In the Gaza-Strip 177,000 dunums 
or 49 per cent of the strip are under cultivation. Of this area 106,000 dunums are 
irrigated agricultural land. The contribution of the agricultural sector in the 
Palestinian GDP ranges between 32.9 and 39.5 per cent in 1994 and 1990 
respectively. The surplus of the vegetable and fruit production of the Gaza-Strip 
was estimated in mid 1990's to be 130,000 ton/annum (ESCWA, 1997a, 2: 5). 
The PNA inherited a weak economy especially in the agricultural sector. This 
sector was targeted by the Israeli occupation, because it included the land and water 
which formed the heart of Israeli policy towards the Palestinian territories. 
The expansion of the Palestinian agricultural sector is directly related to the 
quantities of water that are allocated by Israelis. Israel controls and dominates the 
water in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip by issuing military orders governing the 
regulation of these resources. The Israeli legal system considers water resources as 
state property, and it leased these resources to the Israeli water company (Mekerot) 
for 49 years. Naturally Mekerot worked to serve the Israelis not Palestinians. 
The table below compares the position of agriculture for Palestinians and Israelis in 
1992, based on an estimated Palestinian population of 2 million. 
Table 5.7 
Position of the agriculture for Palestinians and Israel in 1992 
Palestinians Israelis Palestine/Israeli % 
Population (million) 2 5.2 39 
GDP ($million) 2,650 64,510 4 
Per Capita ($) 1,325 12.420 11 
Employees in agricultural sector (%) 33 3 1100 
Employees in all sectors (thousands) 219 1.650 13 
source: [ lmusa, 1997.19. 
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In the post-Oslo Agreement period the proportion of workers in the agricultural 
sector continued to occupy 30 per cent or more of the total Palestinian labour force. 
Despite the fact that there are eleven times more Palestinian agricultural workers 
than Israelis, as is clear in table 6.7, the area of irrigated Palestinian land per capita 
is only equal to 25 per cent of the area of Israeli irrigated land per capita. Israel was 
also able to water 90 per cent of its land, while Palestinians were only able to 
irrigate 33 per cent of theirs, as shown in table 6.6. As mentioned in the previous 
section, Israel used its power to restrict the water supply to Palestinians. Water 
resources, particularly in the West Bank, were greatly exploited by the Israelis. 
Irrigated agriculture is the main source of water consumption. Out of 800,000 
dunums in the Palestinian territories, 210,000 are irrigable land. The Israeli 
restrictions on well drilling have kept Palestinian irrigation supplies nearly constant 
at about 160 mcm/annum for the last 20 years, or 762 cm per dunum (PWA cited in 
Baidoun, 1998,19). Table 6.6 shows that in 1993 the West Bank and Gaza-Strip 
consumed 130 mcm. The PWA estimation could be more accurate because the 
PWA number is based on some projects conducted by the World Bank and other 
donors. 
As mentioned before there is no final estimate about the water resources and 
consumption. Tables 6.6 and 6.8 show different figures but give the same indication 
in water consumption and other related matters. Table 6.6 was drafted as a result of 
academic research, while table 6.8 was drafted by al-Najar who is the director of 
Water Development in the PWA. 
Table 5.8 
Water consumption in different sectors in the Palestinian territories and Israel 
The sector West Bank Gaza-Strip Israel 
Agriculture mcm/annum 95-100 85-90 1320 
House use mcm/annum 27-30 25-27 325 
Industry mcm/annum 3-5 2 125 
Total mcm/annum 125-135 108-115 1,770 
Source: al-Najar, 1998,5. 
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The Israeli settlement policy played the major role in the deterioration of 
Palestinian agriculture in the pre-Oslo Agreement and continued to play the same 
role in the peace period. As mentioned in chapters four and five, the Israeli 
settlement policy continued in the post-Oslo Agreement period. Israel supported the 
Israeli settlements and deprived the Palestinian farmers of their rights, and in 
particular their water rights. Israel tried and succeeded in many cases in 
confiscating the land of Palestinian peasants as shown in chapter two. For example, 
Israel provides the Israeli settlers in the Jordan Valley with 40mcm/annum, and at 
the same time it supplies the Palestinians of the West Bank with around 100 
mcm/annum for agricultural purposes. The population of the Israeli settlers in 
Jordan valley is less than 10,000, while the Palestinian exceeds 1.5 million on the 
West Bank. Although the Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley did not attract 
large numbers of Israelis, Israel continues pumping a huge amount of water to these 
settlements. If this water were directed to the West Bank, a considerable area of 
irrigable land could be irrigated. Agricultural production could increase, which 
would boost Palestinian GDP and thousands of employment opportunities would be 
created. 
Agricultural land is located in zone C, therefore the future of the development of 
this sector relies on Israeli wells. The water supply is essential for the expansion of 
this sector. As I mentioned before, Israel is willing to allocate the Palestinian water 
of the West Bank to its citizens, either Israelis in Israel or settlers in the settlements. 
The five years of the interim period proved that Israel is not willing to expand 
Palestinian agriculture. Israel is willing to enlarge its settlements whether they be 
urban or rural. It even created many new posts and settlements. It constructed many 
by-pass roads on the West Bank. In order to extend the settlements, build new spots 
and settlements, and pave by-pass roads, Israel resorted to confiscating tens of 
thousands of dunums, including thousands from agricultural land. 
The failure to develop Palestinian agriculture will raise food prices, because of the 
high population growth which is more than 6 per cent (natural growth plus numbers 
of Palestinian returnees). The current area of agricultural land, unless expansion 
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takes place, will not help solve the unemployment problem. but will hamper 
economic development. (UNCTAD, 1996,56). 
A group of Palestinian farmers in Salfeet were asked through an interview in 
January 1999, why they did not irrigate more of their irrigable land. They replied 
that water is not available to do so, because "our water (the water of the West 
Bank) is being pumped to Israel and the settlements of the West Bank". The aim in 
the past and now is thus not to increase the area of the irrigable land but rather to 
keep our irrigated land safe from confiscation for settlement activities. Some 
Palestinian farmers lost their irrigated land during the settlement process of 
confiscating land. Since the 1967 War the extending of irrigable land in Palestinian 
has been negligible. One of the farmers said that some olives trees on his farm close 
to the Emanuel settlement were uprooted by some settlers under the guard of the 
Israeli army. 
In the Gaza-Strip the PNA constructed new housing projects on the agricultural 
land. Palestinians believe that the major obstacle to Israeli settlement expansion is 
the presence of the Palestinian population in their homes. The Palestinian Minister 
of Housing said that we chose some new housing sites on rich agricultural land to 
develop housing projects because of their nearness to the settlements. The aim was 
to stop the expansion of these settlements by housing people on these projects. 
Hammad gave examples such as; al-Zahra Town in the southern of Nezarim 
settlement, and al-Karyah al-Namodajeya (Ideal Village) in the northern of Gaza 
City. He added that two other housing projects planned to be constructed in Khan 
Younis and Rafah near to the settlements of the two areas (Hamad interview, 
January 30,1999). 
Therefore, Palestinian agricultural land in the West Bank has been reduced in size. 
The same process has been followed in the Gaza-Strip, due to the population 
increase from both natural growth or the arrival of tens of thousands of Palestinian 
returnees in need of housing. The policy of Palestinian Ministry of Housing of 
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using agricultural land to construct residential developments also decreases the area 
of the agricultural land in the strip. 
Israeli agriculture also consumes seven times more water than Palestinian 
agriculture. Table 6.7 shows that workers in the agricultural sector make up 3-) per 
cent of the total Palestinian labour force, while in Israel it accounts for only 3 per 
cent. The Palestinian labour force is greater than the Israeli if the total populations 
are the same, because more than 50 per cent of Palestinians are between the ages of 
16-40 years, while Israeli society is the same as European societies. 
As mentioned in section three, the PNA's import of agricultural products from the 
Arab and Islamic states appears in the Al and A2 lists. According to article 8 of the 
Jordanian-Israeli agricultural Agreement signed on October 26,1995, Israel 
accepted the Jordanian demand to add new products to the two lists according to 
the PNA's request. Israel was also to allow the free pass age of Jordanian 
agricultural products to the PNA's territories (Agricultural Agreement between the 
government of the Jordanian Hashemite Kingdom and that of Israel). 
The Israeli practice regarding its agreement with Jordan was very clear. It is to 
isolate the Palestinian market from its neighbours (Jordan and Egypt) so as to 
become its sole market. The Minister of Trade and Economy stated that neither new 
products were added to the lists nor free movement of products was facilitated (al- 
Masri interview, September 10,1998). 
There was no change in the status of the distribution of water from Israelis to 
Palestinians during the post-Oslo Agreement except that 28 mcm (for domestic use) 
was added to the Palestinian quota as mentioned above. Israel did not respect this 
obligation particularly in the Gaza-Strip. Therefore, the domestic water situation 
deteriorated during the peace period. The quantities of water allocated for domestic 
use remained constant, while the population increased at least 25 per cent during 
the interim period 1994-1999. 
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The Palestinian territories have a short shore for fishing that is adjacent to the Gaza- 
Strip. Through the issuing of different military orders during the years of 
occupation, Israel was able to impose many restrictions on Palestinian fishing. In 
the post-Oslo Agreement period, some Israeli restrictions continued to apply to 
Palestinian fishing. One Palestinian fisherman claimed: 
Israeli obstacles continued daily in the interim period. The restrictions 
on the width that is allowed for us is the same ... this width is very poor for fishing we cannot see any improvement in the fishing sector in the 
peace period ... the Israeli attitude is the same ... I can confirm that 
nothing has changed from their side ... they are still dealing with us as 
an occupier force not as a peaceful neighbour (Interviews, 
Decemberl998-March 1999). 
5.11 The Palestinian Standard of Living 
Table 6.9 below shows that the Palestinian GNP after the post-Oslo Agreement fell 
below the level it reached during the Intifada period. This was due to the fall in the 
number of Palestinian workers in Israel. The Palestinian GDP saw some 
improvement in the interim period. For example the GDP increased by 11 per cent 
between 1994 (the year of the establishment of the PNA) and 1995. 
The GDP shows the real conditions of the Palestinian economy without reference to 
the Israeli labour market because the real GDP equals the real GNP minus the 
Palestinian workers' income from Israel as shown in table 6.9. In 1992 the income 
of Palestinian labour in Israel accounted for 30 per cent of the real GDP. This type 
of economy is an unhealthy one, and the Palestinian economic subordination is very 
clear. This is why the Palestinian economy suffered during the days of Israeli 
closure. 
Despite these closures and obstacles which hamper its improvement, the Palestinian 
economy shows an ability to advance and develop. We can imagine how much the 
Palestinian economy could progress if the Israeli obstacles were removed. These 
impediments can only be disposed of by the creation of a politically and 
economically independent Palestinian state. 
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In the post-Oslo Agreement period, Palestinian population growth could undermine 
the hope of the growth of per capita GDP. For example, the population growth 
between 1994- 1995, 1995-1996, and 1996-1997 was 6.6, and 7 per cent 
respectively, while the growth of GDP for the same periods was 11, minus 1, and 5 
per cent respectively. This means that the Palestinian population increased by 19 
per cent for the said three years, while GDP increased by 15 per cent for the same 
period. 
The Palestinian Minister of Finance believes that the rise in Palestinian real GDP 
was due to the increase in public expenditure and the expanding of the 
constructional sector and not as a result of the greater volume of agricultural or 
industrial products (Nashashibi, 1997,6: 25). 
The Palestinian economy has exhibited considerable resilience and an ability to 
regenerate growth after repeated external shocks. These shocks resulted from the 
different types of Israeli obstacles (U. N., 1997a, iv). 
Table 5.9 
Real National Income and Per Capita Income Estimates for the West Bank 
and Gaza-Strip, 1988-1992 Average and 1992-1997 
(in constant 1995 US$) 
End-Year 
Real GDP 
(US$ million) 
Real GNP 
(US$ million) 
Population 
(WBGS) 
Per Capita 
GDP (US$) 
Per Capita 
GNP (US$) 
1988/92 
Average 
3,657.13 4,910.69 1,710,200 2,150.52 2,889.87 
1992 3,728.55 5,003.68 1,864,500 1,999.76 2,683.66 
1993 3,196.55 3,892.25 1,974,000 1,619.33 1,971.76 
1994 3,551.90 3,996.65 2,114,000 1680.18 1,890.56 
1995 3,956.48 4,203.99 2,242,500 1,764.32 1.874.69 
1996 3,893.17 4,082.07 2,383,000 1,633.73 1,713.00 
1997 4,107.30 4,408.64 2,554,000 1,608.18 1,726.17 
Source: UN 1,1997,6. 
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5.12 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the impact of the control of land on the Palestinian 
economy. It showed that the control of land is directly related to Palestinian 
economic development. It showed that the early Palestinian hope of a prosperous 
economy after the Oslo Accords was directly related to an aspiration to control their 
land. The chapter also discussed the conditions of the Palestinian economic sectors 
during the post-Oslo Agreement and evaluated the impact on the lack of 
development in these sectors relating to the absence of the control of land. 
By highlighting the water crisis in Palestine during the pre and post-Oslo period the 
chapter showed that Israel remain in control of the water resources. It imposed 
limitations on the Palestinian expansion of certain economic sectors, particularly 
agriculture. The chapter demonstrated that land and water are interlocked, while 
water plays a role in Israeli territorial claims, the alienation of land has an impact 
on Palestinian access to water. 
In the 1970's the GNP of the West Bank doubled in eight years, while in the Gaza- 
Strip it doubled in eleven. This is considered to be the great achievement of the 
Palestinian economy. However this was not relaised through independent growth 
and self development. It was a result of the Palestinian subordination to the Israeli 
economy. When Israel faced an economic crisis in the 1980's, the GNP of 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip dropped sharply by 50 per cent in the 
West Bank and 30 per cent in the Gaza-Strip (Naqib, 1997,105). When Israel used 
its policy of closing the Palestinian territories, the ratio of unemployment rose and 
on occasion reached to 50 per cent. The fundamental problem of the Palestinian 
economy is its subordination to the political and economic decisions of Israel. 
The average Palestinian population growth in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip is 6 
per cent (3.9 per cent net growth and 2 per cent net population movement) (U. N.. 
1997a, 24). The 2 per cent came about even after the many Israeli obstacles and 
restrictions on the return of Palestinians. Palestinian population movement came as 
a result of the Oslo Agreement and its consequences. as the PLO members and 
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others were returned to the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. This growth of 6 per cent is 
a very high percentage in relation to the limited resources available to the PNA, 
therefore the Palestinian GNP per capita declined. The question arises as to how the 
Palestinian economy will cope with the return of hundreds of thousands of 
impoverished Palestinians to their homeland from the refugee camps in countries 
such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria if the same land restriction continue as in the 
interim period. 
The Palestinians the of Diaspora still refrain from investing their capital in their 
homeland. They expect to find everything set up to facilitate this investment, while 
Jewish capital outside Israel has been investing in Palestine since the first wave of 
Zionist migration. Jews are investing in the settlements of the West Bank and Gaza- 
Strip, despite the danger they face because of the settlement. The number of 
Palestinian investors from the Diaspora who invest in Palestine is very limited in 
relation to their numbers. The massive restrictions that the Israelis put in place to 
limit the influx of Palestinian capital from the Diaspora have also played their part 
in creating this situation. 
If Palestinian trade was released from Israeli obstacles and the agreements signed 
with Israel, its export would double and the majority of its export and import would 
go to and come from other Arab countries, Japan, U. S, and the European Union. 
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Foot-notes 
1. Paris Protocol see the Protocol and all the Palestinian-Israeli Agreements in the 
Israeli Foreign Ministry home page www. Israel-mfa. gov 
2. For more details about the Jordan River see Tantish, 1989,102-113 
3. Johnston Plan. For details of this plan see Elmusa, 1997 (3). Pp174 
4. The Israeli-Jordanian Accord of 1994. See the Israeli Foreign Affairs Home Page 
www. Israel-mfa. gov. il/mfa/go. asp? MFAHOOPCO PP27 
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Chapter Six: Land Ownership during the Interim 
Period 1994-1999 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter shows the relation between land registration and ownership and how it 
was affected by the control of land by way of three different categories during the 
interim period. It discusses the possibilities of resolving the ownership of land in 
the different categories of according to the Oslo classification. The chapter also 
shows the legal aspect of land ownership in the post-Oslo period. 
The Palestinian legislative process passed through two stages during the transitional 
period: firstly legislation by the PNA executive authority in the absence of the 
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC); second, legislation by the PLC after the 
Palestinian general election of 1996. Section two deals with these stages and the 
difficulties that faced the PNA in the judicial process with a focus on the future of 
Palestinian Land Tenure (section two). 
No fundamental changes have taken place in the interim with regard to Land 
Tenure in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. But we cannot ignore the efforts that the 
PNA have made in an attempt to resolve certain issues which have accumulated 
throughout Palestinian modern history. The PNA have made efforts in the Gaza- 
Strip which show in what way they may be able to resolve the problem of 
ownership of more than 20 per cent of the land etc. Sections and four and five deal 
with the PNA contribution to land ownership. 
6.2 Legislation in the Interim Period 
The legislative process in the interim period passed through two stages: the first 
continued from the establishment of the PNA in May 1994 until the Palestinian 
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general election of January 1996. The second covered the period up to May 4,1999 
-the last day of the interim period- (Abu Hanoud, 1998,21). 
Throughout the first stage, the PNA President and the Palestinian Cabinet 
(Executive Authority) held the legislative power. This authority was granted by and 
based on the Gaza-Jericho Agreement of May 4,1994. The agreement specified that 
the PNA should consist of one body of 24 members (Cabinet) which should carry 
out and be responsible for all legislative and executive powers and those 
responsibilities granted to it under the agreement. It also stated that the PNA's 
jurisdiction shall cover the Gaza-Strip and the Jericho area (Gaza-Jericho 
Agreement, article iv provision 1, article v provision 1a). Therefore, the President 
of the PNA and sometimes in association with the Palestinian Cabinet passed 
legislation and presidential decisions. Some of these laws were issued by the 
President without reference to the Cabinet. 
As a result of the Oslo II Agreement of September 28,1995, the general election 
took place in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip in January 1996. According to the 
declared agreement, the elected PLC took over responsibility for judicial issues and 
became the legislative authority. 
The PLC was the first elected, legislative and national council for Palestinians in 
their modem history. For Palestinians this was a new development and they lacked 
experience in running the Council. It was unclear whether they should be trying to 
resolve the problems which Israel had created or immediately attempting to create a 
new Palestinian legal system. During their modem history they did not share in the 
drafting of their laws (the laws that governed Palestinians were Ottoman, British, 
Jordanian, Egyptian, and Israeli Military Orders). There was also the daily 
Palestinian problem with the executive authority that came into existence and so on. 
During its first period of office the PLC concentrated more on political issues. the 
daily problems that faced the people, and how to run the Council itself, while in its 
second period the Council concentrated more on the legal issues of enacting 
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different laws. In this period, 27 laws were introduced to the Council, and in the 
third period the legislation process continued (Abdul Haq, 1998,9). 
Throughout these three periods from 1996 to 1999, the PLC enacted laws which 
attempted to unite the legal system in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. As mentioned 
in the second chapter, two legal systems applied in the Palestinian territories. 
Palestinian laws (Ottoman and British Mandate laws with little amendments by the 
Egyptian Administration) were applied in the Gaza-Strip 1948-1967, while 
Jordanian laws were used in the West Bank during the same period. Of course, this 
is in addition to the Israeli Military Orders which abolished or amended the 
majority of the Palestinian and Jordanian laws. 
The PNA guaranteed to use its power within its territorial jurisdiction. This 
jurisdiction, found in the Oslo II Agreement covers the West Bank and Gaza-Strip 
territory as a single territorial unit except for: first, issues that were to be negotiated 
in the permanent status negotiations such as: Jerusalem, settlements, and military 
locations; secondly, power and responsibilities not transferred to the PNA (Oslo II 
Agreement, article xvii, provision 1 and 4). 
Legislative power was guaranteed to the PNA according to the Oslo II Agreement 
which meant that any primary and secondary legislation, including basic laws, laws, 
regulations and other legislative acts. The agreement gave the Ra'ees (President) of 
the Executive authority the power to promulgate laws adopted by the PLC, and to 
issue secondary legislation, including regulations, relating to any matters specified 
and within the scope laid down in any primary legislation adopted by the PLC. But 
the agreement specified that "legislation, including amendments or abrogations of 
existing laws or military Orders, which exceeds the jurisdiction of the PNA or 
which is otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of the DOP and Oslo II 
Agreement shall have no effect and shall be avoidable" (Oslo II Agreement, article 
xviii, provisionl-4). 
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The agreement continued to guarantee the Israeli military governance of the West 
Bank and Gaza-Strip legislative, judicial and executive powers over areas not under 
the territorial jurisdiction of the PNA (Oslo II Agreement, article xvii. provision 4). 
Israeli settlers enjoy all the rights of the Israeli civil laws despite the fact that they 
are living in the occupied territories and the future of their settlements they are 
living in will be determined in the final status negotiations. The Palestinians of 
zone C continued to be governed by Israeli military laws. 
Throughout the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations after the Oslo rounds, Israel tried its 
best to guarantee only an executive power to the proposed Palestinian Council who 
would govern the Palestinian people in the interim period (Masharka, 1998,4). 
Despite the Israeli political system which is based on three authorities: executive, 
legislative, and judicial, the Council that Israel proposed at the beginning consists 
of 24 members with limited executive power. In the eyes of some western scholars 
Israel is considered the sole democratic state in the Middle East and yet it has 
rejected for many rounds the Palestinian right to have a Council with more than 24 
members with a legislative power. To win legislative power for the 88 members of 
the PLC, was a tough battle for the Palestinians in the negotiations. 
The PLC enacted legislation which exceeded its authority that was guaranteed to it 
in the Oslo II Agreement. It tried to take the first step towards Palestinian statehood 
by enacting legislation that covered all the Palestinian territories not just some areas 
of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip such as; zones A and B. Despite the fact that the 
PLC members recognised that these laws would not be applied in zone C. they 
promulgated the laws in order to confirm the Palestinian legal right over all the 
West Bank and Gaza-Strip. The new regulations also confirmed the unity of the 
Palestinian land and people in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. These laws also 
affirmed the Palestinian political aspirations to establish an independent state at the 
end of the interim period. Through these laws the PLC attempted to build the 
institutions which are essential for the creation of any state and make the 
Palestinian legal system compatible with that of the state. 
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More than one legal system has been applied to the Palestinian territories. In zone 
A, it governs all aspects of Palestinian life, while in zone C the Israeli militan- 
orders regulate some elements of Palestinian civil life while others are come under 
PNA laws. For example, matters relating to education, health and criminal issues 
(not related to security issues) have been transferred to the PNA. Those conceited 
with other civil affairs including the land (survey, registration, and transfer) or 
security issues are overseen by the Israeli military orders. 
When a Palestinian is in zone C. he is under different legislation than when he is in 
zone A. In zone B the Palestinian will be under two legal systems: the Israeli 
military orders with regard to security matters and the Palestinian laws relating to 
all civil affairs. In zone C security matters and civil affairs are an Israeli 
responsibility. There is no doubt that such legal conditions in the Palestinian 
territories negatively have affected the civil life of the Palestinian people including 
the land issues. The issues relating to land confiscation, land survey (which was 
halted after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967), land registration and 
transfer of ownership in zone C are an Israeli obligation. In zones A and B the land 
issues are the PNA responsibility. Therefore if a Palestinian citizen owns two tracts 
in zone A and another in zone C he will be subject to two different laws. 
As a result of the Palestinian-Israeli agreements, the PNA was unable to establish a 
comprehensive and united legal system within the West Bank and Gaza-Strip 
because of the following reasons: 
Firstly, not all responsibilities of all aspects of Palestinian life were transferred to 
its jurisdiction. Secondly, the agreements with Israel gave the Israeli military 
government the authority to continue issuing military orders controlling some 
aspects of Palestinian life. Thirdly, the PNA has no power over the Israelis in the 
West Bank and Gaza-Strip even inside the territories that had passed to its full and 
direct control. For example, if an Israeli citizen committed offences in zone A and 
B the PNA has no criminal jurisdiction over him (Oslo II Agreement. Annex IV. 
Provision 2a). This means that the PNA has no authority over the Israeli settlements 
and settlers in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. In this matter they would follow the 
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Israeli legal system. The PNA are not allowed to interfere in the life of the settlers 
though their puissance is a clear interference in Palestinian life. Fourthly'. the PNA 
have no power over the Israelis. The Israeli military government however has 
jurisdiction over Palestinians that are not living in the PNA areas. Israel has 
different levels of power over Palestinians in zones B, and C as mentioned above. 
This type of control was shown in detail in previous chapters. 
6.3 The Legal Changes with Regard to Land Ownership 
On May 20,1994 the President of the PNA issued his first decision confirming the 
continuation of the application of the laws and legislation which were to be applied 
in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip (al-Waqa'ye al-Filistinia, 1994). The order 
abolished many Israeli military orders which were enacted after the 1967 War. The 
laws governing the ownership of land before the 1967 War from 1948-1967 
(Palestinian laws and Jordanian laws) would be applied in the PNA territories. The 
decision was issued as a result of signing the Cairo Agreement, therefore, the 
Egyptian laws were to govern the Gaza-Strip and the Jordanian laws the Jericho 
area. Due to the Israeli redeployment from the West Bank the Jordanian laws were 
extended to cover zones A and B. As for the land laws, all the Israeli restrictions 
(Military Orders) that were imposed during their occupation were abrogated and 
replaced by Egyptian and Jordanian laws. 
Neither the PNA Cabinet nor the PLC issued any comprehensive legislation or 
amended the previous laws regarding land tenure which govern land ownership or 
registration in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. The Palestinian laws (Mandate laws 
and Egyptian amendments) continued to be applied in the Gaza-Strip, while 
Jordanian laws applied at the West Bank (Tamari interview, October 11,1998). 
The PLC recognised the danger that Palestinian land is under as a result of the 
Israeli settlement activities in the post-Oslo Agreement. It issued 23 resolutions 
relating to the land and resisting the Israeli settlement activities in its first two 
rounds 1996 and 1997 (Abdul Haq. 1998.10). The negative aspect of these decrees 
was that neither could be brought into force on the ground as the area was under 
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Israeli control. Therefore, no change occurred particularly in relation to rulings 
regarding the confiscation of land and house demolition. 
The PLC in its decree No. 2/13/181 on June 19,1997 acknowledged the Palestinian 
necessity of enacting a new Land Tenure law for the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. 
Therefore the PLC asked the PLO ambassadors in neighbouring and European 
countries to provide the Council with their land tenure laws (PLC resolution No. 
2/13/181). 
The Council adopted many orders relating to the resistance of the Israeli settlement 
policy. The Council's decision No. 178/12/2 considered the rural areas that were 
threatened with confiscation for the Israeli settlements as national priority areas for 
Palestinian development (al-Majles 1,1998,35). The different means for 
implementing this concept by Palestinians and Israelis is obvious. The Israeli 
national priority settlements had a lot of government support, while Palestinian 
villages and their land are unable to receive PNA support: this land is not under 
Palestinian control. Chapters four and five explained the Israeli policies which 
interrupted and prevented the development of zone C. 
During the interim period, the PLC expressed the need for Palestinian society to 
have its own Land Code governing this crucial issue and to unify the legal system 
in this regard. But it did not express that such tenure is crucial in the interim period. 
This can be deduced from the laws which were enacted by the Council or were in 
the process of being enacted. During the interim period no draft of a law was 
submitted to the PLC, either from the executive authority or from the members of 
the PLC. 
On May 23,1996, according to the request of the PLC Committee for Land and 
Resisting Settlement, the PLC decided to ask the executive authority to study the 
possibility of forming a Palestinian Land and Survey Authority. This authority was 
to deal with the problems of land and its ownership (PLC decree No. 1/6/39). 
Despite the importance of the establishment of such an authority which the 
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executive authority recognised, the PLC decision was not executed during the 
interim period (PLC Committee for Land and Resisting Settlement, 1997c). More 
details about the Land Authority can be found in section four. 
Due to the circumstances that the PNA had dealt with which have been described in 
the previous sections, it became increasingly difficult for the PLC to enact or even 
amend a new law concerning the ownership of land. If the PLC had ordained a new 
Land Code, this would have affected the heart of Palestinian sovereignty. Under the 
interim period circumstances, the PNA was not able to apply its new Land Code 
over the greater part of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. The PLC passed other civil 
laws that indicated the unity of the Palestinian territories as a step to Palestinian 
statehood. 
But, it is not only these circumstances that compel the PNA to maintain the laws 
that govern the ownership of land in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip without 
amendment or changes. The Palestinian Minister of Justice believes that the 
changes or amendments of the Land Code are unnecessary to be useful. He added 
that in many cases the amendment caused more unexpected problems rather than 
solving the disputes (Abu Medain interview, February 17,1999). The most 
important step that should be taken by the PNA is the creating of a Palestinian land 
and survey authority (see section 7.5.1), rather than the issuing of a new land code. 
The main target of this authority should be to carry out a surveying in order to 
determine the ownership of land. As mentioned above, 2/3 of the land of the West 
Bank is not registered and people enjoy the ownership of large tracts of this land by 
traditional means. The survey will seem as an appropriate introduction to the 
registration of the land in the name of its historical owners. The land that has had 
no traditional owners for generations will be transferred to the government. 
Palestinians should not be rushed into drafting the land code but they should start a 
survey of the land. Around 29 per cent of the West Bank became zones A and B 
due to the first Israeli redeployment of 1995 (see map 2.1). As a result of the 
implementation of the Wye River Memorandum around 42 per cent of the West 
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Bank fell into zones A and B where the land survey and registration is a Palestinian 
responsibility. 
6.4 The PNA's Measures to Solve Some Problems of the Land 
ownership in the Gaza-Strip 
In the eastern Gaza-Strip from Rafah to the Gaza Valley, there is around 70.000 
dunums which have not been registered since the Ottoman rule. Neither the British 
Mandate nor the Egyptian administration surveyed this land as a step towards its 
registration. It was not in the Israeli military government interests to register the 
land, rather were they more motivated to confiscate the land from the Palestinians 
as a means of uprooting them. These 70,000 dunums was owned by Palestinians, 
who have lived and cultivated it for generations. This land is known as Beir el- 
Saba 'a Land (Map 6.1). 
In late 1990's the Finnish government financially and technically supported a 
project for the determination of the ownership of this land. The scheme known as 
the Finnish Project will end the debate over ownership. The Palestinian Minister of 
Justice confirmed that, the PNA acknowledge and recognise that this land belongs 
to its historical and original owners, those hundreds of citizens who inherited it 
from their fathers and grandfathers without any legal impairment since, and even 
before Ottoman rule (Abu Medain interview, February 17,1999). 
There is no doubt that the ownership of this land would go to the people not to the 
government. The people cultivated it and inherited it for generations and owned it 
by traditional forms of holding. The PNA recognised this fact and tried to solve this 
problem on that basis. The solution is serves the interests of the citizens. The 
survey of the Northern area of the project has finished and the next step will be 
taken is to announce the findings of the survey and to give the people the right to 
raise objections against the results of the survey or to present proof of alternative 
ownership. Waleed Ayoob. the commissioner of the scheme noted that procedures 
for registering this land in the name of its historical owners will pass through a 
legal process. which will take time. The work in the southern area of the project 
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will start at the beginning of the year 2000, where the same process will be adopted. 
Ayoob confirmed that the plan will be completed by mid 2001. when all the 70.000 
dunums will be registered in the name of their owners. He confirmed that these will 
pay only one per cent of the land value (Interview, December 20.1999). 
Under the Egyptian administration (1948-1967), they tried to hand over to the 
Palestinians a large amount of governmental land in the Gaza-Strip. This attempt 
began in 1962 and continued until 1967. This land was allocated for agricultural 
purposes, where it was estimated that there were more than 20,000 dunums in the 
northern Gaza-Strip, and more than in the southern (Ayoob interview, December 
20,1999). 
The best known programmes regarding this undertaking were those of Mashro' 
Amer (Amer Project) in the southern Gaza-Strip and Mashro' Naser (Naser Project) 
in the northern Gaza-Strip. The Egyptian's aim was to increase the agricultural land 
and to encourage people to cultivate more cultivatable land. The difference between 
Beir el-Saba 'a Land and the land of the Amer and Naser schemes was that land in 
the former area had been inherited for generations, while that in the latter two 
projects had been uninhabited and uncultivated. The Egyptians sold this 
governmental land at public auctions. People could pay by instalments. The 
Egyptian administration divided the payment into five instalments to be paid per 
annum or one instalment every two years. When the war of 1967 broke out and 
Israel occupied the Gaza-Strip, people had not paid all the instalments. 
When the Israeli military government was formed as a result of their victory in the 
1967 War, the Israelis decided to continue the Egyptian initiative and asked 
Palestinians to pay the remaining instalments. But Palestinians refused to complete 
their remaining instalments to the government of occupation except a small number 
of people. The Palestinians have never looked on the Egyptian administration in the 
Gaza Governorates 
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Gaza-Strip as an occupying power as they do the Israelis. Palestinian public opinion 
respected the Egyptian efforts in the Gaza-Strip over the 1948-1967 period. 
When the PNA came into existence in the mid-1990's it tried to solve this problem. 
The PNA's solution as the Minister of Justice explained was that: 
People should pay the remittance of the instalments but not at the same 
price as inbefore the 1967 War. The dunum was sold to the people for 
several Egyptian Pounds, whereas its price is currently tens of 
thousands and even in some places it is in hundreds of thousands of US 
Dollars. In some regions the area was converted from an agricultural 
area to a housing development and its price increased sharply as a 
result. Abu Medain confirmed that the PNA will recognise the 
instalments that were paid during the Israeli occupation (Abu Medain 
interview, February 17,1999). 
He added that the land should be valued according to its current value and the 
remaining instalments paid in relation to that value. For example, if the purchaser 
paid during the Egyptian administration two instalments out of five, which means 
that he paid 40 per cent of the cost of the land, he has still to pay 60 per cent of its 
current value. In addition to that he confirmed that the PNA had decided to exempt 
the owners from 40 per cent of the remaining amount that the purchaser has to pay 
to the PNA (Abu Medain interview, February 17,1999). 
The means by which the PNA dealt with the remaining instalments for the land 
(Ard al-Agssat) were similar to those of the Israelis, the difference being that the 
PNA decreased the value of the remaining instalments by 40 per cent. The Israeli 
estimate which was always very high was made by an Israeli military officer, while 
the Palestinian evaluation was more reasonable. 
If we remove Ard al-Agssat from the government land in the Gaza-Strip, we will 
find that this land (without the settlements) forms less than five per cent of the area 
of the Gaza-Strip. In this regard, the Minister of Housing, told the author: 
Five per cent of the land of the Gaza-Strip is definitely not sufficient for 
future generations to provide for public needs such as hospitals, 
schools, parks, housing projects etc. (Hamad interview, January 30. 
1999). 
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Waleed Ayoob, the adviser of the Minister of Housing and a former director of the 
government land department in the Gaza-Strip, confirmed that more than 50 per 
cent of the government land of the Gaza-Strip is occupied by Israeli settlements. He 
added that these have already been built on government and not on private land. 
Private land that was confiscated for settlement purposes was a very small area 
(Ayoob interview, October 3,1998). It is clear that in the same way as the Israeli 
military authorities the PNA have no interest in considering any land that was 
inhabited or cultivated for generations and not registered as government land. The 
question arises as to what and how much land the PNA will leave for future 
generations of the Gaza-Strip for vital public projects and requirements. For the 
survival of the people of the Gaza-Strip, the PNA should struggle to eradicate the 
Israeli settlements from the strip as these settlements prevent Palestinian expansion 
on government land which already constitutes only 5 per cent. 
During the Israeli occupation a small number of people accepted the Israeli 
proposal to exchange their private property for government land. The exchange 
came as a result of the fact that the private land was surrounded by government 
land. The Israeli military government confiscated the government land in order to 
establish a new settlement and expand an existing one, so the private land was 
confiscated. The military proposed to exchange this private land for government 
land in other location. Very few people accepted this demand so the exchange took 
place for that minority (Abu Medain interview, February 17,1999). 
The director of the government land department in the Gaza-Strip confirmed that 
the PNA would not recognise this exchange, because Israel was an occupying 
power and it had no legal right to change the ownership of land in the occupied 
territories. Abu Arafat believes that the exchange took place between a powerful 
party (military government) who compelled the second and weaker party (a 
Palestinian legal and original owner of the land) to accept the transfer (al-Debari 
interviewx, October 6,1998). 
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In the Mawasi Area, there is some government land which is cultivable (1). The 
PNA offered it for lease for 1-3 years following a decision by the president of the 
PNA. The aim of this order is to cultivate more land that is close to the Israeli 
settlement chain in Rafah and Khan Younis (Qatif Chain); in an attempt to stop the 
expansion of the settlements in the area (al-Debari interview, October 6,1998). 
al-Debari confirmed that this land is estimated to be about 3,000-4,000 dunums. He 
stated that the Ministry of Housing was and still is responsible for government land, 
25 per cent of which has already been leased. The lease was given to the people 
who had cultivated this land for a long time, but the Ministry's condition was that 
the lease should not exceed five dunums per person. The leaseholder should also 
have experience in agriculture and a personal history of cultivating land. He added 
that those people who worked this land before the Israeli occupation would be dealt 
with in a different way from those who had done so after the Israeli occupation (al- 
Debari interview, December 21,1999). 
6.4.1 The Land Registries in the Gaza-Strip 
As a result of the war of 1956, Israel occupied the Gaza-Strip for three months. 
Before its withdrawal, Israel seized all the land registries. The Egyptian 
administration overcame this problem after the 1956 War by issuing new title deeds 
in different forms such as a certificate of mukhtar (head of the village or in some 
cases the head of the family or tribe), the owner's copy of the title deed, returning to 
the tax registries, etc (al-Dahdoh interview, October 4,1999). 
Israel not only appropriated the Land registries of the Gaza-Strip, but also others 
belonging to other provinces of Mandate Palestine. In the Gaza Land Registration 
Offices, there were records belonging to provinces such as, Hebron. Beer Sheva. 
and the southern coastal area (al-Dahdoh interview, October 4.1999). 
The same Israeli attitude was repeated in the 1967 War when the military 
government confiscated these registries and transferred them to Israel. al-Dahdoh 
told the author that when he was the head of the land registration office in the Gaza- 
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Strip in 1970s, he saw all the Gaza-Strip registries during a visit to Israel (al- 
Dahdoh interview, October 4,1999). 
Al-Dahdoh confirmed that after the 1967 War the Land Registration Office 
attempted to reregister all the land of the Gaza-Strip. He added that the office was 
able to compile land registries for the Gaza-Strip in a short period of time. He also 
confirmed to the author that in the early 1970's Israel gave a copy of the land 
registries to the Gaza-Strip Land Registration Office. Registries belonging to 
Hebron, Beer Sheva, and the southern coastal area of Mandate Palestine were not 
returned to the Gaza's office (al-Dahdoh interview, October 4,1999). 
On the eve of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza-Strip in May 1994, the 
Palestinian employees in the Gaza Registration Office smuggled out all the 
registries and hid them. All that remained in the Gaza Registration Office were 
some very old registries which had no value. By the time the Israelis discovered the 
Palestinian action, there was no time for them to recover the registries, because 
their troops were preparing to evacuate the city (al-Dahdoh interview, October 4, 
1999; Ayoob interview, October 3,1998). This operation may have helped the PNA 
to maintain the people's land rights in the strip, particularly when we know that 
many land disputes between Palestinians themselves were not resolved during three 
decades of occupation. During the years of occupation the people tried to solve 
their disputes without recourse to the courts. For example, as a result of the 1967 
War, theose Palestinians who were not in the Gaza-Strip during the course of the 
war were considered absentees. According to Israeli military orders, the land that 
belongs to an absentee will fall under the authority of the Israeli custodian for the 
absentees. consequently people prefer to solve their problems in the traditional 
manner. This way left many disputes regarding land ownership unresolved. 
6.4.2 Land Registries of the Israeli Settlements in the Gaza-Strip 
It should be understood that in the Gaza-Strip, the PNA have all the land registries 
(Fischbach, 1997.41) including these of the land that the settlements were built on. 
The PNA should estimate the area of the Gaza-Strip settlements and it should also 
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accurately estimate the governmental land that was used for Israeli settlements. The 
ownership picture of the land in the Israeli settlements in the Gaza-Strip is very 
clear vis-ä-vis the picture on the West Bank. 
The most of the land in Israeli settlements in the Gaza-Strip was captured and 
leased by the military government to the Israeli settlers. The government land 
leasing process took place in the military government offices. From the beginning 
of the occupation, Israel kept the documents of each settlement with the director of 
the government land department (Israeli military officer). Those Palestinians who 
worked in the housing department of the `Israeli civil administration' were not 
allowed to see the lease agreements (Ayoob interview, October 3,1998). On the eve 
of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza-Strip, the Israelis took all the documents 
proving the agreement leases of this land. The PNA has no data about the lease, 
such as why the land was leased, to whom (Israeli individuals, official institutions, 
or companies) for how long the contract was valid, and so on. The PNA asked the 
Israeli side to hand over these contracts many times, but they ignored the 
Palestinian demand. al-Debari confirmed to the author that during the meeting 
between the PNA and the Israeli officials, Israelis informed them that the land is 
identical to the land of Tel Aviv. It is under Israeli responsibility and it will 
continue like this (al-Debari interview, December 21,1999). 
The Israeli military government leased a great deal of governmental land to 
Palestinians as well as Israelis. Some of it was leased to Israeli citizens for 
commercial or industrial purposes. Ayoob believes that Israelis did not pay the rent 
of the land despite having no legal right to the land leased in the occupied territories 
(Ayoob interview, October 3,1998). 
International law prohibits the occupying power from giving the land of the 
occupied territories to its citizens. But Israeli individuals benefited from the Gaza- 
Strip government land and were able to establish their own businesses where they 
employed Palestinians on the land that should have been allocated to the 
Palestinian's development and improvement. 
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6.5 The PNA's Measures to Solve Some Problems of the Land 
Ownership in the West Bank 
As mentioned in chapters one and two, the question of land ownership in the West 
Bank has still not been settled. Around 2/3 of the land there has not been surveyed, 
therefore, these large areas were not recorded in the registration offices. Israel dealt 
with this land as state land and gave itself the right to expropriate hundreds of 
thousands of dunums for settlement purposes. Most of the `state land' that was 
seized was cultivated or inhabited by Palestinians (2). This policy of classifying 
unregistered land as `state land' continued during the post-Oslo Agreement. For the 
Israeli governments, the meaning of unregistered land (state land) in the occupied 
territories even after Oslo wass to uproot Palestinians and settle Jews. 
To prevent these lands being confiscated by the Israeli military authorities, some 
villagers in the Hebron Governorate proposed before the PLC members that their 
land which was not entered in the land registries should be put under PNA 
ownership (PLC Committee for Land and Resisting Settlement, 1997a). This 
proposal was not realistic, but the question arises why the original owners 
suggested such a thing, despite the belief that this is their land inherited for 
generations. 
The director of government land in the Ministry of Housing on the West Bank 
stated that in several cities of the West Bank there are some places that have not yet 
been surveyed. In a city like Bethlehem, more than 20 per cent of its area has not 
been surveyed. But this does not mean that the owners of these lands have no 
documents that prove their ownership. People have certain documents but not tabo. 
These were issued to them as an introduction to the survey and registration of their 
land and handed out by the Jordanian government 1948-1967. The PNA recognised 
the Jordanian documents and are dealing with them as official proof of the land 
ownership (Sha'lan interview, December 24,1999). 
As a result of Israeli redeployment in the West Bank, zones A, B. and C were 
connected to each other. The Israeli withdrawal divided some parcels of land. This 
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means that the same parcel is located in two areas such as; zones A and C or zones 
B and C. As mentioned above the responsibility of land registration in zones A and 
B is the PNA, while zone C is under Israeli jurisdiction. Where there is a common 
parcel divided between zones A and C or zones B and C. the Israeli military 
government took the registration document of that parcel, as a part of it is located in 
the Israeli area of responsibility known as zone C (al-Maj les 1,1998.28). Sha'lan 
confirmed that until the end of 1999, Israel had not supplied the PNA with a copy 
of these documents (Sha'lan interview, December 24,1999). As long as the parcel 
is divided between the two jurisdictions, it is helpful for both to have the same 
documents for it. 
Even some documents related to plots located in zones A and B were seized by the 
Israelis on the eve of their withdrawal from these areas. Some of these documents 
were returned to the PNA after long and hard negotiations, while others are still in 
Israeli hands, and they are refusing to hand them over to the PNA (Sha'lan 
interview, December 24,1999). The question arises as to why Israel is so interested 
in having such documents and does not surrender them to the PNA. This Israelis 
behaviour gives evidence to the idea that there are many cases of Israelis purchasing 
land illegally. Therefore, they are concerned to conceal the fake transfer of land. 
Palestinians have become familiar with the Israelis procrastinating on many issues, 
including those relating to land. The post-Oslo period has revealed that Israeli 
secondary interests are over the implementation of the agreed provisions even if the 
provision is clear. 
In Hebron, the Israelis showed a readiness of hand over 90 per cent of the land 
registries of the city to the PNA after the signing of the Hebron Protocol 1997 
(more details about this Protocol in chapter three). The PNA were determined to 
obtain all the registries of the city (Tareefi interview, August 20,1998). 
Another type of land on the West Bank that has been inherited from the Ottoman 
rule and the British Mandate is the mosha' land which is still found on the West 
Bank (it is dealt with in detail in chapter one of the study). Thousands of dunums 
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are registered as mosha'. For example 2,000 in the Boreen village of Nablus 
Governorate are in this category of land ownership (PLC Committee for Land and 
Resisting Settlement, 1997c). 
In some areas a partial solution for the problem of mosha' land was made by the 
British Mandate (see chapter one). Israel did not make any effort to solve the 
ownership problem of this category of land. The PNA also did not take any 
practical action to resolve this complex phenomenon of land ownership. The PNA 
took action by passing regulations to settle ownership. The agreements signed with 
Israel did not prohibit it from taking such action, and did not even mentione mosha' 
land. This category of land is present in zones B, and C. Therefore, the PNA could 
start its operation in zone B. 
6.5.1 The Palestinian Land Authority (PLA) 
When the PLC decided to set up the PLA, they asked the Palestinian Executive 
Authority to implement the decision and create this authority. The PLC aimed to 
put an end to the unregistered land that was inhabited or cultivated by Palestinians 
particularly, on the West Bank, so that the West Bank was the primary target for the 
PLC resolution. The main function of the land authority that the PLC proposed was 
to take responsibility for surveying the hundreds of thousands of dunums on the 
West Bank that were not registered, as a legal first step to registering them in the 
land registries (Tamari interview, October 11,1998). 
The PLC decision was also an attempt to stop all the illegal processes of 
transferring land to Israeli hands (military government, companies or individuals) 
that mean taking place particularly, on the West Bank. As mentioned in chapter 
two, many illegal transfers have taken place in the West Bank. Fake authorisations 
from persons were used to complete some conveying of land to Israelis without the 
knowledge of those people (Tamari interview, October 11,1998). 
al-Dahdoh describes the position of the land ownership and registration on the West 
Bank as an area which is still entering a tailspin stage (al-Dahdoh interview, 
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October 4,1998). Israel benefited from the conditions of land ownership that were 
inherited from the Jordanians and the British Mandate. This situation left hundreds 
of thousands of dunums without registration or survey that enabled Israel to 
confiscate it for its settlement expansion and on the plead that it was `state land'. 
Bearing in mind that most registered land on the West Bank is situated in zones A 
and B. As mentioned in previous chapters these zones cover the main cities and the 
built-up area of the villages. The greater part of unregistered land is located in zone 
C which is under full Israeli control. Therefore, the PNA has no responsibility to 
deal with land ownership in about 70 per cent of the West Bank. This percentage 
increased after the implementation of the Wye River Memorandum of 1998. Up to 
early 2000 the PNA controlled 42 per cent of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip as 
zones A and B. 
Tamari replied, that the land authority can and should start working in zones A and 
B where land registration is under PNA responsibility (Tamari interview, October 
11,1998). There is no doubt that starting a survey and registering the land in areas 
A and B will give the proposed land authority appreciable experience to continue 
their work in areas from which Israel will withdraw. If the PNA did not reach 
agreement with Israel on the main issues (refugees, settlements, border, water, and 
Jerusalem), the interim period would be extended and this happened after May 4, 
1999 (last day of the interim period). It was expected that both sides would not 
reach final agreement in the year 2000. The PNA is required to begin the survey in 
zones A and B by the PLA. 
There is no doubt that the establishing of the PLA is a progressive step towards 
solving the complexities of land ownership on the West Bank. But the main 
obstacle to the success of this authority will be the presence of the Israeli 
occupation. Their success means the success of the peace process, because most 
Palestinian land under Israeli occupation is still part of the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict, which should be solved in the permanent status negotiations that start in 
late 1999. 
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The Palestinian Minister of Housing stated that the PNA asked the World Bank to 
financially support the setting up of the PLA. Therefore, the PNA and the World 
Bank negotiated the Palestinian demand in several meetings. The Finnish 
government will also help by giving technical and financial support. The 
Palestinian Executive authority acknowledged that the main function of this 
authority is to survey and then register the unregistered land which international aid 
is going to cover. Hamad confirmed that the PLA would come into existence in the 
year 2000 (Hamad interview, December 23,1999). 
There is no doubt that the differences between the various Palestinian ministries 
connected to the land issue (Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Housing, and Ministry 
of Finance) also play a role in delaying the formation of such an authority. A 
Palestinian official confirmed to the author that differences between the Ministry of 
Housing and the Ministry of Justice concerning the structure and responsibilities of 
such an authority with regard to its role, were obvious. He added that departments 
of the PLA would be cut from the two ministries. It took a long time for both 
ministries to get a unified attention to the role of the PLA. 
6.5.2 Taxes for Purchasing and Selling land 
Until the interim period, taxes for the purchasing and selling of land were around 
five per cent for each process. This percentage is relatively high and was inherited 
from the British Mandate. Therefore, many land purchasing transactions took place 
between people without recording the transfer in the Land Registration Office 
(Tabo). The PNA through the Ministry of Justice decided to decrease this tax to one 
per cent only (Abu Medain interview, February 17,1999). 
The PNA's aim in this decision is to encourage people to register the transfer of 
land in the official place where people's rights can be preserved. Also the decree is 
an attempt to put an end to many problems of land ownership that have arisen in the 
West Bank and Gaza-Strip due to the failure to register the land in the Land 
registration Offices. This will serve as a new financial resource for the PNA if 
people register their land in the land official offices. Previously, the great 
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proportion of the operation of baying and selling land occurred between people in 
the presence of a lawyer without registering the transfer officially or paying the five 
per cent tax. 
In practice, the decision to decrease the purchasing and selling tax has a positive 
aspect and has encouraged people to register the land transfers in the official 
registries, where the vast majority of land transfers are taking place in 1999 (al- 
Debari interview, December 21,1999). 
6.6 The Absentees' Properties 
As stated in chapter two, the Israeli custodian of absentee properties took 
responsibility for properties of Palestinians who fled or were compelled to leave 
their homes in the War 1967. As a result of the signing of the Oslo Agreement, 
thousands of Palestinians returned to the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. Many 
absentees were among those returnees, who enquired about their properties. 
In the Gaza-Strip, the Minister of Justice and the adviser to the Minister of Housing 
confirmed that all the properties of the absentees in the Gaza-Strip had returned to 
their rightful owners. The properties of the Gaza absentees is not in the form of 
large areas of land but of houses, flats and taxi numbers (Abu Medain interview, 
February 17,1999; Ayoob interview, October 3,1998). 
On the West Bank all matters related to absentee land is under the authority of the 
Department of Government Land in the Ministry of Housing. Sha'lan, the director 
of this department stated to the author that any person who, according to the Israeli 
military, is considering a absentee, must prove his rightful ownership of the land 
which is located in zones A or B. The PNA will release his property direct (Sha'lan 
interview, December 24,1999). 
The PNA abolished the Israeli absentee law as it gave the absentee the right to 
repossess his properties if he authorised someone to administer them during his 
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absence, bearing in mind that the release of the properties should be in azones A or 
B which come under PNA jurisdiction (al-Debari interview, October 6,1998). 
The types of properties of the West Bank absentees are different to those in the 
Gaza-Strip. Hundreds of thousands of dunums pass to the Israeli military 
government by the mere fact of declaring it absentee property on the West Bank. In 
zone C, by contrast with the PNA attitude towards the absentees, Israel did not turn 
over the properties of the Palestinian returnees and continues to deal with them as 
absentee properties. 
This Israeli behaviour is not surprising as Israel has had control of Palestinian Arab 
properties since 1948 (as a result of the 1948 War) when the Palestinian left their 
cities and villages to live in Israel. These Palestinian properties were considered 
absentees properties regardless of the fact that their owners lived in Israel and 
enjoyed Israeli nationality. 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the problematic issues linked to the struggle over the 
ownership of land by individuals and government. The complexities of land 
ownership in Palestinian were the legacy of more than a century. Each ruler tried to 
interpret the land tenure to serve his own interests, particularly the Israeli military 
government. In this regard the Egyptian administration to the Gaza-Strip (1948- 
1967) interpreted the land tenure to serve the Palestinian people. We can say that 
the Egyptian took the right steps to deal with land ownership in Palestine and that 
the PNA should continue them. 
The application of the more than one law regarding land ownership in the West 
Bank and Gaza-Strip damaged the PNA performance, but there is no doubt that the 
territorial continuation in the Gaza-Strip helped them to solve many problems 
regarding land possession, while the cantonisation of the West Bank into different 
zones became a major obstacle in solving the land ownership problem which has 
been passed down for more than a century. 
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As Palestinian history has shown the transfer of land was not the Palestinian wish. 
The setting up of the PLA is vital to stem the transfer of land into the Jewish hands. 
This may happen in zones A and B which made up around 35 per cent of the West 
Bank until May 1999. 
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Foot-notes 
1. This land was registered in the name of the British High Commissioner, and 
under the Egyptian administration of the Gaza-Strip 1948-1967 it was recorded in 
the name of the Egyptian Administrator Ruler. At the time people illegally 
cultivated the majority of this land. The PNA and the previous governments did not 
recognise the ownership of those people and consider them illegal owners. 
2. The situation of unregistered land on the West Bank is similar to the said 70,000 
dunum of the Gaza-Strip, that were handed down by Palestinians for centuries 
rather than decades. It is not the fault of the people who inherited this land that the 
previous government did not carry out a survey of these lands as an preamble to its 
registration. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has divided the struggle over land into three different stages. First the 
period of the Ottoman rule, the British Mandate, and the post-Israeli state which 
lasted until June 1967; second, the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza- 
Strip from 1967-1993 and third, the struggle over land in the post-Oslo Agreement. 
The last named has been the focus of the thesis covering the period between 1993 
and May 1999. 
Within the first stage, since the 1880s, Jewish settlement in Palestine was small and 
slow. Settlement activity increased when it became organised by the Zionist 
political movement of Herzel in Basle, Switzerland from 1897. Herzel and later 
Zionist leaders believed in the importance of establishing 'facts on the ground" 
(Settlement in Palestine), which would make it easier to sell the enterprise of the 
Zionist Homeland in Palestine for international approval. 
The Zionist strategy since the founding of the International Zionist Organisation in 
1897, adopted the gradualism strategy to achieve its target in Palestine. The 
Zionists first raised the slogan of establishing a homeland for Jews in Palestine. 
This slogan remained for several decades until they successfully attracted thousands 
of Jews to migrate to Palestine and purchased hundreds of thousands of dunums in 
the most fertile areas in Palestine. It is important to clarify that the small purchase 
of land by Jewish settlers, was sold to them by mainly Lebanese landlords who 
owned substantial tracts and who were motivated more by greed than by patriotism. 
During this stage (1880-1948) the Zionist population did not exceed more than 30 
per cent of the whole population in Mandate Palestine and their holding of land was 
only seven per cent till 1948. However as a result of the 1948 War they managed to 
successfully establish their state which amounted to over 80 per cent of Mandate 
Palestine. 
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As a result of the emergence of all Zionist institutions which were required for the 
establishment of an independent state, the Zionist demand changed dramatically. 
They asked for the establishment of a state not a homeland. They tried their best to 
increase the area of any proposed state. For example as a result of Peel Partition 
Plan in mid 1930's, the Zionist Congress asked the Zionist leaders to negotiate with 
the British government the increase of the area of Jewish state with the British 
Mandate. The Zionist concept of the area of the their state was recondite and 
unclear (Smith, 1992,99). 
Regarding the Peel Partition Plan, David Ben Gurion (the head of the Zionist 
Agency in Palestine) confirmed when he directed a speech in May 1937 to the 
International Zionist Congress that 
There could be no question ... of giving up any part of the land of Israel 
... 
it was arguable that the ultimate goal would be achieved most 
equally by accepting the Peel proposal (Cited in Smith, 1992,99). 
It could be said that Chaem Weizmann was the most expressive and direct person 
who applied the policy of gradualism to the controlling of land. When he accepted 
the Balfour declaration, the Churchill White Paper, and the partition plan of the 
Peel Commission, he did not really agree to their terms or intend to abide by them, 
he tried ceaselessly to circumvent the restrictions of official British policy without 
openly challenging their legality. In most cases the limitations he sought to 
overcome were directly or indirectly related to the scope of the projected state 
(Taylor, 1971,21). The Zionist policy of gradualism continued in the post-Oslo 
period. 
The Zionists succeeded overwhelmingly in implementing their policy of gradualism 
which led to the creation of Israel in 1948. This occurred with the significant and 
massive financial and political support of the superpowers such as Great Britain and 
the U. S. This help was offered more because of their colonial interests than human 
sympathy for the Jewish question in Europe. 
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The strategy regarding land was based on the Zionist expansionist ideology. As 
mentioned above they accepted the Peel Partition Plan that gave them 20 per cent of 
mandate Palestine, then they struggled until they guaranteed 54 per cent in the I J. N. 
Partition Plan of 1947. In the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967, the Zionists succeeded 
to control all mandate Palestine in addition to some parts of Fgypt (Sinai), Syria 
(Golan Heights), and Jordan (Wadi Araba). The principles guiding the Zionists in 
the aftermath of the June 1967 War, addressed by the Israeli Prime Minister l. eve 
Eshkol in August 1967, asserted that we shall never permit a return to a situation 
of constant threat to Israel's security, of blockade and aggression" (Cited in I. ukacs, 
1992,171). This means that Israel will never return to the 1967 War border. In his 
interior policy [shkol supported the Allon Plan in regard to settlement in strategic 
areas of the Occupied Arab Territories, which demanded the annexation of' 
approximately 40 per cent of' West Bank, all Gaza-Strip, the Golan I Icights. and 
annexation of' some parts of Sinai (Ilarris, 1980,51). 
The idea of not returning to the 1967 War border has unified all the wings of the 
Labour Party and the Likud Party even the doves of the Labour Party. In his speech 
to the U. N. General Assembly in 8 October 1968, the Israeli Foreign Minister Ahba 
Eban (considered as a Labour dove) addressed the Israeli Nine-Point Plan. In his 
preamble he asserted the Israeli acceptance to the tJ. N. Security Council resolution 
No. 242 (6) of 22 November 1967 (Lukacs, 1992,178). But he did not confirm the 
Israeli will to conduct comprehensive withdrawal from all the Arab Occupied 
Territories. We should keep in mind that Israel was always ready to enter into a 
peace negotiations with the Arab states. Fshkol, the Israeli Prime Minister. 
confirmed the Israeli will to achieve peace with its neighbouring Arab Countries, by 
entering into direct negotiations with all Arab States either together or separately 
(Cited in Lukacs, 1992,171). From E'shkol's point of view Israel wanted peace, but 
without returning to the pre-June 1967 War boundaries. According to Fban "Israelis 
are willing to seek agreement with each Arab State on secure and recognised 
boundaries within the framework of a permanent peace" (Cited in I. ukacs. 1992. 
178). 
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In the post-Oslo Agreement period, all the Israeli leaders from the Labour Party and 
the Likud Party reassured repeatedly the Israeli will to establish peace with 
Palestinians, but the previous target of the Zionists leaders from 1960's until early 
1990's that pledged of not returning to the 1967 War Borders remained constant. 
The ambiguity of land size used by Zionists remained uncertain, vague, and 
undetermined. There was no law that defined the border and the area of state of 
Israel. The area and borders were linked with the holy promises. The promise they 
adopted would be determined according to Zionists capabilities, which meant that 
military power determines the suitable promise for the area of the state. 
Zionist ideology regarding control of land was based on two main factors the 
expansion of Israeli territories, the expulsion of Palestinians and the replacing of 
them with new Zionist immigrants. This ideology passed through two stages. The 
first, the establishment of the Israeli State was based on the expulsion of more than 
700,000 Palestinian refugees and 350 destroyed villages (1948 War). The second 
period began as a result of the 1967 War when 300,000 Palestinian refugees came 
into existence. 
The imposition of the State of Israel on the Palestinians and especially the impact of 
the defeat by Israel of the Arab armies in 1967 shifted the discussion about Jewish 
settlement and access to land. Since the early days of the Israeli occupation of the 
West Bank and Gaza-Strip, Israel declared that it would not return to the June 4. 
1967 borders. From the Israelis, viewpoint the pre-June 1967 borders were not at all 
secure despite the fact that Israel State had established itself in over 80 per cent of 
Mandate Palestine. Therefore, Israel decided to expand its territories by annexing 
certain parts of the West Bank, and other neighbouring countries. The reason for 
this was because Israel from 1967 onwards linked security issues with controlling 
the land. 
This was the common factor between both the Labour and Likud governments 
despite the fact that they varied in implementing these ideas in practice. Likud 
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intensified settlement activities once they assumed power (1976-1992). unlike 
Labour who concentrated their activities on strategic areas with a small Palestinian 
population area like the Jordan Valley. This ideology was based on the desire to 
keep their state purely Jewish. Theoretically, Labour could then trade the remaining 
territories (non-strategic areas) for peace. This would enable Israel to present itself 
as a peace seeker, but in fact it was a situation which would lead them to be a key 
figure in the region in terms of economic power. For Likud, the thesis showed that 
the settlement in all the Palestinian Occupied Territories was considered to be a 
Jewish right despite international condemnation. By spreading settlements every 
where in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip, the Party have made the total Israeli 
withdrawal from the Palestinian Territories impossible. Both Likud and Labour 
have a similar stand towards the future of Jerusalem in that settlement there should 
be intensive and continuous. Israel will never withdraw from `its capital'. 
Indeed the history of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip proved 
that the Israeli aim was to use it as a reserve for cheap labour in Israel. Almost 
thirty years of occupation left the areas without quality infrastructure and in the case 
of Gaza Strip undermined opportunities for local development of independent water 
and power sources. The Gaza-Strip in particular was repeatedly characterised by 
commentators as a prison camp where the inmates were used by the Israel occupiers 
as and when they chose (Elmusa, 1996,32; Oweiss, 1985,255). There is no doubt 
that the struggle from 1960's to the 1990's made the Palestinian question a political 
one rather than a question of refugees requiring economic assistance, rehabilitation 
or resettlement. The Palestinian struggle for their political and legal rights was 
crowned by the Palestinian Intifada. Its impact over both Palestinians and Israelis 
was great and pushed both sides to recognise the rights of the other. These types of 
changes on Palestinian and Israeli political thought produced the Oslo Agreement 
of 1993. 
There is no doubt that the this Agreement had positive and negative features for the 
Palestinian side. The advantages were, firstly. Israeli recognition of the Palestinians 
as a people who have political and legal aspirations. which hits at the heart of 
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Zionist ideology. The Zionist belief is that the Palestinian people do not exist, 
according to Herzel (the founder of the political Zionism) who wrote that 'Palestine 
a land without people, will be given to a people without land'. Secondly, the control 
of the Palestinian people over some of their land where they were able to ecreate 
the nucleus of a Palestinian entity (Shaat, 1993,6). And finally, the establishment 
of the PNA offers another advantage which is the recognition of Palestinian rights 
and support from the international community, especially the Western countries 
which have started to deal with the Palestinians rights more realistically. 
On the other hand the disadvantages are tangible. The PLO lost its eminent position 
in the Arab and Muslim world which caused them to lose much of their support 
(Shaheen interview, August 18,1998). Secondly, the vague nature of the certain 
provisions of the DOP (particularly, military bases, settlement activities, and the 
border of the settlement) enabled Israel (the powerful party) to interpret these 
provisions according to its interests. Thirdly, the classification of the Palestinian 
territories into three different categories with different levels of control of land 
propelled the Palestinians into an endless debate with Israelis about Palestinian 
rights and responsibilities in each area. 
The Palestinian acceptance to enter into negotiations with Israeli culminated in the 
Oslo Agreement which was set up to resolve the Palestinian question through a 
process of phased solutions. This indicates that Palestinians learnt from the Zionist 
strategy of phased expansionism i. e obtaining land gradually and demanded their 
land be returned to the in stages in the same gradual way that it had previously been 
occupied by Zionists. Therefore, the Oslo Agreement was in direct opposition to 
Zionist strategy. The agreement also proved that further Israeli expansion had to 
cease and that even the land of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip would not be 
controlled. This land of the West Bank and Gaza-Strip is not however considered 
by the Palestinians. as their entire homeland. They believe that the whole of 
Mandate Palestine is theirs. 
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During the Mandate period and even later, the Palestinians rejected all the political 
proposals for resolving the Palestinian question. This rejection was based on the 
Palestinian almost naive belief that the whole of Palestine belonged to the 
Palestinians and there was no area compromise. 
In contrast, the Zionists, by accepting the Peel Partition Plan (gave then 20 per cent 
of Palestine), U. N. Partition Plan (they obtained 54 per cent of Palestine), and the 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (secured form them more than 80 per 
cent of Palestine) they accepted with the intention of acquiring more land at a later 
date. The Zionists acceptance of the different plans and resolutions was based on 
the implementation of their rights and had no bearing on Palestinian rights i. e they 
fully intended to resist any attempts to execute the part of these plans which 
focused on Palestinian rights. 
The thesis explained the Zionist strategy and ideology regarding the control of land 
through the gradualism theory. This study may help the coming Palestinian 
generations to acquire a greater understanding of the Zionism and allow them to 
successfully adopt their enemy's strategy to accomplish real freedom for Palestine. 
The Palestinian coming generation will judge if the Oslo Agreement was cohesive 
with the theory of phased solution or not. 
As for the Israeli settlement activities, the thesis has shown that there was no 
fundamental difference between the Israeli settlement policy in pre and post-Oslo. 
For instance around 10 per cent of the land of the West Bank was confiscated in the 
post-Oslo Period (al-Ayyam, January 27,1997). Thousands of new units were built, 
and the number of settlers increased dramatically. It is essential to realize however, 
that implementation of these activities took place in a very strategic way; i. e. Israel 
started working on expanding the existing settlements and connecting them together 
and at the same time joining them to Israel with sophisticated by-pass roads, rather 
than building new settlements. Therefore in the final status negotiations, these 
settlements would be taken into account to be annexed by Israel instead of being 
removed. 
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The implementation of the Gaza-Jericho First Agreement (1994) brought into 
existence a new Palestinian entity which was established on the greater part of the 
land of the Gaza-Strip and Jericho area. The implementation of the first phase of 
the Oslo II Agreement regarding the Israeli redeployment enabled the PNA to 
control certain areas on the West Bank. This did not cause many difficulties for the 
Israeli settlements but further redeployment in the future will create crucial 
problems for certain Israeli settlements i. e. some will resemble isolated islands in a 
Palestinian ocean which will create headaches for Israel in terms of communication 
and security. This is why Israel relied on redeployment (according to signed 
agreements) as a strategic method, and in addition, in order to gain other benefits 
decleration that they wanted to keep the PNA ruling isolated, fragmented areas with 
no territorial integrity which would result in a weak Palestinian entity and more 
security for Israel. 
The weak implementation of parts of the Oslo Agreement and the failure of Israel 
to put into effect the key elements has had a disastrous impact on the Palestinian 
economy. The PNA is isolated, enabling Israel to close the PNA areas whenever 
they want to by alleging security needs. The main reason behind this sort of closure 
was not related to security factors at all however, but is simply in order to control 
the Palestinian economy. Israel benefited from this situation, not only 
economically, but also by creating an economic environment for the Palestinians 
that was harsh hoping to force them to rush to a final agreement of economic 
concessions rather than concentrating on territorial ones (total Israeli withdrawal). 
The unfair Israeli distribution of water has left the Palestinian areas with a chronic 
shortage for daily use and irrigation especially for certain types of crops. Even after 
the Oslo Agreement which purposefully ignored this matter, Israel paradoxically 
increased the extra quota of 28 mcm/year which was not even enough for the 
Palestinian population growth (natural growth and number of returnees). In the 
future, there should be a just solution to this vital issue not by pumping a great 
amount of water to Israel but by involving better technical and technological 
devices, by searching for new resources and by reducing the waste of water. 
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The PNA inherited a devastated infrastructure from Israel. It was impossible to 
establish or rehabilitate all of it on the West Bank and Gaza-Strip within a short 
time frame. The Palestinian infrastructure needs time to become well established, 
particularly because of the lack of financial aid. Baidoun from the International 
Labour Office argues that the situation has not improved in the West Bank and 
Gaza-Strip during the interim period for the following reasons. Firstly, the 
population increased substantially and thus the demand for the services increased. 
Secondly, the supply of services did not expand and the quality did not improve in 
the same proportion as the demand. Therefore, the gap has widened. Third, 
closures, restrictions on the movement of materials and equipment by the Israelis 
were contributory factors. Fourth, the implementation capacity of the PNA for 
projects was not sufficient. Fifth, the flow of international assistance was not 
regular or smooth (Baidoun, 1998,6). 
As a result of not finalising the implementation of the Oslo Agreement, which 
demanded Israeli withdrawal from almost 90 per cent of the West Bank and Gaza- 
Strip, another problem was created for the PNA in placing the land in Palestinian 
public possession (land ownership) in order to register it (due to long term 
occupation since Ottoman rule), to their traditional Palestinian owners, and because 
of this the PNA was unable to do as it had done in the Gaza-Strip in surveying and 
registering the land. 
According to the above, the most reasonable solution to even the least of the 
Palestinians aspirations, is for Israel to conduct a comprehensive and total 
withdrawal from the pre-1967 War borders. The area of the pre-1967 forms just 20 
per cent of Mandate Palestine, while the area of the post-Israeli state covers 80 per 
cent. This raises a critical question that although the Palestinians accepted the idea 
of establishing their independent state on only 20 per cent of their historical 
homeland. Israel has not accepted keeping their state within the 80 per cent of their 
'historical homeland'. The following solution may be proposed with regard to the 
question of the future of 160.000 settlers. There is an option of giving the settlers 
the choice of either being transferred to Israel with compensation (as happened to 
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Israeli settlers on the eve of Israeli withdrawal from Sinai according to Camp David 
Accord of 1978) or the possibility of remaining under Palestinian sovereignty and 
having equal citizenship rights as Palestinian subjects. For example around 
1,000,000 Palestinians live in Israel and enjoy Israeli citizenship, but there are 
160,000 Israeli settlers living in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip who equally need to 
accept Palestinian citizenship, which would not distinguish them from Palestinians. 
The law that governs the Israeli settlers currently discriminates between them and 
the Palestinians in the settlers' favour. If Israel is serious about the need for peace 
then it will have to change from the mind set that Palestinians are only good for 
their labour power. This is labour incidentally that has built Israel at the expense of 
being unavailable for Palestinians to develop their own nation in the way that 
generations of Palestinians had sought to do in order to free themselves from the 
shackles of occupation. The indignity of Palestinian workers at the Erez checkpoint 
linking the Gaza Strip and West Bank, the delays that they are subjected to and the 
frustration that the Israeli regime imposes, undermines any initiative Israel says it 
has for peace. It also adds enormous transaction costs to the promotion of economic 
development in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip. But of course what Israelis fear now 
is no doubt the possibility of a vibrant Palestinian economy no longer dependent 
upon Israeli trade - already evident by the PNA refusal to accept food imports from 
Israel dumped in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip beyond its 'sell by date'. 
Unfortunately daily Israeli activities and policies in the West Bank and Gaza-Strip 
demonstrate that Israel still holds an ideology which is dependent on force and 
supports their illusion that bulldozers and soldiers create peace (Heikal, 1996b). 
Elmusa put the Israeli criteria for the Final Peace Accord as: 
All in all, when it comes to Israel's territorial aims in the West Bank, 
one cannot help but think that after the rabbis feel redeemed, after 
the generals feel secure and the hydrologists' thirst is slaked, the 
Palestinians will be left with a tattered West Bank fragment, 
insecure and dry (Elmusa, 1996,77). 
We have to bear in mind that it is the people who approve historical and strategic 
solutions. not the leaders. So unless both the Palestinian and Israeli public accept 
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the final solution we will not have a lasting settlement and we may have another 
Intifada. This means that Israeli manoeuvring should not in any "'ay take advantage 
of the weak position of Palestinians to risk delivering an unjust and a non-genuine 
settlement. 
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